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Gemeinsam mit
Johannes Hendrik Hospers,
Ernst Jenni, Benjamin Kedar-Kopfstein,
Hermann Lichtenberger, Edward Lipiński,
Stanislav Segert und Wolfram von Soden
herausgegeben von Hans-Peter Müller

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J. H. Hospers: Polysemy and Homonymy

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ESF Workshop on the Semantics of Classical Hebrew

Introduction

In the spring of 1991 a new European Science Foundation Network was started: „The Semantics of Classical Hebrew". The editors of ZAH kindly gave me the opportunity to introduce the work and aims of this Network: „An ESF Network on the Semantics of Classical Hebrew", ZAH 5, 1992, 85-86.

Since the publication of this note the first of the three Workshops planned by the Network has taken place: from 29th June to 1st July 1992 in Bischofsheim near Strasbourg.

In the present issue of ZAH the lectures given at this first Workshop and the responses to them are published. There were eight lectures, two of a more general nature, the others of more specialized types on the different kinds of semantic approach. The workshop was successful in that a clear picture arose of the different approaches and their problems, more especially in relation to languages and language phases which are known to us only through a relatively small corpus of texts. Thus it was a good and necessary introduction to the work of the second Workshop: the designing of a lexematic framework in which the results of scholarly research (and the arguments leading to those results) can be inserted. (In the third workshop the problems of computerizing such a framework will be discussed.) The lectures and the discussions of the first Workshop were also a helpful introduction to another important task of the second Workshop: finding a neutral, uniform way for describing the results of scholarly research (which have to be inserted into this framework) without distorting in any way the ideas of the scholars in question, who used completely different kinds of semantic approach.

Since an important aim of the Network is to produce in the future a database in which the results and arguments used in scholarly literature on the semantics of Classical Hebrew are collected in a systematized way, it may seem slightly peculiar that some of the lectures of this type of the first Workshop were concerned with modern semantic methods, which are not used, or only rarely so, for semantic research in the field of Classical Hebrew. However, the inclusion of lectures of this type in the first Workshop was intentional.

A database such as the one planned by the Network gives information about what has been done in the field and in this way it can be a great source of information and help to future scholars. But, if it is designed in the right way, it will also indicate where no work or insufficient work has so far been done, and in this way it can be a

stimulus for future research. If in designing the framework, we take into account more modern methods like those mentioned here, there will also be an indication where work of this more modern type can and must be done. A database as planned by the Network could in such a way be a strong stimulus not only for doing new research, but also for applying modern methods.

It goes without saying that we are thankful to the ESF, which makes the work of the Network possible. I want to mention especially the name of Mr. Peter Colyer of the ESF, who was always present and assisted the Network committee in many ways. Naturally we also express our gratitude to the editors of ZAH, who made the publication of the lectures of the first Workshop in one of their issues possible.

Jacob Hoftijzer (Leiden)

ZA 7452

Scope and Problems in the Semantics of Classical Hebrew

James Barr (Nashville)

1. Purpose and prospects of our work.

When we think about an international „workshop" and „network" in the study of semantics in Hebrew, and other dead languages with a restricted corpus of text, and beyond that, perhaps, about the production of a dictionary of a new kind, we are thinking of advance on several fronts. Firstly, we are looking towards a *co-operative* rather than an individual type of decision-making, if that can be achieved. Secondly, we are looking towards the *combination* of several different perspectives and methods in semantic analysis, rather than the, somewhat dogmatic, concentration on one or two. Thirdly, we are looking towards the means by which, especially through electronic processing, the evidences and connections which underlie the semantic interpretation can be *made more evident* through some system of coding built into the presentation of the data in a dictionary entry. In addition to all these, we are looking for a mode in which the *variety* of scholarly opinions can be more fully registered, displayed and made available than the traditional format of dictionaries has made possible.

2. Problems of traditional lexicography.

My own experience in lexicography has emphasized much of this.
There are, indeed, certain elements in the lexicographic task that appear to have a more „objective", empirical character, but even these are commonly shot through with semantic elements of decision which are not so simply empirical. Thus it might, at first sight, appear rather obvious that the collection and presentation of the forms of a word, including plurals, suffixed forms, different tenses of a verb, and the like, is a simple empirical task of collecting and sorting. In Hebrew, however, this is very often not the case. The forms, as they lie in the text, are not „tagged" with a morphological classification or parsing. We as lexicographers *have to decide* whether a form „belongs to a certain word", and therefore must go into the entry for that lexeme, or not. It is not a given fact that there are in Hebrew *two* verbs *y ʾl*, one occurring in the niphal and meaning „be foolish" and the other occurring in the hiphil and meaning „be willing, be pleased, determine [to do something]".[1] If we could see a way in which they belonged together semantically, doubtless we would say that they were one verb. In Ps 90:12 the form *wnbʾ* does not in itself *tell* us that this is not the word „prophet" but the hiphil of the verb „come" (if it is). Our decision depends upon our syntactic/semantic construction of the sentence: only

[1] On this subject cf. the learned article of Prof. Hospers in this volume.

after that has been done do we decide that it is indeed this verb form. In classical Hebrew cases of this kind are quite common.
Thus the general semantic analysis implied in a dictionary entry: the ordering of relatable but different meanings, the way in which their interrelation is understood and displayed, and (perhaps most of all) the way in which individual examples are classified and assigned to this or that meaning – these questions remain unclear and difficult. In my own experience I found this hard. In handling many words I felt the need to express myself, not in a conventional dictionary entry, but in a discursive thirty-page journal article which would discuss the problems and argue towards a solution of the problems. But if one writes such an article on every word, the dictionary itself never gets written.

3. Advantages of the „theological dictionary".

This point, incidentally, is relevant in another way, in connection with the genre of „Theological Dictionaries", a genre which is prominent in the study of ancient Hebrew (as of biblical Greek). One might have imagined that the theological dictionaries would by nature be less linguistic in character and provide less depth of linguistic analysis. As one who in the past has been very critical of particular theological dictionaries, I want to say that this is not always true. For semantic study in ancient Hebrew, our theological dictionaries provide very important information. Precisely linguistically, they can be very strong.[2] And one reason for this is that they provide something that the more obviously „linguistic" dictionaries (BDB, GB, KB etc.) do not provide, namely pages of extended discussion of the meanings and semantic interrelations involved. They can do this, of course, only at the expense of leaving aside the large sectors of the vocabulary that are not expressly theological.

4. Eclecticism and authoritarianism.

The usual dictionary handles these problems by a combination of eclecticism and authoritarianism. *Eclecticism* in that meanings can be arranged in historical sequence (e.g. earliest texts first, if such ordering can be known), in order of frequency (beginning with the most frequent), in order of derivation from some assumed starting-point (e.g. a Proto-Semitic meaning based on evidence of cognate languages), in order starting from the most concrete and moving towards the more „abstract" or „transferred", or, pragmatically, in whatever way seems most likely to be helpful to the dictionary user. *Authoritarianism* in that the dictionary editor (or group of editors, but let us talk as if it was a single person) really has had to take a decision on all these matters, and what is communicated to the user is the effect of that decision – not, as a rule, the reasoning that lies behind that decision. Today, I think, we are exploring possibilities whereby that reasoning itself will be laid more open to the user through the form in which the material, the analysis of meaning, and the evidences that bear upon it, are displayed.

[2] Cf. for instance the excellence in statistics of the work of Jenni and Westermann in THAT.

5. The restriction of the corpus.

What, in any case, are the essential differences that emerge from our „philological situation", from our working with a dead language with a very restricted corpus of text? Clearly, the scholar is not a native speaker of ancient Hebrew. And yet the difference is not an absolute one. The native speaker learns his or her language through membership of a language community, the modern scholar learns it through initiation into a scholarly community and tradition. The processes, though different, are not wholly lacking in analogy. The native speaker's awareness of meanings is much more widely based, and his experience is extensible; his intuitions about meanings are not necessarily infallible, and much depends on the validity of the questions addressed to him. The scholar's awareness is much narrower, but some of its defects are compensated for by the more trained and academic discipline of his study.

The real difference seems to lie in the restriction of the corpus. Moreover, in the case of classical Hebrew this is not an accidental restriction, as in the case of some other languages where only limited fragments from disparate sources have survived: rather, it is – with some qualification at the margins – a restriction to a purposively selected body of literature, a canon of books considered more or less complete, outside of which only limited other materials, mainly inscriptions, are known. It is more like the situation of a native speaker of English whose total experience and knowledge of his own language had been restricted to the works of Shakespeare and nothing else at all, on the grounds that his works were the best literature and conveyed the best ideas about life and reality.

In this respect „dead" languages differ one from another. In classical Hebrew, although the corpus has been extremely narrowly restricted, there has been a tradition of combined linguistic and exegetical study throughout the centuries. A language like Akkadian is much more completely „dead": it has no comparable tradition of scholarship, for no one existed who knew anything about it for two thousand years. On the other hand its materials have expanded very rapidly, so that it seems not to suffer from restrictiveness of the corpus in anything like the degree to which this affects Hebrew.

The restriction of the corpus means that all sorts of statements, however profound and accurate, have to be qualified by the implication: „this is true of the corpus, we cannot say whether it is true of the language". Of this there are some well-known examples. It is often said that the familiar verb *br ʾ* „create" is used only of divine creativity and never of human, and this seems to be true of the corpus, strictly taken; but we cannot be sure it is true of the language as it was. Even within the corpus there are hints: what about the homographic verb which seems to mean „cut down trees"? If we can count a Phoenician inscription as marginally part of the corpus, there may have been a person who was *hbr ʾ*, perhaps „the cutter" (of wood, of stone, of gems?). Possibly there is therefore some human activity remaining as background for the sense „create"; possibly such a sense remained in existence in the language. This illustrates one of the obvious realities of the situation: because the corpus is restricted in this peculiar way, and because it has been so very thoroughly studied in every possible way, and because this thorough investigation still leaves us with numerous riddles and ἀπορίαι, anything that comes from outside

the corpus and seems to offer new, extraneous, information appears at once to gain enormous, perhaps disproportionate, value: it introduces a new word, a new usage, a new meaning, a new perspective, into the tightly-woven network of that which had been there before. Thus the given restriction of the corpus is itself the major reason why comparative philological data, the evidence of newly-discovered inscriptions, and any textual discoveries which at least potentially enlarge the corpus have such great impact.

6. The corpus and the language.

Similarly there are words that very probably existed in the language but do not appear in the texts. We seem to have no word for „bridge", and none for an „hour" of time (though this does appear in the Aramaic of Daniel). There are five or so words for „lion", only dubiously distinguishable in meaning, but, though cats probably existed, there is no word for „cat". (These appear in the later stages of the language, but not within the classical [biblical] corpus.) In general, negative statements, to the effect that such and such „does not exist" or „is impossible" in ancient Hebrew, have to be made with some caution. This may be true not only on the lexical level but also on the grammatical: the advanced student of classical Hebrew has to reckon with isolated, but individually quite numerous, cases of constructions which are „against the rules": *ʾt* apparently with the subject, and so on.
The questions here involved were vividly expressed by E. Ullendorff in his title „Is Biblical Hebrew a Language?" And perhaps something can be done, even from within the strictly delimited corpus of biblical Hebrew, to extend oneself beyond its limits. It may be, for instance, that *conversational* usage even within the Bible may reveal tendencies that differ from those general in narration or in legal texts. Notice, for instance, how frequently *hlʾ* „is it not the case that?" occurs in conversations. Again, I have noticed that the conjunction *ʾbl* in older texts occurs in conversation only: thus Gen 42:21 *ʾbl ʾšmym ʾnḥnw* „well, we are to blame" but in later texts appears in narrative also, and the sense there shifts more to the adversative „but", which is also the familiar Mishnaic Hebrew meaning. This sort of observation should receive more notice in dictionaries. Similarly, the well-known phenomenon of the relative particle *š*, which is familiar in later biblical texts but also occurs sporadically in apparently older ones (several in Judges and Kings) is most naturally explained by the supposition that this form was in colloquial use in some sectors throughout the biblical period but in the main classical period, for some reason, was overlaid by *ʾšr*, and revived in use in the late biblical period.

7. An example: *npš* and „soul".

Now in this opening lecture it does not seem to be my task to offer even preliminary suggestions about how this is all to be done. It seems appropriate rather to call attention to some examples of the problems, examples of different kinds where different approaches to a solution have been in existence.
A very prominent word, and one presenting difficult problems, is the familiar *npš*, conventionally glossed as „soul". Westermann in his excellent THAT article

provides a classification of meaning (THAT II,73) under six departments (I retain his German terms, but simplify his Gliederung of the meanings):

1. concrete basic meaning: Hauch, Atem, Kehle, Schlund
2. Gier/Begier/Verlangen
3. Seele
4. Leben
5. Lebewesen/Mensch
6. Leiche

But much depends on which examples are assigned to which meaning. The key question involves no. 3, the soul. Modern opinion emphasizes the psychosomatic totality of the human being, and tends to depreciate ideas of a separate or separable „soul". Not only so, but apparently the ancient Hebrews thought the same way. A key passage, quoted innumerable times, is Gen 2:7. The first man, Adam, was formed by God, dust from the earth; God breathed into this muddy object the breath of life, and the man became *npš ḥyh*, a living being. Many commentators have argued that this shows that man, as a totality, „is" a living „soul": he does not „have" a soul or possess one, he „is" one.

But this seems to be a mistake. *Npš* here, by the argument itself, belongs to the sense *Lebewesen*: the man, receiving breath, becomes an animate being. The collocation *npš ḥyh* seems always to have this sense. But, precisely because this is the sense, the expression does *not* tell us about sense 3, the soul. Far from emphasizing a psychosomatic union, the sentence may well be a dualistic one: the man consists of two distinct substances, mud or dust and breath. As a living being he has these both together; if the breath ceases, he ceases to be a *Lebewesen*. The passage expressly does not tell us about the nature of the soul, sense 3. The traditional argument is confused because, while arguing (rightly) that sense 5 is here the correct one, it has continued to reason as if the information given is about sense 3 – sense 3 being dominant because it, „soul", is the ancient traditional gloss.[3]

This being the case, and with so particularly prominent a piece of evidence, consideration has to be given to the possibility that the meaning „soul" has been understated and that there is more evidence of a meaning, not necessarily of a soul totally separable from the body, but at least of one at the other end of the spectrum from it. Collocations such as those where a person addresses his own soul, or where *npš* and *bśr* appear to be at opposite extremes (*mnpš wᶜd bśr yklh* Is 10:18), or where a person prays that *npšy*, „my soul", will not be left in Sheol, should be further investigated. In addition, the analogy of other peoples and anthropological evidence cannot be disregarded: many ancient peoples seem to have had quite

[3] It is interesting that Westermann, though counting „Seele" as only one among six main senses, and within that maintaining that the rendering as „Seele" is often a Notbehelf, so that only a comparatively small group really correspond with the meaning of German „Seele" (col. 84), still places *Seele*, and no other word, as the term in the title of his article. This is, I think, significant: in spite of all that has been said, the reader is looking in such an article for something about the „soul" and what the Hebrews had to say about it.

complex theories of something like a „soul".[4] Why could the Hebrews not have had something of the same? I do not claim to have proved that they did; but if we even envisage the possibility of it, then it adds to the complexity of our classification of meanings.

This same word illustrates another traditional, but problematic, practice: the over-emphasizing of „concrete" or physical meanings in the presentation of lexical material. H.W. Wolff (Anthropology of the Old Testament, London 1974) writes a chapter of sixteen pages on *npš* and out of these devotes only one to „soul", over four to „throat" and „neck". I do not in the least dispute the existence of these meanings, but am inclined to think of them as marginal. The really clear cases are mythological: the underworld opens wide its throat, Is 5:14. But when Ps 69:2 cries to God for help because the waters came *ʿd npš*, this could conceivably mean „up to the throat" or „up to the neck" but I do not see why it could not mean „right up to the very soul". Few of the cases where *npš* is said to refer to the human throat seem to me to be certain. Here we could be helped by these non-existent native speakers, who would tell us whether one could say „I have a sore *npš* this morning" or „he has a fishbone stuck in his *npš*". I rather doubt if such sentences were spoken.

8. „Sin" and „missing the mark".

A similar case, with another central term, is *ḥṭʾ*, familiar as the general term „sin". It is common practice to give some prominence to the (actually rather infrequent) cases where the sense is „miss the target (when shooting)"; the analogy of Greek, obviously, favoured the emphasis given to this. This can easily give the impression that „miss the target" is the Grundbedeutung, and therefore that the (far more frequent) usage for ritual or moral „sin" expresses it as a missing of the mark. This seems to me to be questionable. It would be more likely that the meaning is „do wrongly" and that the case of shooting, throwing stones etc. is a particular extension of that. Though not having researched the question, I have a suspicion that the same is the case in Greek.

9. Ghosts and necromancers.

The decision to identify how far words and senses „belong together" is often complex and obscure in Hebrew. Take the term (or terms?) *ʾwb*. It is agreed that it lies in the general field of „ghosts" of the dead. But does it mean the ghost itself, or the person who communicates through the ghost, or some aspect of the technique of communication? The common collocation with *ydʿny* may well suggest a human person who „knows", thus a necromancer. But a collocation like Dtn 18:11 *šʾl ʾwb wydʿny* may suggest that the *ʾwb* is the ghost itself, and if so the *ydʿny* may well be the same. But what about the *ʾwb* of Job 32:19, apparently a leathern bottle? This may be a totally unrelated word; but others have interpreted the term for „ghost" or „necromancer" in the light of it, following the ancient interpretations that

[4] I have in mind particularly the evidence of early Greek usage, for example the picture of the underworld given by Homer in Odyssey xi. The modern fashion has been to discount Greek evidence as being the standard *opposite* to Hebrew thinking, but these habits have to be rethought.

involved ventriloquism. Moreover, the place-name Oboth, though interpreted as „water-skins" by BDB p. 15, seems much more likely to have been a place once known for its divinatory practices.

10. Parallelism.

Everyone recognizes that parallelism is a striking feature of Hebrew, and any future lexicographical project will want to do all that is possible to register the relevant materials in the most informative way: for example, words that often function as „B-words" should be registered as such against their common „A-words". The parallelisms are clearly significant for semantic analysis of any kind. Unfortunately, they are often not only significant, but also *ambiguous*. As has long been recognized, while some parallelisms come close to a semantic synonymy (mountain/hill, wave/billow, *ʿmym/lʾmym*), others may equally be contrastive: day to day/night to night (Ps 19:3), eat flesh/drink blood (Ps 50:13). The basic underlying structure of parallelism appears to be syntactic: a noun parallel with a noun, a verb with a verb, etc., in certain patterns. These structures commonly carry semantic information, but if the meaning of the individual elements is not clear the specific semantic contribution of the parallelism may remain doubtful. Thus, to take another case involving *npš*,

Job 14:22 *ʾk bśrw ʿlyw yk ʾb wnpšw ʿlyw t ʾbl*

one may ask: does the parallelism suggest that the „soul" is very close to the „flesh" and support an understanding in terms of their being two aspects of the same thing, or does it suggest that they are two opposite extremes, the point of the verse being that these two quite different realities are doing the same thing? Parallelisms generally have *some* semantic content but only sometimes do words occurring in parallelisms have virtual semantic identity (= interchangeability without change of semantic effect); in more cases all one can say is that there is *some element* of meaning in common: e.g. Ps 72:11 „all kings will worship him/all peoples will serve him": both kings and peoples are expressions of national power, but their co-occurrence does not mean that „king" means „people". One of the things we should be considering, therefore, is a mode by which parallel expressions might be coded so as to indicate how far they seem to be synonymous, antonymous, or otherwise complementary.

11. Some other semantic difficulties.

In general, much care is needed in the expression of meanings, for statements can often be misinterpreted by the hasty reader, and subtle distinctions have to be observed and noted. Thus it is not wrong to say that *ʾdm* means „human being", but it is not quite right either: for, unless I am mistaken, there is a difference here. A woman is a human being but a woman alone, or when with other women, would not be called *ʾdm*. A woman is always called *ʾšh*, women are called *nšym*. The word *ʾdm* means rather „man", alone or collective, and including women when they are in the same group with men. Thus the case of Greek ἄνθρωπος is not parallel at this point, for it can be, and is, used of an individual woman.

A difficult case to handle are the words involved in the linkage of sin/retribution, the so-called Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhang or Act-and-consequence Syndrome. A word like *ʿwn* may be regarded as having (say) three zones of meaning: 1. iniquity 2. guilt of iniquity 3. consequence of, or punishment for, iniquity (I quote from BDB, p. 730f., who confess themselves perplexed and aware that these are difficult to distinguish). But the distinguishing of them is at least one possible policy. On the other side it has been argued that these are all one thing, all one meaning, that the whole point is that the iniquity is in itself the guilt and is also the nasty consequence that follows. This of course is controversial, and one or other argument may be simply wrong. But any attempt to present this sort of material in dictionary form will have to think carefully about how to display these possibilities.

12. A syntactic approach to presentation of data.

I set out above (p. 7) the mode by which Westermann displayed the range of senses of *npš* in his fine THAT article. In principle that is a *semantic* type of classification, set out under a series of *senses*. The problem with this, of course, is that if particular cases are assigned to the wrong sense, or if there is doubt about them, it is difficult for the user to separate these cases out from the context in which they have been placed and see them as (potential) instances of another sense. It might sometimes be better procedure, from the semantic point of view itself, if the entry were organized on a *syntactic* basis, i.e. not under different meanings but under different types of collocation. Thus an article on *bryt* might be arranged as follows (I did this as a preparatory example in my own lexical work):

1. Covenant is, was, with, between etc.
2. *krt bryt*, the familiar and perhaps dominant case, divided under:
   A. with *ʾt* „with"
   B. with *ʿm*, also „with"
   C. with *l*
   D. Two persons together as subject
   E. Other
3. Initiate covenant, with other verbs:
   hqym (but may be rather „fulfil", see below)
   ntn
   bwʾ bbryt
   ʿbr bbryt plus others
4. Maintain, support, fulfil, acknowledge covenant:
   hqym
   šmr
   zkr
   ʿmd plus some others
5. Annul, abandon, covenant:
   hpr
   ḥll
   ʿbr
   škḥ, ʿzb

6. With other verbs, a few cases
7. Following a noun:
   Persons
   Objects and institutions
8. With following noun:
   Deity
   Persons
   Community
   Institutions
   Perpetuity
   Religious qualities, e.g. justice, mercy, reliability
9. Finally, some disputed cases, e.g. suggestion that there is a *bryt* II „light, splendour" Is 42:6 49:8 (parallel with *ʾwr* 42:6).
10. List of contiguous terms, e.g. *ʾlh šbwʿh; ḥzh ḥzwt; ʾmnh; ʿdwt; ʿdh.*

A plan of this kind could be combined with the more directly semantic form of display: e.g. at the beginning of an article a series of glosses could be set out, each with a number, and the various examples in a syntactically-based display could be tagged with such a number, and with a question mark where necessary. This might be a way in which several different approaches might be combined.

13. Hapax legomena and hopeless cases.

Sometimes, on the other hand, we have to register and deal with something that is in the text but, we strongly suspect, was not part of the language at all: in other words, the form existent in the corpus is the product of a textual error and/or loss of memory of the lexeme originally present. A prominent case in the Torah is the K *ʾšdt*, Q *ʾš dt* of Deut 33:2. Since *dt* „law, religion" is agreed to be a Persian LW and too late in Hebrew to be conceivable for this (doubtless very ancient) poem, we are justified in rejecting the „fiery law" type of interpretation, though it has to be mentioned for its historical importance through the Targum, Vulgate etc. The context gives us a fairly assured frame such as: „He [God] appeared from Mount Paran, he came from the myriads of holiness [or, with LXX: of the place Qadesh]; from his right hand [is, was?] *ʾšdt* to them". We can thus register various suggestions:

1. another place-name (Nyberg)
2. plural of a noun *ʾšd** cognate with ESA *ʾsd* „warrior", cf. Arabic *ʾasad* „lion", in the sense of „divine warriors", i.e. angels, cf. LXX ἄγγελοι (Beeston)
3. participle of a verb *ʾšd* cognate with Aramaic *ʾšd* „pour", hence „being poured", so „streaming along" NEB
4. conjecture *ʾš dlqt* „blazing fire"
5. admit that no reasonably close explanation is known or knowable.

In this, as in many cases, it seems as if we work with the material as if it stood in various grades of clarity and certainty. The „context" helps us in so far as it itself has materials of higher certainty; and yet a new idea or a new discovery that offers a

new interpretation of the most obscure element may show that the supposedly certain contextual elements were actually deceptive.

14. Diachronic change of meaning.

The diachronic changes of meaning within the corpus are an obvious area of difficulty. The difficulty is unequal as between directions: at the end of the period there is fairly high agreement in the recognition of „LBH" (Late Biblical Hebrew) because certain texts are unquestioned as „late" in this sense. Quite a large number of items can thus be definitely labelled as „LBH". When we go back to early stages the same agreement is often lacking. Almost all would agree that certain poems are archaic: e.g. Gen 49, Ex 15, Judg 5; but temporal sequences as between the traditional Pentateuchal „sources" remain – or, better, have increasingly become – controversial. Nevertheless, since the *stylistic* features of J, E, D and P are rather obvious and widely accepted, it seems best to continue to indicate them, and this means also, to imply a historical difference between them, even if one does not commit oneself to any particular statement of that historical difference. This can make a difference in the semantics of individual words. Sometimes fairly sharp differences in meaning can be observed: a familiar case is *mnḥh*, used for any kind of gift in the old sources, as between humans, specialized as a cereal offering in Leviticus. Again, in the case of *bryt* it has often been observed that in some sources God's making a covenant is very similar to a personal agreement between human persons, while in others it is more like a unilateral establishment of a principle, and in the latter case it is perhaps less well indicated by the rendering „covenant".

15. Midrash and decontextualization.

Diachronic change has to be considered also, however, in another form: the mode in which earlier materials within the corpus may have come to be understood by writers and readers within the later stages of the corpus. This process of „inner-biblical" understanding and exegesis has attracted much attention in recent times. On the whole lexicographers have placed the primary emphasis on the meanings attached to items in the time and context of the composition of the texts; if we ask, how a passage, written (say) around 900 BC, was understood by a writer of 400 or 300, we enter upon an additional complication. Thus Professor Sawyer, discussing „Hebrew terms for resurrection", considered a number of passages which, he recognized, did not imply any thought of resurrection in their original context, but were likely to have been so understood by later readers.[5] The same, I would suggest, might apply to the ideas of the separability and immortality of the soul. The Dead Sea Scrolls provide a number of instances in which biblical words and phrases are taken up and reused in senses that may possibly be quite remote from those of their original literary setting.

The collecting, classification and display of such material, however, presents serious problems which have not as yet, it seems, been fully explored. The later, inner-biblical, exegetical reading was of course done by native speakers and deserves

[5] J.F.A. Sawyer, Hebrew Words for the Resurrection of the Dead, VT 23, 1973, 218-234.

respect on these grounds. But native speakers are not infallible, for much depends upon the methods of reading that they employed. If we have taken context as a primary guide, we have to observe that some at least of this exegetical reading went in exactly the opposite direction, being guided by a radical decontextualization: this is one of the obvious primary features of Midrash, that it explains words by taking the meanings they would have in *any context other* than that in which they stand in the passage being read. It may be right that a dictionary should register such interpretations, which have sometimes been very significant historically, but there must be some mode in which they are distinguished from contextually serious understanding. In any case, these considerations make us realise that the interpretations of the „native speaker", far from being authoritative, are likely to be highly fallible.

16. Metaphor.

Metaphorical usages also require investigation. On the whole, I think the lexicographical tradition in Hebrew has used the category of metaphor too easily and carelessly. Some „metaphors" may have been created through mistakes within lexicography itself. One example I have recently discussed is the case of *qn* „nest".[6] The word is used of birds' nests and also, „metaphorically", of various human dwellings, especially those of eastern, „cliff-dwelling", peoples like the Edomites. But there is some evidence from cognate languages that the root could mean any kind of settlement or dwelling. In that case the sense „nest" is a particular application of a general term for a dwelling, the human dwellings of Edomites and others are not metaphorical at all, and, finally, if this is right, we can also accommodate the *qnym* of Noah's ark (Gen 6:14), which otherwise has to be made into a quite separate lexeme. By later times the older general meaning „dwelling" had come to be forgotten, and „nest" was understood as the basic sense; this understanding necessarily generated the „metaphorical" view of the uses of this term for human abodes. I do not insist that my argument is necessarily right, but it illustrates the sort of problems that can arise.

17. Meanings as we know them and meanings as they knew them.

It seems desirable that modern semantic study should distinguish adequately between elements of meaning that were relevant to the speakers and writers and elements that may be validly perceived through modern linguistic methods but that were probably unknown to the actual language users. Our etymological interests may reveal ways in which terms are related, ways that may be interesting to the modern reader, but these same ways may have been quite outwith the consciousness of native speakers and writers in ancient times. It may be interesting to us that *qwh* may have meant „twist", hence giving *qw* „cord, line" and also *tqwh* „tension > hope", but one may regard it as likely that this information was unknown to anyone who actually used the words.

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[6] J. Barr, Is Hebrew קֵן "nest" a Metaphor? in: Semitic Studies I (FS Leslau, Wiesbaden 1991), 150-161.

18. Personal names.

A good illustration of this can be seen in the personal names. Hebrew names, being in many cases semantically transparent, provide much useful matter for semantic discussion. But they also leave much room for misunderstanding. Many of the attempts to state the meanings of names in the traditional dictionaries are old-fashioned and misleading. There are names, like *zkryhw*, which were certainly fully transparent to people at the time: it was obvious that it said „The Lord has remembered" (or something to that effect). But there are other names which we, with our philological methods, can plausibly interpret, but which to them in their own time were probably opaque: could they interpret a name such as *bl ᶜm*, for instance? Very likely the name was meaningful to those who first gave it to this person, but it is doubtful that it was meaningful to those who wrote the Balaam saga that we now possess, still more doubtful for those who read and reread it some centuries later. The same would probably be true of Job. There are foreign names like Nebuchadnezzar which we can interpret through our knowledge of Akkadian but which would be opaque to Hebrew speakers unless they had special information on the matter. There are also names – for instance the „Amorite" names of Genesis, like the name Jacob – of which we can at least hazard an interpretation but where our interpretation is likely to be far remote from that which the biblical writers offer, because they interpreted them as if they were Hebrew-language names, working from within the normal lexicon of Hebrew. Or, to put it in another way, we have to distinguish between, on one hand, meanings of names which were probably valid as meanings understood at the time, and on the other hand the popular etymologies of names which the texts themselves furnish, which in almost all cases are false explanations, given precisely because the names were *not* understood, and derived from incidents and features of the accompanying story (so for example *mšh*, similarly *y ᶜqb*).

19. Conclusion.

I have not attempted any systematic treatment of our theme, and have tried rather to gather together some problem areas which are likely to be met with in our work and to provide some examples which may be useful as a basis for discussion. I hope that this will be helpful to us in starting off our enquiries.

Abstract:

The paper discusses general questions of semantic analysis in ancient Hebrew. Examples of words that present difficulties are given: in particular *npš* „soul" can be analysed and classified in several different ways. Problems in the past lexicographical tradition are mentioned, and suggestions are made for a mode in which various possibilities might be more „objectively" set forth. Problems with special categories, such as metaphorical expressions and personal names, are also briefly mentioned.

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Antwort an J. Barr

Udo Rüterswörden (Kiel)

Den 19 Punkten des Referates von James Barr wird niemand, der sich mit den dort genannten Problemen befaßt, seine Zustimmung versagen können.

Zu 1-4: Die homonymen Wurzeln sind ein ewiges Problem der hebräischen Lexikographie; schön ließe sich das an der nicht zu Ende kommen wollenden Debatte um *ʾbl* zeigen, die nicht zuletzt auch zur Demonstration des konzeptionellen Unterschiedes zwischen einzelnen Wörterbüchern geführt wird. Daß es nur ein *ʾbl* mit der Bedeutung „trauern" gebe, galt Gesenius als sicher.[1] Frants Buhl ist ihm hierin gefolgt; nicht jedoch HAL und Gesenius[18]; die beiden neueren Lexika geben – auf das Akkadische gestützt – eine Bedeutung „vertrocknen" an, die – auf die Natur angewandt – an einer Zahl von Belegen zu passen scheint.[2] Der Vorschlag geht wohl auf Driver zurück.[3] Im Moment scheint der Trend zurück zu der einlinigeren Auffassung von Gesenius und Buhl zu gehen,[4] wobei übertragener Sprachgebrauch in Rechnung gestellt wird. Das Problem scheint kaum entscheidbar, genau wie das von J. Barr geschickt gewählte Beispiel *yʾl*.

Der Sachverhalt wäre nämlich völlig anders bei Wurzeln mit zum Beispiel *ḥ*. In diesem hebräischen Laut sind zwei in einigen semitischen Sprachen unterschiedene Laute zusammengekommen, sodaß sich Homonyme innersemitisch deuten lassen. Es sei nur ein Beispiel genannt: *ḥrš* heißt im Qal „pflügen", aber auch „taub sein". Der Blick ins HAL zeigt, daß wir hier von zwei semitischen Wurzeln mit verschiedenen Anfangsradikalen auszugehen haben, vgl. arabisch *ḥaraṯa* „pflügen" mit arabisch *ḫarisa* „stumm sein".[5] Ein drittes $ḥrš_3$ hat die Bedeutung „zaubern". Hier liegt die Differenz im letzten Konsonanten vor, wie H.-P. Müller anhand des Ugaritischen vorgeführt hat: *ḥrš* bezeichnet eine handwerkliche, aber auch magische Tätigkeit, *ḥrṯ* dagegen das Pflügen.[6] Wenn auch die Bezüge zwischen dem alttestamentlichen Befund und diesen drei Wurzeln im Einzelfall noch diskutiert werden,[7] scheint es dennoch, als sei mit Hilfe der Semitistik ein guter Teil der Homonymieprobleme einer Lösung entgegengeführt worden zu sein. Ein interessantes Problem sei am Rande erwähnt: handelt es sich hier in Wirklichkeit nicht um Homographie statt um Homonymie? Wie J. Blau nachgewiesen hat, scheint die Septuaginta eine

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[1] W. Gesenius, Hebräisches und chaldäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament, Leipzig 1834, 19.

[2] HAL 7; Ges[18] 8.

[3] J. Barr, Comparative Philology and the Text of the Old Testament, Oxford 1968, 320.

[4] D.J.A. Clines, Was there an *ʾBL* II „be dry" in Classical Hebrew?, VT 42, 1992, 1-10; so schon A. Baumann, ThWAT I, 46-50.

[5] HAL 343.

[6] H.-P. Müller, Magisch-mantische Weisheit und die Gestalt Daniels, UF 1, 1969, 80 Anm. 5+6; H.Y. Priebatsch, Spiranten und Aspiratae in Ugarit, AT und Hellas, UF 12, 1980, 321f.

[7] S. dazu V. Hamp, ThWAT III, 237f.

Differenzierung zwischen *ḥ/ḫ* und *ʿ/ġ* noch gekannt zu haben,[8] eine Differenzierung, die auch bei altkanaanäischen Wörtern in ägyptischer Umschrift anzutreffen ist.[9]

Zu 5-6: Die Begrenztheit unseres Textkorpus ist natürlich stets zu berücksichtigen. Ich möchte nur ein Beispiel nennen: Es gibt das Wort *ʾāsām* „Vorratskammer, Speicher". Ein zugehöriges Verbum findet sich im Alten Testament nicht; da mit Ausnahme des Syrischen auch in anderen semitischen Sprachen nur nominale Derivate der Basis existieren, würde man hier wohl kaum eine Verbwurzel supponieren. Doch hier trügt der Schein: das Verb ist tatsächlich und unzweideutig inschriftlich bezeugt, und zwar in dem Ostrakon von Yavneh-Yam, KAI 200. Nach herrschender Ansicht ist das Verb zwar denominiert, doch zeigt dieses Beispiel, daß wir mit dem Alten Testament nur eine sehr lückenhafte und ausschnitthafte Materialbasis haben, die argumenta e silentio immer problematisch macht.

Zu 9: Die Deutung „Weinschlauch" scheint in Hi 32,19 eher unwahrscheinlich. Dort steht: „...wie wenn Wein nicht geöffnet wird, wie wenn neue *ʾobōt* gespalten werden."[10] Wenn der Vergleich auf eine alltägliche Erfahrung anspielt, kommen wir mit dem Schlauch nicht sehr weit; neue Schläuche gelten nach Mt 9,17 als besonders reißfest. „Die mögliche Deutung, die Erregung sei so groß, daß sogar ein neuer Weinschlauch platze (...) läßt sich dem Text nicht entnehmen."[11] Vielleicht geht es hier eher um die Vermittlung verborgenen Wissens und somit um einen Begriff, der auf mantische Praktiken weist.

Zumindest einer der Belege für *ʾwb*, Dt 18,10, verweist auf Bräuche, die außerhalb Israels ausgeübt wurden; für den Verfasser waren sie wohl mehr oder weniger exotisch. Doch dies weist – fernab von eigentlich etymologischen Erwägungen – auf ein sehr interessantes Problem, nämlich das des Kontaktes zwischen Sprachen. Ich würde hier von einem Fremdwort ausgehen. Daß es auch Lehnübersetzungen gibt, hat J. Greenfield anhand eines schönen Beispiels *ana urdūti kabāsu* = *kbš l ʿbd* (Jer 34,11.16 u.ö.) nachgewiesen.[12] Das Phänomen des Sprachkontaktes erstreckt sich ja bis zu den Masoreten, die bekanntlich arabischsprachlich waren. So bezeichnet Schemuel ben Jaʿaqob in Blatt 474a des Petropolitanus (ehedem Leningradensis) ebendiesen Kodex als *mṣḥp*. Es ist ein Wort, das in keinem der gängigen mittelhebräischen Wörterbücher steht; interessant scheint mir aber ein Hinweis auf arabisch *muṣḥaf* „Buch, Koranabschrift".[13] Es ist nicht auszuschließen, daß die Masoreten manchen Ausdruck des Alten Testaments im Lichte des Arabischen verstanden haben. Manche kühne Heilung von Textproblemen durch Verweise auf das

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[8] J. Blau, On Polyphony in Biblical Hebrew (The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities. Proceedings VI,2), Jerusalem 1982.

[9] W. Helck, Die Beziehungen Ägyptens zu Vorderasien im 3. und 2. Jahrtausend v. Chr. (Äg. Abh 5), Wiesbaden 1971², 536f.

[10] S. dazu J. Ebach – U. Rüterswörden, Unterweltsbeschwörung im Alten Testament Teil 1, UF 9, 1977, 68.

[11] G. Fohrer, Das Buch Hiob (KAT 16), Gütersloh 1963, 452.

[12] J.C. Greenfield, *ana urdūti kabāsu* = כבש לעבר*, StOr 55, 1984, 259-263.

[13] S. dazu die Angaben bei E. Ben Yehuda, A Complete Dictionary of Ancient and Modern Hebrew IV, New York – London 1960, 3248.

Arabische mag vielleicht nicht den ursprünglich gemeinten Sinn treffen, vermag indes jedoch das masoretische Verständnis zu treffen.
Daß sich Sprachvergleich wesentlich auf einzelne Wörter konzentrierte, ist für ein Manko zu erachten; hier wäre eine Erweiterung im Hinblick auf ganze Ausdrücke erstrebenswert. Einerseits wäre somit ein Einblick in die semitische Semantik generell möglich; andererseits ist so Entlehnungen auf die Spur zu kommen.
Zu 10: Der Parallelismus, die erneute Formulierung eines Gedankens mit anderen Worten, mag eine Hilfe sein. Das Gebiet ist nicht frei von Überraschungen. So heißt es in Qoh 3,12 nach der Zürcher Bibel: „Da merkte ich, dass es unter ihnen nichts Besseres gibt, als fröhlich zu sein und es gut zu haben im Leben". „Gut haben" ist die Übersetzung von hebräisch *ʿśh ṭwb*. Durch die Wiederaufnahme des Gedankens im nächsten Vers mit *rʾh ṭwb* ist dieses Verständnis sehr naheliegend, und so formulierte schon Franz Delitzsch: „jedenfalls ist eine Forderung ethischen Sinns sowol hier durch den nächsten Zus. als durch die Parallelen ausgeschlossen."[14] Mit dem ethischen Sinn ist das Problem bezeichnet, denn *ʿśh ṭwb* heißt sonst im Alten Testament „Gutes tun", so auch in Qoh 7,20, und nicht: „es sich gut sein lassen." Wie kommt es zu dieser interessanten Abweichung des Wortgebrauchs? Bestechend ist die Lösung, die von den Verfechtern des Einflusses hellenistischer Popularphilosophie auf die Gedankenwelt des Qohelet vorgeschlagen wird: *ʿśh ṭwb* gibt hier griechisches εὖ πράττειν „sich wohl befinden" wieder. Im Gegensatz zu *ʿśh*, für das πράττειν gelegentlich in der Septuaginta stehen kann, bedeutet das griechische Verb neben „tun, handeln" auch „sich befinden, in einem Zustand sein". Daß durch Sprachkontakt neue, bisher nicht dagewesene, Wendungen entstehen können, ist ein gängiges Phänomen; so zum Beispiel unser „es macht keinen Sinn", eigentlich würde man sagen: „es hat keinen Sinn", aber es liegt hier ein Anglizismus vor: „it doesn't make sense." Ist die Beziehung zwischen *ʿśh ṭwb* und εὖ πράττειν von gleicher Art? Das Problem bleibt schwierig; Delitzsch denkt hier an eine Ellipse (= *l ʿśwt lw ṭwb*, vgl. 2,3).[15]
Zu 12: Im Sinne der Benutzerführung ist eine durchgängige Aufbereitung des Materials nach formalen Gesichtspunkten gewiß ein Vorzug. Wer über Erfahrung auf diesem Gebiet verfügt, wird indes mit ein wenig Skepsis fragen, ob dies immer durchzuhalten ist. So ist es bei *brjt* schon von Gewicht, ob Gott als einer der Vertragspartner gedacht ist; auf diesen Gesichtspunkt hatten schon BDB hingewiesen.[16] Bedeutungsnuancen mit Abkürzungen verschlüsselt anzugeben ist gewiß ein denkbarer Weg. Vielleicht eröffnen sich bei der Abkehr von der Zweidimensionalität der Printmedien und durch die Orientierung an Datenbankstrukturen andere Möglichkeiten.
Zu 13-15: Hapaxlegomena sind eine wohlbekannte crux. Die traditionelle Kenntnis des Hebräischen, vermittelt durch die alten Übersetzungen und durch den späteren Wortgebrauch des Mittelhebräischen, kann hierbei eine gewisse Hilfe sein; daneben aber auch die Heranziehung verwandter Sprachen; ich verweise hier auf die

[14] F. Delitzsch, Hoheslied und Koheleth (BCAT IV,4), Leipzig 1875, 265.
[15] Ebd.
[16] BDB 136.

Arbeit von H.R. Cohen.[17] Daß die beiden erstgenannten Hilfen oft genauso versagen wie die letztgenannte, läßt sich an Beispielen belegen. So findet sich in Jes 13,21 ein Tier namens *ʾḥ*; die Bedeutung läßt sich kaum mehr ermitteln; die Vorschläge reichen von der Adlereule bis zur Hyäne.[18] Die Septuaginta mit ihrem ἦχος „Geräusch" ist hier keine Hilfe; sie hat einen griechischen Ausdruck gewählt, der so ähnlich wie der hebräische klingt. Die Versionen haben oft geraten und manchmal ein wenig experimentiert.

Auch das Mittelhebräische läßt uns nicht selten im Stich. Manchmal ist es indes von Vorteil; ich möchte hier auf ein sehr altes Beispiel hinweisen; es geht dabei um das Verbum *brr*. Es kommt in Qoh 3,18 vor; die Stelle heißt in der Übersetzung der Zürcher Bibel[19]: „Der Menschenkinder wegen, sie zu prüfen (*brr*), hat Gott es so gefügt, damit sie sehen, dass sie nicht mehr sind als das Tier." Das Verb *brr* heißt im Qal „absondern, aussondern"[20]; nur an unserer Stelle wird eine andere Bedeutung angenommen. „Prüfen" ist keine glückliche Bedeutung; so bemerkt Hertzberg: „Doch weiß man eigentlich nicht, was der Sinn dieses Prüfens sein soll. Etwa, daß der Mensch durch Leiden geläutert werde wie Hiob? So haben es die alten Übersetzer verstanden (...). Indessen paßt das weder in den Zusammenhang noch überhaupt in den Gedankengang des Qoh."[21] Klug scheint mir die Übersetzung der King James Version: „that God might manifest them." Zu vergleichen ist die Angabe im Lexikon des Baseler Hebraisten Johannes Buxtorf: „ad declarandum eis", ein schönes Zeugnis des seit alters internationalen Charakters der Hebraistik.[22] Diese Bedeutung scheint aus dem Mittelhebräischen gewonnen; dort heißt das Verb im Qal auch „klar machen", im Piel „klarlegen, beweisen, erläutern".[23]

brr scheint eine mittelhebräisch gebräuchliche Vokabel gewesen zu sein, deren Bedeutung nicht durch die Exegese von Bibelstellen ermittelt ist. In diesem letztgenannten Falle wäre der Verweis auf das Mittelhebräische nicht übermäßig erhellend. Dies gilt natürlich auch für Belege aus Qumran. Es ist mithin zu prüfen, ob ein Ausdruck gebräuchlich war oder als bibelsprachliche Reminiszenz galt. Es dürfte indes schwierig sein, einer solchen Forderung nachzukommen; sie erfordert eine gute judaistische Ausbildung.

Die Ansicht, daß der Kontext eines Wortes bei der Bedeutungsermittlung größte Beachtung verdient, ist nicht neu; schon Gesenius hatte diese Forderung formuliert.[24] Für ein Allheilmittel ist dies indes nicht zu erachten. Oft ist der Kontext so beschaffen, daß er die Bedeutung eines Wortes durchaus nicht festlegt. Der klassi-

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17 H.R. Cohen, Biblical hapax legomena in the light of Akkadian and Ugaritic (SBL Dissertation Series 37), Missoula/Montana 1978.

18 Ges[18] 33.

19 Zu den syntaktischen Problemen sei verwiesen auf H.W. Hertzberg, Der Prediger (KAT XVII 4), Gütersloh 1963, 101.

20 Ges[18] 181.

21 H.W. Hertzberg, aaO., 101.

22 Eingesehen ist die zehnte Auflage des erstmalig 1607 erschienenen Werkes: Johannis Buxtorfi Lexicon Hebraicum et Chaldaicum, Basileae 1648.

23 A. Knobel, Commentar über das Buch Koheleth, Leipzig 1836, 181 rechnet mit einem Aramaismus; s. ferner D. Buzy in: La Sainte Bible VI, Paris 1951, 222; vgl. auch Lauhas Deutung in 9,1 („klären"): A. Lauha, Koheleth (BKAT XIX), Neukirchen-Vluyn 1978, 163ff.

24 W. Gesenius, aaO., III ff.

sche Fall, an dem dies immer wieder deutlich wird, sind die Tier- und Pflanzennamen. Dabei geht es beileibe nicht um Glasperlenspiele, sondern um exegetisch recht relevante Sachverhalte. So ist in der Jothamfabel rühmend die Rede von den Früchten von Ölbaum, Feigenbaum und Weinstock; bei dem Dornstrauch dagegen finden wir in Bezug auf die Früchte beredtes Schweigen – oder eine bedeutungstragende Leerstelle.[25] In diesem Zusammenhang ist es schon wichtig zu wissen, welches die in Frage stehende Dornenart ist und ob sie giftige Früchte hat.[26] Was hier mit einfließen muß, ist Realienkunde, Sachkenntnis im botanischen Bereich, wie dies I. Löw in seinem unübertrefflichen Handbuch vorgeführt hat.[27]

Aber auch bei einem so häufigen Verbum wie *ʾmr* werden Probleme offenbar. So hatte – auf das Ugaritische gestützt – M. Dahood vorgeschlagen, an einigen Stellen im Alten Testament „sehen" statt „sagen" zu übersetzen[28] (so in Ps 3,3. 11,1. 29,9. 71,10. 94,4. 105,28, teilweise mit Konjekturen). Eines der Beispiele, Ps 71,10 sei herausgegriffen; die Zürcher Bibel übersetzt: „Denn meine Feinde reden über mich, und die auf mein Leben lauern, ratschlagen und sprechen: «...»" Dahood würde übersetzen: „Denn meine Feinde blicken auf mich („are on the look for me"), und die auf mein Leben lauern, ratschlagen und sprechen: «...»". R. Meyer ist dieser Sicht gefolgt, wobei er eine Weiterentwicklung im Sinne von „trachten nach" annimmt: „In diesem Falle steht *ʾmr* im synonymen Parallelismus zu *šmr*, das nach dem Zusammenhang nur mit «nachstellen» zu übersetzen ist."[29] Ansätze zu dieser Idee gehen auf Friedrich Delitzsch zurück.[30] Für den ersten Moment klingt dies verblüffend, doch es bleibt eine grundsätzliche Erwägung, die mich an dieser Lösung zweifeln läßt. Es gibt semitische Sprachen, in denen *ʾmr* „sagen" heißt, andere, in denen es „sehen" heißt. In keiner Sprache gibt es beide Bedeutungen. Eine Ausnahme scheint das Ugaritische zu bilden, auf das sich Dahood bezieht; hier sind tatsächlich beide Bedeutungen bezeugt. Dies ist indes ein Sonderfall, da wohl eine Entlehnung aus dem Akkadischen vorliegt;[31] die Plausibilität der Annahme wird durch die Zweisprachigkeit der ugaritischen Schreiber gestützt; für die Gestalt des Ilimalku ist dies wirklich urkundlich nachweisbar.[32]

Zu 14: Natürlich wäre eine diachrone Aufbereitung des Materials wünschenswert; BDB hat diese Forderung mit der Anzeige der Pentateuchquellen zu einem guten Teil erfüllt; und dies ist vielfach recht hilfreich. Ich fürchte aber, daß wir nicht nur bei der Datierung von J,E,D,P momentan nicht unbedingt auf Konsens stoßen, sondern daß auch die Zuordnung von Texten zu diesen Größen nicht überall auf Zustimmung stoßen wird. Ein griechischer oder lateinischer Thesaurus hat es da

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[25] S. dazu M. Titzmann, Strukturale Textanalyse (UTB 582), München 1977, 230ff.

[26] S. dazu J. Ebach, U. Rüterswörden, Pointen in der Jothamfabel, BN 31, 1986, 11-18.

[27] I. Löw, Die Flora der Juden I-IV. Wien 1924-1934.

[28] M. Dahood, Hebrew-Ugaritic Lexicography I, Biblica 44, 1963, 295f.

[29] R. Meyer, Methodische Erwägungen zur geplanten Neuauflage von Gesenius, Hebräisch-aramäisches Handwörterbuch, SVT 22, 1972, 181.

[30] Weitere Diskussion bei O. Loretz, Die Psalmen II (AOAT 207/2), Kevelaer – Neukirchen-Vluyn 1979, 433-435.

[31] Eine semantische Lösung des Problems findet sich bei J. Sanmartín Ascaso, Semantisches über *ʾmr*/„Sehen" und *ʾmr*/„Sagen" im Ugaritischen, UF 5, 1973, 263-270.

[32] W.H. van Soldt, Studies in the Akkadian of Ugarit. Dating and Grammar (AOAT 40), Kevelaer – Neukirchen-Vluyn 1991, 27-29.

leichter; Datierung von Autoren und Zuordnung von Texten sind längst nicht so kontrovers wie im Alten Testament.
Ich fürchte, daß diese Probleme keiner Lösung zugeführt werden können, und ein Thesaurus des klassischen Hebräisch genauso auf diachrone Differenzierungen wird verzichten müssen wie die Handwörterbücher.

Zusammenfassung (abstract):

Anhand der Lemmata und Ausdrücke *ʾkl, ḥrš, ʾsm, ʾwb, kbš lᶜbd, mṣḥp, ᶜšh ṭwb, ʾḥ, brr* und *ʾmr* wird zum Beitrag von J. Barr Stellung genommen.

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Recent Developments in Linguistic Semantics and Their Application to Biblical Hebrew*

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1. As Professor Lyons has shown, semantics is a *field of continuity*, extending between linguistic form and knowledge about the world (or acting in the world). Whether one wants to call this „linguistic semantics" is a matter of debate: insofar as one can say that language is a *system of/for representation of reality*, the term seems justified[1].

Of crucial importance in semantics is the following issue: given a reality-configuration *Rc* and given a language *L*, what can we say about the probability that *Rc* will be expressed in *L* by a sequence *S* and not by another sequence *S'* and *S''*? Related to this question is another one: if, in a given situation, it is possible to substitute *S'* (*S''*) for *S*, is there any ground in *Rc* itself why this is so? If not, what can speakers of *L* say about the relationship between sequences *S*, *S'* and *S''*?

Surveying the history of linguistic semantics, one can partition it in terms of major „fertilizations":

(1) a first one, by different forms of *conceptualist* philosophy, such as Platonist, Aristotelian, Thomist, Scotist, Occamist, Cartesian and Lockean trends;

(2) a second one, by diachronic investigations of shifts of meaning: this is the „semasiological" approach which flourished in the 19th century (Reisig, Darmesteter, Bréal), and which had a specific impact on dialectology;

(3) a third one, by philosophy of logic and mathematics: here we have to mention the foundation-laying work of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and, later, of Austin, Searle, and Davidson. This type of work brought about two major shifts in linguistic semantics:

(a) talk about meaning was abruptly severed from its rhetorical ties, and was straightened out by the introduction of a specific metalanguage;

(b) interest shifted from a semantics based on word-meaning to a semantics of *utterances*, and with the development of speech act theory, to a semantics/pragmatics of *uttering*: this brought into the center of attention notions such as

- reference/denotation (designation)

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* Revised version of my response to Sir John Lyons' lecture on „Recent developments in linguistic semantics" (Bischenberg, June 29, 1992). Grateful acknowledgement is made of the comments by Sir John Lyons, Ida Zatelli, Graham Davies and Jacob Hoftijzer.

Since the lecture of Sir John Lyons is not published in this issue, the interested reader is referred to the following publications: J. Lyons, Structural Semantics, Oxford, 1964; Semantics, 2 volumes, London 1977; „Semantics", in: J. Lyons et al., New Horizons in Linguistics, London 1987, 152-178.

[1] For a comprehensive theory of semantics, see J. Larochette, Le langage et la réalité, volumes I-II, München 1974-1980.

- truth (analytic/synthetic)/verification
- knowledge (a priori/a posteriori)
- context (context-dependence/context-independence)
- implication/presupposition

(4) finally, a fourth one, which is tied up with reflection on lexicographical practice, and which concerns the relationships of terms within one field, or the relationship between features attributed to terms. This type of work, which had a successful impact on the analysis of text structure[2], has introduced, apart from the notion of „semantic field" a number of useful terms:

- terms for relationships such as *hyponymy, hyperonymy* and *paronymy*
- terms for decomposition such as *seme, sememe, classeme*
- the term *isotopy*

Apart from these fertilizations, one should mention the attempts to extend semantics well beyond its linguistic implementation: here, horizons have loomed large, first through semiotics, a vast project to study whatever type of significant phenomena (with the more neutral notion of „sign" replacing the content-oriented concept of „meaning" as axiomatical prime), and more recently, through the wave of „cognitive (or cognitivist) linguistics", which in the long run may bring about new insights in semantic structures.

2. We cannot, of course, avoid the practical question: „What can scholars – linguists or theologians – of Biblical Hebrew do with semantics?" It may be good to recall that in the first place we deal with *texts*, and more particularly with texts for which we (normally) do not raise philosophical problems concerning verifiability, rigid designation of proper names, context-dependency or context-independency, etc. It also seems that as readers of the Bible we automatically accept the „discursive universe" as given within the text(s). Another fact we know is that in the Hebrew Bible we have *various* text *types*: we do not read with the same expectations, or with the same receptive attitude, the book of Genesis, the two books of Samuel, the book of Proverbs, or those of the prophets.

Dealing with concrete texts such as the Old Testament entails that, in the specific case of semantic investigations, we do not have to fashion in our heads the semantics of Biblical Hebrew; rather, we should look at the texts and see what is at work.

3. For this purpose, I have selected as a specimen 2 *Sm* XII, 1-13, given here in the Hebrew text.

וַיִּשְׁלַח יְהוָה אֶת־נָתָן אֶל־דָּוִד וַיָּבֹא אֵלָיו וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ שְׁנֵי אֲנָשִׁים הָיוּ בְּעִיר
אֶחָת אֶחָד עָשִׁיר וְאֶחָד רָאשׁ׃
לָעָשִׁיר הָיָה צֹאן וּבָקָר הַרְבֵּה מְאֹד׃
וְלָרָשׁ אֵין־כֹּל כִּי אִם־כִּבְשָׂה אַחַת קְטַנָּה אֲשֶׁר קָנָה וַיְחַיֶּהָ וַתִּגְדַּל עִמּוֹ וְעִם־בָּנָיו
יַחְדָּו מִפִּתּוֹ תֹאכַל וּמִכֹּסוֹ תִשְׁתֶּה וּבְחֵיקוֹ תִשְׁכָּב וַתְּהִי־לוֹ כְּבַת׃

[2] See especially A.J. Greimas, Sémantique structurale, Paris 1966; id., Du sens, Paris 1970.

וַיָּבֹא הַלֵּךְ לְאִישׁ הֶעָשִׁיר וַיַּחְמֹל לָקַחַת מִצֹּאנוֹ וּמִבְּקָרוֹ לַעֲשׂוֹת לָאֹרֵחַ הַבָּא־לוֹ
וַיִּקַּח אֶת־כִּבְשַׂת הָאִישׁ הָרָאשׁ וַיַּעֲשֶׂהָ לָאִישׁ הַבָּא אֵלָיו׃
וַיִּחַר־אַף דָּוִד בָּאִישׁ מְאֹד וַיֹּאמֶר אֶל־נָתָן חַי־יְהוָה כִּי בֶן־מָוֶת הָאִישׁ הָעֹשֶׂה זֹאת׃
וְאֶת־הַכִּבְשָׂה יְשַׁלֵּם אַרְבַּעְתָּיִם עֵקֶב אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה אֶת־הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה וְעַל אֲשֶׁר לֹא־חָמָל׃
וַיֹּאמֶר נָתָן אֶל־דָּוִד אַתָּה הָאִישׁ כֹּה־אָמַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אָנֹכִי מְשַׁחְתִּיךָ לְמֶלֶךְ
עַל־יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָנֹכִי הִצַּלְתִּיךָ מִיַּד שָׁאוּל׃
וָאֶתְּנָה לְךָ אֶת־בֵּית אֲדֹנֶיךָ וְאֶת־נְשֵׁי אֲדֹנֶיךָ בְּחֵיקֶךָ וָאֶתְּנָה לְךָ אֶת־בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל
וִיהוּדָה וְאִם־מְעָט וְאֹסִפָה לְךָ כָּהֵנָּה וְכָהֵנָּה׃
מַדּוּעַ בָּזִיתָ אֶת־דְּבַר יְהוָה לַעֲשׂוֹת הָרַע בְּעֵינָו אֶת אוּרִיָּה הַחִתִּי הִכִּיתָ בַחֶרֶב וְאֶת־
אִשְׁתּוֹ לָקַחְתָּ לְךָ לְאִשָּׁה וְאֹתוֹ הָרַגְתָּ בְּחֶרֶב בְּנֵי עַמּוֹן׃
וְעַתָּה לֹא־תָסוּר חֶרֶב מִבֵּיתְךָ עַד־עוֹלָם עֵקֶב כִּי בְזִתָנִי וַתִּקַּח אֶת־אֵשֶׁת אוּרִיָּה הַחִתִּי
לִהְיוֹת לְךָ לְאִשָּׁה׃
כֹּה אָמַר יְהוָה הִנְנִי מֵקִים עָלֶיךָ רָעָה מִבֵּיתֶךָ וְלָקַחְתִּי אֶת־נָשֶׁיךָ לְעֵינֶיךָ וְנָתַתִּי
לְרֵעֶךָ וְשָׁכַב עִם־נָשֶׁיךָ לְעֵינֵי הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ הַזֹּאת׃
כִּי אַתָּה עָשִׂיתָ בַסָּתֶר וַאֲנִי אֶעֱשֶׂה אֶת־הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה נֶגֶד כָּל־יִשְׂרָאֵל וְנֶגֶד הַשָּׁמֶשׁ׃
וַיֹּאמֶר דָּוִד אֶל־נָתָן חָטָאתִי לַיהוָה וַיֹּאמֶר נָתָן אֶל־דָּוִד גַּם־יְהוָה הֶעֱבִיר חַטָּאתְךָ
לֹא תָמוּת׃

What type of text is this? The fragment concerns a particular situation, brought about by Nathan's story: Nathan acts on David, with the result that David recognizes his mischief. In other words: we have here a *commitment*-situation (A brings B to a certain commitment), which is „instaured" through the narration of a story. It should be noted that Nathan could have acted directly on David, by accusing him straightforwardly of having taken Uriah's wife: but, interestingly, the direct accusation follows only in verses 7-9. Nathan's story operates *indirectly*: Nathan brings David to recognize that a person Y who perpetrates a crime is guilty, and should be punished, and then he states that David is in fact the specific instance of the general case of Y represented in the story.

Taking a closer look at Nathan's story, we find that the macro-components correspond to a sequence of events, and mirror, in a certain sense, the deeds of David. But the representation involves a major transposition: whereas the story is about a nonhuman victim (viz. the poor man's little lamb) and about a man to whom damage is caused, the mischief of David involves the death of Uriah, killed by the Ammonites, and David's laying hands on Uriah's wife.

This transposition is „redressed" in verses 9-10. Another transposition involved is that, in the case of the story, the rich man seems to owe his wealth to himself; David on the contrary, owes his strength and wealth to God, and he is therefore *a fortiori* guilty.

Turning from the „textual structure" of the story to its semantic structure, we note the major opposition between the *rich* man and the *poor* man (verse 1: *ʾeḥad ʿāšīr wᵉʾeḥad rāš*). The former owns much („very many flocks and herds"), the latter almost nothing (*ʾeyn kol kī ʾim kibšāh ʾaḥat* „nothing except a little lamb"). But

the latter treats his property with a sense of overall-investment and attachment: his property is part and parcel of his family („it grew up with him and with his sons together [*yaḥdāw*], it ate of his own food, and it was as a daughter to him"). The rich man does not treat his property in the same way; we can readily assume that he considers it to be alienable, and has therefore no scruples about taking somebody else's property[3]. Nathan's story involves a „delayed" referent: the „rich man" of the story is a *type* of malefactor. David does not hesitate to condemn „the man who does such a thing" (*hā ʾīš hā ʿošeh zōt*: the participle *hā ʿošeh* „who does" also has a virtual meaning here). What we have here is an *attributive* use (in K. Donnellan's terminology)[4] of a definite description (as when we say „the murderer of Smith must be crazy", without knowing the identity of the murderer, but judging from Smith's heavily mutilated corpse). At that moment David is unaware that the definite expression also has a *referential* use (as in „the murderer of Smith must be crazy", when we know that the police have arrested a certain Jones, who confessed the murder). It is Nathan who establishes the connection between the „delayed" referent and the situation-referent: „You are THE man" (*ʾattāh hā ʾīš*, verse 7). At that moment, David has to accept the implications of his verdict (verses 5+6) on the man in the story, and this he does, after Nathan's explication (verses 7-12), in verse 13: „I have sinned against Yahweh". The explication involves the fitting in of the „transposed" referents: David's mischief is not that of taking a lamb from a poor man, but of conceiving the plan to put Uriah in the frontline of the battle against the Ammonites, and of taking Uriah's widow as his wife (verse 9: *wʿ ʾet ʾištō lāqaḥtā lekā lʿ ʾiššāh*; see also v. 10). His punishment will be in contrastive symmetry with his camouflaged mischief: David's wives will all be given to his neighbour, who „shall lie with them in the sight of the sun"[5].

The passage also shows some interesting features of *intratextual* and *intertextual* structure. As to the intratextual aspect, I would mention the use of the verb *ḥml* in verse 4 and verse 6: in verse 4 the sequence *wayyaḥmol lāqaḥat miṣṣo ʾnō umibbʿqārō* is usually translated as „he spared to take of his flock, and of his herd", and in verse 6 *lō ḥāmāl* is translated as „he had no pity". There is clearly an intratextual connection between the two verb forms, and I would prefer to translate in both cases *ḥml* as „to find it heavy/to find it a burden (to...)"[6].

As to intertextuality, it seems to me that Nathan's story should be read in connection with 1 *Sm* 25,2-42, the story of Nabal and Abigail: Nabal refuses to treat David's servants as his guests, and his wife Abigail has to make amends for the offence of her foolish (*nābāl*) husband. Yahweh punishes Nabal for having committed this offence, and after Nabal's death Abigail becomes David's wife. In

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[3] What characterizes the rich man's mischief is that it is both an offence against his guest (not considered worthy of being offered one of his own lambs) and a crime with respect to the poor man.

[4] See K. Donnellan, „Reference and Definite Descriptions", The Philosophical Review 75, 1966, 281-304.

[5] David's crime is also in contrastive symmetry with that of the rich man of the story: whereas the rich man commits an offence against his guest, David has despised his benefactor.

[6] Cf. Akkadian *ḫamālu* „to carry away"; Arab. *ḥamala* „to bear"; compare the semantic range of *pesare, pesar, peser* in Italian, Spanish and French.

the light of these „real events", we can understand that David pronounces a harsh verdict on the rich man of Nathan's story, and in fact we can assume that Nathan *expected* this reaction from David, so that he could lead him, by his own words, into a commitment-situation.

Nathan's story is a beautiful example of discursive relevance. The story is to the point (it concerns a mischief to be punished), it has a deeper („metaphorical") symbolization, and it is economical: the story is confined to the „essential" *deep fact*, viz. the crime of taking someone else's property. Putting this into the framework of speech act theory, we could say that the story, taken by itself, constitutes the *locutionary* level of the discursive event in 2 *Sm* 12,1-13. The story by itself narrates a general type of mischief. The *illocutionary* level comes into play with verse 7: „You are the man!". Nathan makes David realize that the story is about him, David, and that he is guilty of a crime which should be punished. The illocutionary level, then, constitutes the *re*transposition of what had been transposed, through generalization and modification, in the story of the rich man and the poor man. And finally, there is the *perlocutionary* level: David realizes that he has sinned against Yahweh (verse 13). As we know, the perlocutionary effect is something beyond the control of the initiator of the speech act: we do not know how the receiver will respond (to a question, to a warning, to a command, etc.). In the case of David, the perlocutionary effect is a positive one, in that he confesses his crime, and marks his submission to Yahweh.

This brief example may have shown that interesting work can be done on the semantics of Biblical Hebrew, involving the cooperation of linguists and Biblical scholars.

Abstract:

Language is the subject matter of linguistic semantics from a particular vintage point of view: that of its status as a system of/for representation of reality. The paper opens with a survey of linguistic semantics in terms of fertilizations affecting it throughout its history. The remainder of the paper is concerned with the practical relevance of linguistic semantics for the study of the Hebrew Bible. A sample text, viz. *2 Samuel 12, 1-13*, is used to provide an illustration of the results that can be obtained through semantic analysis, on both the intratextual and intertextual level. The analysis combines semantic and pragmatic aspects given the fact that the story told by Nathan leads David into a commitment-situation.

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Etymological Semantics

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In many ways I regret that I undertook to discuss this subject. It would have been much easier to have agreed to be the respondent to this or a related topic. I am not a theoretician, nor do I consider myself a trained linguist, but rather a philologist by training and inclination. It is true that the *word* has been an abiding interest in my work, and I consider it a value in its own right to ascertain the meaning and usage of words, without worrying too much if they may properly be described as paroles or mots. In addition James Barr in his books on the semantics of biblical language and on comparative philology,[1] but primarily in his essay on „Etymology and the Old Testament" has delineated the role of etymology.[2] It would be difficult to add to this discussion. Nevertheless, discuss I must. I will follow the various types of etymologies that Barr offers in that survey and will comment on these.

1. Etymology A: Prehistoric Reconstruction.
Barr[3] quotes the parade example *ʾmr* and notes that the evidence about this root is diverse: Heb. *ʾāmar* „say"; Arab. *ʾamara* „command"; Eth. *ʾammärä* „show, know" and Akkadian *amāru* „see". The proposed proto-Semitic sense, variously offered, is „to be clear" (so most recently HAL). Personally I doubt this. I admit to not having opened all the current dictionaries to see if this method is still in use, but it is still a popular method of presenting the evidence. There is nothing truly exceptional in presenting this testimony as part of the treatment of the root *ʾmr*. One may argue, and here I agree with Barr, that this evidence should not be placed at the beginning of the entry, but perhaps at its end, for in this case there is nothing that adds to the „meaning" that is being offered for any verse in which the root occurs. But awareness of the fact that this nexus of meanings is possible in a root may explain the fact that a lesser known root may also have the same possibility. The root *ḥwy* which is found in both Late Biblical Hebrew and Aramaic is pertinent here, at least as far as performance goes. In BH it is „to inform" while in Aramaic it is both „to declare" and „to show". In the Enoch text in Aramaic from Qumran we find *ʾḥwy* and *ʾḥzy* used as a pair.

In the light of the above, examination of the root *klm* would be in order here. In Hebrew the accepted meaning for this verb which occurs in the *nifʿal* and *hifʿil* is „to be ashamed, to shame" respectively, while in Arabic *kalama* is „to speak" and also „to wound". There is no doubt that one can wound one's friends or one's enemies with words, but I think that the attempt to establish a semantic

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[1] J. Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language, Oxford, 1961; Comparative Philology and the Text of the Old Testament, Oxford, 1968.

[2] In: Language and Meaning, Studies in Hebrew and Biblical Exegesis (OTS 19), ed. A.S. van der Woude, Leiden, 1974, pp. 1-28.

[3] Etymology, pp. 4-7.

relationship between these meanings may be a false step. In Akkadian *kullumu* is „to show, reveal, etc." and this fits with the insight that the *ʾmr* nexus (to speak/to show) provides.[4] Some have sought to interpret, on this basis, certain occurrences of the root *klm* in Hebrew as „to shame (by speech)". But in the following verses for which this meaning has been proposed careful reading would lead to the conclusion that this use of *klm* is a modification of the more frequent usage and that there is no need to assume that Hebrew had both roots. The three instances may be translated: *wĕʾēn maklīm* „without being rebuked" (Job 11:3); *taklīmūnī* „you humiliate me" (Job 19:2); *kī hiklīmō ʾābīw* „for his father had humiliated him" (I Sam 20:34). The proper distinction to be made from the point of view of etymological semantics would be to assume that there were two independent Semitic roots a) *klm* „to speak, show"; and b) *klm* „to injure (wound, shame)". In Arabic we find both root meanings, in Akkadian the first, in Hebrew the second.

2. Etymology B: Historical Tracing within an Observable Development.
Barr used *minḥāh* as an example of this category, and the choice was good.[5] I would like to present a modern instance, that is a word that has entered our learned conscience in the last 40 years – *pešer*, now best known from the interpretative vocabulary of the Qumran scrolls where the phrase *pišrō ʿal* is quite frequent. *Pešer* may be defined as „interpretation" rather than „commentary". In late Biblical Hebrew its sole occurrence is in the construct form *pešer* in Koh. 8:1 with the usual definition being „solution, interpretation". Since the word occurs a few times in Biblical Aramaic for the interpretation of dreams, and the root occurs in various Aramaic dialects, it has been the common wisdom to assume that it is a loan-word from Aramaic. However, this assumption is not necessarily correct. The verb *pašāru* and related nouns are frequent in Akkadian.[6] It is clear that the basic meaning is „to loosen" and its range of meanings includes: „to loosen earth, sell/redeem (*ana kaspim pašāru*), compromise, interpret dreams, loosen curses or bans, free of sins or of oaths, open magical knots, etc. This holds true also for *pšr* in Mishnaic Hebrew – the basic meaning is „to loosen" and its usage includes „to melt, become tepid, compromise/ arbitrate, tear loose, disengage, temper wrath" etc.[7] The usage in Hebrew is wider than that found in Aramaic. I presented Akkadian and Mishnaic Hebrew together, in order to show that it would be natural to apply the verb *pšr* to the loosening and opening of an esoteric text, a meaning that could have easily developed in Hebrew, and which is not found in Aramaic.[8]

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[4] For *kullumu* see CAD K, pp. 519-525; the verb *nekelmû* „to look angrily, with disfavor" (CAD N II, 152-153) should be related in some manner.

[5] Etymology, pp. 7-9.

[6] See AHw, p. 842 s.v. *pašāru*.

[7] Note frequent *pĕšārā* „compromise".

[8] Indeed the Aramaic usage as typified by Daniel (5:12) where *mpšr ḥlmyn* „interprets dreams" is found together with *mšrʾ qṭryn* „loosens knots" would lead one to believe that the Aramaic usage is based on Akkadian.

3. Etymology C: Identification of Adoptions from another Language.[9]
I do not wish to offer any new identifications. This work has been done over the centuries. Indeed, in the Talmud and Midrash the foreign origins of various words were proposed. We may not find all of these identifications philologically sound today but it is worth noting that languages as diverse as Greek and Arabic were brought into play by the rabbis in their search for the meaning of the Biblical text. This tradition continued into the Middle Ages, when both origins and cognates were listed by the lexicographers. It goes without saying that this effort does not cease today. The publication of a new text, not to speak of the possible addition of a newly discovered member to the family of languages, will elicit this. Soon after the decipherment of Hittite, Edward Sapir, a great American linguist, suggested that *ʾargaz* „chest" and *k/qobaʿ* „helmet" were words of Indo-European origin.[10] The Indo-European background of the **seren/*soren*, the *tyrannos* of the Philistines (*sarnē pĕlištīm*) is widely accepted.[11] Numerous Akkadian and Iranian loan-words have been found in Hebrew, either borrowed directly or through an Aramaic intermediary. Kulturwörter have been more exactly identified and the source of *yayin/oinos* and the ferrous nature of *barzel* established. The discovery of West Semitic vocables in the Old Babylonian used by the scribes of Mari and its environs has enlivened this type of etymological research.[12] The lessons to be learned from Ugaritic are also important, for its vocabulary absorbed elements from the other languages such as Hurrian, Akkadian and Hittite which were used at Ras Shamra, an important emporium, and in the neighbouring countries. Also instructive is the Aramaic part of the bilingual inscription from Tell Fekheriye, for it contains Akkadian words otherwise unknown in Aramaic.[13]
A cautionary word is in order, for it is normally difficult to say which words might be loan-words in languages as close as Phoenician and Hebrew. It is only in rare cases that this sort of cross-fertilization of related languages may be perceived. The description of the „Ship of Tyre" in Ezek. 27 may provide at least two words from the sphere of commerce – *ʿzbwn* „export" (lit: merchandise left behind on deposit for sale) and *mʿrb* „import" (from *ʿrb* „to bring in") – that could serve as

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9 Barr, Etymology, pp. 8-11.

10 See E. Sapir, Hebrew ʾargaz, a Philistine Word, JAOS 56, 1936, pp. 272-281, for which HAL gives both a wrong meaning and an impossible etymology; for the second, see idem, Hebrew ‚Helmet,' a Loanword, and its Bearing on Indo-European Phonology, JAOS 57, 1937, pp. 73-77, for which HAL, pursuing the recent, has credited a secondary scholar.

11 This identification has a long history which is not reflected in HAL. Note that *sarnē pĕlištīm* is translated in the Targum of Jud. 16:4 as *ṭurānē pĕlištāʾē*.

12 The most recent listing may be found in A. Malamat, Mari and the Early Israelite Experience, London, 1989, p. 33.

13 A good example would be *gwgl* „water regulator" (l.2). See A. Abou Assaf – P. Bordreuil – A.R. Millard, La Statue de Tell Fekherye, Paris, 1982; J.C. Greenfield – A. Shaffer, The Akkadian-Aramaic Bilingual Statue from Tell Fekherye, Iraq 45, 1983, pp. 109-116. The reverse is also true. The presence in that inscription of *qlqltʾ* „garbage heap" has enabled us to identify *kiqillatu* in Neo-Assyrian (CAD K, p. 4401a). See J.C. Greenfield – A. Shaffer, *QLQLTʾ*, Tubkinnu, Refuse Dumps and Treasure Trove, Anatolian Studies 33, 1983, pp. 123-129.

examples.[14] It is Aramaic that has often been marked as the source language for many loan-words borrowed into Hebrew, and this is surely correct. Yet Theodor Nöldeke, the Altmeister of Semitic philology, whose name was attached to that of Strassburg for many years, and whose knowledge of Aramaic was encompassing, wrote a justifiably critical review of Kautzsch's work on Aramaisms in Biblical Hebrew.[15] There is need for caution in assigning the tag „Aramaism" to a word, since we are aware today of a greater number of shared vocables between Aramaic and the Canaanite dialects than before.[16] The language of the Aḥiqar proverbs is a good instance of Aramaic and Hebrew sharing a series of rare words and idioms[17].
Calques on words and idioms also belong to this section. The Qumran Scrolls afford us an instance of a calque in Hebrew on an Akkadian idiom. In the Rule of the Community (1QS 2:9) we read *wlw ʾ yhyh lkh šlwm bpy kwl ʾwḥzy ʾbwt*, literally: „may you not have well being in the mouth of all the intercessors". The idiom *ʾwḥzy ʾbwt* was not understood until Wernberg-Møller compared the frequent Akkadian idiom *abbutta ṣabātu/abbutta aḫāzu* „to intercede" and noted the unique occurrence of this idiom in a Syriac text.[18] Here, too, since the Hebrew text is some four hundred years earlier than the Syriac one it may very well be asked if it is necessary to assume an Aramaic intermediary.[19]
[It is, however, vital to add that we are not free from examining certain Hebrew compositions in the light of Aramaic. Some years ago while I was participating in the preparation of the ‚New Jewish Publication Society' translation of the Psalms, the feeling developed that some of the difficulties in Psalm 139 were due to the fact that it was either written in a dialect that was under strong Aramaic influence, or that it was translated from Aramaic. Our hint was the use of an Aramaism *ʾessaq* „I will ascend" in v. 8a; on that basis we translated *ʾaṣīʿāh* of 8b as „I will go down". In v. 9a *ʾeśśāʾ kanfē šāḥar* was translated „If I take wing with the dawn" on the basis of the insight that in Aramaic *nĕṭal* is the equivalent of both Hebrew *nāśāʾ* „to lift,

[14] See IEJ 32, 1982, pp. 124-125. But not all scholars accept the interpretation of these words proposed there.

[15] E. Kautzsch, Die Aramaismen im Alten Testament untersucht, Halle, 1902. Nöldeke's important but neglected review appeared in ZDMG 57, 1903, pp. 412-420; many of the points raised by Nöldeke can also be made against M. Wagner's Die lexikalischen und grammatikalischen Aramaismen im alttestamentlichen Hebräisch (BZAW 96), Berlin, 1966, a book that has achieved a semi-canonical status in HAL.

[16] G.R. Driver (Hebrew Poetic Diction, VTS 1, 1953, pp. 26-39) has noted the words that are best known in Aramaic, but which serve in Hebrew poetry as parallel words. They may often be vocables used in dialects or colloquial usages. Some of these may occur later in Mishnaic Hebrew.

[17] See J.M. Lindenberger, The Aramaic Proverbs of Aḥiqar, Baltimore, 1983, pp. 287-8; I. Kottsieper, Die Sprache der Aḥiqarsprüche, BZAW 194, Berlin, 1990, p. 244.

[18] P. Wernberg-Møller, Notes on the Manual of Discipline, etc., VT 3, 1953, pp. 195-202, esp. pp. 196-7.

[19] For the Akkadian idiom see now, K. Watanabe, *abbūta(m)/abbuttu ṣabātu*. Zur immanenten und transzendenten Interzession, Acta Sumerologica 12, 1990, pp. 319-338, and pp. 335-6 for the Hebrew and Syriac.

carry" and *nāsa*^{c} „to travel". The ancient translator/adaptor made the wrong choice among these virtually homophonous roots.][20]

4. Etymology D: Analysis of Words into Component Morphemes.
The search for the basic meaning of a presumed root is willy-nilly the ongoing concern of the lexicographer.[21] Even when the imaginary lexicographer adopts a strictly synchronic approach and has to deal with disparate words like Barr's set *šalōm* „peace", *šalem* „whole" and *šillem* „he paid"; or the sets: *sefer* „book" and *mispār* „number"; *sāfar* „he counted" and *sōfer* „scribe"; or more radically, *sipper* „he related" and *sipper* „he cut hair" (Mishnaic and Modern Hebrew) and is aware that they may not be related, the fact that they are ordered in close proximity in a dictionary causes both the compiler of the lexicon and its user to look for non-existent relationships.[22] True, I have stacked the deck, for if I had put *sefer* and *sōfer* together, or *sāfar* and *sipper* (cf. „toll" and „tell"), we would have had at least two pairs with the root letters *spr* that share synchronically the same root structure and are etymologically related. One of the disturbing elements in using HAL is that the search for a *Grundbedeutung* has led to distortion of meaning, the mixing of etymons and cognates, and also the inclusion under the root rubric of a great deal of strange and extraneous material.[23]

I would like, under Etymology D, to present two items that may illustrate this theme and at the same time be seen as examples of how etymological research can be of use. In the first I would like to show that the examination of the possible semantic extension of a root can be aided by a) not limiting oneself to Biblical Hebrew and b) by examining similar words in the cognate languages. The use of *lmd* in BH is well known.[24] In the *qal* it is „to learn, be trained, accustomed to", with the *piel* adding „to teach, train". Both scholar and student when looking at HAL (p. 505) will be confronted by what at best may be considered strange information which they would do best to disregard. On the basis of *malmad* „goad" we are told that the *Grundbedeutung* of *lmd* is „stechen, anstacheln". The assumption being that students learn only when goaded, but an altogether different approach is required. The examination of the use of *lmd* in Mishnaic Hebrew adds a dimension to its meaning for beside the *piel limmed* as „to teach" it is also used for „to join, bind", especially in relation to wood and blocks of stones.

If we have looked forward in time, it would not be wrong also to look backwards. I have proposed, and this seems to have achieved some acceptance (except in HAL

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[20] There are indeed other examples of Aramaic influence in this Psalm.

[21] Etymology, pp. 11-15.

[22] F. Rundgren, La Lexicographie Arabe, in: P. Fronzaroli, Studies on Semitic Lexicography (Quaderni de Semitistica 2), Firenze, 1973, pp. 145-159 noted (pp. 156-157) that the two sets of *safara* a) „ôter le voile" and b) „luire" have nothing to do with each other despite their proximity in the dictionary. The mode of listing in the traditional type of Arabic dictionary „est apte à détruire d'une manière assez déplorable la structure du champ sémantique".

[23] If HAL is mentioned it is because it is so widely used; but one could with equal ease point to other offenders.

[24] Forgive me if I call upon work done some years ago to substantiate this point.

s.v. *lmd*), that Ugaritic *mdl*, which is found in parallelism with *ṣmd*, „to bind, saddle" is the cognate of *lmd*.[25] True, Ugaritic knows both *lmd* for „apprentice" and *tlmd* for „student", but otherwise the root is unknown in Ugaritic. If correct *mdl* would be a metathesis of *lmd*. It is clear that in Aramaic *lmd* as „to learn/teach" is indeed rare, if not non-existent. But Syriac *lmd* (and we disregard *talmed* and its forms) provides food for thought; here too the meaning of „to attach, join together, compile" is prevalent.[26] The semantic range of *lmd* then would have to include both „to learn", and „to join, bind". Can this revised view of the range of the semantics of *lmd* be of use in the understanding of Biblical verses? I believe that it enables us to understand the subtleties of Biblical composition in at least one verse: in Cant 3:8 *kullām ʾăḥūzē ḥereb melummādē milḥāmā* can be translated „All of them girt with swords, trained for war" or a variation thereof. If *ʾḥz* is seen in the light of its Akkadian cognate *aḫāzu* it has the range „to seize, hold, know, learn". The phrase *ʾăḥūzē ḥereb* can take on the additional meaning of „trained in warfare", while *mĕlummādē milḥāmā* can in turn mean „girt with weapons". This possibility of double meaning adds to the subtlety of the verse.
An excellent semantic parallel to *lmd* would be Aramaic *ʾlp*/*ʾallep* „to learn/to teach" on one side, and its Arabic cognate *ʾalafa* „to frequent a place, be accustomed to, be friendly with", *ʾallafa* „to unite, bring together, connect, gather" on the other.[27] This bifurcation of meaning found in the Aramaic/Arabic *ʾlp* compares to the combining of the meanings in *lmd*.

The second example displays some of the problems of etymological semantics. The need to distinguish among the various etymological elements that combine in the same root letters may be seen in the various contributions to the discussion of the root *mkr*. HAL is once again a poor guide, for it lists in the etymological rubric under mhe., ja., sy., md., the meaning „kaufen". In Mishnaic Hebrew *mkr* is the normal word for „to sell". But *mkr* is not known in any dialect of Aramaic where *zbn* means in the *pĕʿal* means „to buy" and in the *paʿel* „to sell".[28] Thus one very important element of etymological work – correct etymology – has been shunted aside by HAL. A second important element is the pursuit of *Grundbedeutung*. Rudolf Meyer has suggested that the *Grundbedeutung* of *mkr* is „im Handel einsetzen" since it contains the „Doppelsinn von ‚kaufen' und ‚verkaufen'".[29] Besides the fundamental error in meaning, that *Grundbedeutung* would put the cart before the horse. If constrained to find a *Grundbedeutung*, careful analysis of the textual material would indicate that the primary meaning of *mkr* is „to hand over" (note

[25] Ugaritic *mdl* and its cognates, Biblica 45, 1964, pp. 527-534.

[26] C. Brockelmann, Lexicon Syriacum (ed. sec.), Halle, 1928, p. 367.

[27] At least two of the Hebrew uses of the root *ʾlp* fit with this meaning: *ʾalluf* „companion" and *ʾelef* „clan".

[28] However, except for the exceptional meaning of „verloben", that is, „to betroth, espouse" (*afʿel*: „give one's daughter in marriage"), the root does not exist in Aramaic, and that usage, contra HAL, is not found in any Jewish Aramaic dialect. E. Lipiński reminds me of the very plausible supposition that Syr. *mĕkar*, in which the kaf was pronounced with *rukkakha*, was borrowed from Akk. *maḫāru* „to receive".

[29] See his short monograph Gegensinn und Mehrdeutigkeit in der althebräischen Wort- und Begriffsbildung, Jb. sächs. Akad., Phil.-hist. Kl. 120/5, 1979, pp. 10-11.

mkr byd in Jud. 2:14, 3:8, etc. and the skillful use of *mkr//hsgr* in Deut 32:30); the basic meaning of *mkr* may best be described in terms of opposition to *qnh* „to acquire, possess". A nuance was given to both verbs with the addition of *bĕkesef* – so that in Hebrew *mkr* „to sell" and *qnh* „to buy" emerged.

Some problems remain, for not every occurrence fits under the friendly umbrella of *mkr* „to hand over, sell". A nominal usage **mĕkērā* in *kēlē ḥāmās mĕkērōtēhem* (Gen. 49:5) remained particularly troublesome. The „ancients" were no longer sure of its meaning. The rabbis attempted to interpret it by means of Greek *mákhaira* „sword", which fits the context.[30] The influence of this interpretation may still be felt in NRSV „weapons of violence are their swords" or NJPS „their weapons are tools of lawlessness". Those who seek Canaanite-Aegean connections have used this word as a proof text. The correct understanding of this noun, however, was put forward some years ago when the Ethiopic *mäkärä/amkärä* „to advise, counsel" was submitted once again as the cognate by Eduard Ullendorff, with reference to earlier proposals.[31] A translation similar to that proposed by him, „strong weapons are their counsel", seems proper, especially in light of *sōd* and *qāhāl* in the following verse. Admittedly this introduces *mkr* II, a homonymous root, but despite the proper warning against the making of many roots, a good case can be made for this one.[32] A proposed semantic development should somehow deal with all the occurrences of a root. In the case of *mkr* there remains the seemingly strange expression *hitmakker la^{c}ăśōt hā-rā^{c}* found in I Kings 21:20.25 and II Kings 17:17. Translating this literally is not as disturbing to some scholars as it is to me, as witness the NRSV translation of I Kings 21:20: „Because you have sold yourself to do what is evil in the sight of the Lord".[33] Over 50 years ago D. Winton Thomas proposed an interpretation in which the pitfalls of etymologizing can be clearly seen.[34] Thomas turned to the Arabic use of *mkr* for these verses. In Arabic the verb *makara* means „practised deceit, guile"; its related nouns indicate deceit and craftiness. Thomas would connect *hitmakker* in these three verses with this usage and translates the idiom „who showed himself deceitful by doing evil." The text, however, provides no rationale for this translation. In addition, Thomas speculated whether *mkr* „to sell" and *mkr* „to practise deceit" were not really one root since „the Oriental seller habitually tries to deceive the buyer".[35] I would maintain that these roots are homophonous, and that this particular meaning is not pertinent to Hebrew. For *hitmakker* we should look, rather, to *mkr* II, „to advise, counsel". The translation would be „to take counsel" with the reflexive intent of „to decide to". The

[30] Genesis Rabbah 99:6. There remain those who still espouse this strange idea, e.g. O. Margalith, VT 34, 1984, pp. 101-102, with a list of „authorities".

[31] The Contribution of South Semitics to Hebrew Lexicography, VT 6, 1956, pp. 190-198, esp. p. 194.

[32] Worthy of note here is the recent article of D.J.A. Clines on *^{3}bl* (VT 42, 1992, pp. 1-10) where an *^{3}bl* II is eliminated .

[33] The translation of *hitmakker* in the NJPS, „commit one's self", has too modern a ring to it, and probably goes back to the idea of ‚selling'.

[34] JTS 1936, pp. 388-89; 1952, p. 214, recorded by HAL, p. 551.

[35] Ibid., p. 389, n.6.

Targum and the Peshiṭta used forms of *ḥšb*, for *hitmakker*, e.g. *ḥšabtā* for I Kings 21:20, and this was close to the truth.[36]

5. Etymology E: The Use of a Cognate Language to Discover the Sense in Hebrew.[37]

There are many examples of the phenomenon in which, to use Barr's words, „the appeal to Ugaritic or Arabic or Akkadian has brought about a drastic change of acceptation as against an older understanding of a word, or has furnished a meaning for a word formerly taken to be unintelligible". I do not wish to add to the possible examples. All those who have the requisite training experience the etymological urge when they read texts in one of those languages or in Hebrew, Biblical or otherwise. I would like to repeat some examples that have been known for some time that might show how an additional insight has been added. I shall use material that comes from discoveries made during this century, some earlier, some later.

1) The verb *št ᶜ* is found only in Isa. 41:10,23, both times in parallel with forms of *yr ᵓ*. It was easier for translators and commentators to deal with the first occurrence, for the order was *ᵓal-tīrāᵓ // ᵓal-tišta ᶜ* and the context clear; the second occurrence was more enigmatic. Before the discovery of Ugaritic both were usually considered forms of *š ᶜh*.[38] With the discovery of the root *yr ᵓ* in parallelism with *ṯt ᶜ* in Ugaritic, the verbal root *št ᶜ* „to fear" was firmly established. The argument was clinched by the occurrence in the Karatepe Inscription of *nšt ᶜm* and *yšt ᶜ* (both surely *nif ᶜal*) where the context (*wbmqmm ᵓš kn lpnm nšt ᶜm ᵓš yšt ᶜ ᵓdm llkt drk* „in those places which where they previously were afraid, where a man would fear to walk the road") clearly confirmed the meaning „to fear" for *št ᶜ*.[39]

2) *ᵓiššeh*. This word is a good example of the perils of semantic etymology versus cognate comparison. It is frequent in this form (*ᵓšh*), or in the construct plural *ᵓiššē* (*ᵓšy*), in sacrificial contexts. The derivation from *ᵓeš* was natural, the unusual masculine form being explained as a means of distinguishing it from *ᵓiššā* „woman". In BDB it is listed under *ᵓeš* and described as „an offering made by fire". In the recent „Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament" (Eng. transl. of TWAT) s.v. *ᵓesh*, p. 424, we read: „Among the sacrificial terms, we encounter the word *ᵓishsheh* over 60 times, mainly in priestly texts. From the LXX on this term has been associated with *ᵓesh* „fire", and is usually translated „offering made by fire." But this meaning is uncertain and more recent exegetes find other etymological explanations." The reference is to J. Hoftijzer who compared Ugaritic *ᵓṯt* with Heb.

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[36] I would add to the elucidation of this root the fact that in a slightly different guise it is already known in Hebrew – i.e. the use of *mlk* in the *nif ᶜal* for „to take counsel". This usage is found once in Late Biblical Hebrew (Neh. 5:7) and is widespread in Mishnaic Hebrew. The verb *mlk* as „to advise" is known from various Aramaic dialects and from Akkadian. We have then *mkr/mlk* which involves admittedly both a metathesis and an interchange of consonants.

[37] Barr, Etymology, pp. 15-16.

[38] See HUCA 29, 1958, pp. 226-228 for a survey of suggestions.

[39] The occurrence in the Amman citadel inscription remains obscure due to the fragmentary nature of that inscription.

ʾishsheh.[40] He noted KRT 201 and the royal letters 117.15, 1013.14. In the first of these passages the verb *ndr* is first associated with *itt*, and Keret then promises to give a certain amount to the goddess if he takes Hurriya as his wife. In the other passages the phrases are:

a) *bm. tyndr* (15) *itt.ʿmn.mlkt*
b) *ʿmn* (13) *mlk b. tyndr* (14) *itt*

The meaning may be „by means of the *shay* that was vowed there is a ‚gift' for the king"; note too the collocation of *ndr* and *shay* in Ps. 76:12. The conclusion is that Heb. *ʾiššeh* means, like the more frequent *qorbān*, „a gift". Nevertheless, there are scholars – most recently J.-L. Cunchillos who take *tyndr* as a personal name.[41] This, however, does not take account of the many subtleties of the text.[42]

3) The root *ʿdn* can serve as another example of a cognate clarifying the semantic range of a Hebrew root. The noun *ʿedna* (Gen.18:12) has been variously translated, ranging from „pregnancy" to „delight" (sexual, so BDB, p. 726; HAL, p. 749 „Liebeslust"). The etymon usually quoted (e.g. BDB, HAL) is Arab. **ǵadana* a root that indicates „delicateness, softness". The next step, a semantic leap, is „ergötzen", noted as the root meaning by HAL. Now it is true that in late Biblical Hebrew (already Neh. 9:25 *wayyitʿaddenū* „and they luxuriated" NJPS), in Mishnaic Hebrew and in Syriac *ʿdn* (*piel/pael*) is used for „to indulge in delicacies", but in all likelihood this is a late development. The clue to the semantic background was provided by the Tell Fekheiye bilingual where Aram. *mʿdn mt kln* (l.4-5) is an epithet of the god Hadad and is equated with Akk. *mutaḫḫidu kibrāti* „who makes luxuriant the land";[43] the context is that of bringing luxuriant growth by means of rain. The unique Ugaritic verbal use of *ʿdn*, although not totally sure, is also in the context of rain.[44] Akkadian *tuḫḫudu* is used of making things „moist" or „fat" by means of water, oil, or honey. The use of *ʿdn* in Mishnaic Hebrew is important here. Besides the reference to eating delicacies noted above, it is used for lubricating the skin with oil (BT Pes. 43a), and there is the contrast between dried, wrinkled skin, and smooth, fresh skin. The terms used are *nit ʿadden* and *nitpaššeṭ* (BB 120a). Also the action of the *rĕbībīm* (Deut. 32:2) is to bring luxuriant growth, which is also phrased as *mʿdn* (Sifre a.l.). In Gen.18:12 Sarah contrasts her condition (*bĕlōtī*) to having *ʿednā*. I have elsewhere proposed, on the basis of the use of *ʿdn*, the term „lubriciosity" for the condition that it describes.[45] This certainly fits the use of *ʿădīnā* for Babylon in Isa. 47:8. The next step would have to do with the etymology of Eden, and proposals have been made to fit Eden, as a place of

[40] J. Hoftijzer, Das sogenannte Feueropfer in: Hebräische Wortforschung (Festschrift W. Baumgartner), VTS 16, 1967, pp. 114-34.

[41] J.-L. Cunchillos, Textes ougaritiques II, Correspondence, Paris, 1989, pp. 322-323.

[42] Lipiński, OLP 12, 1981, translates *bm. ty.ndr* (15) *itt.ʿmn.mlkt* (note *ty.ndr* as two separate words) „avec le cadeau promis j'ai été auprès de la reine", but *itt* as „j'ai été" through ingenious is not plausible.

[43] L. 4. See Abou Assaf – Bordreuil – Millard, La Statue (above, note 13), Paris, 1982; Greenfield-Shaffer, Iraq 45, 1983, pp. 112-113.

[44] In the Baʿal Epic, CTA 4, V 68-69. See my remarks in the article referred to in the next note.

[45] A Touch of Eden, in: Orientalia J. Duchesne-Guillemin Emerito Oblata, Leiden, 1984, pp. 219-224.

luxuriant growth, into this picture.[46] I shall not presume that our root lies behind the original meaning of Eden, but rather that the interpretation of Eden at various places in the Hebrew Bible assumes that it is a) a well-watered place; and b) a place of luxuriant growth. As to *ᶜednā* it has acquired in recent years a fine cognate in Aram *ᶜdynh*, which occurs in the form *ᶜdynty* in Gen.Apoc. 2: 9,14. The translation „sexual pleasure" fits functionally the needs of the text.[47]

4) Finally, an instance of how an epigraphic discovery puts the use of a term in Biblical Hebrew into perspective. In this case it is the well-known verb *šqr*. Its meaning „to lie, be unfaithful" does not require comment. The supposed cognates from Akkadian, Arabic or Tigre that HAL proposes are not worth considering. It is only in Aramaic, as one might expect, that a cognate is found, which may indeed be a Canaanitism in Aramaic.[48] But the use of this verb in the Sefire Inscriptions has proven instructive. It was noted soon after the inscriptions were published that a) they distinguish between *šqr l* „to be unfaithful to someone (the suzerain)"; and *šqr b* „to break one's covenant with someone" and b) that this distinction holds true for Biblical Hebrew.[49] There is no reason to assume with HAL, p.1520, that the *Grundbedeutung* of this verb is to be found in the specialized meaning connected with covenants.[50]

6. Etymology F: Simple Comparison of Institutions with Cognate Names.[51]

Barr remarked that comparing the institution without comparing the word itself would do. „Is it not probable that the comparison of the two sets of phenomena would assist us in the understanding of both? The answer of course is „yes". It is a question, however, if this is a real case of etymology; or, to put it in another way, to include this would extend the term „etymology" far beyond the point where it continues to be distinctive and therefore useful." He goes on to remark that this type has often been associated with „true etymology", e.g. type A.

On general principles this is a correct observation. However, listing these comparisons under type A etymology, which we have discussed above, obscures the matter. I shall use the well-known root *nḥl* as my example. There is no question about its „true etymology". BDB listed Arabic *naḥala* „to give a thing freely, to give for one's own, bestow" and also Sabean *nḥl* with the same meaning. The information in HAL is richer. It has added mhe. „in Besitz nehmen"; Ug. *nḥl* „Erbsohn", *nḥlt* „Besitz"; and Akk *naḫālu* „besitzen" and then Arabic and Old South Arabic *nḥl* as „schenken", that is, „to grant".

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[46] A.R. Millard, The etymology of Eden, VT 34, 1984, pp. 103-105.

[47] J.A.Fitzmyer, The Genesis Apocryphon[2], Rome, 1971, pp. 86-87. H.L. Ginsberg's „pregnancy", Theological Studies 28, 1967, p. 575, followed by Beyer's „Schwangerschaft", does not fit the context.

[48] The usual Aramaic word for „to lie, etc." is *kdb* (Heb. *kzb*).

[49] Did Aramaic also make a further distinction true of Hebrew, i.e. that *šqr l* is in the *qal*, while *šqr b* is in the *piel*?

[50] One should add that *ᶜdyᵓ* of the Sefire Inscriptions has enabled the restoration of **ᶜadīm* „covenant" (Isa. 33:8//*bryt*) to the vocabulary of Biblical Hebrew, see J.A. Fitzmyer, CBQ 20, 1958, p. 456; D.R. Hillers, HTR 64, 1971, pp.257-258.

[51] Barr, Etymology, p. 17.

Some of the above is dubious.The root *nḥl* has no life of its own in Mishnaic Hebrew since it occurs only in legal formulae and is used only of an heir. The reference to Akkadian is misleading for all the occurrences are in Mari texts and represent a particular idiolect. In addition the „Sabaic Dictionary" of Beeston et al. prefers „grant, lease; louer à bail" for this word and for the noun *nḥlt* „grant, lease; concession, bail".[52] Obviously related but nuanced.

Now, it is worth noting that Heb. *nḥl* (qal, hifʿil) has a specific use, involving either divine possessions or human grants of a limited nature – that is lands possessed and divided or given as inheritance in an inalienable manner. This in distinction to *yrš* (qal, hifʿil) which is used for taking possession of property and inheriting it, without the element of inalienability; thus Zion is *har naḥlātō*, not *har yĕrušātō*. This is also true of Ugaritic *nḥlt*. It is the particular possession of a deity, be it Baʾal *bqdš.bġr nḥlty* [ʿ*nt* III 27(=IV 64)], or Mot: *ḫḫ.arṣ.nḥlth* [51 VIII 13-14;67 II 16]. The exact use of the noun *nḥl* remains enigmatic, for the texts do not unambiguously allow a clear translation „his heir" for *nḥlh*. The phrase *eqlāt* (A.ŠÀ.MEŠ) *na-ḫa-li*, found in PRU III, p. 109 (No. 251.16), l.7 is a good example of the enigmatic nature of this vocable. It was taken by Nougayrol, who published the text, and by others, to be „patrimonie".[53] However, J. Huehnergard argues plausibly for this being *naḥal* „wadi, ravine".[54]

Before discussing the Mari usage one should note that in Akkadian proper there is no word as such for inheriting/giving as inheritance or for giving as a possession. In Akkadian one says simply *zittam zâzu* „to distribute a share". Akkadian also does not have a proper word for heir so that in a Neo-Babylonian text, where a word for „heir" was needed, the word *yāritu*, a loan-word from Aramaic is used.[55] In the Mari texts we find the seemingly strange request of the god Adad of Kallassu (a section of Aleppo, it would seem.) for a *niḫlatu*. The god is quoted as saying „Now, since I have restored him to the throne of his father's house *niḫlatum ina qātišu eleqqē*".[56] The CAD (N II, p. 219) translated *niḫlatu* as „property handed over" and this phrase as „I can take out of his hand what was handed over". However, Moran's translation, following Landsberger *apud* Malamat, is more appropriate: „I should receive from him a *niḫlatum*".[57] Following Malamat and Moran one might venture that the priests of Adad wanted a specific plot of land for their temple which would be the *niḫlatu*, the patrimony of their god. We may perhaps assume that it was land that had previously belonged to the god, and that they wanted it returned to him. This *niḫlatu* of Adad would match the *nḥlt* of Baʿal at Ugarit and that of YHWH at

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52 A.F.L. Beeston – M.A. Ghoul – W.W. Müller – J. Ryckmans, Sabaic Dictionary, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1982, p. 95.

53 E.g. Malamat, JAOS 82, 1962, p. 147, n. 22, follows Nougayrol and also quotes Ugaritic *nḥl* „heir". This is taken up again by Malamat in: Mari and the Early Israelite Experience, London, 1989, pp. 48-52.

54 J. Huehnergard, Ugaritic Vocabulary in Syllabic Transcription, Atlanta, 1987, p. 152.

55 CAD I/J, p. 325b, s.v. *jaritu*.

56 The full text has now been published by B. Lafont, Le roi de Mari et les prophètes du dieu Adad, RA 28, 1984, pp. 7-18, text, pp. 7-10. Lafont suggests that *niḫlatum* means „propriété, possession, domain".

57 ANET, p. 625.

Zion. In return we are told that Hadad would give Zimri-Lim a true reward which is phrased as „throne upon throne, palace upon palace, territory upon territory, city upon city".

The translation given by the CAD for *naḫālu* B (N I, p. 126) as „to hand over (property)" is also not adequate. Again in light of the use of this verb in Hebrew, Malamat's suggestion „assign (hereditary) property, apportion"[58] seems in place. He justifies this by analysis of ARM VIII 14:3-4, in which what is obviously patrimony is transferred *inḫilu* by members of a family to Yarim-Lim, an important person who is obviously fictionally adopted into that family. In another tablet the same Yarim-Lim receives property from the royal house (ARM VIII 12), and in two other texts (13,14) he acquires property under special circumstances, the term *naḫalum* being used. In another instance a daughter of Zimri-Lim complains that her parents had not granted her (*inḫilunini* „not granted me") a field and a garden (ARMT X 90: 3ff). Patrimony was by interpretation non-alienable. It could be transferred but only by a sort of subterfuge, thus proving the rule.[59] The term *niḫlatu* is sparsely attested and Ugaritic *nḥlt* is found in a very limited phrase, whereas Hebrew *naḥălāh* is frequent. This, as well as other presumably shared institutions, may best be studied also in the light of the terms used for them.

I would agree that there is a great deal of arbitrariness in the choices made by the etymologist. It is indeed easy to err and there are many pitfalls, since we all suffer from limited knowledge and lack of experience with all the languages that are of necessity involved in our work. We will not be able to do a perfect job, but we are not free of the obligation to try our best.

Abstract:

This paper deals with 'etymological semantics' following the criteria that James Barr set up in his studies of this subject: a) Prehistoric reconstruction; b) Historical tracing within an observable development; c) Identification of adoptions from another language; d) Analysis of words into component morphemes; e) The use of a cognate language to discover the sense in Hebrew; f) Simple comparison of institutions with cognate names. Examples of these categories were discussed in detail with an attempt to show the usefulness of some of these criteria in adding to our appreciation of the meaning of the Biblical text. The article also criticizes the misuse of etymology in current lexica and the search for a *Grundbedeutung* for Hebrew roots.

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[58] JAOS 82, pp. 147-50; Mari and the Early Israelite Experience, p. 49.

[59] The phrase *ša ina niḫlatim ikulu* in ARM XXIII, 73, ll. 40-41 remains difficult.

Response to J.C. Greenfield

Bertil Albrektson (Uppsala)

Professor Greenfield finds it „difficult to add" anything to Professor Barr's treatment of etymological semantics,[1] and he believes that it „would have been much easier ... to be the respondent." In fact my task is more difficult: not only do I agree with Professor Barr, but I also agree in all essentials with Professor Greenfield, who has provided us with a series of learned and useful examples of the different types of etymological studies distinguished by Professor Barr. Thus there seems to be even less left for me to do than there was for Professor Greenfield.

True, I can think of one or two points in his examples where I might perhaps be able to add an observation or query a particular statement. But these are all minor details, and I hesitate to start a discussion of particular examples when our foremost task should be the general problem of methods and principles. My response will be to try instead to go on where Professor Greenfield leaves off. That is, I shall attempt to say something, however briefly and superficially, about different types of etymological studies and about the limitations of etymology as a method to discover the meaning of words. I must confess that as regards linguistic theory I am something of an innocent, and my tools are blunt (and as a reader of English detective novels I realize how much harm a blunt instrument can do).

The typology of etymological study suggested by Professor Barr seems to me sensible and useful. It is not so much a strictly logical classification with an entirely consistent common basis of subdivision as, rather, a pragmatic attempt to list several different operations which have been termed etymological. This means that there is some overlapping: a particular procedure may legitimately belong to more than one type.

Naturally, this typology is not the only possible one. Professor Yakov Malkiel of Berkeley once published a paper which he called „A Tentative Typology of Etymological Studies".[2] In this he classified contributions according to three major criteria: (1) by scope; (2) by material; and (3) by degree of complexity. His classification „refers strictly to approaches, not to solutions".[3] It is a highly readable article, full of interesting information, but the examples are as a rule taken from living languages with an almost unlimited corpus, and so it is not as immediately useful to us as Professor Barr's typology, which is directly adapted to biblical Hebrew.

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[1] J. Barr, Etymology and the Old Testament, Language and Meaning. Studies in Hebrew Language and Biblical Exegesis (OTS 19), Leiden 1974, pp. 1-28.

[2] Y. Malkiel, A Tentative Typology of Etymological Studies, International Journal of American Linguistics 23, 1957, 1-17; reprinted in: Y. Malkiel, Essays on Linguistic Themes, Oxford 1968, pp. 199-227.

[3] Essays, p. 200.

Not all the types listed by Professor Barr are equally relevant to our problem, i.e. in what way etymological arguments can be used in attempts to discover the sense of a word in classical Hebrew or other dead languages. Our question in fact coincides with Professor Barr's type E, defined as „Use of a cognate language to discover the sense in Hebrew".[4] If we look to etymological studies in general, this particular approach is in fact unusual (it does not figure at all in Professor Malkiel's typology). The point of departure for the etymologist is normally a word with a known meaning, and the task is to establish its family relations to other words and to follow its semantic history as far back as possible. But when we talk of etymological semantics as a method in the study of classical Hebrew, the meaning of a word is not the starting-point but the goal which we hope to reach: the whole enterprise moves in the opposite direction from ordinary etymological research.[5] By comparing words from the same root in cognate languages such as Arabic or Aramaic or Accadian we hope to establish – at least roughly and approximately – the meaning of a Hebrew word that has hitherto not been fully understood.

This heuristic function is not really the normal application of etymological research, and it is characteristic that all the other types of etymology listed by Professor Barr are of a different kind. These other types are certainly not without interest for the semantics of biblical Hebrew but they do not help to determine meanings not otherwise known.

A possible exception is Professor Barr's type C: „Identification of adoptions from another language".[6] This can in certain cases be a sub-division of type E: a difficult word may be explained, not as an indigenous Hebrew derivation from a common Semitic root but as a loan-word from a foreign language, cognate or not. But type C is of course not restricted to words of unknown or disputed meaning: clearly it is a scholarly task to establish also the foreign descent of words the meaning of which is not in doubt, as Professor Barr's example, *hykl* „temple, palace", from Sumerian É.GAL „great house", or Professor Greenfield's *srnym*, the „lords" or „rulers" of the Philistines, supposed to be related to Greek τύραννος. Not least for the lexicographer is it important „to identify the language from which they came, their meaning in that language and, if there is sufficient information, the date of their adoption into Hebrew".[7]

Professor Barr's types A and B which he calls „Prehistoric reconstruction"[8] and „Historical tracing within an observable development"[9] also belong to the traditional kind: both have to do with „the search for word origins"[10] (to quote Professor Malkiel's refreshingly simple definition of etymology), and both are clearly important scientific tasks in themselves. But if we are talking of methods to discover the meanings of words, then they are obviously not immediately relevant.

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[4] Op. cit., p. 15.
[5] Cf. Barr, op. cit., p. 15.
[6] Op. cit., p. 9.
[7] Barr, op. cit., p. 9.
[8] Op. cit., p. 4.
[9] Op. cit., p. 7.
[10] Y. Malkiel, Etymology and General Linguistics, Word 18, 1962, 198-219; reprinted in Essays (above note 2), pp. 175-198; the quotation is on p. 177.

They may, however, help us to distinguish homonyms which coincide in Hebrew but can be separated by their etymology.[11]

Professor Barr's type D, „Analysis of words into component morphemes"[12] seems to me to be essentially a question of grammatical derivation, and I would hesitate to regard it as a branch of etymology proper (and Professor Barr himself seems to entertain similar doubts). Of course we need to know from which root a verb is derived to be able to list it correctly in the dictionary and this is not always straightforward, but such cases are quite rare. The verb *hštḥwh* is a case in point: it depends on the grammatical analysis (from *šḥh* or from *ḥwh*?) whether you should put it under *š* or *ḥ* in a dictionary.[13]

The only remaining type is the last one in Professor Barr's series, type F, defined as „Simple comparison of institutions with cognate names".[14] I share Professor Barr's own doubts whether this is a real case at all; it is, as he says, „rather something found in association with etymology".[15] Professor Greenfield is mildly critical of this and argues that Professor Barr has obscured the matter, but I must confess that I do not fully understand how his own example, which is the term *nḥlh*, shows this. To my mind it remains true that the linguistic affinities of *nḥlh* are one thing, a question that belongs to etymology proper, whereas the degree of similarity between phenomena for which the word *nḥlh* and cognate names are used is a different problem which cannot be decided on linguistic grounds.

I am, on the other hand, a little uncertain about the legitimacy of treating „institutions with cognate names" as a special case. The reason why Professor Barr has chosen to single out this as a type of its own is clear: it is quite common in biblical studies to compare Israelite institutions with similar phenomena bearing similar names in the neighbouring cultures. But in principle this is, I think, just another case of *signifiant* and *signifié*, and there seems to be no methodological reason why the fact that the *signifié* happens to be a social phenomenon should demand a different treatment from when it is, say, an astronomical object, or a religious concept, or an agricultural implement.

Thus we may perhaps conclude that of Professor Barr's six types taken over by Professor Greenfield, only E, and partly C, are strictly relevant to our main problem, how to discover meanings of words in a dead language. Types A, B, and partly C are not methods of detecting semantic values: rather they are ways of explaining meanings already known on other grounds and of elucidating the semantic history of words. Types D and F, finally, may be disregarded as not belonging to etymology in any strict sense.

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11 See, e.g., U. Rüterswörden, Response to J. Barr, above p. 15-20.

12 Op. cit., p. 11.

13 For a detailed discussion of the conflicting theories see J. A. Emerton, The Etymology of *hištaḥ^{a}wāh*, Instruction and Interpretation. Studies in Hebrew Language, Palestinian Archaeology and Biblical Exegesis (OTS 20), Leiden 1977, pp. 41-55. Cf. also G. I. Davies, A Note on the Etymology of *hištaḥ^{a}wāh*, VT 29, 1979, 493-495; S. Kreuzer, Zur Bedeutung und Etymologie von *hištaḥ^{a}wāh/yštḥwy*, VT 35, 1985, 39-60.

14 Op. cit., p. 17.

15 Op. cit., p. 18.

I should like to add, however, that the dividing-line between the first two of these three groups ought perhaps not to be drawn too sharply. There are cases where the meaning of a word may be known on other grounds, for instance with the aid of context and parallelism, but where an etymological argument may corroborate the understanding of the meaning which has been reached by other routes. In Isaiah 28 there occurs in v. 15 the problematic word *ḥozeh*. It has long been thought that it must mean something like „agreement" or „contract", not least on the basis of the parallelism with the word *bryt* „covenant".[16] This understanding is found already in several ancient versions: the Septuagint has συνθήκη and the Vulgate has *pactum*. But the etymology of the word has created difficulties: attempts to derive it from the well-known verb *ḥzh* „see", „behold" seem rather strained. However, in an article in 1937 G. R. Driver presented comparative evidence which confirms the traditional sense: South Arabic has a noun from the same Semitic root meaning „agreement".[17] This appears to be a better explanation than the earlier attempts to derive the meaning from *ḥzh* „see" (and it is perhaps a little surprising that this etymology is not even mentioned in HAL – there the emendation *ḥsd* is suggested, though with a question-mark). This is a case where comparative etymology has helped to support a traditional meaning rather than suggesting a new sense for an obscure word. But the mode of procedure is similar, and whether the meaning defended by an etymological argument is traditional or new, it needs in both cases support from other arguments as well, above all the argument from context.

For it seems to be characteristic of the etymological method that it cannot as a rule achieve certainty by itself: it must be used in combination with other methods, chiefly of course a study of the context or contexts in which an obscure word is used. This uncertainty appears to characterize not only etymology as a way to discover meanings but also etymological studies in general. There is an important difference in precision and certainty between on the one hand the study of sound-changes and on the other the study of changes of meaning.[18] It has been possible to formulate phonetic laws according to which the sounds in different languages have developed. We are all acquainted with tables showing how for instance the sibilants in different Semitic languages correspond to one another and how they can be seen to have developed from the sounds of a hypothetical proto-Semitic language. But it is not possible to discover a similar regularity in the development of meanings. It may be possible to establish common types of semantic change, but nothing really comparable to the sound laws which were one of the great discoveries of nineteenth-century linguistic scholarship.

The French linguist Michel Bréal asked just over a hundred years ago: „Est-il possible de formuler les lois selon lesquelles le sens des mots se transforme?" – and

[16] See J. Barr, Comparative Philology and the Text of the Old Testament, Oxford 1968, pp. 230, 326 (no. 123).

[17] G. R. Driver, Linguistic and Textual Problems: Isaiah I-XXXIX, JTS 38, 1937, 44.

[18] See J. Trier, Wege der Etymologie (Philologische Studien und Quellen, 101), Berlin 1981, p. 16. The sound-laws, of course, are generalizations which are not universally applicable: exceptions do exist. Cf. V. Pisani, Die Etymologie. Geschichte – Fragen – Methode, München 1975 (German translation of the second, revised Italian edition, 1967), pp. 165 f.

his answer was: „nous sommes disposés à répondre que non. La complexité des faits est telle, qu'elle échappe à toute règle certaine".[19]

This is of course especially obvious in Professor Barr's type E. In his other types, as we saw, the result of the semantic development is known, and the task of the etymological investigation is to retrace this development as far back as possible. Even if there is no lack of difficulties and uncertainties, it is perhaps slightly less precarious to follow the track backwards than to start from a root, found only in a cognate language, and to guess which of many possible routes the semantic development has taken. The possibilities of going astray are alarmingly numerous.

It can be quite instructive to apply the etymological method to modern cases where we do know the answer. Suppose for example that English were a dead language with a limited corpus and that we were confronted with a *hapax legomenon* „queen", occurring only in the plural in the name „Queens' College", which, to judge from the context, seems to be an institution in a university city called Cambridge, known also from other texts in classical English. Now if there is no other occurrence of this word, we must look to cognate languages for a solution. And indeed there exists in the Scandinavian languages a word of the same root as „queen": it is the common word for „woman" – Swedish „kvinna", Danish „kvinde", Norwegian „kvinne". It would seem a reasonable hypothesis that the word did in fact have the same meaning in the closely related English language, and the designation „Queens' College" would then indicate that this was a college for women – which fits perfectly with the plural form of this obscure *hapax legomenon*. This conclusion can be supported by a historical argument: there is some evidence in the limited corpus of classical English that the first colleges were reserved for men, so that it would be quite natural for a college for women, especially if it was the first one, to have its revolutionary character indicated in its very name, „Queens' College", meaning „women's college".

Well, there is nothing wrong with this etymological argument – except that it is completely mistaken. The English word „queen" is etymologically the same as the word for „woman" in the Scandinavian languages,[20] but the English word has followed a semantic development of its own, which has resulted in the highly specialized meaning of „female sovereign" or „king's wife". This is how words tend to behave – and Hebrew words are no exception. That is why the etymological method of discovering the meaning of obscure words is frequently so unreliable. Vittore Pisani, in his book on etymology, rightly concludes that „in questions of meaning the developments move in such a way that one cannot as a matter of fact draw any line between the possible and the impossible".[21]

The study of etymology is a fascinating branch of learning and a valuable activity in its own right. But its applicability in our particular case, its possible value for the study of the semantics of biblical Hebrew, is restricted. It is a route that we must sometimes take, but then we should be aware of the many snares and pitfalls that await us. Etymology is, to borrow once more a phrase from Professor Malkiel, „the

[19] M. Bréal, L'histoire des mots, Paris 1887, quoted by Pisani, op. cit., p. 159.

[20] See, e.g., The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, Oxford 1966, s.v. queen; E. Wessén, Våra ord, deras uttal och ursprung, Stockholm 1960, s.v. kvinna.

[21] Op. cit., p. 128.

domain of individuality in language history".[22] Each case of semantic change may possibly be unique. That is why etymological arguments and results do not lend themselves easily to abstraction and formalization.

Abstract:

Prof. Greenfield's contribution is a series of detailed examples; in the response more general problems of methods and principles are discussed. It is established that of the six types of etymological studies listed by J. Barr and adopted by Greenfield only type E, and partly C, are relevant to the problem of discovering meanings of words in a dead language. Types A, B, and partly C, are not methods of detecting semantic values: rather they are ways of explaining meanings already known and of elucidating the semantic history of words. Types D and F may be disgarded as not belonging to etymology in any strict sense.

The etymological method cannot as a rule achieve certainty by itself: it must be used in combination with other methods. In most types of etymological study the known end product of a semantic development is the starting-point, and the task is to retrace this development as far back as possible. Already this involves uncertainties; it is even more difficult to move in the opposite direction, with the previously unknown meaning of a word as the goal. That the risk of going astray is great is shown by an instructive example. The conclusion is that the value of the etymological method for the study of the semantics of biblical Hebrew is limited.

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[22] Essays, p. 221.

Paradigmatical Semantics*

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0. The concept of „paradigmatical semantics" is not a standard notion in modern linguistics. It is absent from the index of Lyons's excellent manual *Semantics*, as well as from the works of Leech and Kempson[1]. However, Lyons's book deals explicitly, in volume I, with the notion of „Paradigmatic relationship". The account given there explicitly refers to the notion of *substitution*[2], and discusses the complementarity between *selection* and *combination*[3]. We touch here the fundamental dimensions of language, as a relational build-up of signs: a „combinatory" dimension, involving combinations between elements (and restrictions affecting these combinations), and a „connective" dimension, involving a series of non-sequential relations (e.g., substitution, association) between elements. It was Ferdinand de Saussure who identified this twofold dimension, positing a distinction between *rapports syntagmatiques* and *rapports associatifs*[4]. Saussure's terms were later replaced with

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1 See J. Lyons, Semantics, London, 1978; G. Leech, Semantics, Harmondsworth 1974[2]; R. Kempson, Semantic Theory, London 1977.
In the semantic study of Biblical Hebrew, the focus of attention has been on lexical semantics; see J. Barr, Semantics of Biblical Language, Oxford 1961; B. Kedar, Biblische Semantik: Eine Einführung, Stuttgart 1981; M. Silva, Biblical Words and their Meaning, Grand Rapids 1983.

2 „The paradigmatic relations contracted by units are those which hold between a particular unit in a given syntagm and other units which are substitutable for it in the syntagm. For example, „old" is paradigmatically related with „young", „tall", etc. in expressions like „the old man", „the young man", „the tall man", etc., as „man" is paradigmatically related with „woman", „dog", etc. in expressions like „the old man", „the old woman", „the old dog", etc. Similarly, the letters *i, e* and *a* are intersubstitutable for one another in the word-forms *pit, pet* and *pat*" (Lyons, Semantics, vol. I, p. 241).

3 „The set of paradigmatically related, or intersubstitutable units that can occur in one position is typically different from the set of units that can occur in another position. We identify units by virtue of their potentiality of occurrence in certain syntagms; and the selection of one element rather than another produces a different resultant syntagm. To describe a language-system is to specify both the membership of the paradigmatic sets and the possibilities of combination of one set with another in well-formed syntagms. Looked at from this point of view, languages can be seen, at each level of analysis, as having two dimensions, or axes, of structure; and every unit has its place at one or more points in the two-dimensional structure" (Lyons, Semantics, vol. I, p. 241).

4 „Linearity precludes the possibility of uttering two words simultaneously. They must be arranged consecutively in spoken sequence. Combinations based on sequentiality may be called *syntagmas*. The syntagma invariably comprises two or more consecutive units: for example, *re-lire* („re-read"), *contre tous* („against all"), *la vie humaine* („the life of man"), *Dieu est bon* („God is good"), *s'il fait beau temps, nour sortirons* („if it's fine, we'll go out"). Outside the context of discourse, words having something in common are associated together in the

the pair „syntagmatic/paradigmatic"[5], the latter referring to a non-linear, or categorial, organization of elements which can be substituted for each other or significantly contrasted in a given context.

In line with the most common acceptation of the term „paradigm", I would define „Paradigmatical semantics" as the study of the semantic content of
(a) all types of structures which are recurrent throughout a class of items
(b) the relationships which connect a particular item with a set of environments, or which can be discovered between different sets of forms not contrasting in the same environment.
Within this view, there is no fundamental dividing-line between semantics and grammar: grammatical categories/structures also have a semantics, which can be fitted into a paradigmatic frame. Such a position allows us to adopt, as a methodological tool, a *distributional* approach in a consistent way: we are interested in the co-occurrence, and restrictions (partial or total) on co-occurrence, between elements of a linguistic system. Also, the notion of paradigm will be applied to any kind of linguistic structure: syllabic formants, discontinuous morphemic patterns, combined patterns, and constituted lexical items. In this view, therefore, paradigmatical semantics is not annexed to grammar, but is an integrated part of the grammatical description of a language; moreover, it can (or should) be studied with the same distributional method as linguists have been using for phonology and morphology.

1. Within paradigmatical semantics we will do well to distinguish between
(a) a semantic analysis of *terms, patterns*, and *units*
(b) a so-called „semantic" analysis of the content of terms.
It has been customary to speak of „semantic analyses" with reference to studies, e.g. by Pottier, Greimas, of semantic fields in terms of „classematic" features[6]. A well-known example is the analysis of the French terms for various types of seats: *chaise, fauteuil, canapé, sofa*, etc. The features extracted from the analysis of terms are, however, not given within the linguistic system: they are features which can be ascribed to the referents (or prototypical referents) of the terms. The only valid linguistic conclusion that can be drawn from such an analysis does not concern the semantic structure of the language (or, better, of a lexical subsystem): it concerns

memory. In this way they form groups, the members of which may be related in various ways. For instance, the word *enseignement* („teaching") will automatically evoke a host of other words: *enseigner* („to teach"), *renseigner* („to inform", etc); or *armement* („arming"), *chargement* („loading") etc.; or *éducation* („education"), *apprentissage* („apprenticeship"). All these words have something or other linking them ... Syntagmatic relations hold *in praesentia*. They hold between two or more terms copresent in a sequence. Associative relations, on the contrary, hold *in absentia*. They hold between terms constituting a mnemonic group" (F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, tr. R. Harris, London 1983, p. 121-122).

[5] See L. Hjelmslev, Omkring sprogteoriens grundlaeggelse, København 1943.

[6] Called *sèmes*, or *classèmes*, or *virtuèmes*. See B. Pottier, Vers une sémantique moderne, Travaux de Linguistique et de Littérature 2, 1964, 107-137; A.J. Greimas, Sémantique structurale, Paris 1966.

the lexematic filling-up (or articulation) of a domain of experience, as it can be logically dissected.

2. The view I will adopt here is that a *linguistically relevant semantics* is only possible if one takes into account linguistic *form*, as a recurrent structure which occupies, in a significant way, a particular *position* within the linguistic system. This also implies that the notion of *paradigm* will be taken here to be *formally* grounded; I admit that there may be interesting topics of study starting from an ontologically or conceptually defined notion of paradigm (e.g., for the study of kinship terms or of colour terms, or for the study of (near-)synonyms and opposites), but I fail to see their linguistic relevance when they are not based on the inspection of linguistic form.

As a consequence we will not deal here with the keynotions of what is commonly called „structural semantics", viz. *synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy, hyperonymy.* Synonymy and antonymy are undoubtedly relations which can be construed between elements belonging to the same paradigm; in fact, parallel formations can be shown to be (almost) synonyms, and such cases they are of course very important for the linguist. The importance lies in the fact that we find here twofold evidence for the arbitrariness of linguistic signs:

(a) More closely related formations (*maqtal/maqtil*) may differ in meaning: an interesting case in point is *mar ʾeh* vs. *mar ʾāh* of the root *r ʾh*.

The first word *mar ʾeh* (always in the singular) basically refers to the exterior visual aspect:

1 Sm 17,42 *ʿim yᵉpēh mar ʾeh* „with a handsome appearance"

1 Sm 16,7 *ʾal tabbēṭ ʾel marēhū* „do not look upon his appearance"

2 Sm 11,2 *wᵉhā ʾiššāh ṭōbat mar ʾeh mᵉōd* „and the woman was very good of form"[7]

The second word *mar ʾāh*, also occurring in the plural, refers rather to the action of seeing; it occurs in Ex 38,8 with the meaning „mirror".

Gn 46,2 *wayyōʾmer ʾᵉlōhīm lᵉyiśrāʾēl bᵉmarʾōt hallaylāh wayyōʾmer yaʿᵃqōb yaʿᵃqōb* „and God said to Israel in a vision by night ‚Jacob, Jacob'"

1 Sm 3,15 *uśᵉmūʾēl yārēʾ mēhaggīd ʾet hammarʾah ʾel ʿēlī* „and Samuel was afraid to tell the vision to Eli"[8]

Ex 38,8 *wayyaʿaś ʾēt hakkiyyōr nᵉḥošet wᵉʾēt kannō nᵉḥošet bᵉmarʾōt haṣṣōbᵉʾōt ʾᵃšer ṣābᵉʾū petaḥ ʾōhel mōʿēd* „The basin and its stand he made of bronze out of the mirrors of the women who were on duty at the entrance to the Tent of the Presence".

(b) Less closely related formations may be seen as coinciding in meaning: e.g. *mrbyt/trbyt* „increase, interest".

Data such as these raise the unavoidable question: *how do we know whether two terms are synonymous*? For instance, are *yšwʿh* and *tšwʿh* synonyms in Biblical Hebrew? And if not, what is the difference between the notion of „salvation" (if that

[7] See also Gn 2,9; 12,11; 24,16; 26,7; 29,17; 39,6; 41,2-4; Jd 13,6; Is 52,14; and note the expression *loʾ marʾeh* „insignificant", Is 53,2.

[8] See also Nu 12,6 and the syntagm „vision of God" in Ez 1,1; 8,3; 40,2.

is the proper translation!) expressed by *yšwʿh* and that expressed by *tšwʿh*?[9] In fact, a close scrutiny of so-called synonyms often reveals a semantic difference:

> „The terms מַחֲלִיִים and תַּחֲלֻאִים, deriving from ḤLʾ/Y mean ‚illness(es), disease(s)', but the *mqtl* form has reference to illness resulting from the effects of wounds (2 Ch. 24:25), whereas the *tqtl* form refers to illness resulting from the ravages of hunger (Jer. 14:18; 2 Ch. 21:19).“[10]

This leads to another problem: where are we to draw the line between basic meaning and contextual meaning? If no decision is taken, it seems very difficult to assess the notion of synonymy on solid grounds; and more generally, all lexicographical work is compromised.

It is even less clear what should count as antonymy, hyponymy or hyperonymy on purely formal grounds: we can easily construct logical relationships of different types (e.g., a symmetrical relation of identity which is transitive, in an open domain [= SYNONYMY]; a symmetrical relation of opposition, within a closed domain [= ANTONYMY]; a non-symmetrical transitive relation of inclusion, in an open domain [= HYPERONOMY] and its converse [= HYPONYMY]), but in what way is this a linguistically relevant analysis of Hebrew?

The last question raises the fundamental problems to be dealt with by any approach to the paradigmatic semantics of any natural language:

(I) How is meaning constituted?

(II) What kind of account do we want to give of meaning?

3. The problem of *meaning*-constitution is an intricate one, in that several options are open to the investigator. One of them is to look for the *meaningful* units within the lexicon, and the approach which I would favour here is a *taxonomic* one, based on observed usage, and not an a priori logical decomposition. Let me give as an example the Biblical Hebrew word *ṭp*. Gesenius-Buhl translate it as „die kleinen Kinder“; in Koehler-Baumgartner's *Lexicon* it is translated „those of a nomadic tribe who are not able to march“. In HAL[3] two translations are juxtaposed: „kleine Kinder“ and „die nicht od. wenig Marschfähigen d. wandernden Stammes“. The term is interesting, given that its *signifié* seems to correspond to a segmentation which is unparalleled in the Indo-European languages. But if we look into the texts, we note, among other things, the following:

(1) very often, there is not the slightest connection with a nomadic setting: e.g., Dt 3,6 *ḥḥrm kl ʿyr mtm hnšym whṭp*[11]

(2) in many cases, the word *ṭp* is found in a juxtaposing chain, which contains words such as „men“, „women“, and „aliens“, e.g. Nu 31,9 („the women of Midian and their infants“), Dt 31,12 („the people, men and women and the little ones, and your

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[9] This question is *not* answered by J. Sawyer, Semantics in Biblical Research. New methods of defining Hebrew words for salvation, Stocksfield 1972.

[10] See B. Waltke – M. O'Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, Winona Lake 1990, p. 91 (with reference to S. Gevirtz, Formative ע in Biblical Hebrew, Eretz-Israel 16, 1982, 57-66); see also their remarks on *tʾwh* amd *mʾwh*.

[11] Cf. Dt 2,34 *wnlkd ʾt kl ʿryw bʿt hhwʾ wnḥrm ʾt kl ʿyr mtm whnšym whṭp* and Esth 3,13 *wnšlwḥ sprym byd hrṣym ʾl kl mdynwt hmlk lhšmyd lhrg wlʾbd ʾt kl hyhwdym mnʿr wʿd zqn ṭp wnšym*.

stranger who is within your gates"), Jos 8,35 („women, little ones and aliens"), Jer 40,7 („men, women, and children"), Jer 41,16 („men (...), women, children and eunuchs"), Jer 43,6 („men, women, and children").
(3) *ṭp* is often found in contexts, in parallelism, with *bnym* where it seems to refer to *younger children* who are not capable of providing for their own nourishment (cf. Jer 40,7); e.g.
Nu 16,27 *wdtn w ʾbyrm yṣʾw nṣbym pṭḥ ʾhlyhm wnšyhm wbnyhm wṭpm*
Dt 1,39 *wṭpkm ʾšr ʾmrtm lbz yhyh wbnykm ʾšr lʾ ydʿw hywm ṭwb wrʿ*[12]
This explains why the use of *ṭp* (contrasted with *bnykm* in Dt 1,39) seems to involve the responsibility assumed by the family or a member of the family; in Gn 50,21 Joseph promises to his brothers that he will nourish them and their little ones:
ʾnky ʾklkl ʾtkm wʾt ṭpkm
Such an interpretation, involving the notion of responsibility for a group of relatives unable to provide for their own nourishment, receives support from the following facts:

(A) *ṭp* is used in conjunction with notions such as „livestock, flock":
Ex 10,24 *rq ṣʾnkm wbqrkm yṣg gm ṭpkm ylk ʿmkm*
„only leave your flocks and your herds behind; your *ṭp* may go with you"
Nu 32,16 *gdrt ṣʾn nbnh lmqnnw ph wʿrym lṭpnw*
„we will build sheep-folds here for our livestock, and cities for our *ṭp*"
Jd 18,21 *wypnw wylkw wyśymw ʾt ḥṭp wʾt hmqnh wʾt hkbwdh lpnyhm*
„and they departed, and put the *ṭp* and the live-stock, and the valuables before them"
Nu 32,26 *ṭpnw nšynw mqnnw wkl bhmtnw yhyw šm bʿry hglʿd*
„our *ṭp*, our wives, our flocks, and all our cattle shall be there in the cities of Gilead"

(B) in Jos 1,13-14 *ṭp* is included among the „gifts of God":
wntn lkm ʾt hʾrṣ hzʾt nšykm ṭpkm

(C) the expression *lpy ḥṭp* indicates the number of family members for whom responsibility is assumed:
Gn 47, 12 *wyklkl ywsp ʾt ʾbyw wʾt ʾḥyw wʾt kl byt ʾbyw lḥm lpy ḥṭp*
„Joseph provided with bread the entire family of his father, according to the number of the *ṭp*".

In conclusion, it seems better not to adopt as a general translation for *ṭp* „those incapable of marching with the caravan", a meaning or, better, gloss which receives support only from Gn 46,5
wyśʾw bny yśrʾl ʾt yʿqb ʾbyhm wʾt ṭpm wʾt nšyhm bʿglwt ʾšr šlḥ prʿh lśʾt ʾtw
and maybe also from Jd 18,21 (quoted above) and Ex 12,37
wysʿw bny yśrʾl mrʿmss skth kšš mʾwt ʾlp rgly hgbrym lbd mṭp
The account given here of the *meaning-constitution of ṭp* may have shown that paradigmatical semantics is (or should be) the result of distributional analysis – a distribution which can involve the juxtaposition or combination of elements which belong, in one or the other respect, to the same paradigm (in the present case, the

[12] Cf. Gn 43,8; Gn 47,12; Gn 47,24; Jd 21,10.

paradigm of nouns referring to social groups with a particular status). Now, this is one way of approaching, in an a posteriori move, the problem of meaning-constitution. The second way is to interpret *meaning-units* within their anthropological or ethnographical setting, an option which necessarily involves a comparative approach. Here again, the approach to be taken should be an a posteriori one, and we should do well to label our categories as objectively as possible. Methodologically, we can rely here on studies involving componential analysis (in terms of ethnographic implementation), such as those of Lounsbury and Goodenough[13]. It also seems to me that such an approach will shed interesting light on etymological research. As an example, I would like to take the noun *leḥem* in Hebrew, the semantics of which should be replaced in its cultural setting, through a comparative analysis within Semitic[14].

In Akkadian the root *lêmu* (*le ʾāmu; laḫāmu - leḫēmu*) means „to take, to absorb"; it is used with the objects „bread" (*akalu*), flesh (and meat: *širu, šumu*), water (*mu*, pl. *mê*), or salt (*tabṭu*). The verb has no derived substantive attested with the meaning „food".

In the North-West Semitic languages the root *lḥm* is also attested. In Ugaritic we have a verb *lḥm* which means „to eat" (in the Qal) and „to feed" in the Šafel; there is also a substantive *lḥm* attested with the meaning „food", mostly „bread". In Hebrew we have a verb *lāḥam* which means „to eat", „to taste" and „to feed" (all in the Qal), next to a homophonous root *lḥm* which means „to get in touch with, to fight". Hebrew also has a noun *lᶜḥūm* meaning „flesh, body", and a noun *leḥem* meaning „bread, food", but never „meat". In Punic and in Aramaic the root is attested under the form of a noun meaning „food, victuals" (in Syriac also with the meaning „a cake or loaf of bread").

The situation in South Semitic forces us to adopt a flexible semantics, which is not referent-focused. In Classical Ethiopic *lāḥem* means „ox, cow". In Tigre the root occurs in two substantives: *lāḥmi* („cow") and *lāḥam* (a huge tree with eatable fruits). In Amharic *lām* means „cow". In the South Arabian language of Soqotri *leḥem* means „fish, big fish, shark". In Arabic the root *lḥm* occurs in verbal and nominal formations. The verb *laḥama* means „to feed somebody with meat, to sell meat", and *laḥima* means „to feed oneself with meat, to be carnivorous, to be fleshy, to use meat as bait". (A nominal derivation *laḥḥām* means „butcher".) The substantive *laḥmu* means „flesh, meat, pulp of a fruit", never „bread".

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[13] See, e.g., W.H. Goodenough, Componential Analysis and the Study of Meaning, Language 32, 1956, 195-216; W.H. Goodenough, Componential Analysis, Science 156, 1967, 1203-1209; W.H. Goodenough, Componential Analysis, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences vol. 3, New York 1968, 186-192; F.G. Lounsbury, A Semantic Analysis of the Pawnee Kinship Usage, Language 32, 1956, 158-194; The Structural Analysis of Kinship Semantics, in: H.G. Lunt (ed.), Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Linguists, The Hague 1964, 1073-1093; A Formal Account of the Crow- and Omaha-Type Kinship Terminologies, in: W.H. Goodenough (ed.), Cultural Anthropology: Essays in Honor of George Peter Murdock, New York 1964, 351-393.

[14] See P. Swiggers, The Meaning of the Root LḤM „Food" in the Semitic Languages, Ugarit-Forschungen 13, 1981, 307-308.

The perspective to adopt then is to place the meaning of the words belonging to the root *lḥm* within their anthropological and ethnographical context: it then becomes clear that the basic meaning is that of the „common (daily) food" used by each social group, either nomads, fishermen, or farmers.

The two examples given, viz. *ṭp* and *lḥm*, could easily be multiplied, and one could think here of *specific types* of investigation such as
(1) the interlocking of space and time in words such as:
qedem („front, ancient time, bygone days"), *qadmāh* („beginning, former state") and *qedem* („east"); *mō ʿēd* („place of meeting, appointed term, season")
(2) the vocabulary of flora: what is the meaning of terms such as *ʾēlāh, ʾallōn, bᵉrōš*?
(3) the religious vocabulary: how are we to define the meaning of terms such as those connected with the roots *ḥṭʾ, ʿwh, šgg, pšʿ*?
(4) the vocabulary of emotions: what is the content of terms such as *ʾbl, ʿnh, kʿs*, or *ḥpṣ, śmḥ, gyl*?

In all these cases we would end up with two basic problems:
(1) What is the *meaning* of a particular term or set of terms: how do we „restitute" this meaning, how far can we be sure to have grasped (something of) the semantics of the Hebrew language, and in what way can we refine our techniques in order to set up a paradigmatical semantics, not of our *translation* of Biblical Hebrew, but of the Hebrew language itself?
(2) What can we say about relations of synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy and hyperonymy: of what, e.g., is *ṭp* an antonym? What types of paradigmatical relationship do exist between *ḥṭʾ, ʿwh, šgg, pšʿ*? How can we „discover" such relationships? And, finally – the problem which constantly lurks behind us – how do we know that such relationships were indeed part of the linguistic competence of speakers (or users) of Biblical Hebrew?

4. I have raised the problem of meaning-constitution, taking it first from the point of view of language structure itself (the collocations of *ṭp*; the comparative ethnographic embedding of *lḥm*). But there is of course another side to it, that of the *account* given by the linguist. Here I see two main approaches in the (paradigmatical) semantics of Hebrew.

(A) The first one is the approach I would like to label *„Centripetal synthesis"*. A good example of it can be found in E. Jenni's *Das hebräische Piʿel: Syntaktisch-semasiologische Untersuchung einer Verbalform im Alten Testament* (1968), a study which can be recommended for both its methodology and its solid documentation[15]. Jenni's conclusion is that the Piʿel has a „factitive" or „resultative" meaning, and this allows him to reduce its basic semantics to the core-meaning „effecting or causing a state". Basically, this marks an important advance with respect to the traditional

[15] See also E. Jenni, Faktitiv und Kausativ von אבר 'zugrunde gehen', in: Hebräische Wortforschung. Festschrift zum 80. Geburtstag von Walter Baumgartner, Leiden 1967, 143-157; E. Jenni, Zur Funktion der reflexiv-passiven Stammformen im Biblisch-Hebräischen, Proceedings of the Fifth World Congress of Jewish Studies, vol. IV, Jerusalem 1973, 61-70.

descriptions of the Pi^{c}el as having a variety of meanings: intensive, causative, declarative, estimative. One could even propose a blanket-term for the Pi^{c}el by saying that it is the verb stem-form which has the meaning of *„state-effecting"* (= bringing into a state). Such an account captures the cases of
- factitive meaning: bringing someone into the state of an actor
- declarative/estimative meaning: bringing someone (verbally) into a state
- intensive meaning: bringing something into the state resulting from an action (or plurality of actions).

Still, a number of problems[16] remain, and because of space restrictions I must content myself with summing them up:
(1) It seems to me that the account hinges on the presupposition that stem-forms are clearly *delimited* from each other. But several verbs have mixed conjugations, and, e.g., some Pu^{c}al forms correspond to Qal forms (e.g., for the verbs *bšl*, *gdl*) and not to Pi^{c}el forms; this raises then the following question: To what extent is there functional opposition and/or functional overlap between Qal and Pi^{c}el or between Pi^{c}el and Hif^{c}il:
- We note, e.g., that *dbr* „to say" occurs in the Qal only with infinitive and participle forms, and in the Pi^{c}el in all personal forms, as well as in the infinitive and participle; in the light of the fact that some „stems" (e.g., Nif^{c}al and Pu^{c}al) are very frequent with participles and infinitives, we should perhaps revise the commonly found paradigmatization of conjugations and stem-forms:
- We note that some verbs only occur in the Pi^{c}el (e.g. *ḥdš*, *ṭnp*, *rmh*) „deceive, betray"): is there any „semantic" reason why this should be so?
- We note that there are cases of overlap between Hif^{c}il and Pi^{c}el forms: e.g., for *qdš*

Pi^{c}el „to declare sacred" (cfr. Gn 2,3 and Ex 20,11)
Hif^{c}il „to declare sacred" (cfr. Jos 20,7 and 1 K 9,3)

Pi^{c}el „to treat as holy" (cfr. Ex 20,8 and Dt 5,12)
Hif^{c}il „to treat as holy" (cfr. Ex 28,38 and Lv 22,2).

(2) The unifying semantic account of the Pi^{c}el runs into the problem of the well-attested semantic differentiation within the stem-form itself: even if one succeeds in bringing together, or in linking, the notions of factitivity and resultativity (as

[16] In recent years the complexity of the Hebrew verbal system has been examined in detail; see, e.g., A.F. Bean, A Phenomenological Study of the Hithpa^{c}el Verbal Stem in the Hebrew Old Testament (diss. Louisville, Faculty of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary), 1976; J.M. Léonard, Enquête sur l'émergence du hifil en hébreu biblique (diss. Montpellier), 1990; P.A. Siebesma, De functie van de Nif^{c}al in het Bijbels Hebreeuws in haar relatie tot de andere passief-reflexieve stamformaties, met name de Pu^{c}al en de Hof^{c}al (diss. Leiden), 1988. See also the methodological reflections offered by M.H Goshen-Gottstein, The System of the Verbal Stems in the Classical Semitic Languages, Proceedings of the International Conference on Semitic Studies Held in Jerusalem, 19-23 July 1965, Jerusalem 1969, 70-91; J. Hoftijzer, Een kwestie van vraagstelling, Leiden 1991; J. Hoftijzer, A Preliminary Remark on the Study of the Verbal System in Classical Hebrew, in: A.S. Kaye (ed.), Semitic Studies in Honor of Wolf Leslau, on the occasion of his eighty-fifth birthday November 14th, 1991, vol. I, Wiesbaden 1991, 645-651. For an overview of the problems, see L. McFall, The Enigma of the Hebrew Verbal System: Solutions from Ewald to the Present Day, Sheffield 1982.

opposed to an *actualis* meaning, as noted by Jenni), I fail to see how the account can capture
- the frequentative uses of the Pi^{c}el: *$^{\flat}$rb* (Pi^{c}el „to act as an ambusher"), *ktb* (Pi^{c}el „to fulfill the profession of scribe"), *n$^{\flat}$p* (Pi^{c}el „to commit adultery with several men")
- the privative use of the Pi^{c}el, sometimes formally coinciding with a resultative meaning: e.g., the Pi^{c}el of *dšn* „to clear of fat", *lbb* „to take away the heart", *^{c}ṣm* „to gnaw the bones" and *ḥṭ$^{\flat}$* (a) „to purify from sin" and (b) „to recognize something as missed/to present as a sin-offering".
(3) It is not clear to me why (or whether) *denominative* verbs (such as the abovementioned *dšn, lbb, ^{c}ṣm*) should be treated with the other types of Pi^{c}el. Personally, I would deal separately with all denominative verbs (occurring in Qal, Nif^{c}al, Pu^{c}al and Hif^{c}il stems).

Jenni's study provides a good example of paradigmatical semantics based on *structures* (or *patterns*); in the case of *ṭp* and *lḥm* we had examples of a semantics based on *terms*. We can also construe a semantics of *units*, and take these either *discretely* (such as, e.g., the initial *ayin* in some animal names: *^{c}ṭlp, ^{c}kbr, ^{c}kbyš, ^{c}kšwb, ^{c}qrb*; what would be „the semantics" of this initial *ayin*?) or *compactly*, as when we would try to study the semantics of units of negation in Biblical Hebrew. In the latter case, our „centripetal synthesis" would be somewhat trivial from the semantic point of view, but interesting from the syntactic point of view:
(1) We have to distinguish types of negation according to their scope[17]:
- a clause (or sentential predicate): *l$^{\flat}$, $^{\flat}$yn, $^{\flat}$l*
- a syntagm: *l$^{\flat}$*
- a word: *l$^{\flat}$, $^{\flat}$l*
(2) In addition, types of negation are to be distinguished according to the morphosyntactic nature of the scope: *$^{\flat}$yn* is used with stative forms, *blty* with infinitive constructs, *mn* with infinitives, *$^{\flat}$l* with jussive forms
(3) There are cases of non-functional opposition: e.g., *l$^{\flat}$ ḥkm* and *$^{\flat}$l mwt*.
From this, it should be clear that a *paradigmatical semantics of „negation"* in Biblical Hebrew will result in *superposed* paradigms (e.g., for *l$^{\flat}$*), and *imbricated* (sub)paradigms (e.g., for *$^{\flat}$l*), as well as in partly overlapping and partly mutually exclusive paradigms.

(B) This leads us into the second type of approach, which I would like to label *„Centrifugal analysis"*. Here also one can deal with specific units (e.g. the preposition *b* or the preposition *mn* – the latter raising the problem of the status of *mē/mi*), with structures (e.g., a centrifugal account of the Pi^{c}el stem-forms or Nif^{c}al stem-forms), or with specific terms. I will limit myself to an example involving the term *b^{c}l* (not taken as a proper name). This term occurs in a variety of uses, which I

[17] See B. Waltke – M. O'Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, o.c., 660-662; P. Swiggers, Nominal Sentence Negation in Biblical Hebrew: The Grammatical Status of אין, in: K. Jongeling – H.L. Murre-Van den Berg – L. Van Rompay (eds.), Studies in Hebrew and Aramaic Syntax presented to Professor J. Hoftijzer on the occasion of his sixty-fifth birthday, Leiden 1991, 173-179.

think it would be unjustified to translate (in a centripetal approach) as „possessor/holder of –".
It seems to me that given the collocations in which *b ʿl* occurs, we should distinguish at least the following meanings:
(a) „owner" (of a property): cf. Ex 21,28; 2 K1,8; Is 1,3; Pr 1,19; Hi 31,29
(b) „citizen, inhabitant": cf. Jos 24,11; Jd 9,2; 1 Sm 23,11
(c) „husband": cf. Gn 20,3; Dt 22,22
(d) „confederate": cf. Gn 14,13 (*b ʿl bryt*); Ne 6,18 (*b ʿl šbwʿh*)
(e) „a man of –" (meaning „a representative instance of" or „a man whose profession it is [to deal with –]"): this is the use we find in
b ʿl hḥlmwt (Gn 37,19) „a dreamer" [a dreamer-man]
b ʿly hpršym (2 Sm 1,6) „horsemen"
b ʿl mšpṭy (Is 50,8) „my juridical adversary" [the man of my judgment].

Note in this respect the typical usage in the Proverbs, where moral types are discussed:
Pr 22,24 *b ʿl ʾp* „a man given to anger"
Pr 23,2 *b ʿl npš* „a person given to greed"
Pr 24,8 *b ʿl mzmwt* „a person given to intrigues".
The latter use of *b ʿl* invites a „paradigmatic" comparison with *ʾyš* and *bn*; we can think here of collocations such as *ʾyš dbrym, ʾyš hbly ʿl, bn mwt, bn ḥyl*. It would be interesting to find out whether for the following collocations it would be possible to substitute for *b ʿl, ʾyš* or *bn* one or two of the other nouns:

bn mwt	*ʾyš khn*	*b ʿl hḥlmwt*
bn ḥyl	*ʾyš dbrym*	*b ʿl hpršym*
bn ʾdm	*ʾyš hšm*	*b ʿl bryt*

We can, I think, exclude with almost no hesitation sequences such as *b ʿl ʾdm* or *b ʿl khn, b ʿl hšm, bn hpršym*, but what about *ʾyš mwt* (attested), *b ʿl ḥyl, b ʿl dbrym, ʾyš ḥlmwt*, etc.? A full-grown paradigmatical semantics of Biblical Hebrew is only possible if we could know which substitutions are possible and which are impossible, and whether a particular substitution does or does not change the meaning of the collocation.
In any event, one cannot deny that in some cases there is overlap between two or three collocations (e.g., *bn/ʾyš/b ʿl yryḥw*), whereas in other instances no mutual substitution is possible; this is one argument in favour of the viability of a centrifugal analysis. The other argument is the observable fact of the multiplicity of collocations for each specific term, which are diverse in nature.

5. By way of conclusion, it may be worthwhile to reflect upon the scepticism expressed here about the attempt to construct a paradigmatical semantics of Biblical Hebrew. It seems to me that there are two important facts that justify a cautious attitude:
(1) All linguistic models are idealizations, which never can cope with the full complexity of the range of data; moreover, linguistic models tend to be selective, and some models are *just not* models in the full sense of the word: a set of techniques and procedures is not yet a model, and some types of conceptual

„models" are not operational and therefore do not deserve the label „model". We may feel more or less troubled by this; but the final criterion should be: will these (so-called) models stand the test of time or not?
(2) In dealing with languages – and especially with languages to which we no longer have direct access – we should never have the illusion that everything can be explained. We never fully dominate the lexicon of any language, let alone the lexical and grammatical structures of its synchronic varieties; as to historical stages, we can achieve much, provide we have at our disposal a rich collection of materials, well contextualized and homogeneously articulated. In the case of Biblical Hebrew we have a documentation which is dispersed in time and space, as well as in content and style: some of these parameters are very difficult to control through the text vocalized by the Massoretes – which, nobody would disagree, remains our starting-point to be taken as seriously (but not uncritically) as possible. Linguistic work on Biblical Hebrew can take (and probably should take) many forms; but we should never forget that in one or another respect we are groping in the dark[18].
Radicalizing the scepticism vented here, it seems that we should acknowledge that
(1) we have no clear idea of what the semantics of a paradigm is; it is even unclear whether there is a paradigm of lexical units (apart from some shared morphological properties);
(2) we hardly know what the notion of paradigm in semantics stands for. We still face unsolved fundamental questions such as the following: How are such paradigms constituted, how far is such an organization not simply an extralinguistic operation, and how far would it advance our knowledge of linguistic structures?

Abstract:

„Paradigmatical semantics" is defined here as the study of the semantic content of (a) all types of structures which are recurrent throughout a class of items, (b) the relationships which connect a particular item with a set of environments, or which can be discovered between different sets of forms not contrasting in the same environment.
The position adopted here is that a linguistically relevant semantics is only possible if one takes into account linguistic form as a recurrent structure which occupies, in a significant way, a particular position within the linguistic system. As a consequence, linguistic semantics can yield valuable results only when based on a distributional approach.
Two topics are addressed here from a formally based point of view: (1) How is meaning constituted? (2) What kind of account do we want to give of meaning? The first problem raises the difficult question of the restitution of the „language-internal meaning" as distinct from translational equivalences. As to the latter problem, a distinction is made between two types of approaches, viz. „centripetal synthesis" and „centrifugal analysis". Various examples are discussed to illustrate the possibilities and limitations of a paradigmatical semantics of Biblical Hebrew.

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[18] This is not to deny that *systematization* is possible and has indeed already been achieved in many areas of the grammar of Biblical Hebrew.

Response to P. Swiggers

Ernst Jenni (Basel)

I agree with Prof. Swiggers almost entirely, notably in that I am also of the opinion that paradigmatical semantics affects not only words, but also grammatical categories of all kinds. This is, by the way, what was meant twenty-five years ago by the terminology in the subtitle „syntaktisch-semasiologische Untersuchung" of my book on the Pi^{c}el, borrowed at that time from Ullmann.[1]
I am less sure that I would say that paradigmatical semantics should always be based on linguistic form (as opposed to content) to be linguistically relevant. However it is perhaps only a matter of terminology, and especially so when I fail to find mention of the correlative term to paradigmatical semantics, viz. syntagmatical semantics. Presumably the two terms are related to what Prof. Swiggers calls centripetal synthesis and centrifugal analysis. At any rate my contribution as a respondent is not so much a theoretical one on terminology, but should concern itself with practical problems of working according to the methods of paradigmatical (and syntagmatical) semantics.

Practical work in the field of paradigmatical semantics (restricted for the moment and for the sake of simplicity to word-semantics/lexicography) has two main objectives. First, how can two apparently synonymous lexemes be differentiated in a convincing manner? Equally important is the second question (which comes generally much less to the fore): How is it to be explained that two apparently different meanings are expressed by one and the same Hebrew word?
I shall try to exemplify this by two case studies: 1) What is the difference between *nūs* „to flee" and *brḥ* „to flee", both verbs belonging to the same paradigmatical field? 2) How is it that the temporal abstract noun *ʾaḥ^{a}rīt* signifies „future" as well as „end", the two meanings being in relative opposition?

1. Differentiation of Synonyms (Paronyms)
a) Reason for investigation.
The main reason which prompts any investigation of this kind does not generally consist in intralingual curiosity (How is the lexical field of „flight" or „escape" organized in classical Hebrew?). Nor is the formulation of the question an onomasiological one (What means are available in Hebrew for expressing the fact, that somebody „goes away from a dangerous situation"?). As a rule the inquiry practically always arises out of an interlingual comparison of meanings. In our case: both verbs are normally translated in Greek by φεύγειν, in Latin by „fugere", in German by „fliehen", in English by „to flee", only occasionally by a more general hyperonym „to run away" / „davonlaufen" / ἀποδιδράσκειν and so on. It belongs to

[1] S. Ullmann, The Principles of Semantics, Oxford 1951, 1963, 34-36; idem, Semantics. An Introduction to the Science of Meaning, Oxford 1967, 32-35.

the inter- (not intra-)lingual comparative observations too, when it is ascertained, that (Old)Aramaic also possesses only one dominant term (*ʿrq*), and also, paradoxically, that modern Hebrew uses only one verb, namely *brḥ*. Incidentally, it would have been different, if a contemporary Accadian scribe had been asked to translate the Old Testament. He would have instinctively translated *nūs* by *naparšudu* and *brḥ* by *nābutu*, because with him the lexical field in question was divided into two parts as in Hebrew. (At the time of Muhammad there is also a great difference between *haraba* „to flee" and the *Hidjra* of the prophet and his *muhāǧirūn*).

To sum up: In a dead language with a restricted corpus of text the reason for paradigmatic semantic investigation is practically always given by interlingual comparison of the vocabulary with all the advantages and dangers that are entailed by this fact. The practical work is always determined and even biased to some degree by the metalanguage employed by the investigator (English, French, German, modern Hebrew), and it is not wholly indifferent whether a data-base is set up in English or in French or in Latin.

b) Procedure of investigation.

Every differentiation of meanings concerning two (or more) quasi-synonyms has to analyse all instances of the use of the lexemes involved and to compare the two sets of occurrences in their context (syntagmatic semantics) in order to find out what is common to both and what is consistently different in both. Logically the result of this distributional analysis will be all the more plausible if the distinguishing semantical feature is relatively plain and simple and at the same time consistent in all the occurrences of the words involved. The heuristic presupposition is that normally two different forms should differ in at least one feature of content, and that instances, where the differences in content have been blurred, should be explained by the special semantic conditions that are prevailing. It is not sufficient to conclude that the meanings of two verbs have been partially assimilated or that they show an overlap without indicating where and under what conditions they intersect. In my experience many of these coincidences of originally distinguishable meanings are due to figurative use, that is words used in a generalized sense through loss of relevant semantic characteristics. To give an example: In German „sitzen" and „liegen" are evidently in semantic opposition. But in a figurative expression like „der Schaden sitzt tiefer" the verb can be exchanged: „der Schaden liegt tiefer", because abstract nouns do not sit and lie like human beings.

As a rule therefore one has to start the comparison of two lexemes with the primary, non-figurative attestations and seek for semantic features that make a difference. In my prime example, *nūs* vs. *brḥ* „to flee", the difference is quite clear (at least to me). Practically all occurrences of *nūs* (about 150) are concerned with the flight of individuals or collectives out of a dangerous situation (battle, wild animals, catastrophes) into more security, whereas *brḥ* (about 60 times) implies leaving an insupportable socio-political situation and passing into a new different state of dominion. In Ex 4,3 Moses flees from a serpent (*nūs*), in Ex 2,15 he leaves the dominion of Pharaoh and settles down in Midian (*brḥ*). In 2Sam 13,29 the sons of David flee in all directions on their mules after the assassination of Amnon

(*nūs*), in 2Sam 13,37 it is reported that Absalom has emigrated to the king of Geshur (*brḥ*). Of course I shall not go into the details of the argument (cf. Orientalia 47, 1978, 351-359).
I would just point out some methodological problems. The required distinguishing feature belongs to semantics and not merely to stylistics or to the domain of connotations. It is not provable and rather irrelevant, when *brḥ* is declared to be more elegant and solemn („gewählter und feierlicher", Gamberoni, ThWAT I, 1972, 780). *brḥ* is not a Sunday word in contrast to everyday *nūs*. It is also not decisive that *nūs* can have rather negative connotations, as Reindl remarks (ThWAT V, 1985, 313: „dass *nūs* ... der Beigeschmack des Schimpflichen anhaftet").
How the distinctive semantic feature can effectively be discovered is not easy to say. It seems to me that it is not merely a matter of intuition, but on the other hand there is no compelling logical procedure in sight. It is self-evident, that there is no room for logical *de*duction (in the words of Eco[2]: all beans in this bag are white / these beans here come from that bag / accordingly they must be white). Nor is it a classical form of logical induction (these beans here are white / they come from that bag / it is likely that the bag contains white beans). Rather it is that which Eco according to Peirce calls *ab*duction (the beans in this bag are white / these beans here are white / perhaps they come out of that bag). That means that the evidential value of our reasoning is not very strong and that the hypothesis cannot be a hundred percent proved and verified.

c) Presentation of results.
Supposing that a semantic differentiation in a paradigmatic field has been carried out successfully, and that it can be plausibly shown why there are some 150 occurrences of *nūs* and nearly 60 of *brḥ*, and why and under what conditions the partial opposition of the paronyms has been neutralized, for instance in figurative use (Cant 4,6 „until the shadows flee" with *nūs*; Job 9,25 „my days ... flee away" with *brḥ*) or by diachronic change in Late Hebrew (in Dan 10,7 „a great trembling fell on them and they fled to hide themselves", with non-specific *brḥ*, the classical Hebrew two-place paradigm seems to be superseded by the Aramaic and Greek one-place structure of the semantic field, using *brḥ* indiscriminately in the sense of classical *nūs* and contemporary Aram. *ʿrq*) – there is still a problem for the practising semanticist: How are the results to be presented to the scholarly world?
It is practically impossible to take into account all previous statements and contributions to the problem dispersed in dictionaries and commentaries and in the whole philologico-exegetical literature (as long as there exists no reliable data-base). It is also not always feasible to exhibit and discuss all the material under scrutiny even with a restricted corpus of text (concordances and data-bases are not easily read by the average consumer). It remains generally possible only to give an abbreviated and condensed account in a periodical (or to bury an article in a Festschrift), with the hope that not only the bibliographical reference but also the substance of the result of semantic work will eventually find its way into the

[2] U. Eco, Zeichen. Einführung in einen Begriff und seine Geschichte, Frankfurt/M. 1977, 132-134.

standard handbooks (and data-bases) during the next few decades, as a contribution to progress in the elucidation of the texts. When we choose this way of representing of our findings, we are faced with new practical problems. For instance, how much space must be devoted to the justification of our linguistic method every time an investigation is carried out? How often are we to repeat that our semantic reconstruction is a gross simplification and has to be used with the greatest caution? As to the aim of the paradigmatic semantic investigation: We should refrain from propagating or inculcating a new and/or better translation in the target language. The verb *brḥ* can carry on being translated by „fliehen", because we cannot change the existing semantic code in normal standard High German. What we can do is to circumscribe in a free way the special shade of sense in a given passage, either by a kind of catchword-synonym in our metalanguage or by a circumlocution or an analogous approximation taken from any language. The best thing will always be to give two sentences with the different verbs in juxtaposition, i.e. to work with contrast parallels (if available, cf. Ex 4,3 vs. 2,15). It is a lucky chance when both verbs occur in one and the same passage as in Jdg 9,21 (after the massacre by Abimelech Jotham flees (out of the immediate danger = *nūs*) and emigrates to Be>er (under a new dominion = *brḥ*), with the same sequence of verbs as in Assyrian royal inscriptions (*ipparšid-ma innabit ana rūqēti*, CAD N, 1, p. 284).

2. Structural non-differentiation of meanings.
What I have in mind here is not the normal phenomenon of polysemy, as for instance in the word *baᶜal* „possessor" (as shown in the centrifugal analysis by the speaker). There we are concerned with relatively simple syntagmatical semantics, with a core meaning („possessor") fanning out in different realizations of special meanings according to the semantic classes of what is possessed (things, animals, persons, second order entities [qualities, activities]). If the *baᶜal* is owner of movable property / landed property (houses) / a horse / a wife, he is accordingly „Besitzer" / „Bürger" / „Reiter" / „Ehemann". If he is *baᶜal bᵉrīt* / *mišpāṭ* / *ḥᵃlōm* / *>af*, if he „owns" a contract / juridical process / dream / rage or any abstract quality or activity, the word *baᶜal* serves as Formwort to introduce a quality or activity connected with a person.
Much more serious are the cases where Hebrew words are systematically lacking an opposition of two senses that are necessarily distinct in our languages. One of the most conspicuous examples is *>aḥᵃrīt*:
a) future, later time, a later time span / Folgezeit, Zukunft (Deut 4,30 *bᵉ >aḥᵃrīt hayyāmīm* „(irgendwann) in der Zukunft", contrasted with v.32 „former days, that have been before you";
b) end, last time / Ende, Endzeitpunkt (Deut 11,12 „from the beginning to the end of the year").
When we look more closely, we find that all the related nouns and adverbial expressions suffer from the same ambiguity, as for instance *bā >aḥᵃrōnā*, which is either „afterwards" (Deut 13,10) or „in the end" (2Sam 2,26), in German „hernach" : „zuletzt". The same ambiguity obtains in the opposite meanings *rē>šīt* / *tᵉḥillā* „beginning" and *rī>šōn* „earlier / first" (cf. ZAH 2, 1989, 121-123). The observation holds good for all terms of the semantic field of the relative determination of time

(beginning, middle, end) as well as for local relative terms (border, edge, front, back, upper side, down side etc.). There is no differentiation between posterior and postremus, prior and primus, exterior and extremus etc. The ambiguity is structurally inherent in the whole paradigmatical field of graded local and temporal terms. It reminds us of course immediately of the lack of morphologically distinct forms for the comparative, elative and superlative in Hebrew adjectives and it is part of a thoroughgoing structural difference in the semantics of Semitic and Indo-European languages. In our languages we are compelled, unavoidably to make a paradigmatical choice between „future" and „end" or, for instance, with *g^{e}būl* between „Grenzgebiet" and „Grenzlinie". The consequences for Hebrew lexicography are considerable and are still to be explored.

Another structural difference between Hebrew and our languages which is of still more serious import can only be briefly mentioned. It is the non-differentiation of *mlk* „to be king" and „to become king", *gdl* „to be great" and „to become great", *yšb* „to sit / être assis" and „to sit down / s'asseoir", *ʿmd* „stehen" and „sich hinstellen", and last but not least *hyh* „to be" and „to become". The ambivalence obtains in a few hundred verbs and is connected with a thoroughgoing non-distinction of static and dynamic usages of prepositions, whereas Latin has to choose obligatorily between ablative and accusative, German between dative and accusative, e.g. *yšb ʿal-kissēʾ* „to sit down on a throne" vs. „to sit on a throne", „sich setzen auf *den* Thron" (dynamic) vs. „sitzen auf *dem* Thron" (static).

There is no room to dwell any longer on this subject. Suffice it to say that paradigmatical semantics should not only busy itself with splitting of meanings, but also with the distinctions that do not exist at all in the Hebrew lexicon.

Abstract:

Practical problems of work in the field of paradigmatical semantics are exemplified by to case studies, one dealing with 1) the differentiation of seemingly synonymous meanings: Hebrew *nūs* „to flee [out of a dangerous situation into more security]" and *brḥ* „to flee [out of an insupportable socio-political situation into a better state of dominion]" (e.g. Ex 2,15; 4,3; Jdg 9,21; 2Sam 13,29.37), the second concerned with 2) the paradigmatical field of graded local and temporal terms, where the Hebrew words are systematically lacking our Indo-European differentiation between comparative und superlative senses (e.g. *ʾaḥ^{a}rīt* „future, last time" vs. „end, last time", cf. Dtn 4,30; 11,12).

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Pragmalinguistics and Speech-Act Theory as Applied to Classical Hebrew*

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1. The Domain of Pragmalinguistics

A description of pragmalinguistics, and the related theory of speech-acts, is a complex and delicate task, since this field of linguistics is in continual development, open to heated debate, and often provokes controversial and opposing points of view.

Pragmalinguistic theory is rooted in the thematic rendering of both the plurality and the mean distribution of the functions and uses of language, as in analytic and linguistic philosophy. The two most significant break-throughs in the field of thematic renderings are to be found in the theory of language games (*Sprachspiele*: delineated by Ludwig Wittgenstein, most notably in his *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, Oxford 1953) and the theory of speech-acts (the topic has been dealt with in detail by John Langshaw Austin in his *How to Do Things with Words*, Oxford 1962, 1975[2])[1]. I shall leave aside Charles W. Morris's concept of

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* I would like to take this opportunity to thank Prof. Delbert R. Hillers for his communications on the use of some performative utterances in Hebrew, as well as for his suggestions regarding bibliographical research. I would also like to thank Dr. Guido Tamburini for his general discussions on speech-act theory. I assume the responsibility for any and all errors.

In addition to works referred to in subsequent footnotes, the following studies are of general relevance: D. Antiseri, Filosofia analitica e semantica del linguaggio religioso, Brescia 1969; K. Bach, R.M. Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts, Cambridge, Ma. 1979; J. Barr, The Language of Religion, in: L. Honko (ed.), Science of Religion, Proceedings of the Study Conference in the Methodology of the Science of Religion (Turku 1973), The Hague 1979, pp. 429-441; G. Brown, G. Yule, Discourse Analysis, Cambridge 1983; K. Bühler, Sprachtheorie, Jena 1934 (Stuttgart 1965[2]); L.J. Cohen, Speech Acts, in Current Trends in Linguistics, 12, 1974, The Hague, pp. 173-208; T.A. van Dijk, Text and Context. Explorations in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse, London 1977; M.G. Harvey, Wittgenstein's Notion of ‚Theology as Grammar', Religious Studies 25, 1989, 89-103; R.M. Kempson, Semantic Theory, Cambridge 1977; K. Macqueen, Speech Act Theory and the Roles of Religious Language, diss. McGill, Montreal 1986; F.J. Newmeyer (ed.), Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey, Cambridge 1988; N.R. Norrick, The Lexicalization of Pragmatic Functions, Linguistics 17, 1979, 671-685; U. Rapallo (ed.), Linguistica, pragmatica e testo letterario, Genova 1986; B. Schlieben Lange, Linguistische Pragmatik, Stuttgart etc. 1975; J.R. Searle, F. Kiefer, M. Bierwisch (eds.), Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics, Dordrecht 1980; J.R. Searle, D. Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, Cambridge 1985; D. Wunderlich (ed.), Linguistische Pragmatik, Frankfurt am Main 1972; W.F. Zuurdeeg, An Analytical Philosophy of Religion, London 1959.

[1] It should be pointed out that the three principal authorities on speech-acts – J.L. Austin, H.P. Grice and J.R. Searle – do not use the term „pragmatics" in referring to their fields of research.

„pragmatics", which, in its study of the relations between signs and their interpreters, that is, with those who use signs in order to produce and receive messages, follows the Peircian school; the object of our study is less concerned with semiotic theory and will concentrate on the linguistic theory of actions in speech; the emphasis on the pragmatic phenomena proper to language is fundamental to this[2].

Generally speaking, pragmatics studies the aspects of language which enable us to understand its use as a tool of communication among individuals and peoples, particularly the ways in which linguistic communication takes place. The following excerpt, by Robert C. Stalnaker,[3] is frequently quoted in defining the specific role which pragmatics plays in linguistics:

> Pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed. There are two major types of problems to be solved within pragmatics: first, to define interesting types of speech acts and speech products; second, to characterize features of the speech context which help determine which proposition is expressed by a given sentence. The analysis of illocutionary acts is an example of the problem of the first kind; the study of indexical expressions is an example of the second.

During the brief history of pragmatic linguistics, both deixis and linguistic acts have served as the principal poles of research. It was none other than the theory of deixis which led Dieter Wunderlich to take a critical position on transformational grammar, and elaborate what he dubbed „linguistic pragmatics" (*linguistische Pragmatik*). For many, however, deixis still remains *in toto* a part of semantics, especially extensional semantics. According to Maria-Elisabeth Conte,[4] deictic terms and linguistic acts both belong to the field of pragmatics, but comprise different classes, and are involved on different levels. The theory of deixis is pragmalinguistical only as far as it is a theory involving terms whose meanings are related through an enunciation, and are therefore determined by that enunciation (particularly in its spatio-temporal coordinates). Deixis thus is interested in the relation between utterance and context.

The primary object of pragmalinguistics is the linguistic act. The theory of linguistic acts is necessary as a reference point for other aspects of pragmatic linguistics, such as pragmatic presuppositions, conversational implicatures, sequential organization of discourse, the organization of linguistic acts into macro-acts, dialogic interaction, discourse analysis, etc... But it also seems important to me, in the study of a language that has been solely transmitted through a limited written *corpus*, to analyze in the greatest detail the linguistic apparatus involving deixis, as it is manifested through the language's morphology and vocabulary, where it is directly functional in the determination of referents, and how it is motivated by the various processes and aspects of the utterance. With this in mind, we may classify the

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[2] Morris's concept has, however, given new impetus to both linguistics and logic: cf. his Foundations of the Theory of Signs, Chicago 1938, and Signs, Language and Behavior, New York 1946.

[3] R.C. Stalnaker, Pragmatics, Synthese 22, 1970, 272-289 (reprinted in: D. Davidson, G.H. Harman [eds.], Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht 1972, pp. 380-397), esp. 275 (383).

[4] M.-E. Conte, La pragmatica linguistica, in: C. Segre (ed.), Intorno alla linguistica, Milano 1983, pp. 94-128, esp. pp. 96-97.

principal deictic categories: 1) *Personal deixis*: this involves the grammaticalization of the roles of the participants of a linguistic exchange; it is rendered mainly through verbal morphology and the personal pronoun system; 2) *Spatial deixis*: adverbs and demonstrative pronouns are characterized in terms of proximity and distance, in relation to the personal category. The deictic aspects of verbs of motion should be included here; 3) *Temporal deixis*: temporal deictic adverbs also indicate the proximity to and/or distance from the time of their enunciation. The classification of verbal tenses is both complex and problematic. Furthermore, it should be noted that the verb may also incorporate modal and/or aspectual factors.[5] Modal and aspectual elements are particularly important in the analysis of Classical Hebrew.

Another phenomenon involving deixis is that which Charles J. Fillmore describes as „discourse deixis", which is to be distinguished from anaphora: „... indicators of structure within any discourse; words and phrases that point to some new stage reached in the discourse."[6] Such a form of deixis may utilize terms used for both temporal and spatial deixis (an example in Classical Hebrew would be *wyhy*). Fillmore also describes the phenomenon which he calls „social deixis", which takes into account the influence that social relations between speakers exert on utterances. This phenomenon, however, is not really deictic, since it involves general aspects of the vocabulary which are illocutory (this will be discussed further on), socio-linguistics, and stylistics (for example, the speaker's choice between common or sophisticated terms). Social deixis does borrow, however, personal pronouns from the deictic apparatus, whose usage may vary, depending on the degree of formality in the conversation (the usage of „tu" or „vous" in French, or of „tu" or „lei" in Italian). The use of epithets as an indication of personal status (such as „your highness") falls under this category.

1.1. Relations between Pragmatics and Semantics

Two opposed view at least may be distinguished concerning the relations between pragmatics and semantics (as well as syntax): one, which is additive, and the other, which is alternative. According to the first view, pragmatics is annexed as a complement to the field of semantics in order to take into account those phenomena which semantics is unable to explain. The field of pragmatics is thus considered a „waste-basket"[7]. According to the second view, pragmatics is not complementary to semantics, but rather its foundation: the theory of language is „engraved" onto a general theory of action whose fundamental element is comprised by either the linguistic act or communicative interaction. At any rate, it is widely held that it is difficult to conceive of semantics or syntax as being autonomous or independent from pragmatics. Oswald Ducrot states: „Semantics implies a pragmatic aspect".[8] The Austinian approach redefines notions that are traditionally semantic, such as those involving reference or truth, in terms of the

[5] J. Lyons, Semantics, Cambridge 1977, pp. 677ff.

[6] C.J. Fillmore, Santa Cruz Lectures on Deixis 1971, Bloomington, Ind. 1975.

[7] So Y. Bar-Hillel, Out of the Pragmatic Wastebasket, Linguistic Inquiry 2, 1971, 401-407.

[8] O. Ducrot, Atti linguistici, in Enciclopedia Einaudi, Torino 1977, vol. 2, pp. 117-136, esp. p. 136.

speech-act. At the current stage of discussion, an intermediate position may be seen, which, while recognizing that pragmatics is autonomous from semantics, assigns to the former an instrumental role in the solution of those linguistic problems which semantics alone cannot adequately address. It goes beyond semantic theory, bringing into question the latter's abilities without qualitatively transforming it.

2. Performative Utterances

Modern pragmalinguistics, without a doubt, begins with the theory of performative utterances. Three authors have identified and elaborated theories about performative utterances from different perspectives, each one independently from the other two, using different terminologies: Erwin Koschmieder, Émile Benveniste, and John Langshaw Austin.[9]

2.1. Main Theories about Performatives

Koschmieder identified performativity within the framework of a study on grammatical functions,[10] where he speaks of *„Koinzidenzfall"*, referring to those utterances which fall under the following four syntactic restrictions: 1. in the first person; 2. in the present tense; 3. accompanied by a *verbum dicendi*; 4. always in combination with the term *„hiermit"*. Koschmieder distinguishes between two types of present tense: a present tense of representation or report (*„Berichtspräsens"*), and a present tense of coincidence.

Benveniste identified performativity in his reflections on the subjectivity of language.[11] „The ability of the speaker to place him or herself as the ‚subject'" of the discourse permits the usage of the verb, in the first person present indicative, to have a semantic value different from that of the same verb's usage in other conjugations, and applies to both classes of verbs (this asymmetry is hidden in conjugation through the regularity of the paradigm). The two classes of verbs are called, by Benveniste, *„verbes d'opération"* and performative verbs.

Austin introduced the performative concept as an opposition to the constative concept. „I run" does not express racing, while „I thank" is used for giving thanks. In cases such as the latter, the stating of the action is equivalent to its performance: hence Austin's term, „performative utterances".[12]

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[9] Conte, La pragmatica linguistica, p. 98, states that Lessius had already characterised performative utterances distinctly, writing that the „efficiunt" that which (they) „significant" (Leonhardus Lessius [Lenaert Leys], De justitia et jure, Antwerpiae [1605] 1609^2, p. 219).

[10] E. Koschmieder, Zur Bestimmung der Funktionen grammatischer Kategorien, in: Abhandlungen der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Abteilung, N.F. 25, 1945 (reprinted in: E. Koschmieder, Beiträge zur allgemeinen Syntax, Heidelberg 1965, pp. 9-69).

[11] É. Benveniste, De la subjectivité dans le langage, Journal de Psychologie 55, 1958, 257-265 (reprinted in: É. Benveniste, Problèmes de linguistique générale, Paris 1966).

[12] Performativity pertains to performative utterances. By analogy, performativity is metonymically used in reference to verbs: performative verbs are those wich are susceptible to a performative use.

For a more detailed description of the theories of Koschmieder, Benveniste and Austin see Conte, La pragmatica linguistica, pp. 98-102.

The performative theory was incorporated by Austin into a more ample theory. He does not limit himself to identifying and elaborating theories about performativity, as had Koschmieder and Benveniste. He overcomes the opposition between performative and constative, by improving on the performative characterization through the conception of the speech-act as the basic unit of linguistic theory. The specialized theory of performative utterances thus becomes an integral part of the general speech-acts theory.

2.2. Other Hypotheses about Performatives

In addition, one of the most distinctive properties of performative utterances is their capacity for self-realization through usage. By this theory, if the issuing of a performative utterance is „happy", the utterance itself will be „happy" as a consequence.

2.2.1. *Delocutivity*. The concept of „delocutivity" has been formulated by several French followers of Benveniste's thesis. Delocutive verbs (identified and theorized by Benveniste) are verbs which derive from a locution, that is, from an utterance: Latin *negare* (to say *„nec"*). This does not simply refer to utterances that derive from another form of speech, but rather from the usage of that form. Its meaning stems from the reference to such usage (among Benveniste's many examples is the Latin *salutare* which derives from its use in the greeting *„salus!"* rather than directly from the word *salus* itself. „Non salutem alicui efficere sed salutem alicui dicere"; its English equivalent is „to hail").

Delbert R. Hillers has dealt with this topic and its connections with biblical Hebrew[13]: „A pair of especially clear examples of delocutive verbs in Hebrew is *hṣdyq/ṣiddeq* and *hršy ᶜ*, ‚to say someone is in the right', and ‚to say someone is in the wrong', respectively. ... *ṣiddeq* and *hṣdyq* do not mean ‚to make someone just' or ‚to behave justly' as one may expect from the analogy of such words as *gdl* (vb., qal), *gdwl* (adj.) with related piel *giddel* and hiphil *hgdyl*. As all agree, *ṣiddeq* and *hṣdyq* mean ‚to say that a person is in the right'. Following this line of thought which Benveniste's study suggests, one soon discovers a related locution. It is the form of words which was used in announcing a judicial decision but used also in pronouncing on the rights and wrongs of other situations. One may compare Ex. 9:27: *YHWH hṣdyq wᵓny wᶜmy hršᶜym* to Deut. 25:1: *whṣdyqw ᵓt-hṣdyq whršyᶜw ᵓt-hršᶜ*".

2.2.2. *Aspect*. I would like to add that in dealing with performativity, emphasis is usually placed on the tenses of the verbs in the utterances under study: present indicative. The aspectual factors which characterize the verbs employed in utterances are equally as important, and deserve further analysis.[14]

The notion of aspect involves, not the point or period in time in which the action represented by the utterance takes place in relation to its enunciation, but rather

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[13] D.R. Hillers, Delocutive Verbs in Biblical Hebrew, JBL 86, 1967, 320-324: quotation from pp. 320-321.

[14] Cf. the interesting questions raised by M. Sbisà, Linguaggio, ragione, interazione. Per una teoria pragmatica degli atti linguistici, Bologna 1989, pp. 197ff. On aspectuality see P. Tedeschi, A. Zaenen (eds.), Tense and Aspect (Syntax and Semantics, vol. 14), New York etc. 1981.

the perspective from which the action is represented, the way in which it is perceived and ultimately uttered. The performative formulae include, however, the representation of a speech-act, and the category of aspect is absolutely crucial in this respect.
It is my opinion that the analysis of performative utterances in languages such as Classical Hebrew, where verbal aspect plays a dominant role, may be facilitated through its aspectual elements.

3. Speech-Act Theory

The critical evaluation of the theory of performatives has led to the theory of speech-acts, as earlier stated. Austin realized that there is no clear opposition between constatives and performatives: observations are acts, as are assertions.
The role of assertion may be explicitly depicted in an utterance by means of a performative formula such as: „I assert that...". This feature of action is inherent in all forms of language; performative utterances are but the most conspicuous examples of language as action.[15]
Performative utterances, while different from constative ones, may nonetheless count truth value terms among their felicity conditions: *hnh ntty lkm ʾt-kl-ʿśb zrʿ zrʿ ʾšr ʿl pny kl-hʾrṣ*, „I hereby give you every herb bearing seed, which is upon all the earth" (Gen. 1:29). A felicity condition implied by this utterance is, for example, the proposition: „there are seed-bearing plants on the earth".
A declarative utterance with a performative verb in the first person present indicative does not satisfy performative requisites. For example, „I'm training", if said by an athlete to someone with limited or no knowledge of sports, as an explanation of why he is performing a certain exercise, is not the execution proper of that action but an interpretation or description. Furthermore, the verb does not necessarily have to be in the first person (or for that matter, that there be any verb at all), in order for the utterance to be performative. There are cases, like that of a jury which, when asked to pronounce its sentence, simply replies: „Guilty". The word used by itself in this istance functions as a performative utterance.

3.1. The Structure of Speech-Act

A speech-act is comprised of partial acts; speech-acts, furthermore, are subject to sub-grouping.[16]
3.1.1. *Partial Acts*. According to Austin, three partial acts are performed in a speech-act: 1) locutionary act; 2) illocutionary act; 3) perlocutionary act. The locutionary act is merely the issuing of an utterance, endowing it with a grammatical structure and a meaning. The illocutionary act consists of the issuing of an utterance with a particular force, that is, with a communicative function or purpose. The perlocutionary act consists of the effect exerted by an utterance on its listeners.

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[15] See Conte, La pragmatica linguistica, pp. 108-109.

[16] According to Diogenes Laertius, Protagoras was the first to classify four types of discourse: prayer or desire, question or interrogation, answer, and injunction or command. See Conte, La pragmatica linguistica, p. 109 n. 30.

Locutions have always been an object of grammatical study, while rhetoric tended to deal with perlocutionary acts, as part of the theory of persuasion. It was Austin who first conceived of the illocutionary act as a central point of speech-acts (that is, that an utterance may be used in making a promise, passing judgement, or giving orders). The „illocutionary act" is often equivalent to the „speech-act", and speaking about speech-acts often means speaking about the illocutionary force. Illocutionary force is merely an abstraction: an utterance that occurs in a communicative situation is always issued with an illocutionary force.

John R. Searle expanded[17] Austin's theory, providing variants: he rejects the distinction between „locutionary" and „illocutionary", in favour of a distinction between propositional and illocutionary acts. Searle intends to show that different speech-acts may share the same propositional content. He gives an explicit formulation of the conditions which dictate the success of a speech-act, and uses this as the basis for the formulation of the constituent rules of speech-acts.

H. Paul Grice,[18] in brief, defined meaning in terms of the ‚speaker', rather than in relation to words or sentences. His definition connects the meaning of linguistic units to the speaker's intentions of producing a desired effect on the listener, precisely through the latter's acknowledgement of the former's intentions. With respect to Grice's definition, the concept of illocutionary force is interpreted as being connected primarily to the speaker's intentions, rather than with the „conventions" almost legalistically dictated by Austin.[19] Use of Grice's positions has recently been made in research on „discourse analysis" and language acquisition; both Searle's and Austin's theories are among those widely applied in the analysis of written texts.

3.1.2. *Illocutionary Force Indicators*. Every language possesses a variety of formal components (lexical, syntactic, prosodic), which may be called force-indicating devices, and characterize an utterance's potential illocutionary force.

The most noteworthy of these indicators are: explicit performative formulae („I promise that..."), sentence-types[20] (declarative, imperative, interrogative), verbal moods (subjunctive, jussive, imperative), modal verbs („to have to"/„must", „to be able"/„can"), verbal tenses and aspects, specific adverbs and particles, intonation (usually difficult to determine or measure in a written text; pertinent notation may, however, be provided). None of these formal devices univocally identifies the illocutionary force of an utterance.

John Lyons's formulation of the relation between utterances and illocutionary force is especially enlightening:

> Sentences are systematically associated, in terms of their phonological, grammatical, and lexical structure, with the illocutionary acts that may be performed in uttering them. There is no one-to-one correspondence between grammatical structure, in particular, and illocutionary

[17] J.R. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, London 1969; id., A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts, in: K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 344-369.

[18] H.P. Grice, Meaning, Philosophical Review 66, 1957, 377-388; id., Utterer's Meaning and Intention, Philosophical Review 78, 1969, 147-177.

[19] See M. Sbisà (ed.), Gli atti linguistici, Milano 1978, p. 21.

[20] In Stephen C. Levinson's terminology: see his Pragmatics, Cambridge 1983, p. 243.

force; but we cannot employ just any kind of sentence in order to perform any kind of illocutionary act.[21]

3.1.3. *Indirect Speech-Acts*. The topic of indirect speech-acts is the object of debate among both linguists and philosophers of language; anthropologists and sociolinguists show a particular interest in the motivation behind speech-acts. On the matter of indirect speech-acts, Searle writes[22]: „In such cases a sentence that contains the illocutionary force indicators for one kind of illocutionary act can be uttered to perform in addition another type of illocutionary act". The (so-called) „rhetorical question" is a paradigmatic case of an indirect speech-act.

3.1.4. *The Classification of Speech-Acts*. It should first be pointed out[23] that both performative and illocutionary verbs, as well as speech-acts, are usually classified without making distinctions. But these groups do not reciprocally correspond one to the other: all performative verbs are illocutionary, although not all illocutionary verbs are performative. While speech-acts belong to the general phenomena of language, performative verbs differ from language to language, and are specific to a given language. For example, the Hebrew verbs *š ʾl* and *bqš* both correspond to the English verb „to ask".

The classification proposed by Austin[24] contains five classes:

1) *Verdictives*: acts which denote discretion such as judgement, description, evaluation, and calculation;

2) *Exercitives*: acts involving the exertion of powers, rights, or influences; some verbs typical of this class are „to nominate", „to fire"/„dismiss", „to command", „to beg (of)";

3) *Commissives*: acts which engage the speakers in certain actions, such as: „to allow", „to bet". Verbs denoting „declaration of intent", such as „to consent", „to participate"/„belong to", „to oppose" are also included here;

4) *Behabitives*: acts which represent the reactions to one's own or another's behaviour and future, including verbs such as „to apologize", „to thank", „to congratulate", „to dare";

5) *Expositives*: acts which include the expression of opinion, the marking of the course of a discussion, and the classification of meanings, such as „to ask", „to answer", „to admit", „to uphold", „to define".

(This classification has raised several objections, principly that this is a classification of illocutionary verbs rather than acts).

The first four classes form a separate group from the fifth.[25] Each of the classes belonging to the first group is characterized by a different hierarchical organization of their respective felicity conditions (which allow for both the execution of an illocutionary act and its proper execution). An example of this is the condition

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21 Lyons, Semantics, p. 733.

22 J.R. Searle, in: K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, p. 359.

23 See Conte, La pragmatica linguistica, p. 115.

24 See How to Do Things with Words, ch. 12.

25 See M. Sbisà, Pragmatica, in: (various authors), Prospettive di teoria del linguaggio, Milano 1983, pp. 349-461, esp. pp. 401-403, and id., Linguaggio, ragione, interazione, pp. 97-130, 174-185.

which requires the existence of accepted forms in order to obtain a desired illocutionary effect, or the condition that requires the suitability of persons and circumstances. Expositive acts seem, instead, to consist of those linguistic practices which may be described, qualified, and/or announced through linguistic means, but whose execution is not clearly performative.
Searle's classification[26] also contains five classes based upon three criteria of classification. The principal criterion is represented by the „illocutionary point", that is, the intent which bestows a *raison d'être* on the illocutionary act. The other two are respectively defined as „direction of fit", that is, the type of relation that a propositional content has with the world, and the classification of „psychological states" which may be expressed through speech-acts.
Reviving a well-known Aristotelian theory, Conte[27] distinguishes between acts of *„prâxis"*, which are the simple reproduction of a type of speech-act (giving thanks, allegation) through the production of a „token" of that type, and acts of *„poiesis"*, which are complex acts which determine, as well as reproducing, a type of act or a state, and modify reality (verbs of this class include „to excommunicate", „to resign", „to bet", „to abrogate").

4. Developments in Pragmalinguistics
Present pragmalinguistical research (for which the speech-act remains a fundamental concept) extends to forms of verbal interaction as well as to both discourse and conversational analysis, and has studied in detail specific linguistic phenomena, such as the usage of modal particles and of connectives, and the problems modality poses in general. Furthermore, speech-acts have come to play an important role in literary theory, in particular in questions regarding the definition of genres in literature, and more specifically, the definitions of poetry, novels, and drama.

5. Notes on the Application of Pragmalinguistics and Speech-Act Theory in the Study of Classical Hebrew
The *corpus* of Classical Hebrew is mainly represented by the biblical text, whose features appear favourable towards the application of the speech-act theory.[28] The Bible is not intended as a tractate on systematic theology: biblical language and narration are often organically dramatic, vividly depicting events. Biblical stories are highly scenic: in recounting a particular event, the author sets a stage where nearly all the players are present, and where actions follow one another with little recourse to „flashbacks" or explicative stitching.[29] The reader's or the listener's

[26] In K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 344-369.
[27] La pragmatica linguistica, p. 118-120.
[28] Inscriptions may also be suited to our type of analysis in many instances: if we take the Šiloaḥ inscription, for example, we are provided with a sort of commentary which condenses an event's relevant acts in order to transmit them to future generations with the vividness, solemnity and authority of one who has witnessed the event, or celebrates its occurrence.
[29] See J. Licht, Storytelling in the Bible, Jerusalem 1978, pp. 28-33; also E. Auerbach, Mimesis. Dargestellte Wirklichkeit in der abendländischen Literatur, Bern 1946, ch. 1.

attention is made to concentrate on the action taking place, on the spoken word. Collisions, debates, and direct discourses are all predominant.
Reflections upon the nature of religious language are especially characteristic of studies of Classical Hebrew, with its instances of the languages of ritual, of magical formulae, and of miracles.[30] One may surmise that the biblical authors understood the speech of God and the prophets as „performative": *kn yhyh dbry ʾšr yṣʾ mpy lʾ-yšwb ʾly ryqm ky ʾm - ʿśh ʾt-ʾšr ḥpṣty whṣlyḥ ʾšr šlḥtyw*, „So shall my word be that goes forth from my mouth; it shall not return to me empty, but shall accomplish that which I please, and prosper in the thing for which I sent it" (Is. 55:11). I should add that, in the Gospels, it is said of Jesus that he would speak to the crowd „as one who has authority" (ἐξουσίαν), and not like the Scribes„ (Matt. 7:29).

The divine and prophetic *dåbår* is thereby presented as a word which proclaims and accomplishes that which it has uttered, or otherwise calls upon the listener to accomplish it. This does not in the least contrast with the fundamental questions raised by James Barr on the matter of *dåbår*.[31] What interests us here is the typology of the utterance, its moods and its effects. If we can show that one may do things with words in all languages, and that even a common mortal's speech is, given the right conditions, performative, we may better understand that which to some appears to be an exclusive trait of Classical Hebrew, opening the way to dangerous semantic misconceptions.
I believe it is possible to proceed in a more systematic way, through the identification and cataloguing of the performative and illocutionary verbs of Classical Hebrew; through the study of their semantics and the description of the ways in which the speech-acts of biblical characters could be qualified and eventually classified. This global endeavour would be of great interest. In the meantime, very limited studies on individual textual areas[32] have shown that in the discourses of Deuteronomy, or within the prophetic call narratives, the speech-acts attributed to the Divinity or to the prophets are heavily verdictive or exercitive with respect to the speech-acts of characters who do not play an authoritative role. When God speaks to man, he does not use, in this case, colloquial models of dialogue, but proclaims, commands, makes promises, conforming His word to the *Machtwort* of the absolute sovereign. This contradicts some of the theories of

[30] I.T. Ramsey's book, Religious Language, London 1957, particularly ch. 3, has long been considered a classic in this field; see also W.J. Samarin (ed.), Language in Religious Practice, Rowley, Ma. 1976 (esp. the article of P.L. Ravenhill, Religious Utterances and the Theory of Speech-Acts, on pp. 26-39); R. Wonneberger, H.P. Hecht, Verheißung und Versprechen. Eine theologische und sprachanalytische Klärung, Göttingen 1986; and finally S.J. Tambiah, Form and Meaning of Magical Acts: A Point of View, in: R. Horton, R. Finnegan (eds.), Modes of Thought, London 1973, pp. 199-299. Valuable data are also to be found in the study of juridical language.

[31] See J. Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language, Oxford 1962, pp. 129-144.

[32] See I. Zatelli, La comunicazione verbale nel „Deuteronomio" in rapporto all'espressione del divino, Atti e Memorie dell'Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere „La Colombaria" 44, n.s. 30, 1979, 1-13; id., La chiamata dell'uomo da parte di Dio nella Bibbia al vaglio della „discourse analysis", Rivista Biblica 38, 1990, 13-26.

advocates of dialogical theology, such as Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig (who have proposed a personal relationship, „Ich und Du", between man and the Divinity).

Performativity and „directiveness", at their maximum, are encountered in the first creation story in the Bible. God creates the universe through His word.[33] *yhy ʾwr*, „Let there be light!", of Gen. 1:3 is a paradigmatic performative formula in the intentions of the speaker (as well as the author), even though it is not expressed in a grammatically canonic form (that is with a verb in the first person perfective). It is a plain act of commandment, expressed – as is possible in Classical Hebrew – through the jussive mood. In this case, the written text is careful to specify in addition the happy result of the performative: *wyhy ʾwr*, „and there was light".

Another well-known example of a highly directive biblical speech-act concerns the imperative found in Gen. 12:1: *lek-lᵉkå*, „Get thee out...!", as God demanded of Abram. Just as for the words further on in Gen. 12:4 (*wylk ʾbrm kʾšr dbr ʾlyw YHWH*, „So Abram went, as the Lord had commanded him..."), I feel it is opportune to resort to verbs such as „to command" in translations, as a means of specifying further the meaning of *ʾåmar* and *dibbeṛ*. It would also be very interesting to re-read of Abraham's splendid and daring intervention (not just a dialogue between peers) on behalf of Sodom (Gen. 18:22-33), in the light of the speech-acts theory, paying special attention to the perlocutionary effects. Here Abraham manages, in a crescendo of rhetoric („Behold, I pray, I take upon me to speak unto the Lord..."; and „Oh let not the Lord be angry..."), to persuade God to promise that he will spare the city if ten just men can be found within it.

An analysis which follows the discourse categories, identified mainly by Austin, may facilitate not only the grammatical description of Classical Hebrew, but also its translation and interpretation in a number of passages. The performative value of certain oath formulae is very evident, for example, in Gen. 14:22: „And Abram said to the king of Sodom: ‚I lift up (*hărimoṭi*) my hand unto the Lord Most High, Maker of heaven and earth, (v. 23) that I will not take a thread nor a shoe-latchet nor that which is thine...'". The words which accompany his ritual gesture sanction and accomplish that which has been solemnly stated.

Another example may be found in Deut. 32:40: *ky-ʾśʾ ʾl-šmym ydy wʾmrty ḥy ʾnky lʿlm*, „I lift up My hand to heaven and say (the equivalent of „I swear"): ‚As I live forever'." The commonplace verb *ʾmr* also has a very marked illocutionary force in its second occurrence in 2 Sam. 19:30: „And the king said unto him: ‚Why speakest thou any more of thy matters? This is my decision (*ʾåmarti*): Thou and Ṣiba divide the land'."

Another element which may underline the presence of performative utterances, or at least of acts with a pronounced illocutionary force, in Classical Hebrew, is the presence of actualizers, such as *hnh*, *hywm*, *wʿth*, which are common in other languages such as English („hereby") or German („*hiermit*"), but not easily encountered in languages such as Italian. I believe that the values and functions of these particles should be further explored in Classical Hebrew. *hnh ntty ʾt-hʾrṣ*

[33] Compare this with the reflections of certain medieval mystics, such as those of Cusanus (Nikolaus von Cues), who gives as one of his definitions of God: "Where creation coincides with speech" (De visione Dei, X-XI).

bydw, „Hereby I give the land into his hand" (Jud. 1:2), is clearly a performative utterance.[34] *hnh ymym b ʾym nʾm-YHWH wkrty ʾt-byt yśrʾl wʾt-byt yhwdh bryt ḥdšh*, „Behold (thereby [I solemnly declare (that)]) the days shall come – the oracle of the Lord – when I will establish a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Judah" (Jer. 31:31). *hnh* introduces a commissive speech-act (the solemn declaration), but *wkrty* is not performative (and for that matter, neither is it perfective).

Formulae such as *hrbh ʾrbh*, „I will greatly multiply..." (Gen. 16:10) and *šmwᶜ šmᶜty*, „I hear, I hear Ephraim grieving..." (Jer. 31:18) could be newly read in an illocutionary light, and thereby be considered as acts of covenant, assurance, etc...

New perspectives may open up as well in the study of the deictic aspects of Classical Hebrew. Especially pertinent are the fact that, in certain biblical contexts, deictic indicators are highly concentrated, and their potential for both concentration and variety: ... *ky ʾtnw ʾnḥnw ʾlh ph hywm klnw ḥyym*, „... but with us, even us, these things here today all of us being alive" (Deut. 5:3); ... *ʾšr ʾnky dbr bʾznykm hywm*, „... which I speak in your ears (figuratively and possibly emphatically meaning „to you") today" (Deut. 5:1).[35]

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, it may be stated than, in the analysis of entire utterances and their modes of expression, we come up with a fuller and more detailed linguistic description than we would, say, in analysis of individual lexemes by their distinctive features. Classical Hebrew appears to be particularly favourable towards this application of the speech-act theory for a number of its characteristics (texts through which the language is transmitted tend to be more mimetic than diegetic; the presence of verbal aspects, etc.). Being a dead language, Classical Hebrew is about as limited in the application to it of pragmalinguistics and speech-act theory as it is in the application of other linguistic theories, notably because of the absence of speakers – the competence (better still, performance) of native speakers – and the lack of possibilities for the study of intonation, one of the most significant elements of the speech-act.

Nevertheless the existing *corpus* seems to offer sufficient matter for adequate and profitable study; it should be pointed out that the *corpus* is strongly characterized by the presence of religious language, and especially prophetic language, a sub-species of the former. Although samples of „everyday" language are certainly not lacking, our results will largely be the analysis of a language in its application to a certain group of texts, rather than that of a given language as a complete system. Finally, in dealing with a written text instead of with the speech-acts of live people, the authors' intentions, with their creative ability (or the veracity of their account) need to be reckoned with.

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[34] The example is cited in: W. Schneider, Grammatik des biblischen Hebräisch, München 1985, p. 204.

[35] See Zatelli, La comunicazione verbale, 5-6.

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H.C. White (ed.), Speech Act Theory and Biblical Criticism, Semeia 41, 1988

[An in-depth and stimulating anthology of essays, which up to now comprises the most complete and organic attempt to analyze the Bible according to the speech-act

theory. The Bible is essentially regarded as a literary *corpus* (rather than a linguistic *corpus*). The discussions on the rapport between speech-acts and literature are both predominant and insightful. Reference is often made to textual deconstructionist theory (currently in decline in European schools). This highly important work may help towards a better understanding of the role that the author or narrator plays in the literary text.]

R. Wonneberger, H.P. Hecht, Verheißung und Versprechen. Eine theologische und sprachanalytische Klärung, Göttingen 1986

[A particularly complex, varied and articulate study on the religious and profane value of promise and its meaning in the Bible. It bases itself upon the speech-acts theory which is utilized in order to bridge the gap between exegesis and ethics.]

I. Zatelli, La comunicazione verbale nel „Deuteronomio" in rapporto all'espressione del divino, Atti e Memorie dell'Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere „La Colombaria", 44, n.s. 30, 1979, 1-13

[A linguistic analysis, based upon the speech-act theory, of the modes of communication proposed by the discourses of the Hebrew text of Deuteronomy.]

I. Zatelli, La chiamata dell'uomo da parte di Dio nella Bibbia al vaglio della „discourse analysis", Rivista Biblica 38, 1990, 13-26

[An application of the speech-act theory to the Hebrew text of the prophetic call narratives, which depicts the roles of the players in the action.]

Abstract:

In the complex and still fluid domain of pragmalinguistics, those linguistic phenomena related to deixis and speech-act theory are given special consideration. In the analysis of Classical Hebrew, the language of the Bible and of the coeval inscriptions, the description of such phenomena sheds further light upon its grammatical peculiarities, semantic values, and interpretative aspects. The dramatic narrative which is typical of the Bible, more mimetic than diegetic, reveals a good degree of performativity, or illocutionary force, in many expressions. For example, dialogues occurring between the Divinity and mortals are often highly „verdictive", that is, their character is not simply conversational. This may be further seen in the various verbs meaning „to say", which at times would be better translated by „to order", „to command". The analysis of complete utterances and their modes of expression, along with proper references as to context, offers a more complete linguistic description and a series of semantic peculiarities which may otherwise go unobserved.

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Response to I. Zatelli

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This was an excellent contribution to our meeting: it explained the scope of a branch of linguistics and its history, it emphasised the central place of „speech-act theory" in it, including the study of performative utterances, it gave some interesting examples of the application of this approach to Classical Hebrew and, at the end, there is a valuable annotated review of earlier literature on pragmalinguistics and the Semitic languages.
There is much that it would be good to discuss here. In my response I should like to comment briefly on four of the topics in the paper which I myself think deserve further discussion and exploration. I make these comments with some hesitation because I am a mere beginner in linguistics. But we have a saying in English, „Nothing ventured, nothing gained", and I think it is relevant to scholars as well as to businessmen!

1. The first topic concerns the *scope* of pragmalinguistics. It may be useful to emphasise more strongly the central place of speech, speech-acts, that is spoken language, in pragmalinguistics. Of course the boundary between spoken and written language is not always clear-cut: stories may be told as well as written, stories often include speeches and conversations, some kinds of written texts approximate, more or less, to the character of spoken language. For example letters often resemble (parts of) slowed-up conversations, political treatises may be like speeches. The penumbra of spoken language, as one might expect, is very important, as it may provide additional examples of the phenomena which are the domain of pragmalinguistics. But it does not alter the fact that much linguistic output in written form lacks these phenomena altogether. To find them in some density we need to concentrate our attention on spoken language or on those forms of written output which are, in different ways, closest to it. It is here that phenomena like performatives and deixis are mainly to be found. Stephen Levinson's book on pragmatics recognises this in the space it gives to conversation.[1]
In the case of classical Hebrew we of course have no examples of spoken language in the strict sense, all our source-material is written. But within that source-material much is presented in the form of speech – dialogue in narrative, sermons in Deuteronomy, laws there and elsewhere, prophetic speeches – and it is from these sections of the Hebrew Bible that we may chiefly hope to discover what the pragmatic features of its language were, so far as they are still discoverable. In saying this I am only, I think, formulating in theoretical terms what Zatelli has actually done, because all her examples on p. 70 come from the types of material that I have specified. But I would like in addition to identify the illocutionary force of a couple of Hebrew particles in her examples on p. 70. In the words of Abraham

[1] S.C. Levinson, Pragmatics (Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics), Cambridge 1983.

(Gen. 18:27,30), „I pray" and „Oh" both in fact represent the Hebrew precative particle *na*ᵓ, which belongs to and identifies a sub-set of „exercitive" speech-acts; while in Gen. 14:23 „that ... not" stands for a special use of the conditional particle *ᵓim* which belongs to and helps to identify a type of „commissive" speech-acts, namely swearing an oath.

2. These examples have taken me into my second point, which is the *relevance* of pragmalinguistics to *lexical study*. Zatelli has rightly emphasised that pragmalinguistics has as its primary object „the linguistic act" (p. 61). A linguistic act may sometimes consist of the utterance of a single word, e.g. „Hello!" in English, but more often it will involve the use of a sentence or more than one sentence. The question then is whether this branch of linguistics has direct relevance to a lexical project such as ours, or to put it more practically, whether it is appropriate for a lexical entry to take account of it, and if so how. The question is implicit, for example, in the fact that the paper sometimes speaks of „performative utterances", but elsewhere of „performative verbs" (both on p. 65, again on pp. 69). If there is such a thing as a performative verb, that sounds like a quality attached to a lexical item which a lexicon ought to record. But I have some difficulty with the description of a *verb* as performative, as it would seem to imply that it is *always* used performatively, or at least that this is its primary character. Is this really so? With few exceptions performative utterances are limited to 1st person present (in English: perfect in Hebrew) forms, such as „I promise that...", and utterances that include other forms of the same verb are not performative, but (to use Austin's term) constative. The verb as such is therefore not performative, it is sometimes used in performative utterances.[2] At the same time one clearly cannot apportion the quality of performativeness purely to syntax, since it is by no means true that all 1st person present tense forms in English have performative force. I think the solution lies in reminding ourselves that a lexicon should record usage – „Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use", as Wittgenstein's principle has often been summarised.[3] Then it is appropriate for a lexicon to record the fact that, when it is used in the 1st person present etc., a particular verb carries or may carry performative force. The same will apply to certain particles: some, like *na*ᵓ, always identify a particular kind of speech-act; others, like *ᵓim*, sometimes do, but not always. Among the latter we should certainly include *hinneh*, traditionally translated „behold", because it is several times used with 1st person singular perfect forms in what look like performative utterances; as Zatelli notes on pp. 70-71 (the point was already noted by Schneider), it often corresponds to the „hereby, hiermit" beloved of pragmaticians, and there is an example of it perhaps in Gen. 18:27.[4] I am not so

[2] These observations elaborate what Zatelli has briefly stated in her note 12.

[3] For this formulation see, e.g., John Wisdom, Paradox and Discovery, Oxford 1965, p. 87 (cited by A.J. Ayer, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Harmondsworth 1986, p. 43). Compare Wittgenstein's statement: „For a *large* class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word ‚meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (Philosophical Investigations, 2nd Eng. ed., Oxford 1958, § 43).

[4] Cf. already W. Schneider, Grammatik des biblischen Hebräisch, 7th ed., Munich 1989, p. 204.

sure about the examples of „today" (*hywm*) and „and now" (*w ᶜth*) which she mentions in this connection too.[5] But they obviously have a deictic force, which a dictionary should identify as a pragmalinguistic feature, and similarly with many other adverbs and adjectives. But not every word in the dictionary will have a pragmalinguistic aspect to be noted, I think.

3. My third point concerns *religion, theology and linguistics*, and here I shall be a little critical of Zatelli's paper. I am particularly thinking of what she says on pp. 69 about the power of the divine word, with the reference to Isa. 55:11: „My word (God says) ... shall accomplish that which I please". I think there is some danger of a confusion between theology and linguistics here, even though Zatelli is careful to say that she is not speaking about some special characteristic of the Hebrew language but rather of something that can be observed in many languages. At the least there seems to be something worth discussing and clarifying here. To me it seems that there is an important difference between what the prophet is talking about (which can also be paralleled in other biblical texts) and what linguists have meant by performative utterances and illocutionary force. I hope I can make the difference clear. The prophet is talking about the *effectiveness* of the word of God, he is making a theological claim that what God says, or if you like, promises, will come true. The linguist who identifies a performative utterance is, however, saying nothing at all about whether a promise, for example, will come true; he is recognising the presence of the conditions which are necessary for a promise *to be made*. Even a broken promise is (or was) still a promise when it was made. If it is true that all God's promises come true, that is a matter for theology, not linguistics. Moreover the performative utterance is identified by certain fixed linguistic features, which are only present in a few of the divine utterances which refer to the future, many of them being couched in the third person rather that the first. I am sure that there is a place for speech-act analysis of divine speech in the Bible as well as human speech,[6] and that theology is always better for linguistic clarity, but precisely for that reason I think it is vital not to mix up theological statements with linguistic analysis. One way to keep them more clearly apart, I suggest, would be if we could include more examples from intra-human speech in the survey of Hebrew usage and less specifically religious ones. For example an analysis could be made of the dialogue between Abraham and the Hittites of Hebron in Genesis 23 or the conversations in the story of Joseph. Such material is also, of course, very prominent in the growing corpus of Hebrew inscriptions.

4. This brings me the fourth point on which I should like briefly to comment. The everyday language of the *inscriptions*, especially the letters and the „judicial plea"

[5] Cf. Schneider, ibid. In the discussion of the paper Prof. J.C. Greenfield drew attention to the occurrence of *ᶜt* and *kym* together at the beginning of epistolary inscriptions, after the greeting (e.g. Lachish 2:3), where they may perhaps have an „actualising" function. Note also Arad 24:18, cited below, where *hym* closely follows *hnh*.

[6] See the essay of W.J. Houston, What did the prophets think they were doing? Speech-act theory and prophetic discourse in the Old Testament, forthcoming in: Biblical Interpretation 1, 1993.

from Yavneh-Yam, contains numerous features of pragmalinguistic interest. There are, first, examples of the three particles which I mentioned earlier:

Lachish 3:9-10

> As the Lord lives (I swear) that no (*ʾim*) man has ever tried to read me a letter.

Lachish 6:5

> Read (them), I say! (*naʾ*)[7]

Arad 24:18

> Behold (*hinneh* – perhaps in the sense „hereby", i.e. by means of this letter) I have sent (perfect tense: the meaning could be „I am sending" in a performative sense) to warn you today.

The second kind of example, with which I shall conclude, is the fact that the letters are full of the deferential use of phrases like „your servant" and „my lord" as substitutes for the 1st and 2nd person pronouns (e.g. Lachish 2:4, 3:8; Yavneh-Yam 1:1-2), just as we find them frequently also used in the Bible when an inferior is addressing his superior. These are examples of the social deixis which Zatelli mentions on p. 000, and they would appropriately be noted in a dictionary as part of the usage of *ʾadon* („lord") and *ʿebed* („servant") when they are combined with pronominal qualifiers.[8]

Abstract:

Four issues in Prof. Zatelli's paper require further discussion: 1. The scope of pragmalinguistics, and its particular relevance to conversation. 2. The extent to which pragmalinguistic features should be recorded in a lexicon. 3. The need for a distinction between theological statements and linguistic analysis, and the value of beginning a pragmalinguistic study of Hebrew from the intra-human discourse in the Bible. 4. The need for attention to the contribution which Hebrew inscriptions can make to pragmalinguistic research.

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[7] This is an example of *naʾ* with a command rather than a request, for which there are few examples in the Bible (though see Gen. 22:2, Isa. 7:3), most uses being by an inferior addressing a superior. The „social deixis" of this particle is thus not entirely uniform.

[8] They are so noted in F. Brown, S.R. Driver, C.A. Briggs, A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament, Oxford 1907, p. 714 and, less clearly, p. 11. A further illustration of a pragmalinguistic feature in the language of the inscriptions would be the „delocutive" use of the verb *brk*, „bless", to mean „say *br(w)k*, Blessed be ..." in Arad 16:2, 21:2, 40:3 and twice in the inscriptions from Kuntillet Ajrud: G.I. Davies, Ancient Hebrew Inscriptions, Corpus and Concordance, Cambridge 1991, p. 81 (8.17.1; 8.21.1). In Biblical Hebrew compare Ps. 118:26 (cited by Schneider, p. 204).

Componential Analysis

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1. Definition.

Componential analysis is a procedure which aims at operating semantic analysis at the level of the word. It assumes that the meaning of „full" words (nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs) can be split up into smaller elements of meaning. These are known as semantic components or semantic features.

The analysis is carried out within a semantic field. This can be defined as a group of words that stand in paradigmatic opposition to one another and that share at least one semantic component. Determining and delimiting a semantic field requires a methodology. According to some, we might start from a pair of words that we suppose belong to the same field, and analyse the features that differentiate them; then we add to them words that carry new features.[1] The features obtained by comparing the lexemes must be such as to account for the meaning of all the terms examined in the semantic field.

Another procedure consists of starting from the intuitive understanding of the sense of a group of words and trying to define the features they share (singled out by means of proportional equations) in order to determine the semantic components.[2] A third procedure uses the definition offered by the dictionary (or the speaker) in order to define the meaning of the word under analysis.[3]

2. Origins and development.

There is no need here to trace a history of studies made on the subject. Nevertheless, since the investigations, both theoretical and practical, that have made use of methods of componential analysis have moved along different lines, a brief sketch of the subject is needed.

2.1. The European tradition.

The idea of a componential analysis had been anticipated by L. Hjelmslev.[4] He assumed that meaning could be broken up into elementary entities by analogy with what occurs at phonological level. These entities („content figurae") were equipped with characteristics similar to those of the phonological features, and were limited in number.

Among the linguists who refer to the European tradition, we can recall the French linguists B. Pottier[5], A.J. Greimas[6], T. Todorov[7], who developed a method of

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1 E. Coseriu, Les structures lexématiques, in W.T. Elwert (ed.), Probleme der Semantik, Wiesbaden 1968, 3-16.

2 J. Lyons, An Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics, Cambridge 1968.

3 E.g., M. Alinei, La struttura del lessico, Bologna 1974.

4 Omkring sprogteoriens grundlaeggelse, Copenhagen 1943 (= Prolegomena to a Theory of a Language, Baltimore 1953).

5 Vers une sémantique moderne, Travaux de linguistique et de littérature 1, 1964, 107-138.

6 Sémantique structurale, Paris 1966.

analysis that describes the elements of lexicon as „packets of semes". According to Todorov, for semic analysis to imply the irreducible character of the semantic combinatory, it has to consider (as in Greimas) the contents of segments of larger utterances, that is, it has to consider meanings that are connected to a specific context or a certain situation of speech. This might, however, remove the boundary between the semantics of a language and the analysis of the speeches uttered in that language.

In recent years, this epistemological aim (not to exclude from the field of semantics those phenomena of meaning observed in speech) has been pursued within the French school by scholars such as F. Rastier.[8] He re-examines the notion of *virtuème*[9] and develops it, distinguishing between denotative and connotative features, that he considers as inherent and afferent semes respectively. The former depend upon the functional system of the language, the latter upon other kinds of encoding (such as socialised or rather idiolectal norms).

The treatment offered by Coseriu and his pupils (like H. Geckeler)[10] seems more rigorous. He prefers to talk of „lexematic structures". He distinguishes between designation (relations between signs and extralinguistic realities) and signification (relations between meanings), pointing out that in lexematics it is exclusively a matter of relations of signification. Moreover, the lexematic point of view concerns only the lexical meanings of one and only one functional language. This allows him to distinguish lexematics from onomasiology (the study of the relations between the signified and the different signifiers that express it) and semasiology (the study of the relations that connect a signifier with the different signified it might express). One of the results of this approach is the possibility of excluding from structural semantics Katz and Fodor's method which, according to Coseriu, does not deal with the structure of meaning but rather the study of interpretation. The lexematic structures are then distinguished from the associative fields (studied by Ch. Bally and his school); these fields concern the associations of one sign with others and are partly connected not with the linguistic units as such but with associations between units of non-linguistic reality.

Observing the primary paradigmatic structures (where terms are mutually implied, without supremacy of one over the other), Coseriu distinguishes the lexical field from the lexical class. The lexical field consists of units which share an area of signification and which stand in immediate opposition to one another. The lexical class is a class of lexemes determined by a classeme which is a distinctive feature that operates in an entire category (e.g., the class of /living creatures/, and within it /human beings/, /non-human beings/, etc.). The classes are revealed in the grammatical or lexical combination of the lexemes (lexemes that allow for the same lexical and/or grammatical combination belong to the same class). Coseriu's concept of lexical field differs from that of the above-mentioned French scholars mainly in the procedure that prescribes that one should

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7 Recherches sémantiques, Langages 1, 1966, 5-43.

8 Typologies des composants sémantiques, Quaderni di Semantica 6, 1985, 35-49.

9 B. Pottier, Linguistique générale, Paris 1974.

10 Strukturelle Semantik und Wortfeldtheorie, München 1971.

construct the lexical field gradually, starting from the immediate oppositions between two or three lexemes.

Among the Italian scholars who made their contribution to componential analysis, I would like to recall Alinei[11] who investigates the Italian lexicon using the computer. The semantic features used by Alinei are taken from the definitions given in dictionaries. In his approach, a „feature" is defined as all information assigned to an entry (= lexeme). From the feature analysis of the lexical system of the „dog's sounds", the feature formulation seems at times to fail to observe the principles of economy of description and their primitive value. So, for example, when the Italian lexeme ustolare („to yelp for food") is defined by the feature / s e e i n g i t s m a s t e r w h i l e h e e a t s /.

2.2. The American tradition.

Whilst in Europe the interest in semantic components begins with Hjelmslev's theoretical considerations, in the United States the first examples of feature analysis of semantic fields originate from the field-work of the ethno-anthropologists. The first studies concern the structure of colours,[12] the terminology of kinship[13] and other lexical and cultural areas of anthropological interest.

The analyses provided by these authors have been particularly important in the theory of features and their function in the economy of description.[14] Although the linguistic relevance of the semantic fields they studied and the fact that these belong more specifically to cultural taxonomies may be a matter of discussion, their methodologies are not incompatible with the tenets of structural semantics.

The approach to semantic analysis elaborated by J.J. Katz and J.A. Fodor[15] in the framework of transformational grammar is completely different. Their analysis aims at giving an account of the semantic interpretation that the speaker offers of the words, which are considered in their syntactic context as members of a sentence. The search for semantic features is then carried out starting from the utterance and from the polysemic lexeme, rather than the semantic field. This is done in order to determine „semantic markers", „distinguishers" and „selection restrictions" for each entry of the dictionary. Katz and Fodor's theory of semantic interpretation has witnessed many developments that cannot be considered here. Suffice it to say that in these developments, as well as in Katz and Fodor's approach, the analysis of the meaning of the words tends to become the analysis of the meaning of the sentence.

One of the results of Chomsky's definition of semantic feature is the assumption that the features have to be „universals of language". Concerning this J. Lyons[16] observed that the empirical evidence that we possess so far tends to refute this

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[11] La struttura del lessico, Bologna 1974.

[12] H.C. Conklin, Hanunóo Color Categories, Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 11, 1955, 399-344.

[13] F.G. Lounsbury, The Structural Analysis of Kinship Semantics, in: Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Linguists, The Hague 1964, 1073-1074.

[14] W. H. Goodenough, Componential Analysis and the Study of Meaning, Language 32, 1956, 195-216.

[15] The Structure of a Semantic Theory, Language 39, 1963, 170-210.

[16] Semantics I, Cambridge 1977, 331 ff.

hypothesis rather than confirm it. In spite of very interesting studies, such as that on names of colours by B. Berlin and P. Kay[17], it does not seem to me that the situation has changed in the past twenty years.

3. Evaluation.

If componential analysis has not been the object of further developments and seems to have been set aside during the past decades, that is due to the growth of the theoretical debate which has shifted its stress onto other aspects of linguistic communication. Following the model of scientific revolutions,[18] in linguistics the focus has been shifted onto the text and the event, making the meaning of the word as such less interesting. In a similar way, in archaeology attention has shifted during recent years from procedural and structural models towards historical and contextual considerations[19].

Consider, for example, F. Rundgren's point of view: „Now this *a priori* named reality being articulated by the aid of textual behaviour, the text, as a cultural as well as a linguistic category, is to be regarded as *the first articulation* of language".[20] Rundgren asks himself: „Why then in Proto-Semitic was the notion of ‚tomb' designated as *qabr*-?". He proposes the following answer: „In the possible world that found expression in *Mundus Semiticus inflectus et intellectus* a cultural fact existed that was expressed in the phonetic behavioural events *q-a-b-r* (image acoustique)".[21] In this perspective the meaning of the word in itself does not seem to be a problem any longer.

The same shift onto other aspects of linguistic communications could be achieved in other ways: through sociolinguistics, for example, considering the pre-eminence of the event in acts of communication. With reference to languages with a limited corpus, A. Avanzini's study[22] on the formulary of building inscriptions of ancient South Arabia offers an approach which is derived from the consideration of the writing event in a given society. But although this consideration of the writing event throws light upon the criteria for the use of the lexicon that go beyond literary genre and the textual model, I do not think that it makes the study of the lexicon worthless at the level of functional language.

That being said, we might ask ourselves what is still valid in componential analysis both from the explicative-theoretical point of view and the operative one. Lyons has drawn attention to the fact that „the allegedly more basic sense-components cannot be shown to have any psychological validity", and to the „highly questionable procedure of treating as basic sense-components ... the meanings of certain lexemes, like ‚human', ‚adult' or ‚female' from his own native language or from some other language that is commonly employed as a metalanguage in theoretical

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17 Basic Colour Terms: Their Universality and Evolution, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1969.

18 T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962.

19 I. Hodder, Reading the Past, Cambridge 1986.

20 The Word and the Text, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Acta Societatis Linguisticae Upsaliensis, N.S. 4:1, 1992, 5.

21 Ibid., 7.

22 For a Study on the Formulary of Construction Inscriptions, in: C. Robin – M. Bafaqih (edd.), *Ṣayhadica*, Paris 1987, 11-20.

and descriptive linguistics".[23] In spite of this and other problems which are still open (whose solution, as in the case of the relation between the linguistic system and cognitive processes, does not depend only upon componential analysis) some positive effects might perhaps be indicated. As regards our awareness of the functioning of linguistic systems, these methods have served to underline some distinctions. Firstly, they have emphasized the need to distinguish clearly between relations of signification and relations of designation. This proves to be equally clear in both the interpretation based upon the lexematic point of view and that which requires the extension of its applicability to speech. Rastier,[24] for example, points out that semantic features are neither qualities of a referent nor parts of a concept.

Just as clearly, componential analysis has helped to distinguish structures of the lexicon from associative fields. Besides, Coseriu[25] has effectively shown the difference between the structured linguistic lexicon and the terminological lexicon („lexique nomenclateur et terminologique"), including popular classifications. In the debate that followed Coseriu's exposition, this distinction was supported by Ullmann[26] who, although approving it in general terms, wondered whether or not popular nomenclatures should be put on the same level of technical and scientific terminologies.

From the operative point of view, Lyons has expressed a rather negative opinion. According to him, componential analysis „is as valid as the relations upon which it is based and which it may conveniently summarize ... But there seems little value in setting up a new kind of linguistic unit (the ‚sememe') when all that can be said with it can be said just easily without".[27] With respect to the treatment offered by Coseriu, the difficulty of delimiting the functional languages is also to be considered (as the same Lyons noticed during the Workshop).

Other linguists may consider interesting the results of experiments that have made use of componential analysis. Having observed that a componential analysis rigorously carried out fails to account for metonymic and metaphoric uses, B. Kedar[28] still admits that it can become, in some circumstances, a heuristic method clarifying differences of meaning. So the paradox of componential analysis (supposing the method is valid, the plan to elaborate a complete list of the semantic components of a language is illusory) is in any case an answer to the intention of the past to create „semantic alphabets" or „universal mental dictionaries".[29]

4. Applicability.

My task on the present occasion is not to offer a theoretical contribution to issues concerning componential analysis but only to verify its possible value within the

[23] Structural Semantics I, Oxford 1977, 333 ff.

[24] Typologies des composants sémantiques, Quaderni di Semantica 6, 1985, 35.

[25] Structure lexicale et enseignement du vocabulaire, in: (various authors), Les théories linguistiques et leurs applications, Nancy 1967, 18.

[26] Ibid., 79.

[27] Structural Semantics, Oxford 1967, 80.

[28] Biblische Semantik: Eine Einführung, Stuttgart 1981, 188.

[29] R. Simone, Fondamenti di linguistica, Roma – Bari ^{2}1991, 491 ff.

study of the lexicon of Biblical Hebrew or other languages with a limited corpus. This can be done in two ways; through theoretical examination of the problem, and through critical examination of the available studies in this field.

4.1. Applicability to languages with a limited corpus.

Adherence to a model of linguistic description, when there is no bias to an ideology or school, may be based upon two different factors: realism and convenience, as has been observed with regard to another problem.[30] Realism means to choose the model that we think is able to reproduce the object described as accurately as possible. Convenience means to choose a method that can describe most of the facts using less principles (be they rules or elements). Economy would probably be a more suitable term for this second criterion.

A principle that can be used in description might also be the one of „irreversible solidarity", formulated by Jakobson. Some elements are presupposed by the presence of others (primary values) whereas some others presuppose the presence of the former (secondary values). When the language we want to study is part of a verifiable historical evolution, the consideration that a certain characteristic (phonological for instance) should not appear before others might be a means to verify the effectiveness of a reconstruction. An example of an application of this criterion can be seen in L. Heilmann's observations[31] with regard to the „impossible" phonological system of Nostratic proposed by Cuny. The use of the Berlin-Kay hypothesis to support the stages of development of colour terms in Hebrew[32] could be regarded as an example of the application of the same criterion in the field of Semitic languages.

If we pass on to verify these criteria with reference to the analysis of the lexicon in languages with a limited corpus, we have first to observe that we know these languages from written documents. These are considered as a secondary code, functionally parallel to phonic utterances. In principle, graphic variants and invariants are assimilated to phonological ones and likewise on the morphological and lexical levels. Nevertheless it remains to consider the influence that the secondary code (the graphic system, but also the writing system in general) exerts on the transmission of a language. This is particularly obvious in the Semitic graphic systems, especially that which is used in Hebrew. But the influence of the code is evident not only with regard to the phonological system. The manuscript tradition in itself with all its problems could be taken into account and also, regarding the original writing, the manifold conventions of the scribes. It seems to follow then that the focus of structural methods on the formal aspect of language might become an operative instrument for the study of these texts. Compare what W. Richter[33] has observed with regard to Hebrew.

Since we cannot study Hebrew but only the literary language that has been preserved (and which belongs to different literary genres), and it is not possible to resort to „informants" to check the records, what method of componential analysis

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30 M. Negri, Lingue antiche e linguistica strutturale: nuclei problematici e prospettive euristiche, Acme 40, 1987, 14 ff.

31 Linguaggio, lingue, culture, Bologna 1983, 198 ff.

32 A. Brenner, Colour Terms in the Old Testament, Sheffield 1982, 56 f.

33 Grundlagen einer althebräischen Grammatik, St. Ottilien 1978, 5.

should we then prefer? In principle it would seem that, on these terms, only the level of signification (and not that of designation) is accessible.
„We may learn the meanings of the words, but not a knowledge of their intended content which must be derived from other, non-linguistic sources, or which there is no hope of recognizing at all".[34] For this reason, Coseriu's method, which refers only to relations of signification, has seemed appropriate.
If we wanted to apply a method such as the generative one we would find ourselves in a vicious circle for lack of informants (that is, for lack of intuitive judgements on the meaning of sentences offered by the speaker). Also, a structural method should allow us to expand our knowledge of the lexical meaning of individual words which are parts of a field.

4.2. Lexical fields in Hebrew.

In my first article on the structure of the semantic field of colours[35] I attributed the fact that the literature about Biblical Hebrew did not offer examples of componential analysis to special difficulties caused by the study of dead languages. In fact I was able to quote only two articles which, though failing to come to a real semic analysis, tried to define the meaning of terms by examining the system of oppositions found in the texts. These terms belong to the semantic field of „folly"[36] and the field of rich and poor[37] in the wisdom literature. To these were added observations on words relating to the semantic field of truth,[38] where the concept of semantic field is understood in the sense of J. Trier. Even after my article on the structure of the semantic field of colours, followed by an application to a single problem,[39] the bibliography about this subject has not grown very much. Sawyer[40], for example, indicated among previous studies on associative fields those on biblical words for „time",[41] geographic terminology,[42] terms for the pottery,[43] but he did not mention any study of componential analysis. In following years we can recall A. Vivian[44], I. Zatelli[45] and A. Brenner[46]. Kedar's manual[47] does not provide a selected

[34] M.Z. Kaddari, Semantic Fields in the Language of the Dead Sea Scrolls, Jerusalem 1968, VII.

[35] P. Fronzaroli, Sulla struttura dei colori in ebraico biblico, in: (various authors), Studi linguistici in onore di Vittore Pisani, Brescia 1969, 377-389.

[36] T. Donald, The Semantic Field of ‚Folly' in Proverbs, Job, Psalms and Ecclesiastes, VT 13, 1963, 285-292.

[37] T. Donald, The Semantic Field of Rich and Poor in the Wisdom Literature of Hebrew and Akkadian, OrAnt 3, 1964, 27-41.

[38] J.F.A. Sawyer, Root-meanings in Hebrew, JSS 12, 1967, 43-46.

[39] P. Fronzaroli, I cavalli del Proto-Zaccaria, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Rendiconti 26, 1972, 593-602.

[40] Semantics in Biblical Research. New Methods of Defining Hebrew Words for Salvation, London 1972, 33.

[41] J. Barr, Biblical Words for Time, rev. ed., London 1969, 185-207.

[42] A. Schwarzenbach, Die geographische Terminologie im Alten Testament, Leiden 1954.

[43] A.M. Honeyman, The Pottery Vessels in the Old Testament, PEQ 71, 1939, 76-90.

[44] I campi lessicali della „separazione" nell'ebraico biblico, di Qumran e della Mishna, Firenze 1978.

[45] Il campo lessicale degli aggettivi di purità in ebraico biblico, Firenze 1978.

[46] Colour Terms in the Old Testament, Sheffield 1982.

[47] Biblische Semantik: Eine Einführung, Stuttgart 1981, 187-189.

bibliography on this point, although it offers some interesting and original remarks. L. Kutler's article[48] refers to Weinrich but it does not use formal methods.
We can find in all these analyses some interesting contributions to the study of Hebrew semantics. Some of these are also relevant to the study of semantic fields as intended here. For example, Sawyer[49] notices that four terms belonging to the field of „truth" are also found in the field of „firmness" (*ʾəmūnā, neʾəmān, kēn, nākōn*). This is in keeping with what has been observed on the possibility that a word can belong to more than one field at the same time.[50] But the way this has been investigated by Sawyer concerns „what part the root plays in the word total meaning". Moreover, the four terms specified do not correspond even to the basic definition of the semantic field (a group of words that are in paradigmatic opposition). Similar remarks could be made for most of the cited studies. In conclusion, the studies which can be used are limited to my two articles and the books by Vivian, Zatelli, Brenner.
4.2.1. Delimiting the lexical field.
Most of the authors I have quoted (who as already stated aim at studying associative fields) derive their standards for judging what words belong to a field from lexicographic descriptions.[51] Sometimes they use the contexts of every single word. Or else they refer to the intuition of the scholar: „the criteria for building up this far larger field are in the last resort intuitive".[52] Concerning this, Sawyer himself discusses whether or not the intuitive element could legitimately be used in the scientific investigation. He concludes that „a knowledge of Hebrew implies that I can intuitively recognize words of related meanings".[53]
On the contrary, I had suggested in my first contribution a procedure based upon the possibilities of substitution allowed in the messages offered by the corpus.[54] Starting from the hypothesis that a lexeme A belongs to a field which is to be described, and considering it as an invariant, we then proceed to an inventory of a class B of variables. These are formed by lexemes which occur in the corpus associated with A. For each member of class B singled out in this way we extract from the corpus the members of class A', so that they can replace A in A+B. As regards the criterion to identify members of the class A', we must choose terms which occur in the corpus in opposition to one another (e.g., „Are they black or white?"). If a single member of class A' could replace A in all the utterances, it would be completely equivalent to A. In fact, we find that each member of class A' can replace A in some specific utterances, but not in all of them. For each member of A' we must then complete classes B using the same method of extraction already illustrated for A. Following this, we extract new replaceable members for each

48 A Structural Semantic Approach to Israelite Communal Terminology, JANES 14, 1982, 69-77.
49 Journal of Semitic Studies 12, 1967, 45.
50 E. Coseriu, Les structures lexématiques, in: W.T. Elwert (ed.), Probleme der Semantik, Wiesbaden 1968, § 3.1.3.
51 E.g., Sawyer, JSS 12, 1967, 45, n. 1.
52 Sawyer, Semantics in Biblical Research, 33.
53 Ibid., 34.
54 P. Fronzaroli, Sulla struttura dei colori in ebraico biblico, 379-381.

member of A' through the new members of class B not common to A. The procedure ends when new extractions are no longer possible:

A: white	B: horse	A': black, bay, sorrel, etc.
	B: garment	A': black, blue, pink, etc.
	B: flower	A': blue, pink, red, etc.
	B: house, etc.	A': red, gray, etc.

We have now a class A' of lexemes which belong to the same semantic field of A. In fact, being able to replace A they share at least one semantic feature with A. To each member of the class A+A' corresponds a class B of lexemes which can be associated with it:

A+A'	white	B	horse, garment, flower, house, etc.
	black		horse, garment, etc.
	blue		garment, flower, etc.
	red		flower, house, etc.
	bay		horse
	sorrel		horse
	etc.		

The extraction procedure does not establish a hierarchy between the lexemes extracted first and those extracted later. It is evident that the procedure could be started with any member of the field which is to be isolated; in that case the order of extraction would be different.

As for later studies, a full methodological discussion can be found in Zatelli's book. Moving along the same line as Coseriu and Geckeler, she chooses the field of „purity" adjectives as the subject of her investigation. To determine the area of a field she uses an integrated system (studying dictionaries of and linguistic researches on the lexemes under examination). She does not ignore difficulties typical of the biblical corpus, especially with reference to stylistic redoundancies and, with poetic language, the existence of „stereotype" antonymic pairs.[55] Vivian's research on the lexical field of „separation" runs along the same theoretical lines but differs in simultaneously dealing with different historical languages and different functional languages in the three stages of Hebrew: Biblical, Qumranic and Mishnaic. The criteria used to delineate fields are partly internal to the system, such as the exclusion of lexemes whose connection is weak or peripheral to the lexical field. They are also partly derived from the approved preliminary assumptions, such as the exclusion of technical terminology.[56]

A. Brenner, intending to suggest an evolutionary framework for the development of colour terms in Biblical Hebrew and Post-Biblical Hebrew, discusses at length the difficulties in the interpretation of the biblical text and standards to identify chronological stages and levels of speech, roughly equivalent to functional language. She also pays attention to the situational context.[57] As for the structuring of the field of „basic" colours with a different degree of complexity in successive stages of Hebrew, the Berlin-Kay hypothesis has been extensively used.[58] On the other hand

[55] I. Zatelli, Il campo lessicale degli aggettivi di purità, 24-27.

[56] A. Vivian, I campi lessicali della „separazione", 128 f.

[57] A. Brenner, Colour Terms, 18-25.

[58] Ibid., 39 ff. and passim.

it does not seem to me that any formal method has been used to determine the terms belonging to the field.

4.2.2. Identifying semantic features.

As regards the criteria used to identify features, the situation is not too different from the one already examined in judging when individual words belong to a field. Most of the studies mentioned do not aim at using componential analysis and therefore do not deal with the problem. In other cases the problem is tackled, even though it is not considered to be of primary importance. Sawyer, for example, observes that „of the six commonest words in the HOŠIA^{c} group, only one, ^{c}AZAR, is a Qal form" and asks himself if this „grammatical component" is also a semantic component.[59] Besides, he observes that an important „element of separation" is observable in verbs of the HOŠIA^{c} group and that it could be described as a semantic component. Yet it is context-bound, and moreover varies in degree from one member of the lexical group to another. In general, Sawyer underlines the numerous problems of componential analysis still unresolved. As regards labelling the components, he thinks that this depends entirely upon the intuitive knowledge of the linguist, doubting that it could be possible to find a method which would not refer to contextual criteria as well. I think we cannot say that he is wrong on this point. In fact, whilst it has been possible to suggest a procedure to judge when individual words belong to a field, the procedure that would extract semantic features from the meaning of the words is not clear at all. If we apply the same concept of features to the same lexical field, this might lead us to a different analysis of the field. In general features are supposed to have explicative and elementary values and to be such as to account for the economy of description.

In order to proceed to a distinctive features analysis of the content, Zatelli[60] resorts to the notion of „dimension" (Geckeler) or „axe sémantique" (Greimas). The basic dimensions used to analyse the field of „purity" adjectives in Biblical Hebrew are: /natural dimension/, /ethical-religious dimension/, /material-religious dimension/. Within these the fundamental opposition is that of /pure/ : /non-pure/. Zatelli warns us not to attribute a value of absolute definition to the metalinguistic formulations we use. As to the designation of classes in Biblical Hebrew she underlines the caution required by the limits of the biblical text, without any possibility of verification external to the text itself.[61] So if a lexeme is attested once or twice referring to an animal, we cannot conclude that the term under examination acts in the class /living creatures/. This method of analysis leads to definitions such as the following:

bar old poetic language and language of Job adjective denoting /purity/; dimension /ethical-religious/; positive pole; class /human beings/ and /cultural-religious elements/.

The most delicate point in Zatelli's classematic analysis (inspired by Coseriu's criteria) consists of her interpretation of the selected classes as classes determined

[59] Semantics in Biblical Research, 59.

[60] Il campo lessicale degli aggettivi di purità, 71-72.

[61] Ibid., 31.

by „affinity". These are /human beings/; /human acts and behaviours/; /cultural-religious elements/; /natural and material elements/; /animals/.[62] But whilst /human beings/ and /animals/ correspond to the „affinity" criterion (the class of the determining term acts as the distinctive feature of the determined term), this could be maintained only with difficulty for the other classes listed above. These might rather correspond to the „selection" criterion (the archilexeme of the determining term acts as the distinctive feature of the determined term). Instead, the fact that a lexeme might be at the intersection of two classes (here, /+human beings/ and /+cultural-religious elements/) presents no difficulty. These reservations considered and formalizing more strictly we have then:

bar /+purity/, /+ethical-religious/; /+human beings/, or /+cultural-religious elements/.

Vivian[63] also uses the notion of „dimension" but he points out that in lexical fields formed by verbs the relations with verbal classes and classemes are much stronger; this triggers much more complex and unstable relations. In order to verify the level of economy of description, we may consider the comparative table that summarizes the analyses of 11 lexemes of the field of „separation".[64] There 18 semes are used; this might seem excessive for the definition of 11 lexemes. Nevertheless, we must take into account the fact that the table considers the use of the verbs in four different functional languages of pre-exilic Hebrew (narrative, poetic, poetic-dialectal, juridical-ritual). Moreover, the same semes are also found in other verbs which do not belong to this field and this diachrony.

In her study of the field of colours, A. Brenner can rely on previous researches and consequently deals with completely different problems. Firstly, she is able to organize the materials in groups which assemble colour adjectives according to a decreasing level of generality of use. The meaning of primary colour adjectives is determined by its being mutually exclusive. These adjectives are monolexemic; their meaning is not included in that of any other colour adjective; their application is not limited to a narrow class of objects. The area covered by each one of these lexemes is then divided into overlapping sections by secondary and tertiary adjectives. Brenner designates the dimensions of the field of colours as hue (the presence or relative absence of chromaticity), brightness (a quantitative criterion applied to the quality of chromaticity), and saturation (the intensity of the perceived colour), with reference to what is normally perceived as the characteristic attributes of colour sensation (i.e., as a psychological „reality").

Brenner's investigation contains very interesting observations and contributions, such as the discussion on primary adjectives that Hebrew possessed in different synchronies.[65] She is not interested in the semic definition of the lexemes. Consequently, she does not discuss the possibility of a semic analysis of primary

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62 Ibid., 64 ff.

63 I campi lessicali della „separazione", 126 ff.

64 Ibid., 183 ff.

65 Colour Terms, 53-57.

colours, beyond the already cited observation on their mutually exclusive meanings (i.e., on the fact that they are in equipollent opposition). This position recalls that of R. Jackendorff: „Surely a decomposition of ‚red' must include the stipulation that it is a color ... But once the marker COLOR is removed from the reading of ‚red', what is left to decompose further? How can one make sense of redness minus coloration?"[66] Now this might be valid for contemporary European languages, where in the one-dimensional field of basic colours each one of them is opposed to the others. But, as far as Hebrew is concerned and from a strictly linguistic point of view, I think that it would be interesting to point out that in the pre-exilic stage the colour system defined *ʾādōm* only as the area of highly saturated colours, whereas already in the exilic stage[67] the same lexeme defined the area of relative presence of chromaticity:

ʾādōm	(pre-exil.)	/ + brightness /, / + saturation /;
	(exil.)	/ + brightness /, / + saturation /,
		/ + chromaticity /.

5. Conclusion.

In conclusion, the difficulties found in the attempt to analyse some semantic fields of Hebrew reflect the difficulties we met at the theoretical and operative level (§ 3). The problem of legitimizing the use of intuitive criteria has emerged in two different contexts: in delimiting the field and labelling the semantic components. The degree of intuitive knowledge will depend in part upon the size of the preserved corpus. But since we are considering languages with a limited corpus, the degree of intuitive knowledge will probably remain limited. The utility of componential analysis could then consist of the use of formal methods which would show clearly structures otherwise difficult to reveal. This can be obtained, at least to a certain extent, with regard to the delimitation of the field. As for identifying and labelling semantic features, the problem cannot be solved within our languages with a limited corpus but it concerns a basic limitation of the method.

One of the most evident characteristics of Vivian's and Zatelli's works is the attempt to keep distinct the functional languages (within different synchronies). The utility of applying the lexematic point of view to one and only one functional language can also be easily verified in languages with a limited corpus. An interesting case is that studied by B. Levine[68] in Ugaritic. In this language *ś* and *alp* continue the meaning of Common Semitic „ovine" and „bovine", but in ritual texts they mean „male ovine" and „male bovine" respectively, as opposed to the innovations *dqt* and *gdlt*, denoting the female of the two classes. This shows that the same lexeme may have a different meaning in different kinds of texts, that is in different functional languages belonging to the Ugaritic diasystem.

Because of the impossibility of carrying it out on the whole vocabulary of a language (in addition to theoretical and operative problems often mentioned), componential analysis will probably remain a technique for sounding the organisation of the lexicon. It underlines the complexity of the relations which exist

66 Semantics and Cognition, Cambridge, Mass. 1983, 113.

67 According to Brenner, ibid., 56.

68 Ugaritic Descriptive Rituals, Journal of Cuneiform Studies 17, 1963, 108-111.

between words and the presence of a structuring in the lexicon. At the level of application, it is extremely convincing in describing structures which are different from those familiar to contemporary European languages. How many readers of the Bible, for example, have ever known that in pre-exilic texts the adjective commonly translated „red" should actually be translated (or, better, paraphrased) as „intensely coloured"?
As for the aim of an ideal semantic data-base for a machine-readable corpus of texts in a dead language, a system of cross-references could be used to connect the words of the same field.

Abstract:

Componential analysis is a procedure which aims at operating semantic analysis at the level of the word. It assumes that the meaning of „full" words can be split up into smaller elements of meaning (semantic components or semantic features).
Whilst in the United States the first examples of feature analysis of semantic fields originate from the field-work of the ethno-anthropologists, in Europe the interest in semantic components begins with Hjelmslev's theoretical considerations. Along these lines the more rigorous treatment is perhaps offered by Coseriu and his pupils. Completely different is the approach to semantic analysis elaborated by J.J. Katz and J.A. Fodor in the framework of transformational grammar.
Delimiting the lexical field and identifying semantic features requires a methodology and involves the problem of legitimizing the use of intuitive criteria. As to the applicability in Hebrew and the difficulties found in the attempt to analyse some semantic fields, articles and books are recalled, such as those on the semantic field of colours (P. Fronzaroli, A. Brenner), the field of „puritiy" adjectives (I. Zatelli), the field of „separation" (A. Vivian).

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Logical Semantics: an Overview from a Textological Point of View

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0. Introductory remarks.

In the last three or four decades research in logical semantics has produced so many approaches to natural languages that it is not possible to treat all of them in a 45-minute lecture in a sufficiently informative way. However, while the aim of this overview is to analyse the logical semantics from the point of view of its applicability in the semantic interpretation of a (limited) corpus of verbal texts, this aim can help to decide which aspects of these approaches should be chosen for presentation and how they should be presented.

Taking into account the fact that the approaches of logical semantics are dealing with different *natural language fragments* – almost always motivated by the history of logical research – and that they do it by using *such sophisticated formal systems* the mastery of which presupposes *very special competence*, I will myself focus on the treatment of the general methodological principles of logical semantics.

In order to minimize the terminological problems, I will present these methodological principles from a linguistic point of view, and in the form of an „anthology of quotations" which can help the reader find further information in the quoted sources in an easy manner. After the presentation of a short (critical) analysis of these principles, I will try to find out in which form they can be applied, not only for the interpretation of constructed natural language fragments, but also for the interpretation of given texts.

According to this strategy, my paper contains the following sections: (1) explication of the factors playing a central role in the (linguistic) semantic interpretation of an utterance (this explication will be used as point of departure for the treatment of the chosen aspects of logical semantics); (2) analysis of the basic methodological principles of logical semantics, and the classification of some of its directions which are relevant for natural languages; (3) remarks on the further elaborations of logical semantics and its application in the interpretation of natural languages; (4) outline of the theoretical framework of the so-called semiotic textology, in order to elucidate the possible form of application of logical semantics as presented here, as well as the needs of text interpretation (in this section the examples will be taken from the „Canticum Canticorum"); (5) conclusions. In addition the paper also contains an Appendix.[1]

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[1] This paper is published here in a radically abbreviated version. From the second and third sections there remains only the initial programmatic paragraph in each case, and the bibliography and Appendix are reduced, too.

1. The central factors in the semantic interpretation of an utterance.

For the demonstration of these factors I have chosen an article of Bierwisch[2] because, on the one hand, he defines these factors in a very plausible way and, on the other hand, on the basis of these definitions, he also analyses the methodological principles of logical semantics.
An utterance and the interpretations assignable to it are defined by Bierwisch as follows:

> Eine Äusserung ist zunächst ein physikalisches Ereignis oder Gebilde, mit einem Terminus von Kasher (1972)[3] eine Inskription *ins*, das von einem Sprecher (oder Schreiber) produziert wird und von einem Hörer (oder Leser) perzipiert werden kann. Zu einer sprachlichen Äusserung wird ein solches akustisches oder optisches Signal dadurch, dass ihm eine sprachliche Struktur *l* zugeordnet wird, kurz:
>
> (D 1) Eine sprachliche Äusserung *u* ist ein geordnetes Paar (*ins, l*), wobei *ins* ein physikalisches Signal und *l* die Repräsentation der sprachlichen Struktur von *u* ist. [33]
>
> (D 2) Die sprachliche Struktur *l* einer Äusserung *u* ist eine Tripel (*phon, syn, sem*), wobei *phon* die phonetische, *syn* die morphosyntaktische und *sem* die semantische Struktur von *u* ist. [34]
>
> (D 3) Eine kontextuell interpretierte Äusserung *mu* ist ein Tripel (*u, ct, m*), wobei *u* eine sprachlich interpretierte Äusserung gemäss (D 1) und (D 2) ist, *ct* der Kontext, auf den *u* bezogen wird, und *m* die Bedeutung, die *u* in bezug auf *ct* annimmt. [35]
>
> (D 4) Eine kommunikativ interpretierte Äusserung *kmu* ist eine Tripel (*mu, ias, ks*), wobei *mu* eine kontextuell interpretierte Äusserung gemäss (D 3) ist, *ias* die Struktur der Interaktionssituation, in der die Äusserung interpretiert wird, und *ks* der kommunikativer Sinn, den sie in bezug auf diese Bedingungen annimmt. [35]
>
> Fügt man die in (D 1) bis (D 4) festgelegten Bestimmungen ineinander, so erhält man für die Komponenten einer kommunikativ verwendeten sprachlichen Äusserung folgendes Schema:

[2] Manfred Bierwisch, Psychologische Aspekte der Semantik natürlicher Sprachen, in Wolfgang Motsch and Dieter Viehweger (edd.), Richtungen der modernen Semantikforschung, Berlin, 1983, 15-64.
[3] Cf. A. Kasher, A Step toward a Theory of Linguistic Performance, in: Y. Bar-Hillel (ed.), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht, 1972, 84-93.

$$(((ins, (phon, syn, sem)), ct, m), ias, ks)$$

$$l$$

$$u$$

$$mu$$

$$kmu \qquad [35]$$

In other words, according to Bierwisch, the interpretation of an utterance depends on the following three factors: the linguistic structure of the utterance, its context of use, and the communicative interaction within this context. (As an example, Bierwisch uses the utterance „ich werde alle abschliessen lassen".)

2. The basic methodological principles of Logical Semantics and the classification of some of its natural-language-relevant directions.

In this section I start with the article of Bierwisch quoted above, which offers a very clear point of departure. After this I summarize an annotated classification created by Partee,[4] and I conclude with some general remarks on logical systems ...

3. Some (critical) remarks on the further elaboration of Logical Semantics and on its application in the interpretation of natural languages.

I will refer here to the opinions of Partee, Barwise, Bierwisch and Heydrich. Partee[5] and Barwise[6] treat the problems from the perspective of logical semantics, Bierwisch[7] from the perspective of linguistic semantics, and Heydrich[8] from that of text-theoretical research ...

4. Outline of the theoretical framework of so-called „Semiotic Textology".

From the results of the critical analyses of logical semantics and of textological research (here I am talking about the results of the analyses presented in this paper

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[4] B. Partee, Possible Worlds in Model-Theoretic Semantics: A Linguistic Perspective, in: Sture Allén (ed.), Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences, Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65, Berlin – New York 1989, 93-123.

[5] As cited in the previous note: see also her Speaker's Reply in the same volume, 152-161.

[6] J. Barwise, Situationen und kleine Welten, in: von Stechow Armin-Dieter Wunderlich (ed.), Semantik/Semantics, Ein internationales Handbuch der zeitgenössischen Forschung/An International Handbook of Contemporary Research, Berlin – New York 1991, 81-89.

[7] Cf. note 2 above.

[8] W. Heydrich, Possible Worlds and Enkvist's Worlds. Discussion of Nils Erik Enkvist's paper «Connexity, Interpretability, Universes of Discourse, and Text Worlds», in: Sture Allén (ed.), Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences, Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65, Berlin – New York 1989, 187-198.

as well as the results of the analyses I myself have developed) I have drawn the following conclusions:
(i) logical semantics can (and perhaps should) be used as a model for the construction of a semiotic-textological theoretical framework; its methodology, however, cannot be used without substantial modifications;
(ii) an attempt should be made at constructing such a textological theoretical framework, which can function as an „interface" between logical-semantic research and linguistic-textological research, i.e.:
- this framework should be conceived so that its design is relatively near to the design of logical model-theoretic semantics;
- this framework should be furnished with a (semi-formal) representation language which makes it possible: (a) to account for every natural-language word-category; (b) to assign to every type of text-sentences (speech-act types and propositional attitude types too) such a representation as satisfies, at the same time, the criteria of translatability into a logical language, as well as the criteria of textual adequacy; (c) to construct lexical explications having the form of (semi-formal) text representations.

On the basis of these conclusions I have tried to elaborate the framework of semiotic textology. In the following section I would like to briefly outline it.[9]

[9] For earlier work see J.S. Petöfi, Some remarks on „formal pragmatics", in: J.S. Petöfi – Hannes Rieser (edd.), Probleme der modelltheoretischen Interpretation von Texten, Hamburg 1974, 1-13; id., Some problems of text typology and text processing on the basis of a partial text theory, in: J.S. Petöfi, Adalbert Podlech and Eike von Savigny (edd.), Fachsprache-Umgangsprache. Wissenschaftstheoretische und linguistische Aspekte der Problematik, sprachliche Aspekte der Jurisprudenz und der Theologie, maschinelle Textverarbeitung, Kronberg/Ts. 1975, 61-91; id., The logico-semantic theory of natural languages as text theory (A research program for formal linguistics and natural logic), in: J.S. Petöfi (ed.), Logic and the formal theory of natural language. Selective bibliography, Hamburg 1978, 313-333; id., Written, spoken, and the face-to-face verbal communication. Some philosophical aspects of the investigation of natural language, in: Rudolf Haller and Wolfgang Grassl (edd.), Language, Logic and Philosophy. Proceedings of the 4th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 28th August to 2nd September 1979, Kirchberg/Wechsel (Austria), Wien 1980, 144-159; id., Representation languages and their function in text interpretation, in: Sture Allén (ed.), Text Processing. Text Analysis and Generation, Text Typology and Attribution, Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 51, Stockholm 1982, 85-122; id., Some aspects of the structure of a lexicon entry, in: Atti a cura di Marta Fattori e Massimo Bianchi, SPIRITUS. IV° Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, Roma, 7-9 gennaio 1983, Roma 1984, 15-53; id., Lexicon, in: Teun A. van Dijk (ed.), Handbook of Discourse Analysis, Vol.2: Dimensions of Discourse, London 1985, 87-101; id., Von der Satzgrammatik zur semiotischen Textologie. Einige methodologische Fragen der Textinterpretation, Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung (ZPSK) 40/1, 1987, 3-18; id., Language as written medium: text, ch.7 in: N.E. Collinge (ed.), An Encyclopaedia of Language, London – New York 1990, 207-243; id., A humán kommunikáció szemiotikai elmélete felé / Towards a Semiotic Theory of the Human Communication (bilingual edition), Szeged 1991.

4.1. The design of a semiotic textology.

4.1.0. The semiotic textology to be treated here has been conceived as a discipline the primary aim of which is the first and second degree explicative theoretical interpretation of dominantly verbal objects called „texts".
The expression „first and second degree explicative theoretical interpretation" is used, in this context, as a terminus technicus, and it should be explicated as follows:
- the *explicative* interpretation assigns an „architectonics-analysis" (with its central component „meaning") to the text to be interpreted;
- the *theoretical* interpretation assigns the architectonics-analysis (with its central component „meaning"), as a theoretical construct, to the text to be interpreted; it should be noted that this theoretical interpretation is not meant to „simulate" the process (and factors) of „text comprehension in a natural context" even if, as far as its results are concerned, it is not meant to be counter-intuitive;
- the *first-degree* and *second-degree* interpretations assign, respectively, a „direct" and a „symbolic" architectonics-analysis to the text to be interpreted; it should be noted that the text can be interpreted in a symbolic way even if its direct interpretation is successful.

4.1.1 The first-degree components of the architectonics of the text (as they are conceived in the theoretical framework of semiotic textology) and the bases for their first-degree explicative theoretical treatment are represented in the figure in the Appendix (part III). – I am using the term „meaning" in the sense of the „significatum"-component of this figure.

4.1.2. I should like to present here an informal description of the operations and factors which play a role in the first-degree explicative theoretical interpretation. In this description I do not follow the real order of these operations and I do not treat the possible feedbacks among them.
The interpreter:
(a) separates the physical text-manifestation /= *Vehiculum*/ to be interpreted from its context; every other operation and factor of the interpretation is related to this vehiculum, taking into account its linguistic-semiotic facet /= *Notatio*/ as well as its material physical-semiotic facet /= *Figura*/;
(b) assigns a mental image /= *Vehiculum-imago*/ to the vehiculum and the contextual interpretation of its assumed formal (phonological, morphological, syntactic, lexical-prosodic, metrical-rhythmical) architectonics /= *Formatio contextualis*/; here I do not want to deal with the so-called V-model which is the basis for this operation (cf. the symbol $_{V}M_{F}$ in the figure);
(c) assigns a systemic formal interpretation /= *Formatio sistemica*/ to the *Formatio contextualis*; the basic lexical units of both of the formal interpretations are „formatives", that is, elements which are indifferent towards a semantic interpretation;
(d) assigns a systemic semantic interpretation /= *Sensus sistemicus*/ to the *Formatio sistemica*; that is, assigns a well-formed configuration of senses to the configuration of the formatives; in the case of an interpretation whose aim is a

philological fidelity, in performing this operation, the interpreter has to use an author- or epoque-specific thesaurus;
(e) assigns a contextual semantic interpretation /= *Sensus contextualis*/ to the *Sensus sistemicus*; this implies that the interpreter should perform the following operations:

*

(e11) assign an author-specific set of knowledge – a so-called R-model (cf. the symbol ${}_{S}M_{R}$ in the figure) – to the *Sensus sistemicus*; this model contains the presumed knowledge of the author, which refers to the world, on the basis of his thesaurus;
(e12) activate the pieces of knowledge present in this model, with the help of which he can assign a functioning *Sensus contextualis* to the *Sensus sistemicus*; this functionality means that the model contains the image /= *imago*/ of such a state-of-affairs configuration /= *Relatum*/ as is congruent with this *Sensus contextualis*; for the sake of simplicity, I make no distinction here between the mental images and their indicators as theoretical constructs;

**

(e21) assign a R-model which contains his set of knowledge concerning the world; I do not deal here with the question about how to treat the relation between an interpreter-specific model and an author-specific thesaurus;
(e22) the operations to be performed here are analogous to the ones described in (e21);

***

(e31) compare the configurations of states of affairs resulting from the operations (e12) and (e22);
(e321) if the two configurations are identical, then the process of interpretation is successfully finished;
(e322) if the two configurations are not identical, then:
- the interpreter should try to make them identical via the reconstruction of the first, or of the second, or of both of them, in order to finish successfully the process of interpretation;
- if he cannot do that, then, on the basis of one of his configurations of states of affairs, he should try to explain one of the producer-specific configurations of states of affairs, in order to make both configurations acceptable, and, in this way, to finish successfully the process of interpretation.

(f) If none of the (e)-operations is successful, the interpreter can revise either the *models* used for the interpretation, or the *Sensus contextualis*, or the *Sensus sistemicus*, or even the *Formatio*.

(I hope that it is not difficult to see the relations between this description of a semantic interpretation and the description made by Bierwisch, which is presented in the first section of this paper.)

4.2. Some aspects of a semi-formal representation-language.

4.2.1. It seems useful to use *functors-argument structures* as basic units in the semi-formal representation-language; the *functor* part of the structure has to be modifiable, the *argument* part has to contain not only argument variables or constants, but also the indicators of their role.
Formula (a) represents the global form of a functor-argument structure, while formula (b) represents the specified form of it.

(a) [F]{ A }

(b) [([[([M]) | Ql / Qn ([F_m]) |] F_d]) F]{r_1:x_1, r_2:x_2,..., r_n:x_n}

< > < > < > < > < > < > < > < >

Remarks on formula (b):
- units in round brackets are optional, and they might be cancelled;
- „M" is a variable for *modifiers*, which correspond to expressions like „very", „exactly", and so on;
- „Ql" is a variable for *quality indicators*, which correspond to adjectives or adverbs, such as „green", „cold",..., „slowly", „quickly", and so on;
- „Qn" is a variable for *quantity indicators*, which correspond to numbers, or to indefinite numbers, like „some", „few", and so on;
- „Fm" is a variable for *measure functors*, which correspond to units like „piece", „litre", „km", „km/h", and so on;
- „Fd" is a variable for dimension functors, which correspond to „number", „weight", „volume", „colour", and so on;
- „F" is a variable for *basic functors*, which, using the terminology of traditional grammar, correspond to „nouns", „verbs", and „conjunctions";
- „r_i" is a variable for *argument-role indicators*;
- „x_i" is a variable for *arguments*;
- the symbols „< >" indicate the slots where the natural-language-specific morpho-syntactic pieces of information should be inserted.

As we can see, the formula (b) contains symbols for every type of natural-language word category.
If a functor-argument structure does not contain the constant „iitc" (= it is the case), I am speaking about a *proposition kernel*. By using temporal and local specifiers („st", „sl", respectively), we can construct propositions from the *proposition* kernels. (See formula (c), in which the symbols „p" indicate proposition kernels, and the symbols „P" indicate propositions.)

4.2.2. A proposition can be either elementary or complex; the complex propositions are constructed from the elementary ones by using (semi-formal natural-language-specific) connectives.
By embedding propositions into propositions in a type-specific way, we can create a so-called *atomic text*. Formula (c) represents a (non-completely well-formed) atomic text, which can be assigned to the first text sentence of the „Canticum Canticorum" (cf. the Appendix (part IV.1)).

This formula has an embedding structure dominated by a *communicative proposition*, which contains the parameters of the communication situation; the dominated propositions are of the following types: *performative-modal* (with the basic functor „TELL"), *world-constitutive* (with the basic functor „DESIRE"), *descriptive world-constitutive* (with the basic functor „FACT"), *descriptive neutral* (with the basic functor „KISS"). The propositions marked with „*" are semi-formal „interpretative reconstructions" of some pieces of natural-language information contained in the given text sentence. The graphic representation shows the relations among the temporal specifiers of the individual propositions. For the sake of simplicity, in these propositions I have used English words in capital letters as basic functors.

This type of formula makes it possible:
- to translate it into a formal logical language, if such a language already exists for the case represented in the formula;
- to decompose the different pieces of information in order to create a network of sub-worlds, presumably expressed in the text to be interpreted (the term „sub-world" is not identical with the logical term „possible world");
- to decompose a semi-formal text-representation from every relevant point of view.

(c) P^{Cc} :=: [iitc]{st:t_o, sl:l_o, up:p^c}

p^c :=: [COMMUNICATES]{r_i: i01, rj. i03, r_k: P^{Pm}}

---

* P^{Pm} :=: [iitc]{st:t_o, sl:l_o, up:p^m} i01: W /woman/

p^m :=: [TELL.]{r_i: i01, r_j: i03, r_k: P^{Ww}} i02: M /man/

* P^{Ww} :=: [iitc]{st:t_1, sl:l_1, up:p^w} i03: X

1

p^w :=: [DESIRE.]{r_i: i01, r_j: P^{Dw}} i04: $the kisses

1 of i02's mouth$

* P^{Dw} :=: [iitc]{st:t_2, sl:l_2, up:p^w}

2

p^w :=: [FACT.]{r_i: i01, r_j: P^{Dn}}

2

P^{Dn} :=: [iitc]{st:t_2, sl:l_2, up:p^n}

p^n :=: [KISS.]{r_i: i02, rj: i01, r_k: i04}



This formula can be read as follows:

it is the case [=iitc] in $\{t_o, l_o\}$, that i01 COMMUNICATES to i03:

---

iitc in $\{t_o, l_o\}$, that I [=i01] TELL to i03, that

iitc in $\{t_1, l_1\}$, that I [=i01] DESIRE, that

iitc in $\{t_2, l_2\}$, that it is a FACT for me [=i01], that

iitc in $\{t_2, l_2\}$, that i02 KISSes me [=i01] with i04

Concerning the initial part of the „Canticum Canticorum", with the help of the communicative propositions, it is possible to represent explicitly the different parameters which are related to the first and the second text sentence respectively. For combining these first two text sentences, we should assign a semi-formal connective to the Latin word „quia". The English and German translations show two possibilities for the interpretation of „quia" (cf. the Appendix (part IV.1)).[10]

The descriptive neutral proposition of the formula (c) has to be contained in the component „sensus sistemicus", while the complete formula (c) has to be contained in the component „sensus contextualis" of the semiotic-textological model of interpretation (Cf. section 4.1 and the Appendix (part III)).

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[10] On the aspects of the semi-formal language applied here see, for example, W. Heydrich – J.S. Petöfi, A text-theoretical account of questions of lexical structure, Quaderni di Semantica IV, 1983, 120-127, 294-311; Petöfi, Written, spoken, and the face-to-face verbal communication. Some philosophical aspects of the investigation of natural language, in: Rudolf Haller and Wolfgang Grassl (edd.), Language, Logic and Philosophy. Proceedings of the 4th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 28th August to 2nd September 1979, Kirchberg/ Wechsel (Austria), Wien 1980, 144-159; id., Representation languages and their function in text interpretation, in: Sture Allén (ed.), Text Processing. Text Analysis and Generation, Text Typology and Attribution, Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 51, Stockholm 1982, 85-122.

4.2.3. In connection with the *lexical explications* we have to make a distinction, on the one hand, between *lexicon-* and *encyclopedia-specific* explications and, on the other hand, between *systemic* and *contextual* explications.

In the *systemic* (lexicon- or encyclopedia-specific) explications it is useful to represent the *explicanda* as constituents of functor-argument structures in the following way: the functor-argument structure has only to have the explicandum as a „constant"-constituent, the other places in the structure should be filled with information referring to the relevant properties of the collocations given in the text corpus to be analysed. This way of representation allows us to construct „collocational semantic networks" specific for the text corpus analysed.
The *explicantia* should have the form of a semi-formal text representation constructed on the basis of the putnamian principles of the stereotypes.[11]

In order to treat some aspects of the *contextual* explications, let us comment on the examples represented in (d), which contains every occurrence of the expression „ubera/uberum" in the „Canticum Canticorum".

(d)

1 1 W quia meliora sunt *ubera* tua vino
Truly, more pleasing is your *love* than wine.
Ja, deine *Liebe* ist besser als Wein.

1 3 W memores *uberum* tuorum super vinum
Let us extol your *love* beyond wine!
Deine *Liebe* wollen wir rühmen höher als Wein.

1 12 W inter *ubera* mea commorabitur
between my *breasts* he lies.
das zwischen meinen *Brüsten* ruht.

4 5 M duo *ubera* tua sicut duo hinuli
Your *breasts* are like two fawns,
Deine zwei *Brüste* (sind) wie zwei Kitzen,

4 10 M pulchriora *ubera* tua vino
How much more pleasing is your *love* than wine,
Wieviel besser ist deine *Liebe* als Wein,

7 3 M duo *ubera* tua sicut duo hinuli
Your *breasts* are like two fawns,
Deine zwei *Brüste* (sind) wie zwei Kitzen,

7 7 M et *ubera* tua botris

[11] Concerning this topic cf. Bierwisch's opinion, quoted in the previous sections, and also F. Neubauer – J.S. Petöfi, Word semantics, lexicon systems, and text interpretation, in Hans-Jürgen Eikmeyer and Hannes Rieser (edd.), Words, Worlds, and Contexts. New Approaches in Word Semantics, Berlin – New York 1981, 337-343, and Petöfi, Some aspects of the structure of a lexicon entry, in: Atti a cura di Marta Fattori e Massimo Bianchi, SPIRITUS. IV° Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intelletuale Europeo, Roma, 7-9 gennaio 1983, Roma 1984, 15-53; id., Lexicon, in: Teun A. van Dijk (ed.), Handbook of Discourse Analysis, Vol.2: Dimensions of Discourse, London 1985, 87-101.

and your *breasts* clusters.
und deine *Brüste* den (Dattel-) Trauben.

7 8 M et erunt *ubera* tua sicut botri vineae
Let your *breasts* be like the clusters of the vine,
Dann werden deine *Brüste* wie die Weintrauben sein,

7 12 W ibi dabi tibi *ubera* mea
There I will give you my *love*.
Dort will ich dir meine *Liebkosungen* schenken:

8 1 W *ubera* matris meae
nursed at my mother's *breasts*!
der an den *Brüsten* meiner Mutter gesäugt.

8 8 (W) soror nostra parva et *ubera* non habet
... and she has no *breasts*.
die hat noch keine *Brüste*.

8 10 (W) et *ubera* mea sicut turris
and my *breasts* like towers.
und meine *Brüste* sind wie Türme.

As the English and German translations show, this expression appears in different co-texts with a different sensus. For an explicit representation of the contextualized systemic sensus we have to formulate the „rules of contextualization". I am sure that these rules cannot be formulated while remaining on the „sensus level"; to create or accept a contextualization means to find an external (relatum specific) context in which the state of affairs correlated to the sensus (to be chosen or accepted) is acceptable on the basis of a „coherence conception". It means that sensus contextualis and relatum imago (which are the analoga of the „intension" and the „extension", respectively) cannot be separately constructed. It is the „textual coherence" which plays a decisive role in the construction of the „sensus contextualis, relatum imago" pair. (Of course, the situation is more complex in the case of a second-degree – symbolic – interpretation.)

4.2.4. I have not treated the problems of the symbolic interpretation either in connection with logical semantics or in connection with the semiotic textology. Here I should only mention that the model-theoretic framework of logical semantics can also be used as a pattern for the symbolic interpretation of natural-language texts. It means that we can transform the natural-language expressions into such „semi-formal" variables as can be interpreted in different ways according to different symbolic interpretation-models. For example, it is possible to treat the Latin words „ubera" or „vinum" as variables in the above sense, and create a Targum-model or some Christian models with the model-specific (semi-formal) functions which assign „model-specific symbolic values" to these variables. (In the context of the semiotic textology I call the semi-formal texts containing „variables" *hyper-texts*.[12])

[12] On the problem of using hyper-texts for the semiotic-textological symbolic interpretation of biblical texts see J.S. Petöfi, A humán kommunikáció szemiotikai elmélete felé / Towards a Semiotic Theory of the Human Communication (bilingual edition), Szeged 1991; for the

5. Concluding remarks.

As an introduction to the concluding remarks, I should like to refer, once again, to Partee's opinion on the value of possible-worlds theories: „...possible worlds as a technical tool have helped to provide an appropriate *structure* on the space of meanings"[13].

I am convinced that even a semi-formal use of the model-theoretic logical-semantic framework as a technical tool can help to provide an appropriate structure on the space of *text*-meanings. For a demonstration of this opinion, however, one should undertake the following pilot-studies:

- to find out which type of semi-formal representation (allowing for translatability and satisfying the requirements of text interpretation) is more appropriate for the defined aim to be reached;
- to analyse the criteria of coherence for biblical texts (e.g. the new edition of Schneider's *Grammatik des biblischen Hebräisch* already deals with the „grammatical tools" for coherence, and Abadi has presented a survey of the studies made in Israel on the topic of connexity and coherence);[14]
- to analyse the possibilities of controlling the construction of hyper-texts for metaphorical and symbolic interpretation; this also implies the analysis of the „adequate sources of knowledge" to be used in this second-degree interpretation process.[15]

Abstract:
The aim of the original paper was to analyse what kind of methodological help the results of the logico-semantic research can offer for the text-interpretation, in general, and for the interpretation of dead-language texts, in particular. – The fulfillment of this aim required: (i) the outlining of a logic-oriented textological conception able to operate with every factor relevant for the meaning-constitution of natural-language texts; (ii) the textological analysis and systematization of the results (and the methodological tools) offered by the logical semantic research; (iii) the demonstration of the applicability of the outlined logic-oriented textological framework in the interpretation of at least a few examples. – The time-limit posed upon each speaker during the conference did not allow me to give a complete presentation of this very complex topic, and it was necessary to further reduce the text for the publication. Due to these reasons, since I hope that (a) a big part of what I presented in connection with (ii) can be reconstructed on the basis of the bibliographical references, and (b) I will have the opportunity to present the applicability of the textological framework also in the analysis of dead-language texts, I reduced the parts of my original paper concerning (ii) and (iii).

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symbolic interpretation in the Targum see U. Neri, Il Cantico dei Cantici. Targum e antiche interpretazioni ebraiche, Roma 1987[2].

[13] B. Partee, in: Sture Allén (ed.), Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences, Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65, Berlin – New York 1989, 108.

[14] W. Schneider, Grammatik des biblischen Hebräisch, München 1989[7]; A. Abadi, Studies on connexity and coherence in Israel, in: Charles Michel, János S. Petöfi, and Emel Sözer (edd.), Research in Text Connexity and Text Coherence. A Survey, Hamburg 1986, 369-397.

[15] For the „Canticum Canticorum" cf., for example, O. Keel, Deine Blicke sind Tauben. Zur Metaphorik des Hohen Liedes, Stuttgart 1984; id., Das Hohelied, Zürich 1986.

Appendix.

PART I*: A Montague-type representation of a sentence (quoted from Manfred Bierwisch, Psychologische Aspekte der Semantik natürlicher Sprachen, in: Wolfgang Motsch and Dieter Viehweger (edd.), Richtungen der modernen Semantikforschung, Berlin, 1983, 15-64);

PART II*: „A5: Truth in a model" (quoted from Barbara Partee, Montague grammar and transformational grammar, Linguistic Inquiry 6, 1975, 203-300);

PART III: The design of the semiotic textological framework;

PART IV.1: Canticum Canticorum 1:1-5 (quoted from Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam Versionem, Stuttgart 1983; Roland E. Murphy, The Song of Songs. A Commentary on the Book of Canticles or the Song of Songs, Minneapolis 1990; and O. Keel, Das Hohelied, Zürich 1986, respectively);

PART IV.2**: Index for the quoted Latin biblical text;

PART IV.3: Notes to Canticum Canticorum 1:1-3 (quoted from Murphy, Commentary, ad loc.)

(* – not reproduced here)
(** – only the lexical item „über" is reproduced here)

PART III



Ve	: Vehiculum	Fσ	: Formatio sistemica	Sc	: Sensus contextualis
Velm	: Vehiculum-imago	Sσ	: Sensus sistemicus	ReIm	: Relatum-imago
Fc	: Formatio contextualis			Re	: Relatum

The symbols containing ‚M' refer to the models.

The symbols containing ‚B' refer to different types of knowledge, hypotheses, preferences, and dispositions which can be used in the interpretative process.

	Canticum Canticorum	The Song of Songs, by Solomon	(Das ist) das Lied der Lieder das von Salomo (stammt)
1	Osculetur me osculo oris sui	Let him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth!	Er soll mich mit seinen Küssen küssen!
	quia meliora sunt ubera tua vino	Truly, more pleasing is your love than wine	Ja, deine Liebe ist besser als Wein
2	fragrantia unguentis optimis	The fragrance of your perfumes is pleasing,	und besser als der Duft deiner Salben.
	oleum effusum nomen tuum	flowing perfume, your name;	Ausgegossenes(?) Salböl ist dein Name;
	ideo adulescentulae dilexerunt te	therefore the maidens love you.	darum lieben dich die jungen Frauen
3	trahe me post te curremus	Draw me after you! Let us run!	Zieh mich hinter dir her. Wir wollen laufen.
	introduxit me rex in cellaria sua	The king has brought me to his chambers.	Der König hat mich auf sein Zimmer gebracht.
	exultabimus et laetabimur in te	Let us exult and rejoice in you!	Ausgelassen wollen wir sein, uns mit dir vergnügen.
	memores uberum tuorum super vinum	Let us extol your love beyond wine!	Deine Liebe wollen wir rühmen höher als Wein.
	recti diligunt te	Rightly do they love you.	Mit Recht lieben sie dich.
4	nigra sum sed formosa filiae Hierusalem	Black am I, and beautiful. O daughters of Jerusalem	Schwarz bin ich und anziehend, ihr Töchter Jerusalems,
	sicut tabernacula Cedar sicut pelles Salomonis	like the tents of Qedar, like the pavilions of Solomon.	wie die Zelte Kedars, wie die Behänge Salomos.
5	nolite me considerare quod fusca sim	Do not stare at me because I am blackish,	Schaut mich nicht so an, weil ich schwärzlich bin,
	quia decoloravit me sol	for the sun has burned me.	weil mich die Sonne erspäht hat.
	filii matris meae pugnaverunt contra me	The sons of my mother were angry with me;	Die Söhne meiner Mutter zürnten mir.
	posuerunt me custodem in vineis	they assigned me as keeper of the vineyards -	Sie machten mich zur Hüterin der Weinberge.
	vineam meam non custodivi	my own vineyard I have not kept.	Meinen eigenen Weinberg habe ich nicht gehütet.

PART IV.2.

1. **ūber**, eris, *n.* (altind. *udhar*, griech. οὖθαρ, ahd. *ûtar*), I) das Euter, die Zitze, die ſäugende Bruſt, Cic., Verg., Plin. u. a.: uber exserere (entblößen), Val. Max.: ubera dare, Ov.: ubera dare expositis fera (v. der Wölfin), Ov.: ubera praebere, Ov., od. admovere, Verg.: ubera ducere, ſaugen, Ov.: raptus ab ubere, entwöhnt, abgeſetzt, Ov.: im Bilde, distenta musto ubera, Colum. 3, 21, 3: putria maturi solvantur ut ubera campi, Colum. poët. 10, 90. – Sprichw., ubi uber, ibi tuber, keine Roſen ohne Dornen, Anul. flor. 18. p. 29, 7 Kr. — II) übtr.: A) der traubenförmige Klumpen, den die ſchwärmenden Bienen bilden, wenn ſie ſich an einen Baum hängen, Pallad. 7, 7, 6. — B) meton.: a) die Fruchtbarkeit, Reichlichkeit, Fülle, ſowohl des Bodens als der Gewächſe, divitis ag i, Verg.: fe tilis ubere ager, Verg.: uber agri, Tac.: vitem ubere suo gravatam levare, Colum. — b) poet., das fruchtbare Feld, der Acker ſelbſt, Verg. georg. 2, 234 u. 275.

Ausf. Lateinisch-Deutsches Handwörterbuch

PART IV.3.

Notes

𝔐 יִשָּׁקֵנִי (Qal jussive, נשק, plus pronominal suffix: "Let him kiss me") makes appropriate sense in context. Vocalization of the consonantal text to yield יַשְׁקֵנִי (Hip'il jussive, שקה, plus pronominal suffix: "Let him give me to drink") is supported by Gordis (78) and apparently also NEB ("that he may smother me"); cf. the more radical emendation הַשְׁקֵנִי (Hip'il imperative, שקה, plus pronominal suffix: "Make me drink" or "Drown me"), accepted by Karl Budde ("Das Hohelied" in E. Kautzsch and A. Bertholet [eds.], *Die Heilige Schrift des Alten Testament*, Vol. 2 [Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), ⁴1923] 392), Friedrich Horst (*BHK*, 1201 n. "a" to 1:2), and others. There is a wordplay on שקה ("drink") and נשק ("kiss") in 8:1–2; it may be that 1:2 already suggests this play (cf. also 5:1), but nothing is gained by alteration of 𝔐.

The preposition מִן in מִנְּשִׁיקוֹת ("with the kisses") is partitive (*GHB* §133e), and it contributes to the alliteration (יִשָּׁקֵנִי מִנְּשִׁיקוֹת).

The introductory כִּי ("truly") is to be taken as asseverative or emphatic, rather than causal (Albright, "Archaic Survivals," 2; cf. *HSyn* §449).

"Pleasing" is literally "good" (מִדֹּדֶיךָ). This word can mean "sweet" in relation to wine, as argued by Albright ("Archaic Survivals," 2) on the basis of the Ugaritic designations: *yn ṭb* is "sweet wine" in contradistinction to *yn d l ṭb*, "wine that is not sweet" (cf. *UT* 1084.1–23). But this distinction could depend on a quality other than sweetness. Here "good" need not be narrowed in meaning; cf. also 7:10[9].

Both 𝔊 and 𝔙 read consonantal דדיך as דַּדַּיִךְ, "your breasts" (cf. Ezek 23:21; Prov 5:19). But the vocalization of 𝔐 is preferable, deriving the noun from the root דוד. Thus one has דֹּדֶיךָ ("my love"), as the favorite term used by the woman of the man (1:13,14,16; etc.), and דּוֹדִים in the plural to designate acts or expressions of love (1:4; 4:10; 5:1; etc.).

The pronominal shift in v 2 with reference to the male lover, from third to second person ("his mouth . . . your love"), does not require emendation in the interest of consistency; such shifts (enallage) are well attested in Hebrew poetry (e.g., Ps 23:1–3,4–5,6), and elsewhere in the Song (1:4; 2:4; etc.).

Interpretation

The dialogue in vv 2–6 exhibits a bewildering shift in persons (enallage) which creates difficulty in establishing the identity of the speakers. There may even be two units: vv 2–4, with *'āhăbûkâ* "(they) love you," serving as an *inclusio* to bind vv 3–4 together), and vv 5–6, the discourse of the woman to the Daughters of Jerusalem. If the maidens of v 3 are to be understood as the Daughters of Jerusalem (v 5), one may regard dialogue as the bond among all these lines.

The genre of vv 2–4 is best classified as a "song of yearning": the woman yearns for the man's kisses ("let him kiss me") and his presence ("draw me"), and proclaims how lovable he is (fragrance, name, love). The genre of vv 5–6 is self-description.[1]

The life setting escapes us. Krinetzki identifies the maidens with the companions of the bride, and proposes that the setting is the bringing of the bride to the house of her betrothed.[2] Similarly, Würthwein understands vv 2–4 as a reply to the bridegroom's invitation to move to his house. But such reconstruction is too specific; nothing in the text really demands it. Verses 2–4 are best understood as a soliloquy by the woman; the physical presence of the man is not necessarily indicated. Verses 5–6 are directly addressed to the Daughters of Jerusalem who are present, either physically or in spirit.

■ 2 The woman expresses a desire to experience the signs of love. It is clear that mouth-kisses are meant, but nose-kissing is also known from Egyptian sources. The opening line certainly plunges *in medias res*, but this strong expression of the woman's desire is appropriate in view of the tenor of the rest of the work.[3]

The comparison of love to wine means that his caresses and affection provide her more pleasure than even the staple of Israelite life, wine. In 4:10 the man will return the compliment with the same comparison.

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1 For these respective genre designations, cf. Horst, "Formen," 186 and 182.

2 L. Krinetzki, 85.

3 Bernard of Clairvaux has caught the spirit of this passionate opening of the Song: "The favors I have received are far above what I deserve, but they are less than what I long for. It is desire that drives me on, not reason. Please do not accuse me of presumption if I yield to this impulse of love. My shame indeed rebukes me, but love is stronger than all. I am well aware that he is a king who loves justice; but headlong love does not wait for judgement, is not chastened by advice, not shackled by shame nor subdued by reason. I ask, I crave, I implore; let him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth" (*Sermon* 9.2 [tr. CFS 4, 54]).

Response to J.S.Petöfi

Jón Gunnarsson (Reykjavík)

Among the papers presented to this workshop, Prof. Petöfi's paper stands out as perhaps one of those richest in content. Following a clear exposition of some central issues in contemporary Logical Semantics, he has presented us with a valuable „anthology of quotations" – a series of fundamental criticisms of some of the more widely publicized versions of Logical Semantics as applied to the study of natural languages. Limitations of time have inevitably made it necessary for Prof. Petöfi to leave out in his discussion a number of approaches relevant to our topic and the workshop's task at hand. But, one must bear in mind that Logical Semantics is by no means a unanimous or unified camp. So Prof. Petöfi has certainly had to make some hard choices. Due to the large number of questions addressed in his paper and the limited time available, I will have to limit my response to only a small number of the many important issues raised in his paper.

Following Prof. Petöfi's order of exposition, I start with Bierwisch's article „Psychologische Aspekte der Semantik natürlicher Sprachen", a well chosen point of departure. Bierwisch succeeds in addressing precisely those issues which are of relevance for any linguist, trying to assess the relevance of Logical Semantics to linguistics. He throws in a number of pragmatic considerations as well in his discussion, and, as a whole, his approach is parole- or performance-oriented.
For purposes of exposition, I divide Bierwisch's article into two parts; *firstly*, his formalism for the representation of utterances, their contextual relations and their communicative intent. *Secondly*, his overview of the type of semantics that has its origins in the work of Gottlob Frege, and his criticism of that approach.
To start with, let us consider Bierwisch's three-layered pyramid of interpretation, intended to account for a linguistic *utterance* as conditioned by a given communicative purport in a given context. As can be seen from his schema, the utterance is taken as the basic unit, accumulating additional meaning as contextual and performative variables are successively instantiated.
This scheme makes allowance for a considerable number of variables which have to play a role in the interpretation of utterances and, presumably, none of these variables loses its value when we deal with text fragments from the corpora of languages no longer spoken. But, calling to mind the most likely potential users of the database, exegetes, translators and Biblical scholars in general, will they indeed find the scheme sufficient for their purposes? May we, possibly, anticipate a demand for an additional level of analysis, added to the interpretational pyramid and encompassing additional content, possibly even severely constraining choices at each and every of the lower levels? I have in mind e.g. some traditional terms of classification commonly used in exegesis.

The Song of Songs, from which illustrations for this particular topic were drawn, illustrates well some of the issues to be addressed. Now, what kind of a work is the Song of Songs? No lack of diverging answers there. What was its „Sitz im Leben" in ancient Hebrew society? Is it a profane poem, or a collection of bits of poetry of varying age? A marriage song, or a song of spontaneous love, not sanctioned by societal institutions (so Gerleman)? Associated with the cult? Partly of Egyptian or Akkadian origin, conditioned by a different religious environment? The dealings of Ishtar and Tammuz perhaps? By origin connected with Canaanite religion? Or are we attending a „hieros gamos" here? Such suggestions and others have been made. The exegete must surely take a stand on these issues and others. Terms like „context" and „communicative intent" will inevitably be conditioned by the choices made in the light of assumptions such as these, and the choices made may be inherited right down to the level of interpreting lexical units. Add to this the number of concepts connected with the Documentary Hypothesis. During the discussions here, wishes for the inclusion of such concepts as well as etymological information have been expressed. This is becoming a long list, but my question is: How much of this will we want to see in a truly useful database?

This is mentioned as an illustration of *practical* questions which might conceivably arise, – and the task supposedly being prepared by this workshop is an eminently *practical* undertaking; viz. the creating of a powerful database system from which scholars will want to retrieve information of varied character and for a multiplicity of purposes. In the light of that fact, how many of the variables given in Bierwisch's scheme would we like to see included as parameters for information retrieval? All of them? A richer set? Some of them perhaps? Or, possibly, a totally different formalism? The day will surely come when such questions will have to be faced. I leave such questions open as well as the question of the desirability and, indeed, the feasibility of appropriately coding for retrieval items like *utterances, context variables* and the rather elusive concept of *communicative intent*. Given the size of the corpus, the undertaking seems Herculean. And, with an eye to the wide divergences of opinion held by Old Testament scholars as to the context and communicative intent of the host of utterances in the corpus, it is hard to see how things of this nature can be dealt with to everyone's satisfaction.

Bierwisch goes on to give an outline of the salient features of that school (or schools) of Logical Semantics which traces its heritage back to the writings of Gottlob Frege. A common feature characterizing this school is the yet unfulfilled dream of integrating linguistics, semantics and logic into a single discipline. The dream is an old one, it goes back one hundred years to Frege's „Über Sinn und Bedeutung". This article was part of Frege's endeavour to find a basis for mathematics in logic; a formalism appropriate for relating one purely formal system to another. The central concepts from Frege, on which Bierwisch bases his discussion, are *the concept of „logical form"*, the *intension/extension* dichotomy and Frege's principle of *compositionality*.

Bierwisch's definitions (p. 38 of his article) will suffice for our purpose here: „Die Bedeutung oder Extension einer Äußerung ist das, worauf sie verweist; der Sinn, bzw. Intension ist die Art, in der sie auf die Extension verweist." These are the traditional, time-honoured definitions. Next, as defined relative to extension and

intension, an utterance has a logical form, Frege tells us. And logical it is in the sense that it can be tested as to truth-functionality, i.e. an utterance can be either true or false. *Tertium non datur.* Finally, the Fregean notion of compositionality states that the intension of an utterance is a function of the meanings (the logical forms) of its parts plus the way in which they are combined, i.e. their syntax. The task presents itself. It lies according to Bierwisch (p. 37) „...im kontrollierten Aufbau formaler Systeme, bei denen die logische Form *lf* (und das heißt nach der oben getroffenen Annahme die semantische Struktur *sem*) mit ihrer syntaktischen Struktur *syn* zusammenfällt ...".

Finally, add to this the requirement, that in order to be of interest within the Fregean scheme of things, an utterance must have a *logical form* which means that it must be truth-functional. Combining this with the above, we arrive at the equation, supposedly applicable to any given utterance (u):

$$lf(u) = sem(u) = syn(u).$$

Most linguists would be reluctant to accept statements of this kind. As linguists, we are, of course, concerned with the truth values of the statements we may make on matters linguistic. But we are not overly interested in the truth value of the utterances we use as our subject matter. After all, we deal with many kinds of utterances to which no truth value can be assigned. Imperative or performative sentences certainly lend themselves as easily to linguistic analysis as any other utterances. According to the Fregean school of thought and going by the book, such sentences would seem to lack logical form and there would, presumably, remain little hope of dealing with their semantics in any meaningful way.

Consider again the concepts of extension and intension. Bierwisch's description (p. 39): „...die Beziehung zwischen Intension und Extension [wird] bei dieser Betrachtungsweise zur Beziehung zwischen zwei komplexen Strukturen, und die Art dieser Beziehung genau zu bestimmen, läßt sich als eine mathematische Aufgabe formulieren."

On the preceding page he has to say this on the concepts of the extension of an utterance: „Die Extension einer Äußerung sind also offenbar die Dinge, Beziehungen, Sachverhalte der Umwelt (im weitesten Sinne), auf die verwiesen wird. Und die Intension einer Äußerung kann als eine (komplexe) Regel aufgefaßt werden, die diese Dinge, Beziehungen und Sachverhalte identifiziert".

Note here: In the *first* quotation Bierwisch describes the view held by many logical semanticists that the relationship obtaining between extension and intension can be construed as a relationship between two complex *structures*. So *structure* (definition begged) *is taken to be a property of extensions* here. From the *latter* quotation note the proviso „(im weitesten Sinne)" – in the widest sense. But how wide a sense? Wide enough to encompass e.g. the story of Alice in Wonderland? And, considering examples such as the above, can we say that they possess extensional *structure* in any sense? Given the above-mentioned concept of a relationship between extensional structures and intensional structures, it is hard to see how any meaning can fruitfully be attached to such a concept of intensional structure in natural language. And Bierwisch, indeed, seems to have trouble with these concepts.

Bierwisch concludes that it is naive and erroneous to postulate some pre-existent classification of reality into objects, classes and states-of-affairs, i.e. a structure

which our consciousness reflects, and indirectly, our language reflects in some passive sort of way (p. 51): „... meine These ist nun, daß das innere Modell der Extensionsbereich sprachlicher Äußerungen ist, daß es ihren Kontext bildet und daß zu ihm die Äußerungsbedeutung gehört. Kurz, das worüber wir sprechen, ist das interne Modell, die auf die Realität projizierte Struktur." This, inevitably, leads him to the big question (p. 56): – „... ob die Unterscheidung zwischen diesen beiden Repräsentationen [Intension und Extension] damit nicht ein Artefakt wird."
So the rather negative result of his discussion boils down to the assumption that intension and extension are both internal to the human mind and, evidently, any networks of relationships linking the two will be equally mind-internal. This, to me, is a timely and healthy scepticism as to the limitations of much of Logical Semantics as commonly applied in linguistics, and the relevance of the views discussed to the task of our workshop seems highly questionable. In the light of Prof. Petöfi's exposition, I imagine, that he, too, shares Bierwisch's doubts.

At the end of his expositon, Prof. Petöfi suggests a formalism for dealing with simple propositions. Now, with some reservations, these might be compared to the „infons" of Situation Semantics, the „kernel sentences" as defined by Rulon Wells, Zellig Harris, early transformational-generative grammar as well as the kernel sentence concept central to Nida's theory of translation. Some questions arise here:

1. How do units in the system combine with each other to form more complex wholes?
2. How do units in the system combine with negation?
3. Why are the parameters of time and space (st, sl) placed *outside* the formula?
4. Can propositions occur in the argument slots in this formula?
5. Is the *order* of the unit slots fixed?
6. Using [F] as a cover symbol for nouns, verbs *and* conjunctions seems to call for some explanation.
7. Can we be certain, that *every* natural language word-class is vouched for in this system as Prof. Petöfi states?
8. A further specification of the term „basic functor" – as described in Prof. Petöfi's paper and used in his interpretation of the beginning of the Song of Songs – is needed. How large a set of these is envisaged?

I shall try to indicate the possible relevance of some of these questions in the light of Prof. Petöfi's application of his formalism to the opening verse of the Song of Songs. Here we find a wealth of information condensed into one formula. Participants are indexed, performative aspects are accounted for, and in each case we find a kernel proposition expanded to a proposition by replacing „constants" by „basic functors". So, underlying the innocuous-looking *yšqny mnšyqwt pyhw*, five propositional kernels and five propositions are lurking. One may again ask: Too much or too little? Certainly, if all of the Hebrew scriptures were to be dealt with in this way, the amount of analysis to be carried out boggles the mind. Not that I hold this information to be irrelevant. The formalism, however, is extremely space-consuming, and it certainly does bring to mind e.g. some of the work published by adherents of the school of Generative Semantics. Taking a closer look at the three words of the Hebrew text, we see that in the formalism adopted, the last two words

(*mnšyqwt pyhw*) are inserted as *arguments* in the last proposition listed. Now, the generative semanticists would not have been happy with this at all. Their purpose was in many ways similar to what Prof. Petöfi's formalism is intended to accomplish, i.e. to do justice to the semantic content of an utterance by making explicit its underlying or implicit propositions. The number of these tended to grow to such proportions as arguments were replaced by propositions, that Prof. Petöfi's solution seems quite moderate in comparison.

Prof. Petöfi's lecture referred to R.E. Murphy's commentary on the Song of Songs. And Murphy finds it relevant for our understanding of the book to remind us that the ancient Egyptians practiced nose-kissing as well as mouth-kissing. And we may well use a Yes/No question as a tool for eliciting truth values and imagine an Egyptian woman asking another: „Does he kiss you with the kisses of his mouth?", to which the other might conceivably reply „No, we prefer nose rubbing". Now, it takes a proposition to separate the true from the false, and I can well imagine linguists who would insist on seeing an underlying proposition here. Similar arguments might be put forward as regards the terms of time, space and participant indexing in Petöfi's formalism. Another answer to the above question from a Hebrew housewife might be: „No, he stopped doing that long ago". Or: „No, now he's running after the servant girls all the time". If we put our trust in Yes/No questions as indicative of the number of implicit propositions, we would wind up with a very rich description indeed. I am not encouraging this, though the approach seems to have its merits. We must draw the line somewhere. The question is: Where? The question also remains, how much of the theorizing we have been indulging in here will survive the encounter with the computer. It is known to be a sobering experience at times. Face to face with the purring machine, many a glorious edifice of thought has come a-tumblin' down like the walls of Jericho did at the blast of Joshua's trumpets. That, of course, was delightful news to the Hebrews. The European taxpayers, who are now paying us for discussing grand theory, will possibly be somewhat less delighted.

Abstract:

Given that the stated end-purpose of our workshop is the creation of a data base of the Hebrew Scriptures tagged for retrieval by semantic criteria, an attempt is made here to assess the adeqacy to that task of the ideas discussed in Professor Petöfi's outstanding paper. The feasibility of replacing linguistic analysis with aprioristic logic-inspired schemes is briefly discussed as well as the applicability of Petöfi's formalism to the data. A plea is entered for a less cumbersome, more viable and linguistically oriented way of presentation.

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Polysemy and Homonymy

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0. *Introduction*

It is well-known that a linguistic sign always consists of a formal aspect (a „signifiant"), i.e. the form in which the linguistic sign manifests itself, which primarily amounts to a phonemic structure and – sometimes – to a graphemic presentation of that structure, and a semantic aspect (a „signifié") which the linguistic sign denotes. Equally well-known is that the relation between the two aspects is both arbitrary as well as conventional in each language, which makes the phonemes constituting a linguistic sign as efficient as possible. It is one aspect of typically human creativity that we are thus able to form a very large number of morphemes (members of an open system) and ultimately an infinite number of different sentences with a closed list of phonemes.

Another aspect of this typically human creativity is the fact that in natural languages linguistic signs with an identical formal aspect may nevertheless be connected to diverse semantic aspects. Very often, lexical words do not have just one single unvarying semantic aspect. For a very large number of linguistic signs there is in fact no one-to-one relation at all between formal aspect and semantic aspect. This asymmetry in the relation between formal and semantic aspects of linguistic signs, which is inherent in natural languages and expressed by the ambiguity of lexical words both in the diachronic and the synchronic sense, is one of the linguistic universals. This linguistic phenomenon too plays an important role in the optimum functioning of the language as a flexible and efficient semiotic system for communication. It makes the meaning of a word much more flexible than would be possible solely on the basis of the more rigid sphere of sound and form. This characteristic of language, together with the principle of recursiveness, which allows certain patterns to recur within other patterns, to a large extent determines the creativity of language. This too could be considered an „economic" principle of language – in this case: semantic economy – as it enables a language to make do with fewer words because words can always assume new functions.

Such an ambiguity is not limited to the lexical sphere but may also occur in the syntactical sphere in terms of surface structure. This then produces ambiguous sentences of a type which became very well known in linguistics, such as: „They are flying planes,", or „Visiting relatives can be a nuisance," and so on. However, in relation to the objective of this first workshop of the ESF Network, in which a methodological reflection on the lexicon was the central issue, I will restrict myself here to the problem of lexical ambiguity.

This lexical ambiguity consists of two types which – to a certain extent – can be explained by the nature of their origins, and have been given different names in linguistics. Where there is a number of semantic variations within one and the same lexeme, the term *polysemy* is used. Where there are two or more at first entirely

different and unrelated lexemes which acquired an identical form in the course of the history of the language while retaining their own meanings, this ambiguity is referred to as *homonymy*.

These two linguistic concepts make up the title of this paper, and I propose to discuss this topic in the following manner:

1. Further discussion of the two terms, which will also include a discussion of the terms *homophony, homography, monosemy, synoymy*, and *antonymy*,
2. Discussion of the demarcation between polysemy and homonymy, and some conclusions drawn from it,
3. Applying this to the semantics and lexicography of Classical Hebrew. I introduce the latter limitation because of the theme of this workshop, which is concerned with the „Semantics of Classical Hebrew".

1. *Terminology*

1.1 *Polysemy*

This term is newer than the term to be discussed later, and was first used in 1897 by M. Bréal, who also introduced the term „sémantique"[1]. The term is derived from Greek, from the words πολύς (many) and σῆμα (sign). In the nineteenth century there had been major developments in linguistics, not only in the field of comparative and historic linguistics but also in semantics. This had given rise to the conviction that beside the term „homonymy" (to be discussed later), there was room for a special term to denote a different kind of lexical ambiguity. Thus the term *„polysemy"* was created, and since then this term has been increasingly used to denote the kind of lexical ambiguity involving one and the same word, viz. a semantic diverging within the *signifié* of one and the same linguistic sign, which thus acquired more than one meaning. This always concerns one word with several semantic variants, contrary to homonymy which is always a case of two or more words with the same form and/or spelling. Polysemy involves semantic variants that go back to the same root and can be derived from one principal or basic meaning and can also often be predicted according to the rules of semantic change. Such semantic developments of one and the same laxical item occur in all languages, though not always in the same way in the various languages. Examples in English are words such as *„plain"* which can also acquire meanings such as *„clear"*, *„unadorned"*, or *„obvious"*, and *„church"* which can denote both the church as an institution and a church building. And then there are metaphors, e.g. the use of *„tongue"* for *„language"*, in which the designation of a speech organ is transferred to its activity. Such variant uses of a lexeme can usually be disambiguated from the context fairly easily.

The concept of polysemy is situated within a double system of opposition:

1) in opposition to *homonymy*, which will be discussed shortly,

[1] M. Bréal, Essai de sémantique (science des significations), Paris 1897. In 1899 a second edition of this work was published.

2) in opposition to *monosemy* – from Greek μόνος (alone) and σῆμα (sign) – where the *signifiant* of a linguistic sign always has one and the same *signifié*. Such complete monosemy is rare, however, except in scientific terminology.

Most lexemes are in principle polysemous, or they can easily become polysemous. One could also say that one of the semantic distinctions within a particular polysemous lexeme becomes monosemous within a specific terminology. A word such as „operation", for example, will have a different semantic content in the terminology of a surgeon from that which it has in the terminology of a strategist, but ultimately this is a polysemous word, of which a specific use is selected by a specific group.

1.2 *Homonymy*

This term, too, was taken from Greek, from the words ὁμός (the same) and ὄνυμα (name). Homonymy also involves a form with two or more meanings, but contrary to polysemy this does not concern a formal aspect of one linguistic sign which developed various – sometimes very divergent – semantic aspects. Homonymy always involves two or more separate linguistic signs whose formal aspects have become identical through all kinds of causes, such as a converging sound development, or by analogy factors within a paradigm, or the extension of the vocabulary with loan words, while their semantic aspects have been preserved. Thus, homonymy is situated in the sphere of the *signifiant* in the same way as polysemy in the sphere of the *signifié*. Therefore, homonymy does not concern one word with various meanings, but various words with the same form. Homonymy is based on phonemic – mergers! – and graphemic convergences of etymologically different words, (e.g. *„seal"*$_1$ [animal] and *„seal"*$_2$ [stamp] in English), morphemes and syntactic constructions. As I have explained before, I will not include the latter two in my discussion. I will restrict myself here to lexical homonymy.

Beside the already mentioned requirement for homonymy to exist, there is something else which determines the content of the term – and in particular: lexical – homonymy. Such a total homonymy should always involve two lexemes belonging to the same word class and having an identical sound and spelling, as in the case of the lexemes *„seal"*$_1$ and *„seal"*$_2$ presented above. In the case of different word classes, e.g. the noun „can" and the verb „can", it would be better to use the term „partial homonymy", adding a qualifier which is also used with the terms „homophony" and „homography" (to be discussed shortly), which are nowadays seen as special cases of homonymy.

Homophony – from Greek ὁμός (the same) and φωνή (sound) – concerns homonyms that are phonemically but not graphemically identical. This is the case with, for example, lexemes such as *„peace"* and *„piece"* or *„rite"* and *„right"*, but also with two lexemes of a different word class, such as *„meat"* and *„meet"*. This is a form of homonymy which exists only at the phonetic/phonological level.

Homography – from Greek ὁμός (the same) and γραφή (writing) – involves homonyms that are graphemically but not phonemically identical, for example lexemes such as *„lead"*$_1$ (a dog's lead) and *„lead"*$_2$ (made of lead). This is a form of homonymy which exists only in the graphemic sphere.

Particularly in languages with a conservative orthography, homophones usually illustrate very clearly that they are cases of homonymy and not polysemy, through their different graphemic representations. This is sometimes more difficult to decide in the case of homographs.

From what has been said so far about the terms polysemy and homonymy it will be clear that whereas polysemy as the product of metaphorical and other linguistic creativity is highly essential to the functioning of language as a flexible and efficient semiotic system, homonymy – whether total or partial – does not play a similar creative role.

The homonymy system, too, is situated within a double system of oppositions:

1) opposite *polysemy*. From what has been stated above this has already become somewhat clear, and it will be discussed further in the following section.
2) opposite *synonymy* – from Greek σύν (together) and ὄνυμα (name). Its direct opposite is *antonymy* – from Greek ἀντί (opposite) and ὄνυμα (name). Synonymy involves various linguistic signs, all of which may express the same semantic aspect, thus the exact reverse of the ambiguity of one and the same linguistic sign. Usually, however, there is only partial and approximative similarity. Unlike homonymy, synonymy never exists in its purest form. Subjective nuances will always continue to play a role. Synonymy and homonymy are therefore not such correlate oppositional terms as monosemy and polysemy can be.

A similarity between polysemy and homonymy is that the lexical ambiguity that may be created by these linguistic phenomena is usually easily disambiguated in the communication, as language users activate the specific meaning which is suitable at a given time in a given situation almost as a matter of course. The fact is that within semantics the context has always been the decisive factor for the synchronic meaning. This always entails a specific final interpretation. S. Ullmann has justifiably described the context theory as „vielleicht der wichtigste Einzelfaktor in der Entwicklung der Semantik im 20. Jahrhundert"[2]. This goes for all ambiguity, both of a polysemous and of a homonymous nature. It is however of the highest importance to lexicography to determine as well as possible whether something is a case of polysemy or of homonymy, in view of the classification of lexemes according to headword. The following section will therefore present a survey of the current insights in linguistics concerning this topic. In doing so, I will have to restrict myself to a selection of some views I consider significant.

2. *Precise demarcation of polysemy and homonymy*

J. Lyons quite justifiably begins his section on the difference between the two kinds of lexical ambiguity, homonymy and polysemy, with the remark: „the difference between homonymy and polysemy is easier to explain in general terms than it is to define in terms of objective and operationally satisfactory criteria"[3]. Other semanticists, too, have made similar remarks. In this context, G. Leech mentions „a

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[2] S. Ullmann, Grundzüge der Semantik, Berlin 1967, 60.

[3] J. Lyons, Semantics, 2, Cambridge 1977, 550-569. In my opinion, the problems surrounding polysemy and homonymy are brilliantly dealt with here.

problem which has been a longstanding matter of concern for students of semantics: how does one draw the line between *homonymy* (roughly, two or more words having the same pronunciation and/or spelling') and *polysemy* (‚one word having two or more senses')?"[4]. D. Crystal states: „The theoretical problem for the *linguist* is how to distinguish ‚polysemy' ... from ‚homonymy'"[5].

In the literature one also often finds the remark that the boundaries between polysemy and homonymy are often so vague and fuzzy that lexicographers confine themselves to using certain rules of thumb to classify their data. T. Todorov and O. Ducrot even state: „Es gibt eine Unzahl von Grenzfällen"[6].

At first sight it seems fairly easy to make such a distinction: all one has to do is examine whether various meanings belonging to the same linguistic sign are more or less mutually related and can be traced back to one and the same *etymon* (polysemy) or that two or more totally unrelated linguistic signs are involved (homonymy).

This etymological criterion has its drawbacks, however. In the first place, etymological, i.e. diachronic, information should always be irrelevant in a synchronic analysis of language, as genetic relationships in the language are not part of the competence of the native speaker. In the second place, the historic origin of lexemes has not been traced with the same degree of scientific accuracy. And in those cases where it has been established, most native speakers of a language are hardly aware of it. The etymological criterion cannot therefore be decisive synchronically. It should not be used as an aid for creating a strict demarcation between polysemy and homonymy, and is indeed no longer so applied.

The criterion of meaning being more or less related within what etymologically speaking is one linguistic sign can itself be regarded as a synchronically relevant consideration. However, in this area too the native speaker is usually not capable of accurate judgments. For example, he will sometimes see a relationship that used not to exist, which means that what is intuitively[7] regarded as polysemy is in fact no more than a psychological reinterpretation of a case of homonymy as polysemy. The example that is often quoted for English is the homonymous lexemes *„ear"*$_1$ (auditory organ; < Old English „éare", related to Latin „auris") and *„ear"*$_2$ (of corn; < Old English „éar", related to Latin „acus/aceris"). The native speaker would usually intuit this as a case of what is commonly known as metaphoric polysemy, while in fact it is a clear case of homonymy.

The reverse is also possible. Then the mutual relation is no longer seen and an example of polysemy is reinterpreted as homonymy. A case in point is *„crane"* (hoisting-crane), derived through a visual metaphor form *„crane"* (bird). Something similar may even lead to a reinterpretation taking on a graphemic form, as with *„flour"* and *„flower"*, two lexemes that are also based on a polysemous development.

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[4] G. Leech, Semantics, Harmondsworth 1974, 228-230, 228.

[5] D. Crystal, A First Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics, London 1980, 174-175.

[6] T. Todorov & O. Ducrot, Enzyklopädisches Wörterbuch der Sprachwissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main 1975, 269 [translation of „Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences du langage", Paris 1972].

[7] Cf. H.-M. Gauger, Wort und Sprache, Tübingen 1970.

This is a case where for once the lexicographer does not need to make up his mind, as he is bound by the alphabetical order of the entries.
In this way, polysemy may originate from homonymy, when the native speaker sees a relationship that is not actually there, and conversely, homonymy may originate from polysemy when secondary meanings of a polysemous word grow apart too far and are no longer related in a synchronic description of the language.
Thus, the distincition between polysemy and homonymy cannot always be clearly determined by a purely structural method.
To overcome this problem other criteria have been investigated. Efforts were made, for example, to look for core meanings to determine the existence of at least polysemy better. Another attempt was to search for the synonyms and antonyms corresponding with the various meanings found with cases of ambiguity. Differences between the antonyms would then be a sign of homonymy. F.R. Palmer has paid considerable attention to these methods, but concludes – and rightly so, I believe – that neither of these holds good[8].
Attempts to make the notion of semantic relations within polysemy more explicit in terms of componential analysis of the meanings of lexemes must also be considered unsuccessful. And within the framework of transformational-generative theory the opposition between polysemy and homonymy has never been explicitly discussed.
None of the proposed criteria or approaches to come to a precise demarcation between polysemy and homonymy appear satisfactory. As early as 1968, J. Lyons calles this distinciton: „in the last resort, indeterminate and arbitrary"[9]. In 1974 W. Abraham and R. Elema discussed it as follows: „Genau genommen ist die Trennung zwischen Homonymie und Polysemie willkürlich und läßt sich nicht festlegen"[10]. In 1976 H.G. Schogt was also of the opinion that there are no formal and objective criteria for making a genuine distinction between homonymy and polysemy, to which he added: „on en est donc réduit à faire appel à l'intuition des locuteurs"[11]. And in 1980 D. Crystal – whom I have quoted before – wrote: „But all such criteria involve analytic problems, and the distinction between polysemy and homonymy thus remains a source of theoretical discussion in linguistics"[12], and then referred to the extremely well-wrought discussion of this topic by J. Lyons in the second volume of his „Semantics" published in 1977. He in his turn had – under certain conditions – already come to the conclusion that „the linguist might well decide that it is preferably to leave the theoretical status of the distinction between homonymy and polysemy unresolved"[13].
I wholeheartedly agree with these conclusions. However, in the words of H.G. Schogt: „Pourtant la distinction entre homonymie et polysémie a des conséquences

[8] F.R. Palmer, Semantics, a New Outline, Cambridge 1976, 65-71. This author therefore states: „I do not, of course, claim that we can always distinguish polysemy and homonymy in our present-day language" (p. 69).
[9] J. Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics, Cambridge 1969, 406.
[10] W. Abraham (ed.), Terminologie zur neueren Linguistik, Tübingen 1974, 338.
[11] H.G. Schogt, Sémantique synchronique: synonymie, homonymie, polysémie, Toronto and Buffalo 1976, 56.
[12] D. Crystal, op.cit., 275.
[13] J. Lyons, op.cit. (1977), 552.

pratiques dans la lexicographie"[14]. This is a lasting problem which must be solved ad hoc every time it occurs. In those cases, it is impossible to do without a certain – albeit approximate – demarcation between polysemy and homonymy: one or more entries. It is usually not possible to determine this on the basis of the existing dictionaries, as their editors have often made very arbitrary decisions in this area, which is reflected by the discrepancies between the classifications in the various dictionaries.
My final section, dealing with polysemy and homonymy in Classical Hebrew, will mainly address these, more practical, problems in greater depth.

3. *Polysemy and homonymy in languages with a limited corpus: Classical Hebrew*

The ESF Network has the „Semantics of Classical Hebrew" as its research subject and therefore this first workshop is devoted to „Semantics of Dead Languages with a Limited Corpus". The remarks following in this section will therefore specifically concentrate on Classical Hebrew.
However, prior to this discussion it should be noted that the qualification „dead" might lead to a misunderstanding as Classical Hebrew has never wholly become a „dead"[15] language in the true sense of the word, as for example happened with Akkadian and Phoenician and a host of other languages that once existed.
Classical Hebrew can be characterized, however, as a language phase from the past with a limited corpus. In my opinion, this corpus not only consists of the Hebrew of the Old Testament, but also the old Palestinian epigraphic material written in that same language, and the Hebrew Qumran texts. The Hebrew of the Old Testament is however the best known of all Semitic languages of that period and may in its turn be subclassified further according to periods[16].
Since linguistic phenomena such as polysemy and homonymy belong to the linguistic universals, they can also be found in languages with a limited corpus. This is also the case with phenomena such as homophony and homography, but here things are often somewhat more difficult than with present-day languages. On the one hand, it is impossible to call on native speakers of such a language to obtain information about the pronunciation; on the other hand, the graphemic

[14] H.G. Schogt, op.cit., 56.

[15] Cf. W. Dressler & R. Wodak-Leodolter (eds.), Language Death, International Journal of the Sociology of Language 12, 1877, 5-32 [also published in: Linguistics 191, 1977 (Contributions on Various Sociolinguistic Aspects of Language Death)].

[16] For the periodization of Hebrew as a whole and the subclassification of Classical Hebrew cf.:
Ch. Rabin, Hebrew, in: Th. A. Sebeok (ed.), Current Trends in Linguistics, Vol. 6: „Linguistics in South West Asia and North Africa", The Hague – Paris 1970, 304-346,
J. Blau, The Historical Periods of the Hebrew Language, in: H.H. Paper (ed.), Jewish Languages. Theme and Varations, Cambridge, Mass. 1978, 1-13 [with responses by Y. Hayon and S.J. Lieberman, 15-28],
M. Hadas-Lebel, Histoire de la langue hébraïque des origines à l'epoque de la Mishna, Paris 1981,
E.Y. Kutscher, A History of the Hebrew Language, Jerusalem – Leiden 1982 (edited by R. Kutscher).

representations are often even more approximate than is the case with our present-day languages, and it is equally impossible to make inquiries about the written texts. Apart from that, the same rules apply. When ambiguities arise through polysemy and homonymy, these will have to be contextually disambiguated for such languages with a limited corpus too, in which case the synchronic description of language takes priority. However, if for the purpose of distinguishing between polysemy and homonymy one would like to appeal to the intuitions of native speakers concerning semantic relationships, which can sometimes be relevant in this context, this appeal will got unheeded too.

Classical Hebrew is such a language which is only known to us from a corpus of texts which is relatively limited. It has come down to us only in a graphemic representation and is not homogeneous either. Various questions posed to this material cannot be easily answered. On top of that the graphemic representation mentioned is rather incomplete, as it hardly represents the vocalic phonemes, except those of the Hebrew of the Old Testament, but these were added only in a much later period by the Masoretes. Particularly the semantic interpretation of the epigraphical material, especially when it concerns letters, can pose additional problems as their wider context is sometimes totally obscure. This is not very surprising, as such letters were obviously not written to satisfy the historical and linguistic curiosity of people living many centuries in the future.

All these things together have the result that in languages with a limited corpus locked in the past not only a semantic interpretation, but also the problems surrounding the demarcation between polysemy and homonymy will in general be slightly more complicated than in the case of modern languages.

With regard to the special polysemy-homonymy problems in Classical Hebrew little has been published in the literature in recent years. Of course these linguistic phenomena have been incorporated in B. Kedar's book on the semantics of the Old Testament published in 1981[17], but that was only to be expected within the scope of such a work of reference. Some articles were published in the mid-eighties dealing solely with certain aspects of polysemy, for example the 1986 Orientalia article by H.-P. Müller on the (limited) polysemy in the Semitic and Hebrew system of conjugation[18]. But these only discussed certain cases of grammatical polysemy – for which I, following Waltke and O'Connor, would rather reserve the term „multifunctionality" – and not specific polysemy which in my opinion is primarily of a lexical nature[19]. In 1988 the present author investigated a very special case of polysemy, viz. „enantiosis" – the so-called *ʾaḍḍād* („Wörter mit Gegensinn") of the Arabic grammarians – which emerge when the ambiguity of a polysemous lexeme has become so strong that opposite meanings have come into being[20].

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17 B. Kedar, Biblische Semantik, Stuttgart 1981.

18 H.-P. Müller, Polysemie im semitischen und hebräischen Konjugationssystem, Or 55, 4, 1986, 365-389.

19 B.K. Waltke & M. O'Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, Winona Lake, Indiana 1990, 344.

20 J.H. Hospers, Das Problem der sogenannten semantischen Polarität im Althebräischen, ZAH 1/1, 1988, 32-39.

Also in 1988 B. Kedar-Kopfstein published two articles on „synaesthesia", in which he gave various examples of a connection in the language between sensory perceptions and states of mind, e.g. when Hebrew *mar* comes to mean „sad" in addition to „bitter". This then involved various developments in the meaning of polysemous lexemes[21]. However, in 1990 the same author published an article in which he – albeit briefly – did discuss the position of polysemy as distinct from homonymy[22]. There the author reaches the same conclusions as I have already mentioned after my discussion of the current ideas about the demarcation between polysemy and homonymy in general linguistics. As far as the linguistic material of Biblical Hebrew is concerned, the author points to the many obscure etymologies and the lack of clarity caused by intuitive reinterpretations which may turn polysemy into homonymy and vice versa. Finally he points to the support that may somethimes be got from the classic Bible interpreters (the old translations and the ancient and medieval philologists).

Indeed one will have to admit that also for Old Testament Hebrew it is not always possible to precisely demarcate polysemy and homonymy. For translation purposes this is not so important, as the context must be the decisive semantic factor, whether the ambiguity is of a polysemous or homonymous nature. Only for the lexicographer does such a demarcation remain important, as he must decide whether – in the case of homonymy – one form should get two or more entries, or – in the case of polysemy – only one. In times such as present, when various groups have drawn up detailed plans for a new Hebrew dictionary, we are all faced with such choices.

In many practical cases this will not be too difficult. Nobody will be of the opinion that the various meanings – belonging to the same semantic field or metaphorically evolving from one another – of such words as *lāšōn* (tongue, language, etc.) and *rōš* (head, beginning, etc.) have a homonymous origin and thus should be listed under more than one entry with the same form. Conversely, any lexicographer will appreciate that the root *ḥrš* (to plough *and* to be deaf) requires two or more entries. Here both the nature of these meanings and the knowledge derived from comparative-historical Semitic philology point in the direction of homonymy, as this concerns two or more completely different roots assuming an identical form through the merging of /*ṯ*/ and /*š*/ into /*š*/, while the /*ḥ*/ can also be a product of merging.

However, as I have stated before, it will not always be possible to be completely certain. In my opinion, it would be best to maximize the polysemy and limit oneself to one entry. „Actual homonyms are rare in Hebrew," Waltke and O'Connor state, and I believe they are right[23]. Only when a thorough comparative and historical study of the Semitic languages makes it plausible that it is better to regard the ambiguity in a particular case as homonymous rather than polysemous, two entries should be used.

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[21] B. Kedar-Kopfstein, Synästhesien im biblischen Althebräisch in Übersetzung und Auslegung, ZAH 1/1, 1988, 47-60, and ZAH 1/2, 1988, 147-158.

[22] B. Kedar-Kopfstein, Glossen zur traditionellen biblischen Philologie (2), ZAH 3/2, 1990, 207-211.

[23] B.K. Waltke & M. O'Connor, op.cit., 48.

To conclude I will give an example of such a decision. The Hebrew lexeme *ʿayin*, which primarily means „eye", but also „well" (developed from the primary meaning), in a few places also means „appearance" or „colour". Formerly all these meanings were regarded as instances of polysemy of the lexeme *ʿayin*. In a recent article in *Zeitschrift für Althebraistik*, V. Hurowitz presented the interesting proposal to relate the meaning „appearance" – via the Akkadian parallel *šiknu* – to a Hebrew root which has the meaning „reside, be present", just like the Akkadian *šakānu*. As a matter of course one then arrives at the verb *ʿWN* (in Classical Hebrew only attested by the derivative *māʿōn*, meaning „dwelling"). In my opinion, this is a felicitous idea of the author[24]. I will pursue it further, however, and propose to include two entries for the homonymous lexeme *ʿayin*, viz.: *ʿayin I* (eye, will) and *ʿayin II* (appearance).

Abstract:

This article treats in the first place two well-known types of lexical ambiguity which, to a certain extent, can be explained by the nature of their origins: 1) *polysemy* when there is a number of semantic variations within one and the same lexeme and 2) *homonymy* when there are two or more at first entirely different and unrelated lexemes which required an identical form in the course of the history of the language while retaining their own meanings. One can, however, not always draw a clear line between *p.* and *h.* Not only should the etymological criterion always be irrelevant in a synchronic analysis of language, but neither has every historic origin of lexemes been traced with the same degree of scientific accuracy. Such a demarcation remains, however, important for the lexicographer. For he has to decide whether one form should get two or more entries (homonymy) or only one (polysemy). This presents a special difficulty in the case of languages with a limited corpus – „dead" languages – as for instance Classical Hebrew. For it is no longer possible to obtain information from the native speakers if one is in doubt. And the graphemic representations are often even more approximate than in our modern languages.

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[24] V. Hurowitz, The Etymology of Biblical Hebrew *ʿayin* „appearance in Light of Akkadian *šiknu*, ZAH 3/1, 1990, 90-94.

Réponse à J.H. Hospers

André Lemaire (Paris)

La présentation de J.H. Hospers est si claire qu'on hésite quelque peu à ajouter quelques remarques à ce texte qui va à l'essentiel. Nous évoquerons donc simplement quelques aspects pouvant servir d'amorce à la discussion de notre atelier.

1) Si la plupart des lexèmes sont, en principe, polysémiques, ou peuvent facilement le devenir, on notera concrètement ici l'importance de la *métaphore* qui joue d'ailleurs un rôle de premier plan en poésie et, donc, dans les textes bibliques poétiques ou prophétiques[1]. Il faudrait surtout développer la remarque sur *l'importance du contexte* dans la sémantique d'un mot et essayer de la formaliser en vue d'une utilisation éventuelle de l'informatique. Quelques pistes peuvent être évoquées dans cette direction:

a – Le contexte peut désigner le *domaine* auquel se rattache un mot: ainsi, en français, un „clou" („nail" en anglais) est une petite tige métallique à tête et à pointe (relativement longue) qu'on enfonce pour fixer; il est vendu en quincaillerie et utilisé surtout dans le travail du bois et de quelques autres matériaux. Cependant, en médecine, un „clou" désigne un furoncle et, en circulation urbaine, „les clous" désignent un passage piétonnier (même si celui-ci n'est plus marqué aujourd'hui par de vrais clous mais par des bandes blanches).

b – Le contexte peut concerner le *niveau de langue* employé (cf. „register" en anglais). Ainsi, en langage *familier*, „le clou d'une soirée" désigne son attraction principale, et en langage *populaire*, „clou" peut renvoyer à un poste de police ou à une machine en mauvais état.

c – Le contexte peut être aussi géographique et représenter un *dialecte ou parler local*. Ainsi l'épigraphie paléo-hébraïque semble-t-elle révéler l'existence de deux dialectes hébreux différents, celui du royaume du nord étant plus proche du phénicien que celui du royaume de Jérusalem[2]. Même si la plupart des textes bibliques, souvent rédigés ou, au moins, recopiés par les scribes de Jérusalem, représentent essentiellement le dialecte jérusalémitain, l'existence probable des dialectes judéen et israélite et de certains parlers locaux ne doit pas être négligé.

d – Enfin, le contexte peut aussi désigner des acceptions sémantiques particulières, *idiomatiques*, souvent, à l'origine, métaphoriques. Ainsi, l'expression toute faite „mettre au clou" signifie renoncer à se servir de quelque chose, „river son clou à quelqu'un", c'est le réduire au silence par une parole mordante.

Il est évident que cette polysémie liée au contexte, au genre littéraire, est un des problèmes bien connus des traducteurs, y compris ceux de la Bible. En effet, cette polysémie d'un mot peut ne pas correspondre et jouer de la même façon dans une

[1] Cf., par ex., D. Bourguet, Des métaphores de Jérémie, Paris 1987.

[2] Cf., par ex., W.R. Garr, Dialect Geography of Syria 1000-586 B.C.E., Philadelphia 1985, spéc. pp. 227, 233.

autre langue qui pourra éventuellement utiliser des mots différents. Une amorce d'exemple peut révéler l'importance de ce problème pour la sémantique de l'hébreu biblique:

kātēp = „épaule" (corps)
„aile" d'un bâtiment (architecture)
„épaulement" d'une montagne (géographie)...

Il semble que le Chicago Assyrian Dictionary (CAD) ait davantage formalisé cette approche sémantique contextuelle que la plupart des dictionnaires d'hébreu biblique. Il est vrai que le corpus cunéiforme est plus abondant et plus varié et que le genre littéraire de chaque tablette (économique, historique, astrologique, magique...) y est souvent plus évident.

2) La distinction entre homonymie et polysémie est un problème dont la solution n'est pas toujours aussi assurée que le souhaiteraient les lexicographes, cependant la présentation qui vient d'en être faite paraît quelque peu pessimiste. D'une façon générale, il n'est pas sûr que „genetic relationships in the language are not part of the competence of the native speaker". Pour ne donner qu'un exemple concret d'un mot récent, un certain nombre de Français sont probablement encore conscients du fait que le verbe „limoger", signifiant „priver un haut fonctionnaire de son emploi tout en lui conservant son traitement", vient du fait que, souvent, ceux-ci étaient envoyés dans la ville de Limoges... Il se peut que l'étymologie proposée par le „native speaker" soit parfois fausse, mais il semble assez pessimiste de nier a priori l'existence de locuteurs ayant conscience que leur langue et les mots qu'ils utilisent ont une histoire.
La citation de H.G. Schlogt: „on en est donc réduit à faire appel à l'intention des locuteurs", contredit, d'ailleurs, cette position pessimiste même si elle nous semble, elle aussi, quelque peu exagérée, extrémiste. En fait, on constate plutôt que si certains locuteurs ont parfois conscience de l'histoire du sens des mots qu'ils utilisent, cette connaissance reste souvent limitée et toujours à vérifier. C'est d'ailleurs là une part du travail du philologue.
Dans cet effort pour distinguer homonymie et polysémie, le rejet systématique de la diachronie paraît a priori stérile: si l'on définit l'homonymie comme résultant de la convergence phonémique ou graphémique de deux mots, à l'origine, différents, il est clair que la distinction de l'homonymie vis à vis de la polysémie n'apparaîtra guère en se limitant volontairement à une visée synchronique. Par définition, ce problème ne peut être résolu qu'en sortant de la synchronie, soit par une étude diachronique des mots dans la langue considérée, soit en sortant de la langue considérée et en comparant ce mot aux mots apparentés dans les langues apparentées.

3) L'étude de la polysémie ou de l'homonymie en hébreu classique suppose d'abord un certain consensus sur la *définition de l'hébreu classique*. On peut accepter d'y inclure les textes hébreux de Qumrân et donc une extension jusqu'au début de l'époque romaine mais, alors, l'hébreu classique devient une langue utilisée pendant un bon millénaire et, dans ce cas, une approche purement synchronique paraît irréaliste et fallacieuse. Durant cette longue période, non seulement de nouveaux mots sont-ils apparus, par développement interne ou par emprunt, mais

encore certains autres semblent avoir changé de sens ou, au moins, assumé de nouvelles significations. Même si l'évolution de la langue semble plus facile à déceler au niveau des usages grammaticaux et des tournures, et si l'évolution sémantique de l'hébreu classique reste souvent mal connue et discutée, il est clair que la *dimension diachronique* ne peut être absente d'une étude sémantique de l'hébreu classique. Cela pose beaucoup de problèmes concrets et suppose d'abord une certaine périodicisation (en partie conventionnelle) de l'hébreu classique: archaïque[3], d'époque royale, post-exilique (jusque vers 300?)[4], hellénistique et du début de l'époque romaine[5]. Cela suppose aussi une datation relativement assurée des textes: or, si, à quelques nuances près (parfois importantes !), cela semble acquis en épigraphie, la datation des divers textes bibliques reste beaucoup plus discutée, sauf, peut-être, celle des plus récents. Malgré cette difficulté, on pourrait s'inspirer d'une présentation formalisée du type de celle du CAD (avec la distinction du paléo-, moyen- et néo-assyrien...), même s'il s'agirait alors d'une périodicisation plus courte (2 à 4 siècles ?) et donc, parfois, plus discutable. De toutes façons, il semble utile, voire nécessaire, que cette dimension diachronique apparaisse clairement dans l'étude sémantique de l'hébreu classique et, si possible, dans les dictionnaires.

La référence à cette dimension diachronique restera, cependant, assez souvent insuffisante pour régler les problèmes posés par l'homonymie vis à vis de la polysémie. En fait, le recours à la philologie comparée peut aussi permettre, indirectement, d'éclairer la situation synchronique en révélant les différentes consonnes primitives qui ont pu fusionner dans la langue ou, au moins, dans l'écriture hébraïque. Il reste que ce recours à la philologie sémitique comparée n'est vraiment décisif que pour certaines consonnes tandis que, pour d'autres, il semble inopérant. On peut cependant faire deux remarques complémentaires:

1 – Si, pour certaines consonnes, l'hésitation entre homonymie et polysémie n'est pas directement levée par la philologie sémitique comparée, elle pourrait être éclairée par le biais d'une autre approche, appelée „parallélisme sémantique" par J.L. Palache[6] et M. Masson[7]. Cette appellation prête quelque peu à confusion car, en exégèse biblique, le „parallélisme sémantique" a un autre sens et concerne une des caractéristiques bien connues de la poésie ouest-sémitique et de la poésie hébraïque en particulier. On se demandera donc s'il ne faudrait pas plutôt parler de *„sémantique parallèle"*. Quelle que soit la terminologie utilisée, „on peut parler de parallélisme sémantique lorsqu'un mot (ou une racine) M1 exprime deux valeurs

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[3] Cf., par ex., les remarques récentes de I. Young, The style of the Gezer Calendar and some ‚Archaic Biblical Hebrew' passages, VT 42, 1992, 362-375.

[4] Cf., par ex., les recherches de A. Hurvitz, en particulier: A Linguistic Study of the Relationship between the Priestly Source and the Book of Ezekiel, Paris 1982.

[5] Cf., par ex., E.Y. Kutscher, A History of the Hebrew Language, Jérusalem/Leiden 1982, spéc. pp. 12ss et 87ss.

[6] Semantic Notes on the Hebrew Lexicon, Leiden 1959 (notes collectées et publiées par H. Rabin).

[7] Cf., par ex., Etude d'un parallélisme sémantique: ‚tresser'/‚être fort', Semitica 40, 1991, 89-105.

sémantiques S.1 et S.2 et qu'un autre mot M2 se trouve aussi exprimer ces deux valeurs.

Ex: latin *alveus* ‚auge, baquet', mais aussi ‚canot'
linter ‚auge, baquet', mais aussi ‚barque'..."[8]

En clair, dans un cas d'ambiguïté homonymie versus polysémie, on optera plutôt pour la polysémie si la variété des sens connus du mot (ou de la racine) est attestée pour d'autres mots de cette langue ou d'une autre langue, si possible apparentée. L'exemple final cité par J.H. Hospers (supra, p. 123) ressort d'ailleurs indirectement de cette méthode: puisque, en accadien, la même racine se manifeste par un verbe signifiant „résider" (*šakānu*) et par un nom signifiant „apparence" (*šiknu*), il est vraisemblable que, en hébreu classique, la même racine (*ᶜwn*) ait donné le nom *māᶜōn* signifiant „habitation" et le nom *ᶜayin* signifiant „apparence".

2 – Du fait que l'hébreu classique est une langue „morte" ou, plutôt, une langue du passé lointain, nous ne traitons jamais directement avec d'éventuels homonymes homophones mais avec d'éventuels homonymes homographes, ce qui est d'autant plus important que, au moins primitivement, il s'agissait d'une simple *homographie consonnantique*, le redoublement et les voyelles n'étant pas marquées. Cette caractéristique est bien connue des épigraphistes mais il faut aussi en tenir compte dans une étude sémantique de l'hébreu classique.

Resumé (abstract):
En vue d'une exploitation informatique, il est utile de formaliser la polysémie des lexèmes en fonction du contexte (domaine, niveau de langue, dialecte, époque). Cela suppose de fixer les limites de l'hébreu classique et d'en proposer une périodicisation.
Pour distinguer les lexèmes homonymes, le recours à la diacronie et à la philologie sémitique comparée paraît indispensable. On peut aussi utiliser, de façon générale, la polysémie analogique des lexèmes d'autres langues suivant la méthode du „parallélisme sémantique" qu'il faudrait plutôt appeler „sémantique parallèle" ou „polysémie parallèle".

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[8] Ibid., p. 89.

Bibliographische Dokumentation

Lexikalisches und grammatisches Material

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I. Lexikalisches Material: Fortsetzung zu ZAH III, 1990, 221-231; IV, 1991, 95-114.194-209; V, 1991, 91-112.226-236.

mkwn (*mākôn*)
- G.F. Hasel, The „Little Horn", the Heavenly Sanctuary, and the Time of the End (F. B. Holbrook [ed.], Symposium on Daniel. Introductory and Exegetical Studies [Daniel and Revelation Committee Series 2], Washington 1986, 378ff., hier 412f.).
- *mkwn* meint „Fundament", nicht „Stelle", „Standort".
- Dan 8,11.

mkr I
- E. Lipiński, In Search of the Etymology of Some Semitic Loan-Words (Y.L. Arbeitman [ed.], Fucus. A Semitic/Afrasian Gathering in Remembrance of Albert Ehrman [Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 58], Amsterdam/Philadelphia 1988, 325-333).
- Etymologie von syr. *mkr* nicht von gemeinsemit. *mkr* (althebr. *mkr*), sondern von spbabyl. *maḫāru* „to face", „to equalize in value". Akk. /*ḫ*/ entspricht dabei dem aram. spirantisierten /*k*/.

mkr (*makkār*)
- C.S. Wright, *mkr* in 2 Kings XII 5-17 and Deuteronomy XVIII 8 (VT 39, 1989, 438-448).
- „The word *makkār* should be viewed as a noun whose meaning reflects the activity inherent in its related verb *mkr*" (441). Der priesterliche Vollzug des *makkār* ist als Prozedur identisch mit *kæsæp ʾāšām wᵉkæsæp ḥaṭṭāʾôt*: Ein Priester verkauft die in sein Eigentum übergegangenen nicht verzehrten Stücke des Opfertieres.

mktb → *mktm*

mktm (*miktām*)
- C.T. Hodge, Miktam (A.S. Kaye [ed.], Semitic Studies [Festschr. W. Leslau] I, Wiesbaden 1991, 634-644).
- *mktm* ist eine Ablautform von *mktb*, die auf den bekannten *b*/*m*-Wechsel zurückzuführen ist. Inhaltlich wird man die Differenz mit den alten Übersetzungen als Unterschied des Schreibmaterials zu bestimmen haben: „This leaves papyrus

as the probable material for a *miktāb* and suggests «clay tablet» for *miktām*." (641).

ml³ jd

- M. Delcor, Réflexions sur l'investiture sacerdotale sans onction à la fête du nouvel an d'après *Le Rouleau du Temple* de Qumrân [XIV, 15-17] (A. Caquot et al. [edd.], Hellenica et Judaica [Festschr. V. Nikiprowetzky], Paris 1986, 155-164, bes. 155f.).
- *ml³ jd* meint ursprünglich: „die Hand mit Opfergaben füllen" (Ex 29,24; Lev 8,27), „mit Geld (Gehalt) füllen" (Ri 17,10.12; 18,4); vgl. dazu assyr.-babyl. *mullû qāta* „füllen mit dem dem Priester zustehenden Anteil an der Opfermaterie" (ARM II 13,17) und zur Sache 1 Sam 2,13; die Wendung erhält sekundär die Spezialbedeutung „als Priester einsetzen" (11QTemple XIV,15-17).

ml³k (*mal³āk*)

- J.O. Akao, Jahweh and *Mal³ak* in the Early Tradition of Israel: A Study of the Underlying Traditions of Yahweh/Angel Theophany in Exodus 3 (Irish Biblical Studies 12, 1990, 72-85).
- Traditions- und überlieferungsgeschichtliche Fragen zum Gebrauch von *mal³āk* in Ex 3.

ml³k (*mal³āk*)

- E. Jacob, Variations et constantes dans la figure de l'ange de YHWH (RHPhR 68, 1988, 405-414).
- Beobachtungen zur Vorstellung des *ml³k jhwh*, besonders in den Theophanieschilderungen des Buches Exodus.

ml³k (*mal³āk*)

- E.J.T. Tigchelaar, L'ange qui parlait à Zacharie, est-il un personnage apocalyptique? (EstB 45, 1987, 347-360).
- Vornehmlich religionsgeschichtliche Bemerkungen zum *angelus interpres* in den Visionen des Sacharja, Dan 7-12 sowie 1 Henoch.

ml³k (*mal³āk*)

- W.D. Whitt, The Jakob Traditions in Hosea and Their Relation to Genesis (ZAW 103, 1991, 18-43, hier 32).
- Vf. hält *ml³k* Hos 12,5 für eine Glosse, denn „מלאך is never used in poetry in parallel with either אל or אלהים".
- Hos 12,5a.

ml³kh (*mᵉlākāh*)

- A.G. Auld, Sabbath, Work and Creation: *ml³kh* Reconsidered (Henoch 8, 1986, 273-280).
- *ml³kh* beschreibt Gottes „whole act of creation as a «craftman's commission»" (280).

mlḥmh (*milḥāmāh*)

- J.P. Weinberg, Krieg und Frieden im Weltbild des Chronisten (OrLovPer 16, 1985, 111-129).

- Erörterungen zur Semantik und theologischen Bedeutung von *mlḥmh* und anderen Schlüsselbegriffen des Wortfelds „Krieg" (bes. *ḥjl*, *ṣb*ʾ, *mḥnh*) beim Chronisten: Krieg als „eine weitgehend entmythologisierte und desakralisierte Erscheinung" (121).

mlk I (*mælæk*)
- J.D. Fowler, Theophoric Personal Names in Ancient Hebrew (JSOT, Suppl.Ser. 49), 1988, hier 50-53.
- „... compounds with *mlk* contain very little evidence to suggest that the element was used in all but a few names as anything other than a divine appellation for the Hebrew deity" (52f.).

mlk I
- A.M. Schwemer, Gott als König und seine Königsherrschaft in den Sabbatliedern aus Qumran (M. Hengel – A.M. Schwemer [edd.], Königsherrschaft Gottes und himmlischer Kult [WUNT 55], Tübingen 1991, 45-118).
- Interpretation der Sabbatlieder aus Qumran unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Königsherrschaft Gottes und seines König-Seins, des Verhältnisses dieser Topoi zur alt- und zwischentestamentlichen Tradition sowie der Funktion der Sabbatlieder. Für Einzelheiten muß auf die Arbeit verwiesen werden.
- Vgl. J. Carmignac, Roi, royauté et royaume dans la liturgie angélique (RQu 12, 1986, 177-186).

mlk śrjm (*mælæk śārîm*)
- Sh.M. Paul, *mśʾ mlk śrjm*: Hosea 8:8-10 and Ancient Near Eastern Royal Epithets (ScrHier 31, Jerusalem 1986, 193-204).
- Vf. übersetzt in Hos 8,10 *maśśāʾ mælæk śārîm* mit „Tribut für den König der Könige" und verbindet den Titel mit akk. *šar šarrāni* „König der Könige", wobei *śārîm* lautlich an akk. *šarrāni* anklinge. Weitere wichtige, aus dem Akk. entlehnte Königsepitheta im Hebr. bzw. Biblisch-Aram. sind: *mælæk jāreb* = akk. *šarru rabû* (Hos 5,13; 10,6); *mælæk gādôl* = akk. *šarru rabû* (2 Kön 18,19 u.a.); *mælæk ʿaz* = akk. *šarru dannu* (Jes 19,4); *mælæk rab wᵉšallîṭ* = akk. *šarru rabû u dannu* (Dan 2,10); *mælæk hāʾᵃrāṣôt* = akk. *šarru mātāti* (Esra 9,7); *mārēʾ malkîn* = akk. *bēl šarrāni* (Dan 2,47).

mlk (*molæk*) Göttername
- J. Day, Molech. A God of Human Sacrifice in the Old Testament (University of Cambridge Oriental Publications 41), 1989, 24-28.
- Die alttestamentliche Bezeugung der Gottheit Molech ist mit dem kanaanäischen Gott *mlk* (KTU 1.100:41; 1.107:17) zu verbinden. In akk. Texten ist dieselbe Gottheit als *malik* bekannt, der gleichgesetzt werden kann mit dem Unterweltgott Nergal. Die hebr. Vokalisation *molæk* leitet sich wohl sekundär von *bošæt* ab.

mlk (*molæk*)
- J. Tropper, Nekromantie (AOAT 223), 1989, 234f.
- Vf. spricht sich für die Identität von hebr. *molæk* mit *mālik* (Partizip *pāris* der Verbalwurzel *MLK* „herrschen") aus.

mlk (*molæk*) Göttername
- M. Weippert, Synkretismus und Monotheismus. Religionsinterne Konfliktbewältigung im alten Israel (J. Assmann – D. Harth [edd.], Kultur und Konflikt, Frankfurt/M. 1990, 143-179, hier 172[48]).
- „M. E. ist hebr. *mōlek* Gottesname < **mulk-* »Königtum« *(abstractum pro concreto)*."

mlk (*molæk*)
- A. Wénin, Samuel et l'instauration de la monarchie (1. Sam 1-12) (EHS Ser. 23, Bd. 342), 1988, 79f.
- *mlk* ist „un *maqtil* construit sur le Yifil" der Wurzel *HLK* oder *YLK*. Die Verbindung *mlk mś'* bedeutet „offrande sacrificielle de présentation" (80).

mlkh → *gbjrh*

mlkwt
- Carmignac, siehe zu *mlk* I Schwemer, S. 181f.

mlkwt → *mlk* I Schwemer

mmgrwt (*mamm^{e}gurôt*) Kontextform
- W. van der Meer, Oude woorden warden nieuw. De opbouw van het boek Joël (Dissertation Kampen 1989), 148f.
- Joël 1,17 steht *mmgrwt* semantisch parallel zu *'wṣrwt* „Vorrat" und ist wie hebr. *mmkr(t)* bzw. akk. *namkūru* „Handel(svorrat)" als „Vorratskammer" zu deuten: *MKR* > *MGR* durch Teilassimilation von stimmlosem /*k*/ an stimmhaftes /*m*/.

mmlkh
- Carmignac, siehe zu *mlk* I Schwemer, S. 182f.

mmlkh → *mlk* I Schwemer

mmšḥ (*mimšaḥ*)
- K. Jeppesen, You are a cherub, but no God! (Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament 1991, 83-94).
- Vf. erklärt die MT-Form *mmšḥ* als „a unique *m*-noun from the root *MŠḤ*, to anoint".
- Hes 28,14.

mmšlh → *mlk* I Schwemer

mmtjm → *lmmtjm*

mn (*min*)
- A. Caquot, Cinq Observations sur le Psaume 45 (L. Eslinger – G. Taylor [edd.], Ascribe to the Lord. Biblical and other studies in memory of Peter C. Craigie [JSOT, Suppl.Ser. 67], 1988, 253-264, hier 257f.).
- Zur Erklärung des *minnî* Ps 45,9b schlägt Vf. vor, die Präposition *min* mit dem Suffix der 1. Pers. Sing. zu lesen, so daß sich als Übersetzung dieses Hemistichos ergibt: „depuis les palais d'ivoire on te célèbre par ma bouche" (257).
- Ps 150,4.

mn (*min*)
- D.J.A. Clines, Job 1-20 (WBC 17), Dallas 1989, 72.
- Der Parallelismus membrorum fordert in Hi 3,11 (*mrḥm*) die Übersetzung „immediately after".

mn (*min*)
- J.H. Hospers, Das Problem der sogenannten semantischen Polarität im Althebräischen (ZAH 1, 1988, 32-39, hier 36f.).
- Zur Polysemie von *min* und dessen Austauschbarkeit mit *b^{c}-* und *l^{c}-*.

mn (*min*)
- I. Willi-Plein, Gen 27 als Rebekkageschichte (ThZ 45, 1989, 315-334, hier 320-322).
- *mn* kann in Gen 27,39b „nur direktional, d.h. von «einem bestimmten Ausgangspunkt her» verstanden werden" (321).

mn → *b-*

mn → *ṭrm*

mnwḥ I → *šlwm*

mnwḥh (*m^{c}nûḥāh*)
- J. Ebach, Über »Freiheit« und »Heimat«. Aspekte und Tendenzen der מְנוּחָה (D.R. Daniels - U. Gleßmer - M. Rösel [edd.], Ernten, was man sät [Festschr. K. Koch], 1991, 495-518).
- Diachronisch orientierte Überlegungen zu der wechselseitigen Beeinflussung von „Freiheit" und „Heimat" als Interpretationsmodellen für das Verständnis von *m^{c}nûḥāh*.

mnwḥh → *šlwm*

mnḥh (*minḥāh*)
- G.A. Anderson, Sacrifices and Offerings in Ancient Israel. Studies in their Social and Political Importance (HSM 41), 1987, 27-34.
- Umfassende Studie zu Etymologie und Bedeutungsgeschichte: Das Lexem ist nicht von *NḤJ* (W.F. Albright, Vocalization of the Egyptian Syllabic Orthography, New Haven 1934, 53), sondern von *MNḤ* herzuleiten, vgl. phön. *mnḥt* „cultic gift" und ugar. *mnḥ(j)* „gift". Das Lexem bedeutet ursprünglich „(profane) Gabe, Tribut" (so in der ugar. Epik, die den archaischen Wortgebrauch überliefert) und erfährt eine sekundäre Spezifizierung zur kultischen Gabe („grain offering")(29). Im AT liegen beide Bedeutungen nebeneinander vor.

mnḥh → **hdm*

mn^{c}n^{c}jm (*m^{c}na^{c}an^{c}îm*)
- H. Seidel, Musik in Altisrael, Untersuchung zur Musikgeschichte und Musikpraxis Altisraels anhand biblischer und außerbiblischer Texte (Beiträge zur Erforschung des Alten Testaments und des antiken Judentums 12), 1989, 76.

- Vf. äußert sich skeptisch gegenüber der Übersetzung von *m^{e}na^{c}an^{c}îm* mit „Sistrum" (HAL 570). „Bei einer Ableitung von *nw^{c}* = «schütteln» könnte man eher an die in der Eisen II-Zeit verbreitete tönerne Rassel denken."
- 2 Sam 6,5.

msh/mss
- B. Kedar-Kopfstein, Synästhesien im biblischen Althebräisch in Übersetzung und Auslegung (ZAH 1, 1988, 47-60.147-185, hier 156).
- Zur Verbindung von *MSH/MSS* mit *leb*.

mskn (*misken*)
- E. Lipiński, Emprunts suméro-akkadiens en hébreu biblique (ZAH 1, 1988, 61-73, hier 69).
- Vgl. nassyr. *muškēnu*, wobei zu beachten ist, daß das akk. Wort seit der ababyl. Zeit einen Bedeutungswandel erfahren hat, der soziologisch auf die Verarmung der *muškēnu*-Klasse zurückzuführen ist.
- Koh 4,31; 9,15.16.

msknwt (*misk^{e}nôt*)
- Lipiński, siehe zu *mskn*, S. 69.
- Zu *misk^{e}nôt* vgl. nassyr. *maškanāte* (Pl. von *maškantu/maškattu*); zu *miskenût* vgl. nassyr. *muškēnūtu* „indigence".
- Ex 1,11; Dtn 8,9; 1 Kön 9,18; KAV 197,20.

msrwt, mwsrwt (*mo/ôserôt*) Ortsname
- Y.T. Radday, Vom Humor in biblischen Ortsnamen (M. Augustin – K.-D. Schunck [edd.], „Wünschet Jerusalem Frieden". Collected Communications to the XIIth Congress of the IOSOT, Jerusalem 1986 [Beiträge zur Erforschung des Alten Testaments und des antiken Judentums 13], 1988, 431-446, hier 440).
- Der Ortsname (Num 33,30) ist eine humorvolle Fiktion und mit *msrwt* I „Fesseln, Zügel" identisch, „denn gezügelt und gezüchtigt wurden sie auf ihrem Weg gemäß Dtn 8,5".

msrp (*m^{e}sārep*)
- Sh.M. Paul, Amos – A Commentary on the Book of Amos (Hermeneia), Minneapolis 1991, 215f.
- „The *msrp* would then be the one whose profession is to anoint the dead with *s^{e}rāp*, most likely aromatic spices."
- Am 6,10.

m^{c}h
- A. Wolters, The *Copper Scroll* and the Vocabulary of Mishnaic Hebrew (RQu 14, 1990, 483-495, hier 492).
- „Münze".
- 3Q15 8,9;10,9.

m^{c}ṭ (*m^{e} ^{c}aṭ*)
- J. Wehrle, Zur syntaktisch-semantischen Funktion der PV ‹Präpositionalverbindung› *k^{e}* = *m^{e} ^{c}aṭ* in Ijob 32,22 (BN 55, 1990, 77-95).

- Vf. bestimmt die Verbindung „der Präposition *k-* «wie, gemäß» im semantischen Bereich von «Vergleich» und «Entsprechung»". Das Substantiv *mᶜṭ* bezeichnet dabei eine „Quantität, die nicht präzise fixierbar ist" (90). Syntaktisch „fungiert die PV als adverbiale Näherbestimmung des Prädikats im Antecedens" (91).

mᶜlh (*maᶜālāh*)
- J. Ziv, „NQB" – MᶜLH (BethM 101, 1985, 269-273).
- „The names of Maale-Akravim and Adme-Hanekev are derived from the steep and serpentine approaches to them".
- IZBG 33, 1985/86, S. 292, Nr. 1885.

mᶜṣ → *ʾḥjmᶜṣ*

mᶜśr (*maᶜaśer*)
- Anderson, siehe zu *mnḥh*, S. 78-90.
- Umfassender Überblick zu Etymologie und Bedeutungsgeschichte: Zu *mᶜśr* vgl. akkad. *eširtu*, ugar. *maᶜśaru* (eine allgemeine Steuer, meist Getreide). Entsprechend ist auch für hebr. *mᶜśr* eine ursprünglich profane Bedeutung anzusetzen.

mp → *nwp*

mpqd (*mipqād*)
- J. Garfunkel, The Meaning of the Word *MPQD* in the Tell ᶜIra Ostracon (Leshonenu 52, 1987, 68-74).
- Das Wort weist hier nicht die Bedeutung „Musterung, Zählung" auf, sondern ist – *PQD* und *ŠMR* sind synonyme Wurzeln – synonym mit *mišmār* „Wache"; *mpqd brkyhw* bezeichnet die von Berakjahu befehligte Wachmannschaft.

mṣʾ
- E. Otto, Rechtsgeschichte der Redaktionen im Kodex Ešnunna und im „Bundesbuch" (OBO 85), 1989, 91.
- „Zu *ʾim jimmāṣeʾ* s. S. Dempster, Formula, RB 91, 199: ‚The verb *mṣʾ* emphasizes the discovery of the criminal, who is caught with the condemning evidence in this context'; ähnlich S. Wagner, Art. *mṣʾ*, ThWAT IV, 1051."
- Ex 22,6.

mṣbḥ → *jd* I

mṣbt (*maṣṣæbæt*)
- G. Beale, Isaiah VI, 9-13: A Retributive Taunt Against Idolatry (VT 41, 1991, 257-278).
- Der Vergleich mit Eiche und Terebinthe macht den „cultic overtone" deutlich, der dem Wort in Jes 6,13 zugrundeliegt.
- Vgl. jetzt H.-P. Müller (ZAH 5, 1992, 163-185, bes. 178ff.).

mṣwh → *twrh*

mqbt II (*maqqæbæt*)
- J.G. Janzen, Rivers in the Desert of Abraham and Sarah and Zion (Isaiah 51:1-3) (HAR 10, 1986, 139-155, hier 145).

- Vf. erläutert verschiedene Bedeutungsmöglichkeiten von *mqbt* im Zusammenhang mit *bôr*; „the *maqqebet* will then refer to the fissure in the rock depression or *bôr* holding the water, while in the case of humanly bored openings it will refer to a hole or the enlargement of a slight natural crack", vgl. auch akk. *naqbum*.

mqdš ʾdm
- D. Dimant, *4QFlorilegium* and the Idea of the Community as Temple (A. Caquot et al. [edd.], Hellenica et Judaica [Festschr. V. Nikiprowetzky], Paris 1986, 165-189, bes. 176ff.).
- Nach einer Neubearbeitung von 4Q*174* (= 4QFlor) 1,1-13 kommt der Verfasser zu dem Schluß: „... the Temple of Men represents an interim stage between the Temple of Israel of the past (and present?) and the eschatological Temple of the future" (177). Der *mqdš ʾdm* meint die real gegenwärtige Gemeinde in Qumran, „a temple-like community ... the «congregation of priests»" (188).
- Vgl. M.O. Wise, *4QFlorilegium* and the Temple of Adam (RQu 15, 1991, 103-132).

mqhlwt (*maqhelôt*) Ortsname
- Radday, siehe zu *msrwt*, S. 437.440.
- Der Ortsname ist fiktiv und bedeutet „Tumult, rebellische Versammlung" (Num 33,23); vgl. die Wurzel *QHL* Num 16,19.

mqwh → *ʾhbh*

mqwm (*māqôm*)
- D.N. Premnath, Latifundialization and Isaiah 5,8-10 (JSOT 40, 1988, 49-60, hier 55).
- *māqôm* bezeichnet in Jes 5,8b ein kleines bäuerliches Landgut.

mqwm → *bjt*

mqṭr mgš (*muqṭār muggāš*)
- W. Zwickel, Räucherkult und Räuchergeräte (OBO 97), 1990, 310f.
- „*mqṭr* muß ... Jahwes Anteil am Opfer bezeichnen ... Was für den Menschen ein Opfertier ist, ist aus Jahwes Sicht eben nur der Rauch, der zu ihm hinaufsteigt." (311).

mqṭrwt (*mᵉqaṭṭᵉrôt*)
- Zwickel, siehe zu *mqṭr mgš*, S. 328f.
- Gegen die Versionen ist *mqṭrwt* „als Part. pi. aufzufassen und am ehesten recht umfassend mit «Räuchergeräte» wiederzugeben." (329).

mqṭrt (*miqṭæræt*)
- Zwickel, siehe zu *mqṭr mgš*, S. 243f.
- In Ez 8,11 bezeichnet *mqṭrt* sicher nicht den Altar, sondern entweder Räuchertassen oder Räucherkästchen.
- Vgl. im selben Band die Abbildungen S.41-53 bzw. 91-102.

mql šqd (*maqqel šāqed*)
- K. van der Toorn, Did Jeremiah See Aaron's Staff? (JSOT 43, 1989, 83-94, bes. 90-92).
- *mql šqd* stellte die künstlerische Nachbildung des Stabes dar, der nach der Ätiologie Num 17,25f. gestaltet war und als Kultobjekt im vorexilischen Tempel seinen Platz hatte.
- Jer 1,11-12.

mqnh (*miqnæh*)
- J.F.A. Sawyer, Cain and Hephaestus. Possible Relics of Metal-Working Traditions in Gen 4 (AbrNahrain 24, 1986, 155-166, hier 160).
- *mqnh* meint allgemein „Besitz", wobei Viehbesitz eingeschlossen sein kann, aber nicht muß. Die Wendung *jšb ʾhl wmqnh* meint dann „traders, who dwell in tents".

mr
- J.A. Fitzmyer, The Qumran Scrolls and the New Testament After Forty Years (RQu 13, 1988, 609-620, hier 618).
- *mrh šmyʾ wʾrʿʾ* 1QGenApok 22,16, vgl. Tob 7,17; Mt 11,25; Lk 10,21; ferner Jud 9,12.

mr I (*mar*)
- Kedar-Kopfstein, siehe zu *msh/mss*, S. 147.154.
- *mar* geht Verbindungen ein mit Wörtern aus dem auditiven (*ṢʿQ, ZʿQ, ṢQḤ, ŠMʿ*) und transsensorischen (*NPŠ*) Bereich.
- Gen 27,34; 1 Sam 30,6; 2 Kön 4,27; Zef 1,14; Spr 14,10; Sir 29,25(32); Est 4,1.

mrʾ III → *mrh*

mrʾh (*marʾæh*)
- L. Eslinger, „A Change of Heart": 1 Sam 16 (L. Eslinger - G. Taylor [edd.], Ascribe to the Lord. Biblical and Other Studies in Memory of Peter C. Craigie [JSOT, Suppl.Ser. 67], 341-361, hier 356).
- Vf. bespricht die Bedeutung von *mrʾh* in der Erzählung von Davids Erwählung. Dabei kommt der Wurzel *RʾH* die Rolle eines Leitwortes zu.
- 1 Sam 16,7.

mrʾj → *bdn*

mrd
- C. Hardmeier, Prophetie im Streit vor dem Untergang Judas (BZAW 197), 1990, 254[168].264.293f.
- In Ez 17,15 ist *MRD* doppeldeutig: Der Aufstand gegen Nebukadnezar (politisch) wird (theologisch) als Rebellion gegen Jahwe gedeutet. Das Wort bezeichnet (auch 2 Kön 18,20) im Gegensatz zu *ʿbd* die Aufkündigung eines Vasallenverhältnisses und ist „überhaupt erst im frühen 6. Jh. unter dem Einfluß des Reichsaramäischen (im AT) heimisch geworden" (293).

mrh
- K. Koenen, Textkritische Anmerkungen zu schwierigen Stellen im Tritojesajabuch (Bibl 69, 1988, 564-573, hier 568-570).
- Vf. konjiziert *titjammārû* nach *titmārû* „ihr werdet mästen", wobei die zugrunde liegende Wurzel *MRH* als eine Nebenform von *MR* ʾ III angesehen wird.
- Jes 61,6.

mrzḥ (*marzeʾaḥ*)
- Ph.J. King, The *marzeaḥ* Amos Denounces (BAR 14, 1988, Nr. 4, 34-44).
- „The *marzeah* was a pagan ritual, that took the form of a social and religious association. The term may denote the group of people who participate in the rite, or the building where the rite took place." (36).

mrzḥ (*marzeʾaḥ*)
- M. O'Connor, Northwest Semitic Designations for Elective Social Affinities (JANES 18, 1986, 67-80, hier 70-72).
- Vf. diskutiert hebr. *mrzḥ* im Zusammenhang mit weiteren westsemit. Belegen: „... **marziḥ* generally had under 25 members". Zwei „patterns" sind zu beobachten: „One involves nine lay members and one «priest», «president» or «symposiarch» ... The other pattern ... includes twelve lay members and a head ..." (72).

mrjrj (*mᶜrîrî*)
- J.C. de Moor, „O Death, Where Is Thy Sting?" (L. Eslinger - G. Taylor [edd.], Ascribe to the Lord. Biblical and Other Studies in Memory of Peter C. Craigie [JSOT, Suppl.Ser. 67], 99-107, hier 105[22]).
- Zu Dtn 32,24 „compare Ugaritic *šmrr* «poisonous»".
- Vgl. auch D. Pardee, ZAW 91, 1979, 401-406.

mrmh (*mirmāh*)
- Y. Minokami, Die Revolution des Jehu (GTA 38), 1989, 81f.
- Vergleich der Gebrauchsweisen des Terminus *mrmh* in 2 Kön 9,23b und in der aram. Vertragsinschrift Sefire III (KAI 224,22; 8 Jh. v. Chr.).

mrᶜhw (*mereᶜehû*) Kontextform
- J.D. Safren, Ahuzzath and the Pact of Beer-Sheba (ZAW 101, 1989, 184-198, bes. 191-198).
- Zu *mrᶜhw* Gen 26,26 vgl. ababyl. (Māri) *merḫum* I (AHw 646 „ein Funktionär [Oberrichter?]"). Vf. schlägt vor, *mrᶜhw* als *marᶜehû* „his (Abimelech's) pasturage supervisor" (198) zu vokalisieren; die Lesung *mereᶜehû* „sein Freund" ist aufzugeben.

mrr II
- Janzen, siehe zu *mqbt* II, S. 150[16].
- Vf. erläutert die Möglichkeit, die Form *hāmîr* in Ps 46 als Inf. constr. von *mrr* II anzusetzen; vgl. arab. „pass by, go, (sometimes) flow", *marmara* „cause to flow" und *mamarrun* „water-course".

mś' I (*maśśā'*)
- M. Weippert, The Balaam Text From Deir ʿAllā and the Study of the Old Testament (J. Hoftijzer – G. van der Kooij, The Balaam Text from Deir Alla Re-Evaluated, Leiden 1991, 151-184, hier 155[16]).
- „Hebrew *maśśā'* ... is, in my opinion, an abbreviation of an original **maśśā qōl*, a *nomen actionis* derived from *NŚ'* + *qōl*, «to utter»".

mś' I (*maśśā'*)
- Wénin, siehe zu *mlk*, S. 79f.
- *mś'* kann die Bedeutung „présentation, offrande" haben.

mś'h (*maśśā'āh*)
- R.C. Bailey, David in Love and War (JSOT, Suppl.Ser. 75), 1990, 97f.
- In 2 Sam 11,8b sollte übersetzt werden: „the one to give the signal to the king". Dessen Aufgabe bestand darin, Uriah auf frischer Tat beim Brechen des „soldier's oath" zu ertappen.

mś't (*maś'et*)
- Anderson, siehe zu *mnḥh*, S. 129.
- *mś't* ist von *NŚ'* „tragen" herzuleiten: *manśi't* > *maśśi't* > *maśśe* (')*t* > *maś'et* (Formenbildung unter Rückwirkung des Pl. *maś'ôt*); vgl. pun. *mś't* (eine Abgabe an den Opferpriester). Das Lexem bedeutet althebr. ursprünglich „Geschenk" und wird sekundär zum Opferterminus und zur „Tempelsteuer".

mšḥ I
- J.K. Kuan, Third Kingdoms 5,1 and Israelite-Tyrian Relations During the Reign of Solomon (JSOT 46, 1990, 31-46, hier 33).
- *mšḥ* kann auch für sich allein die Salbung zum König bedeuten, ohne daß dieser ausdrücklich genannt werden muß. In diesem Fall wird *ʿl* nicht gebraucht.

mšḥh
- Wolters, siehe zu *mʿh*, S. 492.
- „(Anointing) oil" (3Q15 12,12).

mšḥjt (*mašḥît*)
- Hardmeier, siehe zu *mrd*, S. 347-351.
- „*ŠḤH* (Hi) bezeichnet «das aktuelle, absichtliche ... Verderben»" (348f.). Besonders das Partizip *mšḥjt* ist Terminus technicus der Militärsprache. Der Schwerpunkt der Verwendung liegt aufgrund der konkreten Erfahrungen mit babylonischen Plünderern im Jeremiabuch.

mšḥjt (*mašḥît*)
- V.Ph. Long, The Reign and Rejection of King Saul (SBL, DissSer 118), 1989, 97.
- Die „raiding parties" in 1 Sam 13,17 werden mit dem „technical military term" *mšḥjt* bezeichnet, d.h. „their duties included plundering and ravaging the land".

mšk I → *qšt*

mškb
- Wolters, siehe zu *m ᶜh*, S. 489.
- Das Lexem bedeutet in 3Q15 11,16 „tomb, grave".

mšl I
- H.-Chr. Schmitt, Das Hesbonlied Num. 21,27aβ-30 und die Geschichte der Stadt Hesbon (ZDPV 104, 1988, 26-43, hier 32f.).
- *MŠL* qal ist mit „einen Spruch, ein Gleichnis, einen Spottvers machen" wiederzugeben. Die *mošᶜlîm* Num 21,27 sind als „Spruchdichter" anzusehen (33).

mšl I
- J.J. Schmitt, Like Eve, Like Adam: *mšl* in Gen 3,16 (Bibl 72, 1991, 1-22).
- Vf. spricht sich für die Ableitung von *MŠL* I „to represent, be like" aus.

mšl I (*māšāl*)
- K. Nielsen, There is Hope for a Tree (JSOT, Suppl.Ser. 65), 1989, 245f.
- Vf. diskutiert die Bedeutungsbreite von *māšāl*, besonders in Jes. „... the root משל originally indicated similarity, and could be used about both proverbs and parables. The basic meaning has been forgotten over the years, and therefore משל could also be used about proverbs that contained no comparative or figurative elements, about the satirical poem, and about various other forms of speech".

mšmr (*mišmār*)
- J.G. Janzen, Another Look at God's Watch over Job (7:12) (JBL 108, 1989, 109-113).
- Vf. diskutiert die Bedeutungsnuancen von *mšmr*: „... *mišmār* can refer not only to a defensive guard or lookout, or to a place of custody after capture or arrest, but also to a siege blockade of an enemy not yet subdued" (110).

mšnh (*mišnæh*)
- J. Lindenberger, How Much For a Hebrew Slave? The meaning of *mšnh* in Deut 15:18 (JBL 110, 1991, 479-482, hier 479).
- Vf. plädiert mit M.Tsevat („Alalakhiana", HUCA 29, 1958, 109-143, bes. 125-126) nach akk. *ištannu* für die traditionelle Übersetzung als „twice as much", „double".
- Gen 43,12.15; Ex 16,5.22; Jes 61,7; Jer 17,18; Sach 9,12; Hi 42,10.

mšnh (*mišnæh*)
- Lipiński, siehe zu *mkr* I, S. 327.
- Als etymologische Beziehung zwischen akk. *mašennu/masennu*, ugar. *mṯn* und althebr. *mšnh* kann die Basis *ṯnj* oder *ṯnn* („ϑny and ϑnn") angenommen werden, „expressing the idea of copying something or someone. The semantic field of this root will extend, in consequence, from the notation of «repeating» someone's words to «seconding» or «replacing» somebody in the exercise of his functions, or even «taking on» someone else's appearence." (327).

mš^{c}j (*miš^{c}î*)
- M. Görg, Ein verkanntes Wort für die „Hebamme" in Ez 16,4 (BN 58, 1991, 13-16, bes. 15).
- Vf. diskutiert Zusammenhang mit dem demotischen Lexem *ms-^{c}3* („Hebamme"), das älteres *m-s(j)áw.-t-* ersetzt.

mšphh (*mišpāḥāh*)
- K. Berge, Die Zeit des Jahwisten (BZAW 186), 1990, 52-62.
- *mšphh* bezeichnet nicht „staatspolitische Einheiten", sondern „vorpolitische Einheiten" (62). Der Jahwist „bezeichnet Gen 10 nicht alle Nationen und Volksgruppen als *mišp^{c}ḥôt*, nur die nächsten Nachbarn Israels, die noch keine Nationalstaaten gebildet haben" (61).

mšpṭ (*mišpāṭ*)
- H. Cazelles, Autour de l'Exode (Études) (Sources Bibliques, Paris 1987, 167-174).
- Vergleichende Studie zu *mšpṭ* und ugar. *mṯpṭ*.

mšpṭ (*mišpāṭ*)
- F. Crüsemann, Das Bundesbuch – Historischer Ort und institutioneller Hintergrund (J.A. Emerton [ed.], Congress Volume. Jerusalem 1986 [VTS 40], 1988, 27-41).
- Vf. legt thetisch dar, daß die *mišpāṭîm* im Bundesbuch in die Königszeit zu datieren sind. Für ihre Herkunft ist die Institution des Jerusalemer Obergerichts (vgl. 2 Chr 19,8ff.) anzunehmen.

mšpṭ (*mišpāṭ*)
- C. Stansell, Micah and Isaiah: A Form and Tradition Historical Comparison (SBL, DissSer 85), 1985, 105.
- „... the context of [Micha] 3:1ff.; 3:9ff. (cf. 3:8) indicates that the prophet means »justice«".

mšpṭ → *ḥq*

mšpṭ → *twrh*

mšpṭj → *b^{c}l mšpṭ*

mšš
- Kedar-Kopfstein, siehe zu *msh/mss*, S. 55.
- Zur Verbindung von *MŠŠ* mit → *ḥšk*.
- Ex 10,21; Ijob 12,25.

mtwš^{3}l (*m^{c}tûšā^{3}el*) Personenname
- H.S. Kvanvig, Roots of Apocalyptic (WMANT 61), 1988, 44.
- *mtwš^{3}l* aus (akk., hebr.) *mut(u)* „Mann" und *š^{3}wl* „Unterwelt".
- Gen 4,18.

mtḥṭ
- Y. Thorion, Beiträge zur Erfassung der Sprache der Kupfer-Rolle (RQu 12, 1986, 163-176, hier 162).

- „In dem aus drei Teilen zusammengesetzten *mtḥt* und *mtḥt l-* haben sowohl *l* als auch *m* ihre ursprünglichen Bedeutungen verloren; sie haben keine Bedeutung mehr, so daß die Bedeutung des ganzen Komplexes mit der von *tḥt-* «unter» identisch ist."

mtn II (*mattān*) Personenname
- F. al-Khraysheh, Die Personennamen in den nabatäischen Inschriften des Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum, Marburg/Lahn 1986, 116f.
- Zum nabat. Frauennamen *mtnw*; Vergleich mit dem Personennamen *mtn* bzw. mit *mtn* zusammengesetzten Personennamen im Safait., Phön., Pun., Palmyr. und Hebr., sowie dem arab. Personennamen *Muṭannā*. Vf. referiert die beiden Möglichkeiten der Ableitung von *mtn*: entweder von *NTN* „geben" oder von arab. *MTN* „stark sein".

mtnh I (*mattānāh*)
- R. Gelio, Osservazioni critiche sul *māšāl* di Qoh. 7,5-7 (Lateranum 54, 1988, 1-15).
- „... si può affermare che la derivazione di *mtnh* (TM *mattānāh*) dalla radice *yānāh*, determinando la sua funzione nei confronti di *ʾet lēb*, oltre a risolvere certe difficoltà grammaticali, lega più strettamente 7,7 a tutto l'insieme del *māšāl*, e fa di Qoh 7,5-7 una unità bene costruita a chiasmo e attribuisce alla personalità del saggio qualifiche che gli sono riconosciute nell'ambito della letteratura sapienziale." (15).

mtnjh Personenname
- St. Timm, Anmerkungen zu vier neuen hebräischen Namen (ZAH 2, 1989, 188-198, hier 189).
- Auf dem bei P. Bordreuil, Catalogue des sceaux ouest-sémitiques inscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale, du Musée du Louvre et du Musée biblique de Bible et Terre Sainte, Paris 1986, als Nr. 57 veröffentlichten Siegel ist in Zeile 2 statt der eigenartigen Namensform *mtnjh* das gebräuchlichere *mtnyhẘ* zu lesen.

mtnjhw → *-jh(w)/-jw*

mtnjhw → *mtnjh*

mtq
- Kedar-Kopfstein, siehe zu *msh/mss*, S. 53f.
- Zur Verknüpfung von *MTQ* mit *ʾwr* und mit Ausdrücken des Redens.
- Koh 11,7.

mtqh (*mitqāh*) Ortsname
- Radday, siehe zu *msrwt*, S. 440.
- Der Ortsname ist fiktiv und bedeutet „Versüßung", d.h. Vergebung (Num 33,28); vgl. die Wurzel *MTQ*.

mtrgm (*mᵉturgām*)
- W. von Soden, Dolmetscher und Dolmetschen im Alten Orient (L. Cagni – H.-P. Müller [edd.], W. von Soden. Aus Sprache, Geschichte und Religion

Babyloniens [Istituto Universitario Orientale. Dipartimento di Studi Asiatici. Series Minor 32], Neapel 1989, 351-357.
- Das part. pass. *mᶜturgām* in Esr 4,7 ist ein Aramaismus. Das Wort selbst ist im Alten Orient seit der altassyrischen Zeit belegbar. Da weder eine semitische (*ragāmum* bedeutet nicht „dolmetschen", außerdem gibt es keine Nominalform *taprusannu*) noch eine indoeuropäische Etymologie in Frage kommt, wird das Wort auf einen – dem heth. *tarkummai-/tarkummiia-* „(Opfergaben) ankündigen; (Ankommenden) melden; (jemanden) zitieren; (für Beter) vermittelnd eintreten" (H.Otten) entsprechenden – altkleinasiatischen Wortstamm **tarkum(m)-* zurückzuführen und im Semitischen ein Lehnwort sein.

nʾ I (*nāʾ*)
- H. Rouillard, *El Rofé* en *Nombres* 12,13 (Sem 37, 1987, 17-46, bes. 17-22).
- Laut Vf. kann die Partikel *nāʾ* auch nach einem Nomen stehen: *ʾel nāʾ rᶜpāʾ nāʾ lāh* „El! Je te prie, guéris-la, je te prie!" (Num 12,13) (17). Die oftmals vorgeschlagene Konjektur von *ʾel nāʾ* zu *ʾal-nāʾ* „nicht doch" wird abgelehnt, da *ʾal* + Imperativ unmöglich ist.

nʾ (*nôʾ*)
- K. Seybold, Profane Prophetie (SBS 135), 1989, 56[14].
- „Ägypt. *wȝs.t* (für Stadt und Gau) oder einfach *nw.t* ‚Stadt', auch *T-apet* bzw. *Djeme*, akk. *Ni-i*, heth. *Nija*, hebr. *Noʾ* (*ʾAmôn*), griech. Διός(πολις); vgl. HAL 621."

nʾd (*noʾd*)
- Tropper, siehe zu *mlk*, bes. 307.
- Ijob 32,19 steht *ʾwb* anstelle eines ursprünglichen *nʾd* „Weinschlauch".

nʾ → *nʾwt*

nʾwt (*nᶜʾôt*) Kontextform
- J.H. Hayes, Amos, Nashville 1988, 64f.
- *nʾwt* (Am 1,2) ist nicht von *NWH*, sondern von *NʾH* herzuleiten und mit „Oasen" zu übersetzen.

nʾkr → *nkr*

nʾm (*nᶜʾum*)
- C.H. Gordon, Eblaitica (ders. et al. [edd.], Eblaitica: Essays on the Ebla Archives and Eblaite Language, Winona Lake / Ind. 1987, 19-28, hier 21).
- Vgl. zu hebr. *nᶜʾum* eblait. *en-ma* (akk. *um-ma*): „but a genetic connection between them looks phonetically so remote that no one associated them. However, Eblaite *en-ma X* »so says X« bridges some of the gap, at least with regard to the first consonant. ... It is the syllabification of *nĕʾûm* that makes squaring it with *en-ma* so difficult. Transposing the *ʾ* and *n* in *en-ma/nĕʾûm* is rather jarring. Accordingly, we are posing a problem rather than claiming to solve it." (21).

nbʾ
- P. Michaelsen, Ecstasy and Possession in Ancient Israel (Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament 1989, Heft 2, 28-54).

- Vf. tritt in eine Auseinandersetzung mit S.B. Parker, R.R. Wilson und D.L. Peterson um das Verständnis von Ekstase und Geistbesitz ein; dabei macht Vf. zahlreiche Bemerkungen zum kontextspezifischen Verständnis von *nbʾ*.

nbjʾ (*nābîʾ*)
- Stansell, siehe zu *mšpṭ*, S. 67-99.
- Vf. erläutert Bedeutungsfeld der *nb(j)ʾjm* in Mi und Jes, vor allem in Opposition zu den verwandten Berufsgruppen (*ḥozæh*, → *qosem*).

nbjʾ (*nābîʾ*)
- A. Tsukimoto, Emar and the Old Testament (AJBI 15, 1989, 3-24).
- Wenn hebr. *nbjʾ* mit akkad. *nabû* zusammenhängt, „one cannot deny its etymological, if not phenomenological relationship with *anabbītu* (or better *munabbītu?*) in Emar" (15f.).
- D. Arnaud, Recherches au pays d'Astata - Emar 372,97; 379,11-12; 383,10.

nbl I (*nebæl*)
- W.G.E. Watson, Lexical Notes (Newsletter for Ugaritic Studies 39/40, 1988, 10-12, hier 11).
- *nbl* bedeutet „amphora". „On Hebrew *nebel* see the extensive discussion by W. McKane, Jeremiah I (ICC), 1986, 292-298."

nbl I/II → *nblwt*

nbl II (*nābāl*) Personenname
- C. Grottanelli, Storie di Giuda (Egitto e Vicino Oriente 11, 1988, 167-183, hier 168).
- Der PN bezeichnet eine „persona che non sa comportarsi"; das Wort entstammt der Terminologie der Blutrache.
- 1 Sam 25,25; vgl. 2 Sam 3,3.

nbl II (*nābāl*) Personenname
- Y.T. Radday, Humour in Names (ders. - A. Brenner [edd.], On Humour and Comic in the Hebrew Bible [JSOT, Suppl.Ser. 92 = Bible and Literature Ser. 23], 1990, 59-97, hier 62f.).
- *nbl* (1 Sam 25,25) „is a palindrome of Laban (Gen 29-31), another rich shepherd and exactly as much of a miser as Nabal".

nblh (*nᵉbālāh*)
- Clines, siehe zu *mn*, S. 54.
- In Hi 2,10 „the adjective should probably be taken here essentially in its social sense as «low class» or «common», with the unambiguous overtone of disapproval on moral or religious grounds."

nblwt (*nablût*)
- S.M. Olyan, „In the Sight of Her Lovers": On the Interpretation of *nablūt* in Hos 2,12 (BZ 36, 1992, 255-261, bes. 261).
- Angesichts der Homophonie der Wurzeln *NBL* I und II können in dem Wort *nblwt* zumindest vier Bedeutungen mitschwingen: „foolishness", „sexual misconduct", „exposure of the woman's literal nakedness", „degeneration".

ngd
- M. Eskhult, Über einige hebräische Verben des Sprechens – Etymologie und Metapher (OrS 38/39, 1989/1990, 31-36).
- Vgl. gemeinsemit. *NGD* „ziehen, führen". Die Bedeutungsentwicklung führt im Hebr. zu „anführen, vorbringen, berichten", wobei vielleicht die bildliche Vorstellung vom „Hervorbringen der Worte" erkennbar ist.

ngh
- D. Dimant – J. Strugnell, The Merkabah Vision in Second Ezekiel (4Q*385* 4) (RQu 14, 1990, 331-348, hier 338).
- Zu *ngh mrkbh* in 4Q*385* 4,6.

ngjd (*nāgîd*)
- M.Z. Brettler, God is King. Understanding an Israelite Metaphor (JSOT, Suppl.Ser. 76), 1989, 33-35.
- Hebr. *ngjd* ist ein „devine designee", kein „prince" (33). Ein Zusammenhang mit *NGD* hiph besteht nicht.

ng^{c}
- J.M. Baumgarten, The 4Q Zadokite Fragments on Skin Disease (JJSt 41, 1990, 153-165, bes. 158f.162f.).
- Zu *ng^{c}* 4QD^{a} = 4Q*266*, Kol 17, Z. 13 (= Z. 21 des „Composite Text") und CD 13,4-7; 1QS 4,9-12.
- → *ng^{c}* Qimron.

ng^{c}
- Kedar-Kopfstein, siehe zu *msh/mss*, S. 155.
- *NG^{c}* bezeichnet auch „(geistig-seelisch) rühren".
- 1 Sam 10,26.

ng^{c}
- E. Qimron, Notes on the 4Q Zadokite Fragment on Skin Disease (JJSt 42, 1991, 256-259, hier 258).
- Zur genannten Stelle (→ *ng^{c}* Baumgarten) vgl. auch 11QPs^{a} 24,13, „*ng^{c}* is clearly a skin disease"; 1QH 1,32 „skin disease (caused by an evil spirit)" sowie 1QH 5,28.

ngš → *mgš*

nd (*ned*)
- A. Wolters, Not Rescue but Destruction: Rereading Exodus 15:8 (CBQ 52, 1990, 223-240).
- *ned* ist umzupunktieren in *nod* und dann – mit T und S – als „wineskin" zu verstehen. Zu vergleichen ist aram. *nôdā'* und akk. *nādu*.

ndd I
- J. Tropper – E. Verreet, Ugaritisch *NDY, YDY, HDY, NDD* und *D(W)D* (UF 20, 1988, 339-350, hier 345).
- Zu hebr. *NDD* I vgl. jetzt ugar. *NDD* „fliehen, entwischen, weggehen".
- → *gdd* I

ndh I
- Tropper – Verreet, siehe zu *ndd*, S. 348f.
- Zu hebr. *NDH* I vgl. ugar. *YDY* „austreiben, entfernen".

ndjb (*nādîb*)
- Clines, siehe zu *min*, S. 301.
- Zur Ableitung von *NDB* „to volunteer". Ijob 12,21 sind also „military leaders" gemeint.

nhjrh
- É. Puech, Le testament de Qahat en araméen de la grotte 4 (4QTQah), RQu 15, 1991, 23-54, hier 37f.).
- Zur Verwendung von *nhr* und *nhjrh* in 4QTQah 1,1-2,1.

nhr (*nāhār*)
- N. Lohfink, Dtn 12,1 und Gen 15,18 (M. Görg [ed.], Die Väter Israels [Festschr. J. Scharbert], Stuttgart 1989, 183-210, hier 199[38].
- Vf. wendet sich gegen die Emendation in *nḥl* und versteht unter *nhr* hier den Nil, wohl in Gestalt eines östlichen Nilarmes.

nhr (*nāhār*)
- S. Sekine, Die Tritojesajanische Sammlung (Jes 56-66) redaktionsgeschichtlich untersucht (BZAW 175), 1989, 269.
- „*nāhār* als «Vergleich des herankommenden Heils» findet sich nur an zwei Stellen bei Trtjes angesichts 30 Belegen bei den Propheten insgesamt".
- Jes 59,19; 66,12.

nhr → *nhjrh*

nwd (*nôd*) Landesname
- Radday, siehe zu *msrwt*, S. 442f.
- Der Landesname *nwd* ist fiktiv und leitet sich als Wortspiel von *NWD* „schwanken" ab: Kain wohnt (*jšb*) – wo immer er sich niederläßt – auf schwankendem Boden (Gen 4,16).

nwh (*nāwæh*)
- A. Malamat, Pre-Monarchical Social Institutions in Israel in the Light of Mari (J.A. Emerton [ed.], Congress Volume. Jerusalem 1986 [VTS 40], 1988, 165-176, bes. 168-172).
- Zur Äquivalenz und Bedeutungsnuancierung von Mari-Akkadisch *nawûm* und hebr. *nāwæh* (168-172).
- ARM I 6:26-8; 42:5-11; II 33:21; 45:10; 48,8ff.; V 23.

nwḥ (*nôᵃḥ*) Personenname
- al-Khraysheh, siehe zu *mtn* II, 119.
- Beim nabat. Personennamen Verweis auf hebr. Personennamen *Nôᵃḥ*.

nwḥ → *šlwm*

nwṭ
- R. Scoralick, Trishagion und Gottesherrschaft (SBS 138), 1989, 18-22.
- Kurzer Forschungsüberblick zum Hapax legomenon *tnwṭ* „wanken" (Ps 99,1) und der verwandten ugar. Wurzel *NṬṬ*.

nwm
- C. Hardmeier, „Geschwiegen habe ich seit langem, wie die Gebärende schreie ich jetzt". Zur Komposition und Geschichtstheologie von Jes 42,14-44,23 (WoDie 20, 1989, 155-179, hier 160[19]).
- Anstelle von MT *hnh hnm* ist in Jes 41,27a „נם als pt.m.sg. der allerdings nur mhebr. belegten Wurzel נום" zu lesen, dem ein *hnnj* voranzustellen ist.

nwn (*nûn*) Personenname
- Gordon, siehe zu *nʾm*, S. 23.
- Vgl. zum hebr. Personenname *nwn* vielleicht eblait. *nu-nu*; dieses wiederum sum. Lehnwort: GIŠ.NUN „Zeder"?

nwp
- M. Dietrich – O. Loretz, Die Wurzel *NŪP* „hoch sein" im Ugaritischen (UF 22, 1990, 67-74).
- Ugaritische Belege (v.a. KTU 1.3 VI 9) zeigen, daß im Ugaritischen eine Wurzel *NŪP* „hoch sein" existierte, die auch dem hebr. Nomen *tnwph* zugrundeliegen dürfte.

nwp (*nôp*)
- M.L. Barré, The Seven Epithets of Zion in Ps 48,2-3 (Bibl 69, 1988, 557-563, hier 561f.).
- *nôp* Ps 48,3 bezieht sich auf die ägyptische Stadt Memphis. Im MT ist Memphis nur in den Formen *mp* (so einmal in Hos 9,6) und *np* (alle anderen Stellen) belegt, erst im Mhebr. begegnet auch die Schreibung *nwp*. Vielleicht verband der Psalmist *nôp* klanglich mit äg. *nfr* (*nūfĕ**) „schön".

nḥwm (*naḥûm*) Personenname
- Seybold, siehe zu *nʾ*, S. 54[4].
- Auflistung einiger inschriftlicher Belege für den Namen *naḥûm* aus dem Juda des 7./6. Jh.s.

nḥl I (*naḥal*)
- C.A. Kennedy, Isaiah 57:3-6: Tombs in the Rocks (BASOR 275, 1989, 47-52, hier 50).
- „*nḥl* should thus be recognized here as a term for a grave or tomb, possibly having as its original referent those tombs cut into the sides of rock scarps, whether in wadi beds or not."

nḥl mṣrjm (*naḥal miṣrajim*)
- M. Görg, Josua (NEB 26), 1991, 73.
- „Mit dem »Grenzbach Ägyptens« dürfte zunächst der *naḥal habbᵉśôr*, in nachexilischer Zeit das *wādi el-ᶜarīš* gemeint sein."

nḥlh I (*naḥ^{a}lāh*)
- Malamat, siehe zu *nwh*, S. 172-175.
- Zur Äquivalenz und Bedeutungsnuancierung von Mari *naḫālum* (nominales Derivat *niḫlatum*) und hebr. *NḤL* (*naḥ^{a}lāh*).
- ARM I 91:6; VIII 11-14; X 90:3ff.

nḥlt jhwh (*naḥ^{a}lāt jhwh*)
- S. E. Loewenstamm, „*nḥlt h^{ɔ}*" (ScrHier 31, Jerusalem 1986, 155-192).
- Vf. bietet eine ausführliche Diskussion zur Wendung *naḥ^{a}lāt jhwh* „Erbbesitz JHWHs" im AT, zieht religionsgeschichtliches Vergleichsmaterial heran und erörtert die theologische Aussage an den einzelnen Belegstellen.

nḥm niph
- K. Jongeling, Joab and the Tekoite Woman (JEOL 30, 1987/88, 116-121).
- *NḤM* niph bedeutet „in 45 out of 48 instances ... «to have ill feelings», «to be sorry for»". Dies ist auch für 2 Sam 13,39 anzunehmen.

nḥšt I (*n^{c}ḥošæt*)
- S. Herrmann, Die Herkunft der „ehernen Mauer". Eine Miszelle zu Jeremia 1,18 und 15,20 (M. Oeming - A. Graupner [edd.], Altes Testament und christliche Verkündigung [Festschr. A.H.J. Gunneweg], Stuttgart 1987, 344-352).
- Mit *l^{c}ḥomôt n^{c}ḥošæt* (Jer 1,18; 15,20) ist sowohl der Prophet nicht nur selber als „eherne Mauer" und damit als der Geschützte bezeichnet, „sondern auch derjenige, der durch seine göttliche Beauftragung und seine Botschaft Schutz und Rettung denen im Lande bedeuten könnte, die dem prophetischen Wort vertrauen" (351).

nṭr
- H.-J. Heinivetter, Das Hohelied als programmatische Komposition (BBB 69), 1988, 76[13].
- Der Titel *noṭerāh ʾæt-hakk^{c}rāmîm* impliziert in Hld 1,6 einen „bezeichnenden Doppelaspekt". Nach einer Stelle im Pap.Anastasi I wurde „«Weinberghüterin» wohl schnell mit erotischen Assoziationen verbunden".
- Vgl. M. Görg, BN 21, 1983, 110; H.-P. Müller, ATD 16/2, 1992, 15f.

nknh (*n^{c}konāh*)
- S. Wagner, Theologischer Versuch über Ijob 42,7-9(10a) (J. Hausmann - H.J. Zobel [edd.], Alttestamentlicher Glaube und Biblische Theologie [Festschr. H.D. Preuß], Stuttgart 1992, 216-232, hier 218).
- „Die Bedeutungsbreite von *n^{c}konāh* umfaßt die deutschen Äquivalente Wahrhaftiges, Begründetes, Zuverlässiges und Rechtes."
- Ijob 42,7b.

nksjm (*n^{c}kāsîm*)
- Lipiński, siehe zu *mskn*, S. 69f.
- *n^{c}kāsîm* „biens", „possessions" ist entlehnt vom aram. *nik^{c}sîn*, das seinerseits von nbabyl. *nikassu* stammt. „Le vocable akkadien dérive, à son tour, du sumérien

n í g . k a/k à?/k a_9, dont le second élément n'est pas encore expliqué d'une manière satisfaisante." (70).
- Jos 22,8; Koh 5,8; 6,12; 1 Chr 1,11-12.

nkr
- E. Schuller, 4Q*372* 1: A Text about Joseph (RQu 14, 1990, 349-376).
- Zu *gwj n*ʾ*kr* in 4Q *372* 1,11.15. Vgl. zur Schreibung mit < ʾ > E. Qimron, Leshonenu 39, 1975, 135f., und zum Gebrauch der nichtbiblischen Wendung CD 14,15; 11QT 57,11; 64,7.

nkr I
- W. Vogels, Hosea's Gift to Gomer (Hos 3,2) (Bibl 68, 1987, 412-421).
- *wāʾækkᵉræh* Hos 3,2 liegt die Wurzel *NKR* I zugrunde.

nkr II
- Clines, siehe zu *mn*, S. 60f.
- *NKR* II „erkennen" hat in Hi 2,12 die Konnotation „anerkennen".

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Artikel

Words for Wisdom

תבונה and בינה; ערמה and מזמה; עצה and תושיה[1]

Michael V. Fox (Madison, WI)

1. Introduction

Biblical Wisdom Literature employs a large vocabulary to designate the cognitive powers and actions it describes and inculcates, to which we may give the umbrella term wisdom. The general denotations of most of these terms are clear, and I do not intend to propose fundamentally new definitions. But to do the sages justice, we must attempt to calibrate more finely the definitions of the words in the semantic field so important to them. The terms studied here are typical of Wisdom Literature and occur with disproportionate frequency in Wisdom texts, but most are frequent in other genres as well. I will approach these terms by pairing near-synonyms to highlight the semantic shape of each, leaving for a later study the broad and central concepts designated *ḥokmah* and *daᶜat*, as well as a few minor terms. I consider and count the uses in the extant Hebrew of Ben Sira alongside the MT and include the few Biblical Aramaic occurrences, which conform entirely to their Hebrew cognates.

Gerhard von Rad doubted the value of a "Begriffsuntersuchung" of these words, in view of the fact that "Israel auch in seinen theoretischen Reflexionen keineswegs mit einem einigermassen präzisen Begriffsapparat arbeitet".[2] But to judge biblical

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[1] The following commentaries are referenced by name of author alone or with abbreviated title:
Peter Craigie, Psalms 1-50 (WBC), Waco, Tex., 1983.
Edward L. Curtis, Chronicles (ICC), Edinburgh, 1910.
Edouard Dhorme, Job, Nashville, Tenn., 1984 (orig. 1926).
S.R. Driver, and G.B. Gray, Job (ICC), Edinburgh, 1921.
Berend Gemser, Sprüche Salomos (HAT I, 16), 2nd edn. Tübingen, 1963.
Robert Gordis, The Book of Job, New York, 1978.
Norman Habel, The Book of Job (OTL), Philadelphia, 1985.
L.F. Hartman and A.A. DiLella, The Book of Daniel (AB), 1978.
William McKane, Proverbs (OTL), London, 1970.
W.O.E. Oesterley, The Book of Proverbs (WC), London, 1929.
Otto Plöger, Sprüche Salomos (BK XVII), Neukirchen, 1984.
Marvin Pope, Job (AB 15), Garden City, N.Y, 1973.
Helmer Ringgren, Sprüche (ATD 16), Göttingen, 1962
M. H. Segal, The Complete Book of Ben Sira [Hebrew], Jerusalem, 1958.
C.H. Toy, Proverbs (ICC), 1959, Edinburgh, 1899.
N.H. Tur-Sinai, The Book of Job, Jerusalem, 1967.
N.H. Tur-Sinai, Proverbs of Solomon [Hebrew], Tel Aviv, 1947.
John D. W. Watts, Isaiah 1-33 (WBC 24), Waco, Texas, 1985.

[2] Gerhard von Rad, Weisheit in Israel, Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1979, 25.

Hebrew vocabulary imprecise is to assume that reality is segmented into neat compartments and that "we" have a map of the territory against which we can gauge how precisely another language fits into them. In fact, neither biblical Hebrew nor modern languages have a "präzisen Begriffsapparat" in such matters, if by precision we mean that each term has a discrete and invariant semantic range. The boundaries between such terms are necessarily vague, and in many cases two or more of them could fit the context quite well. English "understanding", for example, is different from "wisdom" (it is possible to have *understanding* of an issue but lack the *wisdom* to use that understanding rightly), yet in a great many circumstances either word fits. Similarly, we should not expect to find two discrete types of intellection called *binah* and *t^{e}bunah*. The goal is to discover why a certain word was chosen for a specific context, but it is dogmatic to think that only one word in the semantic field could have served. Nevertheless, patterns of use show that each term has its own slant, tone, or focus, and these can be recovered only by exegesis. In the absence of living informants, the recovery must inevitably be partial and uncertain.

The working principle of this study is the "presumption of monosemy", as formulated by Charles Ruhl, according to which an analysis of lexical meaning should start with the assumption that each word has a single, highly abstract, core meaning that it brings to the context; hence "what appears to be a number of separate senses, possibly highly different and unrelatable, can better be analyzed as a single general lexical meaning that can be variously 'modulated' by a range of specific interpretations".[3]

The heuristic principle of monosemy by no means denies the existence or importance of polysemy. It does, however, hold that if we admit multiple meanings too quickly, we will not advance beyond a paraphrasing of contextual functions and will learn nothing about what the word contributes to new contexts. True polysemy should be conceded only when the different contextual senses prove discontinuous and incompatible, and then unity should be sought within each different meaning granted. For example, "vision" and "mirror" are discrete meanings of *mar$^{\circ}$ah* (such cases could also be described as different homonymous words). Within the first category, however, we should not distinguish "prophetic vision" and "dream" as different lexical meanings, as if Hebrew speakers understood these as distinct phenomena which happened to be designated by the same sound.

In sum, rather than viewing a word as bearing a multiple-choice listing of different meanings, it is more productive to view a word – until proved otherwise – as offering a single, flexible "packet" of meaning (= lexical meaning) that assumes different shapes ("senses") under pressure of context (= contextual meanings or applications).

I am attempting to ascertain what meaning an author could expect his readers to bring to context. This meaning, being prior to the sentence and not equivalent to its message, must be abstracted from the actual uses of the words in question. To find this meaning does *not* require finding a single English word that satisfactorily

[3] Charles Ruhl, On Monosemy, Albany, N.Y., 1989, 7 and passim.

renders the Hebrew in all contexts; there are usually several appropriate glosses, none of which covers exactly the same semantic territory.

A semantic study has to be alert to the possibility of historical shifts in meaning. In BH, this can be done only approximately, since many words – even some important ones – are attested only skimpily and much of the material is undatable; this is especially true of proverbial wisdom. As far as I can tell, however, within the biblical material (including Ben Sira) there are no important shifts in the uses of the terms studied here. In the case of *binah*, however, one notable use in Daniel is not attested in earlier texts.

The applications of wisdom-terms fall into three categories: faculties, activities, and knowledge. A *faculty* is a power to undertake various types of mental actions; it exists prior to them and is present even when not being used. A *mental activity* is the thinking itself, the exercise of the mind during a definite period of time. *Knowledge* – the communicable content of thoughts and ideas – is the product of mental activity. In the case of the words under study, I do not regard these applications as separate meanings, or even as separate compartments within a single meaning, but as three possible realizations of a single meaning.

2. *Binah* and *t^ebunah*

The first difficulty presented by *binah* and *t^ebunah* is to determine how they differ from each other. Absolute synonymy in any language is a rarity and it is fair to assume these words were not completely interchangeable. The LXX translators, however, treated them as such. The most common renderings of both are φρόνησις and σύνεσις, with a few other terms occasionally used for either. As far as I can tell, the particular choice of Greek rendering for a term is not determined either by the translation unit or by its function in context (note how *binah* is rendered ἐπιστήμη in Job 28:12 and σύνεσις in the identical sentence in v. 20).

Binah (40x Heb., 1x Aram.) is a qal inf. of √*byn*, "perceive", though its sense seems closer to that of the hiphil, "to understand" (*binah* never means visual perception). *T^ebunah* (44x Heb.) is a *taqtul* formation characteristic of hollow verbs and related to the sense of both the qal and hiphil.[4]

Some significant differences in syntactic usages are that one is said to do things (form heavens, defeat an enemy, make wealth, lead dependents) "in" or "by" (*b-*) *t^ebunah*, but not "in" or "by" *binah*. *Binah* is not a *means* of activity. Moreover, people are said to "know *binah*" but not "know *t^ebunah*".

As an infinitive formation, *binah* bears whatever transitivity the verb has. Nouns of the *taqtul* pattern are implicitly intransitive.[5] Thus there can be "semantic objects" of *binah* (for example, one can have *binah* of a language, a dream or a situation), while *t^ebunah* never refers to an action that, as a verb, might govern a direct object (thus, for example, though a man of *t^ebunah* can fathom someone's plans [Prov 20:5], the knowledge of those plans is not *t^ebunah*). One may have *t^ebunah* and do things in *t^ebunah*, but *t^ebunah* is not an action done *to* something. *Binah* too is a

[4] H. Bauer and P. Leander, Historische Grammatik der Hebräischen Sprache des ATs, Bd. I. 1922 (repr. 1962, Hildesheim), §61rη.

[5] An exception is *t^erupah*, "healing", which suggests transitivity.

faculty continuously resident in its possessor, but it may also be an mental act or exercise of a mental power upon an object.

There is no evident semantic distinction between the singular and the plural forms. The plural *binot* occurs once, in Isa 27:11, where no notion of plurality is relevant ("for it [Israel] is not a people of *binot*"). The plural *tᶜbunot* is clearly abstract in Ps 78:72, "and by the *tᶜbunot* of his hands he led them", and it seems to be abstract in other occurrences as well (Ps 49:4; Prov 11:12; 28:16; Job 32:11). The lack of a distinction between plural and singular is seen in the fact that *ḥăsar leb* is paralleled by both *ʾiš tᶜbunot* (Prov 11:12) and *ʾiš tᶜbunah* (Prov 15:21). The plural *tᶜbunot* seems to denote a plurality of sayings in Ps 49:4 and Job 32:11 (// *dᶜbarim*), but since the singular too can in effect refer to a series of sayings, as in Prov 5:1, the plural is not differentiated from the singular in that way either.

The distinction between *tᶜbunah* and *binah* is essentially this: *tᶜbunah* designates the pragmatic, applied aspect of thought operating in the field of action; it aims at efficacy and accomplishment. *Binah* is the conceptual, interpretive activity of thought, operating in the field of meaning; it aims at perception and comprehension.

2.1. *Tᶜbunah*

The table at the end of the article notes words that appear in collocation with the wisdom terms, whether in parallelism, antithesis, quasi-parallelism,[6] or synonym sequence. In the body of the article I mention only the data that help define the words in question.

One significant cluster of collocations with *tᶜbunah* that is not shared by *binah* includes *ᶜeṣah* (Isa 40:13-14; Job 12:13; Prov 21:30),[7] *mᶜzimmah* (Prov 2:11), *koaḥ* (Job 26:12) and *gᶜburah* (Job 12:13). These are concerned with power and planning for action and point to the practical orientation of *tᶜbunah*. *Tᶜbunah*, together with *ḥokmah* and *ᶜeṣah* in Prov 21:30, designates powers or plans that might be used *against* someone (though against the Lord, of course, they prove nugatory). *Binah*, by my understanding, does not have that kind of directedness; one would not say that there is (or is not) *binah* "against" the Lord, just as we would not naturally use English "perceptiveness" or "discernment" in that way.

Tᶜbunah and *binah* parallel each other only once, in Prov 2:3, where they are both epithets of wisdom. This verse does not prove that the terms are identical, since they may designate different aspects of Lady Wisdom.

2.1.1. *Tᶜbunah* as a faculty (know-how, competence, good sense)

As a faculty, *tᶜbunah* produces decisions and actions appropriate to the circumstances. It is the competence to deal with circumstances, and it generally implies a follow-up, or at least the possibility of a follow-up, in action. *Tᶜbunah* always refers to a practical astuteness or common sense, rather than to an analytical, conceptual exercise of intellect. It is also the knowledge produced by this faculty. *Tᶜbunah* does not imply an understanding of causes, significances, and implications. In short, *tᶜbunah* is know-how, whether in the execution of a particular

[6] Quasi-parallelism refers to words that provide similar semantic content to a parallel line but fill a different syntactic function.

[7] In Prov 8:14, personified *binah* says that she *has*, not that she *is*, *ᶜeṣah, tušiyyah*, and *gᶜburah*. The point is that intellectual penetration also supplies practical powers.

task or in social relations generally. English "know-how" may be the closest equivalent of *tᶜbunah*. Sometimes "wit" and "common sense" are the best glosses.
As a faculty, *tᶜbunah* designates a talent from which effective actions spring. God's *tᶜbunah* served him in creating the world (Jer 10:12; 51:15; Ps 136:5; Prov 3:19). (Significantly, *binah* is never said to be the instrument of these deeds.) When God created the world, no one showed him *derek tᶜbunot*, "the way of competence"; in other words, no one had to show God how do go about his work (Isa 40:14). Isaiah 40:28 uses *tᶜbunah* in speaking of God's *abilities* as governor of history: he who was able to create the world "does not tire and does not weary, and his *tᶜbunah* is beyond investigation". Having great *tᶜbunah* is here opposed to weariness rather than to ignorance or lack of understanding. *Tᶜbunah* is among the powers God employs in building and healing, in counting and naming the stars (Ps 147:4-5), in defeating Rahab (Job 26:12), and in various acts of decisive power which no man can undo (Job 12:13, alongside *ḥokmah*, *ᶜeṣah*, and *tᶜbunah*).
Occupational skills are *tᶜbunah*. A skilled shepherd (Ps 78:72), merchant (Ezek 28:4), and craftsman have *tᶜbunah* (e.g., Exod 31:3; 35:31; 1 Kgs 7:14). (However, since the craftsman also has *binah* (as well as *ḥokmah* and *daᶜat*), we cannot be sure exactly just which aspect of his skills is designated by this term; see below, § 2.2.1.2). The amoral skills of political advisors include *tᶜbunah* (Ob 8).[8]
Tᶜbunah is *phronesis* in Aristotle's usage: "a reasoned and true capacity to act with regard to human goods" (Nic. Eth. VI.5). In Isa 44:19, *daᶜat* and *tᶜbunah* are the qualities the idol maker lacks; if he had them he could draw the obvious conclusion that the statues are inanimate. Perhaps *binah* too could have been used here to designate reasoning powers, but by using *tᶜbunah* the author may be suggesting that the stupidity of idolatry is evident even to ordinary good sense (φρόνησις, as *tᶜbunah* is appropriately rendered here), let alone to intellectual penetration.
In Proverbs, the "man of *tᶜbunah*" is competent in human relations; he is patient (14:29; 17:27), quiet (11:12) and reserved (18:2). He draws out other people's thoughts (20:5). He walks the straight path (15:21) and enjoys acting wisely. These virtues are in the realm of attitudes and social skills rather than intellectual penetration and comprehension. One person could, of course, have both, but the term *ʾiš tᶜbunah* signifies a particular facet of character. Let me emphasize: all these qualities should not be packed into our definition of *tᶜbunah*. Rather, *tᶜbunah* means "competent", and the sages are teaching us what true competence consists in.
Lady Wisdom, who personifies the powers of wisdom taught by Proverbs, is called *tᶜbunah* as well as *binah* and *ḥokmah* in Prov 8:1. She is a personification of the faculty rather than (as happens in Ben Sira) of specific teachings.
Outside Proverbs and Sira,[9] *tᶜbunah* never implies moral virtue. It is only the sages who assert that *tᶜbunah* makes one a better person ethically.

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[8] A significant verse in spite of its obscurity is Ob 7, where a *thing*, a *mazor*, is said to lack *tᶜbunah*. The most likely meaning of *mazor* is "trap" (KBL[3] and many; some emend to *mṣwd*). The competence of a fabricator of a product is ascribed to the product, or, in this particular case, denied. The only kind of "understanding" that can be commuted from a maker to the product is practical competence.

[9] And possibly Deut 32:28, where, however the people's lack of *tᶜbunah* may mean just that they are silly-headed and confused, – *ʾobad ᶜeṣot*, as they are called there.

2.1.2. *T^{c}bunah* as content (sensible teachings)
Words and teachings engendered by *t^{c}bunah* are themselves *t^{c}bunah* or *t^{c}bunot*, as in Job 32:11, "I listened for your *t^{c}bunot*". The teachings of Proverbs 1-9 are called, among other things, *t^{c}bunah* (Prov 2:2, 6; 5:1; cf. Ps 49:4). The Wisdom teacher ascribes all types of intellectual powers to his teaching and thus makes it difficult to differentiate among them. Ben Sira calls personified wisdom *t^{c}bunah* as well as *ḥokmah* (14:20). In 14:20-15:10, Ben Sira treats Lady Wisdom as a personification of wisdom *teachings* and identifies her with Torah, which can be mediated on and contemplated (v. 20). In both Proverbs and Ben Sira, the type of teachings designated *t^{c}bunah* cannot be distinguished from those called *binah, ḥokmah,* or *da^{c}at*, since all these terms are applied to the same material.
2.2. *Binah*
2.2.1. Uses of *binah*
Binah is the faculty of intellectual discernment and interpretation, the exercise of that faculty, or the product thereof, in words or acts. It is intellectual understanding in and of itself. This is not to say that *binah* is *not* practical; rather, the term is not marked for practicality.
Binah is the BH term closest to English "understanding" (the usual rendering), in the sense of the comprehension of meanings and a perception of causes. *Binah* includes reason, the intellectual faculty used in solving problems and deducing truths. The raw faculty of *binah*, insofar as it is possessed by an individual independently of application, is similar to the modern concept of intelligence. ("Understanding", "reason", and "intelligence" are not well distinguished even in English, and an attempt to define and describe such concepts would quickly lead into the labyrinths of epistemology and psychology). In Hebrew these faculties and their products are encompassed in *binah* as a single concept. *Binah* is an intellectual, not an inherently moral virtue, although the sages assert that it almost inevitably engenders moral action.
Of the various collocations of *binah*, only the broad terms *ḥokmah* and *ḥakam* (*ḥakkim*) are shared with *t^{c}bunah*. The unshared collocations of *binah* (*śekel, leqaḥ, šamoa^{c}, musar*) cluster around the notion of intellectual understanding more than practical behavior.
2.2.1.1. *Binah* as a faculty (reason, intelligence)
Binah resides within a person and enables understanding and mental perception. God favored Solomon with *binah* (as well as *ḥokmah* and *śekel*) to enable him to conduct Israel's affairs wisely (1 Chr 22:12). *Binah* is one of several faculties (as *ruaḥ* is frequently best translated) that the ideal ruler will receive, including *binah, ^{c}eṣah, g^{c}burah, da^{c}at*, and *yir^{ɔ}at YHWH* (Isa 11:2). The nouns in the series are not synonymous, but designate several aspects of the ideal.[10] *Binah* here is presumably the same faculty with which Solomon was endowed.
The *binah* that God gave the obscure *śekwi* (whether it means "cock" or "Mercury") (Job 38:36) and that the ostrich (Job 39:17) and Rehoboam (Sir 47:23) lack is certainly intelligence rather than particular knowledge or skill. Zophar's *binah* –"...

[10] Hence the presence of *g^{c}burah* among these qualities does not contradict the observation above about the collocations of *binah*.

and a spirit from my *binah* answers me" (Job 20:3b) – is the source of the teaching that he expounds in subsequent verses. Prov 3:5 warns against relying on one's own *binah*, which must be the reasoning power or intelligence that engenders plans (*ʿeṣot*).[11]

The *ḥokmah* of the *ḥăkamim* and the *binah* of the *nᵉbonim* (both groups refer to either to political advisors or, more generally, to the intelligentsia) will, Isaiah threatens, be obfusticated (29:14). These are intellectual powers of genuine value, for their deprivation is a punishment to the entire people, comparable to the blinding of the prophets threatened in v. 10. This *binah* is not the specific plan or interpretations the wise men offer, but rather their intellect itself, a faculty comparable to the vision ("eyes") of the prophets (v. 10).

Binah is the ability to interpret, i.e. to decode signs; these may be in the form of events, language, or texts. Isaiah 27:11 condemns Israel for not being "an intelligent people (*ʿam binot*)". The failure in this case is not a loss of practical good sense, but a willful inability to comprehend the meaning of events. Isaiah has been condemning the people for this dullness from the beginning of the book (1:3), using the figures of blindness and deafness,[12] for he regards the exercise of intellect (*binah, ḥokmah*) as a moral demand. A similar use is Jer 23:20, where Jeremiah says that "in the future you will understand it [God's plan] well", lit., "understand it with *binah* (*titbonᵉnu bah binah*)". Through *binah* Israel will know how to read the meaning in events. *Binah* refers to a similar interpretive intelligence in Sir 38:6; people who use it are able to recognize God's power in events such as the sweetening of the waters of Marah and in the provision of pharmaceutical plants. *Binah* is used of the ability to understand a language: "a people... whose tongue is barbarous (*nil ʿag*) beyond understanding (*ʾeyn binah*)" (Isa 33:19). (One would not say that there is no *tᵉbunah* of a language, for *tᵉbunah* is not the ability to decode signs.) *Binah* is not used of social skills, such as reserve and patience.

2.2.1.2. *Binah* as content (teaching, understanding)

Knowledge produced by *binah*, whether one's own or another's, is itself *binah*. A proverb can convey *binah*; hence Ben Sira speaks of a *mašal binah* (6:35). *Binah* in this sense is sometimes the object of *yadaʿ*, "know", and *lamad*, "learn". When the erring Israelites one day see their children in their midst, they will "know *binah*" and "learn a lesson (*leqaḥ*)" (Isa 29:24). These are the particular conclusions that the people will draw from observing the unfolding of God's will. *Binah* here is knowledge that corresponds very closely to the interpretive faculty indicated in Jer 23:20. Although this understanding will certainly affect behavior, the knowledge the Judahites will have according to Isa 29:24 is not intrinsically aimed at action; it is an

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[11] That is the sense of *binah* in Prov 23:4, according to the usual interpretation: "don't strain to become rich, "from your intelligence, avoid doing so" (*mibbinatᵉka ḥădal*). *Binah* then refers to "intellectual discrimination" (McKane, p. 382). But *ḥadal min* + inf. elsewhere means to desist from or not do something (Exod 23:5; 1 Kgs 15:21). Hence the inf. *binah* here is probably a gerund from the qal of √*byn* used in the same way as in v. 1: "look at", "stare at", with the implicit direct object "wealth" supplied from v. 4a (v. 5 shows that this implicit direct object has indeed been activated).

[12] As observed by Watts, Isaiah 1-33, 1985, 347, 350.

understanding of something that has already occurred, not the knowledge of how to do something.

1 Chr 12:33, which refers to the Issacharites "who have [lit., know] *binah* with respect to the times (*yodᵉ ᶜey binah laᶜittim*), to know what Israel should do". (Compare the idiom *yadaᶜ binah* in Isa 29:24; Job 38:4; and 2 Chr 2:11, 12.) It is uncertain just what domain of knowledge is meant. Astrology is one possibility,[13] though it seems unlikely that the author of Chronicles would approve of astrologers or imagine the tribe of Issachar as having two hundred of them. A similar phrase is used in Esther 1:13, in which "the wise men who understand the times (*yodᵉ ᶜey haᶜittim*)" employ reason (though of a foolish sort) rather than astrology to analyze the needs of the "times", i.e., the present circumstances. The Issacharites' *binah* is probably of the same sort.

In Job 38:4, God asks Job, "Where were you when I founded the earth? Tell [sc., me the answers to the following questions], if you have [lit. know] *binah*". Here *binah* is an intellectual understanding of the origins and operations of the world; it is not know-how or skill.

Job 28 attempts to redefine the scope of the concepts *ḥokmah* and *binah*, and in so doing reveals their meaning prior to redefinition. The poem appends *binah* to *ḥokmah* and treats the two as a single entity, asking rhetorically, "But wisdom – where does it come from, and where is the place of *binah*?" (vv. 12, 20). The poem's answer is that it (*ḥokmah-binah*) cannot be located; God alone knows where it is. The poem must be using *ḥokmah* and *binah* with reference to speculative, intellectual knowledge about the world, for only that (and not practical good sense) is what is inaccessible to human investigation, and it is a set of truths – known only to God – rather than a faculty or a mental activity, for those are not objects of *searching*. At the end of the poem, true human wisdom is redefined thus: "See, the fear of the Lord, *that* is wisdom, and the avoidance of evil is understanding'" (v. 28). To claim that human "wisdom" and "understanding" are *really* something other than speculative knowledge, v. 28 must first be using the words to designate the speculative knowledge repudiated in the preceding verses, and then be shifting their application to wisdom of a different sort. *Binah* is again used alongside *ḥokmah* in a very similar redefinition of wisdom in Prov 9:10: "The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord, and knowledge of holiness is *binah*". This is not a flat identification of a meaning built into the language, a dictionary definition of the terms, as it were. It is, rather, an insistence that *real* wisdom resides in religious attitudes of which everyone is capable: fear of God and "knowledge of holiness". The latter is not theological learning, but, like "knowledge of God", essentially refers to awareness of God's will and recognition of his power.[14]

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[13] E.g., Curtis (Chronicles), Targum, and many. But there is little argumentation offered on behalf of this view.

[14] *Qᵉdošim* refers to God, as in Hos 12:1; thus most commentators, e.g. Toy. (Elsewhere *qᵉdošim* as a noun refers to Israelites or angels, but a knowledge of neither of these is relevant to wisdom or religion.) Hence *daᶜat qᵉdošim* is equivalent to *daᶜat ʾĕlohim*; compare Prov 9:10 with 2:5). Knowledge of God is an awareness of his will, an ethical-religious attitude (Hos 4:1; 6:6). It is equivalent to knowledge of God's ways (see Job 21:14, etc.). Within the extensive literature on the topic see in particular H. Botterweck in TDOT V, 477-78 (ThWAT).

Agur (Prov 30:2-3) makes the distinction between the two kinds of wisdom more radical when he modestly grants that he does not have even human (let alone angelic) *binah* and that he has not learnt *ḥokmah*, but asserts that he *does* have "knowledge of holiness".[15] The wisdom Agur disclaims is something usually *studied* or *learned*, which must be something comparable to "theology" – a knowledge of doctrines and theories derived from human investigation and speculation. The implication is that other men do have this *binah-ḥokmah*, but that it is not the most important sort of wisdom (hence this passage is less skeptical than Job 28). A proper religious attitude and knowledge of religious fundamentals is possible without wisdom of that sort. By my understanding of the words, Agur might have claimed that he lacked *binah* but did possess *tᶜbunah*.

In Daniel, *binah* refers to a special kind of knowledge, namely interpretation of esoteric messages. Daniel and his fellows have the ability to respond to queries in "every matter of *ḥokmat binah*", lit., "the "wisdom of understanding", that the king asked of them (1:20).[16] Judging from what the kings ask of Daniel, this refers in practice to dream interpretation. The phrase "wisdom of *binah*" could be rendered "learning in interpretation". In other occurrences, *binah* is not a faculty or activity, but a particular interpretation. Daniel never achieves this *binah* by means of his reasoning powers, but has it granted to him as a reward for faithfulness and prayer. He prays for *binah* of a vision (Dan 8:15) and receives the explication by supernatural communication from Gabriel. Likewise in 9:22 and 10:1,[17] *binah* is an interpretation of a particular revelation. *Binah* is something which the wise may *know*, if God grants them knowledge (2:12; 21).

Almost all occurrences of *binah* accord with the proposed definition, but we should also consider a couple of verses that seem to run against it. In Job 39:26, God asks Job, "Is it from your intelligence" (*mibbinatᶜka*) that a hawk takes wing...?". *Binah* is here used in the act of creation, much like *tᶜbunah* is elsewhere, but I do not think the two are identical. I suggest that whereas *tᶜbunah* would designate the skill that went into the production of flying creatures, *binah* points more to the intellectual

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[15] Prov 30:3b is, of course, a crux, but the meaning of *binah* in v. 2 does not depend on its meaning. By one common interpretation, the negative applies to v. 3b as well (e.g., Toy, McKane; hence Agur is saying that he does *not* have "knowledge of God". It is, however, doubtful that the negative can be elided in an otherwise complete sentence. Others take v. 3b as a purpose clause dependent on *lamadti*: "so that I might know knowledge of holiness [or 'God']" (Ringgren, Plöger), which also implies that he *lacks* this knowledge. Most commentators do not distinguish *binah*//*ḥokmah* from *daᶜat qᵉdošim* and assume that the latter is a theological understanding of divinity. However, "knowledge of God" is never esoteric or particularly cerebral anywhere in the Bible. Most likely, vv. 5-6 allude to the "knowledge of God" that Agur claims he does has: the knowledge that comes from God's word.

[16] Alternatively, *ḥokmat binah* may be a construct of synonyms, equivalent to *ḥokmah ubinah* (see Y. Avishur, Stylistic Studies of Word-Pairs (AOAT 210), Neukirchen, 1984, 160); the LXX and Theodotion translate that way.

[17] The end of 10:1 is difficult. A plausible translation is "... He paid attention to the oracle (*ubin ʾet haddabar*), so that he understood the revelation" (*ubinah lo bammarʾeh*) (Hartman-DiLella). The preceding clause "the oracle was true" (*weʾĕmet haddabar*), shows that the last clause refers to Daniel's understanding of this specific revelation rather than to a general interpretive ability.

powers behind the production of such marvels. *Binah* is the word chosen because at issue is the scope of Job's ability to understand how God creates and runs the world, and understanding of that sort could only be called *binah*, not *tᵉbunah*. God sets his own *binah* against Job's. Also *binah* harks back to *binah* in God's challenge in 38:4. A similar notion of creative understanding lies behind 2 Chr 2:12, in which a Tyrian artisan is said to be a wise man who "knows *binah*". *Tᵉbunah* is more often used in describing the artist's skills. Nowhere, however, is an artisan said to "know" *tᵉbunah*, a fact indicating distinction between an artisan's *tᵉbunah*, which is a means of production (see above, § 2.1.1), and his *binah*, the body of learned, intellectual knowledge of artistry.[18]

2.3. *Binah* and *tᵉbunah* in relation to *ḥokmah*

Assuming that the 44 occurrences of *tᵉbunah* represent the range of its use in the language as a whole, it appears that *tᵉbunah* is a hyponym of *ḥokmah*: everything that could be called *tᵉbunah* could be called *ḥokmah* as well. *Binah*, however, though in most regards encompassed by *ḥokmah*, sometimes refers to mental ability and activity in a way that would not be called *ḥokmah*. *Binah* is understanding per se. *Ḥokmah* is the broader mental capacity that makes understanding possible, as well as the knowledge that understanding produces, but it is not the understanding itself. The understanding of a particular foreign language would not be called *ḥokmah*, nor would the interpretation of a particular book or dream be so designated (using a phrase such as **ḥokmat haḥazon* or **ḥokmah bammarʾeh*, meaning the understanding of a specific vision). The understanding of a particular divine plan is *binah* (Jer 23:20), not *ḥokmah*. On the other hand, the art and lore of interpretation could be called *ḥokmah*, which is a more general, constant quality that exists independently of individual minds. (The phrase in Dan 1:20, *ḥokmat binah*, suggests this). In other words, both as faculty and result, *binah* is directed to specific objects in a way that *ḥokmah* is not.

The fact that *ḥokmah* covers a broader range than *tᵉbunah* and is less focused than *binah* explains why *ḥokmah* is always the A-word when parallel to either of the others. The more common and prominent term is set in the A-slot; the B-term in this case does not provide heightening so much as greater specificity.[19]

3. *ᶜormah* and *mᵉzimmah*

ᶜormah (6x) and *mᵉzimmah* (19x) are morally neutral intellectual faculties and thoughts. This neutrality adds a certain pungency to some proverbs which is made insipid by moralizing renderings, such as glossing *ᶜormah* as "prudence" (NIV) or *mᵉzimmah* as "discretion" (KJ; NIV) or "prudence" (NIV). *ᶜormah* is the talent for devising and using adroit and wily tactics in the attaining of one's goals, whatever these may be. *Mᵉzimmah* is a type of thought and a faculty for such thought, namely private, unrevealed thought; only in Proverbs (1:4; 2:11) does it refer to the mental faculty or skill employed in devising such thoughts.

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[18] Aristotle draws a similar distinction by bracketing the artist's wisdom together with the philosopher's as *sophia* and distinguishing these from practical wisdom, *phronesis* (Nic. Eth. VI.7).

[19] Adele Berlin, The Dynamics of Biblical Parallelism, Bloomington, Indiana, 1985, 96-99.

3.1. *ʿormah* (cunning, wiliness)
Outside of Proverbs, all occurrences of *ʿormah* and its cognate forms refer to the employment of artifices to achieve ends that cannot be declared openly, such as in the schemes of the serpent (Gen 3:1), the first-degree homicide (Exod 21:14), the Gibeonites (Josh 9:4), and the wicked wise men (Job 5:13). The verb *heʿĕrim*, to act cunningly, refers to malicious schemes in Ps 83:4 and tricks in 1 Sam 23:22.
In Proverbs alone are the noun and verb used of cunning put to legitimate uses. Here, *ʿormah* is not only native cunning, but also the skill that an inexperienced lad lacks and must acquire (1:4; 8:5). A silly-headed innocent who sees a scoffer beaten and one who heeds chastisement will wise up – *yaʿărim* (19:25; 15:5; sim. Sir 6:32). Lady Wisdom herself legitimizes *ʿormah* when she boasts of proximity to it (8:12). This does not make *ʿormah* an intrinsically virtuous ability; rather it is a practical faculty that wisdom promises its adherents.
ʿormah never is determined by the article or suffixes, nor does it occur in construct. The significance of this is unclear, but we may note that we do not usually say "the cleverness" in English without adding a possessive. However, the suffixed form *ʿormam*, from the apparently synonymous * *ʿorem*, does occur (Job 5:13).[20]
3.2. *Mᵉzimmah* (private thoughts, caginess)
The notion common to derivatives of √*zmm* is that of hidden, private thinking. The verb refers not only to illegitimate intentions, but also to God's just and beneficial designs (e.g., Jer 23:20; 51:11; Lam 2:17; Zech 8:14, 15) and to legitimate human planning (Ps 17:3; Prov 31:16; Sir 51:18[21]). The noun accords with this range of use.
The notion of scheming (the meaning usually given in the lexicons) is a contextually determined extension of the primary sense of *mᵉzimmot*, namely, hidden thoughts. Though another person's *mᵉzimmot* may be known or deduced, one is never said to *declare* his *mᵉzimmot*, in the way that one may declare his *ḥokmah* or *ʿeṣah*. Sometimes *mᵉzimmot* are not actually plans or schemes, i.e. secret plans for achieving something, but just private reflections (e.g., Ps 17:3; cf. Sir 32:2, 4). For example, the wicked man's *mᵉzimmot* in Ps 10:4 are summed up as "there is no God". The *mᵉzimmot* of Job's friends are their belief that Job's wickedness has caused his suffering (21:27-28), not some plot against him. But since scheming generally requires keeping one's thoughts secret, *mᵉzimmah* is the term often applied to plans or schemes; and since secret plans tend to be hostile to others, the word usually bears negative connotations, as in Prov 12:2: "A good man will receive God's favor, while he will condemn the man of *mᵉzimmot*" (sim. 14:17, 24:8). (English "scheme" picks up a negative connotation by the same process.) The collocation with "evil" and the locution "man of *mᵉzimmot*" as a sinister type suggest associations with wicked scheming, though the term does not always imply this. But even when they are just – as in the case of God's own plans – *mᵉzimmot* are, except in Zech 8:15, hostile and destructive.
It is an audacious move, then, when Proverbs appropriates both *ʿormah* and *mᵉzimmah* for its catalogue of virtues (1:4; 2:11; 5:2). In Prov 3:21, *mᵉzimmah*

[20] Were it not for the risk of special pleading, I would suggest emending this hapax to *ʿormah* (LXX^{B} ἐν τῃ φρονήσει): "He captures the wise by *ʿormah*" – i.e., God's own cleverness, which is the concern of this doxology.
[21] Reading *zmwtʸ* with 11QPs^{a} xxi 15.

apparently refers to the father's words themselves. Lady Wisdom herself attains "knowledge of *mᶜzimmot*" (8:12). The reason for this appropriation is not that "the educational process was more occupied with developing mature intellectual skills than with morality" (McKane, Proverbs, p. 265), but that the sages relegated all effective intellectual powers to the realm of wisdom and mustered them in the inculcation of morality. By proffering *ᶜormah* and *mᶜzimmah*, the prologue of Proverbs wants us to know that this book – and not, say, the flashy wise-guy down the street – is the place to turn for the prized powers of cunning and caginess.

At the same time, Proverbs assigns a special function to *mᶜzimmah*. *Mᶜzimmah*, private thinking, is to be used in keeping your own counsel and thinking for yourself. This power will protect you from the temptations of the wicked man and woman (2:11f.; 5:2f.), because when they try to seduce you to their ways, you will be able to look inward, maintain independence of thought, and stand up to their inveiglements. (*ᶜormah* would presumably work in a similar way, but the text does not happen to specify this.)

4. *ᶜeṣah* and *tušiyyah*

4.1. *ᶜeṣah* (planning, design) (88x Heb.; 1x Aram. *ᶜeṭaʾ*)

The meaning of *ᶜeṣah*, commonly rendered "plan" and "advice", is not a matter of dispute, but its definition can be refined. *ᶜeṣah* is essentially *deliberation*: careful thinking and planning (Prov 20:18), the resolution arrived at by such thinking (1 Chr 12:20), and the capacity for such thought (Isa 11:2; Jer 32:19; Job 12:13; 38:2; 42:3[22]; Isa 19:3[23]; Jer 49:7).[24] In the LXX, *ᶜeṣah* is usually translated βουλή, which has almost the same semantic shape as the Hebrew.

A plan recommended to others is advice or counsel, as *ᶜeṣah* is usually glossed (e.g. Job 29:21; Prov 12:15; 19:20; Ezra 10:8; and often). Planning that takes the form of deliberation among several people rather than by an individual is counsel or consultation (Judg 20:7; 2 Kgs 18:20; Isa 8:10; 29:15). An *ᶜeṣah* is not necessarily advice to others (see, e.g., Isa 5:19; 14:26; 19:17; Jer 49:30; Job 38:2; most clearly in Ps 13:3; Prov 20:5). The notions of "advice" and "consultation" are not inherent in the lexical meaning, nor are these distinct lexical meanings of the word. They are rather contextually determined functions of the lexical meaning. Hence when Proverbs praises *ᶜeṣah* and the *yoᶜeṣ*, it is urging deliberate, careful planning and planners, not the giving of advice (Prov 20:18; 11:14; 24:6).[25]

Sometimes when *ᶜeṣah* is used there is little implication of extended planning, and "intention" may be the best rendering; e.g., Ps 73:24; Job 10:3; Prov 20:5 (it is a man's intentions generally, rather than his "plans", that are hard to fathom); Ezra 10:3 ("... as the Lord intends"); 1 Chr 12:20 ("the leaders of the Philistines sent him away intentionally"). Still, the notion of deliberation and careful thought is integral

[22] It seems more likely that God is accusing Job of impugning his ability to design and run the world rather than obscuring the design itself.

[23] Parallel to *ruaḥ*; Egypt's capacity for rational thought seems to be what God is threatening to destroy.

[24] Similarly, the plural in Deut 32:28 refers to the ability to calculate and make effective plans. It is this, rather than specific plans, that is "lost".

[25] Note that the parallel term in all three verses is *taḥbulot*, which is a type of thought, not the act of giving counsel.

to the meaning, and the word is never used of thoughtless decisions or spontaneous wishes.

"Plan" or "planning" is usually a good gloss for *ʿeṣah*, but sometimes the deliberations called *ʿeṣah* do not propose a specific future action or program, as English "plan" would imply. The *ʿeṣah* of the wicked that Job repudiates in Job 21:16, is quoted in v. 14f.: "And they say to God, 'Get away from us; we don't want to know your ways. What is Shadday that we should serve him, and what good would it do us to beseech him?'" Such thoughts express intentions or determinations rather than plans. The psalmist speaks of his incessant *ʿeṣot*, parallel to the misery (*yagon*) in his heart (Ps 13:3), where the function of the B-term is closer definition of the A-term.[26] These *ʿeṣot* are not counsels, nor do they seem to be specific plans formulated for future action. They are simply thoughts mulled over constantly, if not obsessively, and in that sense, they are deliberations.[27] The marginal reading (Ms. B) of Sir 30:21, if correct, uses the word in the same way.[28] Deut 32:28 condemns Israel: "They are a nation "devoid of *ʿeṣot*" [lit., "that lost *ʿeṣot*"], in whom there is no *tᵉbunah*". Lacking plans or counsel would not be cause for moral condemnation. Israel's lack is rather the ability to figure out what is good for them (NJV: "a folk devoid of sense"). In these cases, *ʿeṣah* means deliberate, calculated thought, a notion that cannot be separated from "plan"/"counsel" as a distinct "meaning".

Valid contextual translations of *ʿeṣah*, depending on the quality of the thoughts so designated and whether they are communicated with the purpose of influencing others, are "plans", "advice", "calculation", "intention", "deliberation", and even "brooding". Defining *ʿeṣah* as deliberation and careful thinking, rather than assuming that the word is identical to English "plan" and "advice", obviates the need to emend certain verses or to create new words.[29]

4.2. *Tušiyyah* (resourcefulness; competence) (13x)

The meaning of *tušiyyah* must be abstracted from its thirteen occurrences, two of which are obscure.[30] The word appears almost exclusively in Wisdom literature: six

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[26] Emending to *ʿaṣṣebet* or *ʿaṣṣabot* (BHS and many) is thus unnecessary.

[27] Craigie (Psalms, ad loc.) says that *ʿeṣot*, literally "counsels", provides a curious sense and that the combination of an intellectual activity with soul is unlikely. He follows G.R. Driver (WO 1 [1947-52], 410) in giving the word the sense of "pain". But *ʿăṣat nepeš* appears in Prov 27:9, where "pain" or "sorrow" would be meaningless. V. 9b means (as Tur-Sinai argues in Proverbs, p. 26), that taking counsel [Tur-Sinai has identified a word *meteq* meaning counsel, ibid.] with another person makes one happier than taking counsel with oneself alone.

[28] Ms. B reads "Do not give your soul to judgment (*dyn*), and do not stumble in your iniquity (*ʿwnk*). We should probably read *dwn* (*dawon* = Gk λύπη, for *dyn*, with Segal et al.). The margin has *bʿṣtk* (thus too Gk, and Syr), for *bʿwnk*. Segal's emendation of *bʿwnk* to *bʿṣbk* is unnecessary.

[29] Additional lexemes proposed to explain these cases are √ *ʿṣh* II = strife (G.R. Driver, WO 1 [1947-52], 411f. and JSS 13 [1968], 45f.; see above, n. 27 and *ʿṣh* = "fellowship, circle", esp. in the phrase *ʿăṣat rᵉšaʿim* (R. Bergmeier, "Zum Ausdruck עצת רשעים in Ps 1:1, Job 10:3, 21:16, und 22:18", ZAW 67 [1966], 229-232). I agree with John Worrell (VT 20 [1970], 65-74) that the word never clearly means "council" in the OT and possibly not in Qumran either.

[30] Micah 6:9 is undoubtedly corrupt. Prov 18:1 is too uncertain to help in defining the word, but *tušiyyah* there seems to refer to plans or intentions that the unsociable man (*niprad*) in

of the occurrences are in Job, four in Proverbs, one in Sirah.[31] The LXX is not much help, since it offers a different rendering for each occurrence[32]; modern translators are likewise inconsistent.

The lexicons give the term two distinct meanings, one referring to a faculty (e.g., "Umsicht" [KBL³]), another to its consequences (e.g. "Gelingen, Erfolg" [KBL³]). E. Dhorme (Job, p. 65) emphasizes the first sense, defining *tušiyyah* as denoting first of all "the foresight which plans ahead", whence "prudence" and "intelligence". Driver and Gray[33] explain it as "effective counsel, effective wisdom". H. A. Brongers[34] says that the frequent association of *tušiyyah* and *ᶜeṣah* shows that the former belongs to "der Sphäre des Nachsinnens und der Überlegung" it has not, "wie von einigen Interpreten behauptet wird, das Resultat des Überlegens (effects, effectual working, success, Erfolg) im Auge". The term could, of course, appl to both "spheres" (cf. *hiśkil*, "be perspicacious", "succeed"), but that is not borne out in the case of *tušiyyah*.

The word's skimpy attestation might justify an appeal to etymology. The root is √*yšy*, which might also be the root of *yeš*, "there is", "substance" (thus BDB, KBL³ et al., as well as several medieval commentators, e.g. Radaq, Sefer Hashorashim; Hame'iri on Prov 2:7). On the basis of this etymology, J.F. Genug asserts that in all occurrences one senses "the relation of its essential idea to truth absolute, or as we may express it, the *yeš* of things".[35] H. Bauer gives the term's "primary meaning" as "'was vorhanden ist', dann 'Kraft, Fähigkeit'".[36] Gemser (p. 24) incorporates the notion of existence by defining *tušiyyah* as "'was das Dasein fördert', 'was den Versuch gelingen lässt', also sowohl 'Hilfe' als 'Klugheit, Takt'". In fact, one can extract almost anything from the notion of "what is in existence".

Tušiyyah (like *ᶜormah*, see above) occurs only as a bare noun, even when parallel to a determined noun (Job 6:13; Sir 38:8). This suggests that the word refers first of all to an abstract power or quality that exists independently of a particular manifestation of it in someone's mind.

In my view, *tušiyyah* denotes clear, proficient thinking in the exercise of power and practical operations, as distinct from thinking as an intellectual act. Like *tᶜbunah*, *tušiyyah* is a competence rather than a form of understanding and knowledge. All the occurrences accord with this definition. The word also refers to decisions

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some way repudiates or dissociates himself from (*yitgallea*ᶜ, cf. MH *nigla*ᶜ and *hitgallea*ᶜ, "be scraped off", "exposed" [M. Jastrow, Dictionary]; cf. Tur-Sinai, Proverbs, 90).

31 Three occurrences in the Dead Sea Scrolls may be mentioned for comparison: 1QS X 24, XI 6; and Dam. II 3.

32 σωτηρία (Prov 2:7), βοήθεια (Job 6:13); ἀσφάλεια (Prov 8:14), βουλή (Prov 3:21), δύναμις (Job 26:3), ἰσχύς (Job 12:16), ἀληθές (Job 5:12); σώζειν (Mic 6:9); εἰρήνη (Sir 38:8). Isa 28:29 (ματαίαν παράκλησιν), Job 11:6 (τῶν κατὰ σέ), and Prov 18:1 (καιρός) do not seem to render *twšyh*. In LXX Job 30:22a, which corresponds to MT 22b (H. Orlinsky, HUCA 29 [1958], 270), ἐν ὀδύναις probably renders the ketiv *tšwh* by association with *šoʾah* (cf. Dhorme); Theod has σωτηρία in 22b. It may be significant that most of these glosses refer to strength and assistance rather than to intellectual capacities.

33 Job, part II, 30f.

34 "Miscellanea Exegetica", in Festschr. Alexander R. Hulst, Nijkerk, 1977, 47.

35 "Meaning and Usage of the Term תושיה", JBL 35 (1911), 115.

36 ZAW 48 (1930), 77.

produced by such thinking. In all cases, *tušiyyah* is used in addressing a conflict or crisis, or at least a tension. Good renderings are "resourcefulness" (thus NJV at Job 6:13) and "wits" as in "to have one's wits about him". Unlike *tᶜbunah, tušiyyah* seems to connote cleverness and inner strength.

The set of collocations with *tušiyyah* – "strength", "help",[37] "might", "shield" – shows that the concept belongs to the domain of powers and is used in planning (*maḥšabah, ᶜeṣah*) directed at action (*maᶜăśeh*).[38] Worth reconsidering is the etymology suggested by K.H. Grimm,[39] associating the term with Heb. *ʾošyah*, Aram. *ʾušiytaʾ*, "support", "pillar", cf. Jer 50:15, qere, *ʾošyoteyha*, "buttresses". The concept of support and firmness accords nicely with the word's uses in the HB. (From this etymology, Grimm [p. 36] derives the idea of "help", whence "success, power, source of help, reliability". This array of senses is close to the mark but not sufficiently focussed.)

Tušiyyah is a *power*, one that is not deeply intellectual. It is used in determining a course of action and dealing with difficulties rather than in comprehending intricacies or deducing conclusions. It is an inner resource that Job feels he has lost (6:13b), along with his strength (*koaḥ*, 6:11-12); hence he is "helpless" (6:13a).[40] Job is not confessing a lack of insight or understanding, nor is he lamenting loss of some sort of success. His grievance is far more severe. He is complaining that he lacks the fortitude and the clarity of thought to stand up to God (again in 9:14-21 he fears his feebleness and confusion in confrontation with God). In the same vein, Job complains that his *tušiyyah* has dissolved at God's hands (30:22b, qere).[41] The phrase *tᵉmogᵉgeni tušiyyah* may be translated, "you make the ability to think clearly dissolve for me".[42] To make someone "ride on the wind" (the parallel in 22a) is the kind of act that causes disorientation rather than ignorance. The verb is used of the soul in Ps 107:26, describing the fear and confusion of sailors in a storm (thus they become drunk and their skill is lost; v. 27).[43] Just so has God made *tušiyyah* dissolve for Job.

Tušiyyah (alongside *mᶜzimmah*) provides *protection* to those upon whom it is bestowed (Prov 3:21-26). This power is not intrinsically virtuous; crafty, tricky men have it, though God may frustrate it (Job 5:12). God holds *tušiyyah* in store for the upright as a reward; it will shield them (Prov 2:7) and help them hold to the right

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[37] Or "strength", as *ᶜezrah* should perhaps be translated in Job 6:13, cf. Ugaritic *ġzr* (P. D. Miller, Jr., UF 2 [1970], 172). English "help" usually refers to assistance coming from someone else; yet in English too one who lacks strength is "helpless".

[38] William McKane, correctly identifies *tušiyyah* as a "'power', 'capacity', 'competence'" (Prophets and Wise Men, p. 80).

[39] K. H. Grimm, "The Word תושיה in the OT", JAOS 22 (1901), 43f.

[40] *Haʾim* and *ʾeyn* are conflated synonyms; only one negation makes sense here. On *ᶜezrah* see n. 37.

[41] Most commentators point the ketiv *tšwh* as *tᶜšuwwah*, supposedly equivalent to *tᶜšuʾah*, "storm" (e.g., Pope, Gordis), but nothing is gained by creating this hapax. The qere is quite comprehensible.

[42] *Tušiyyah* appears as a bare noun even here, where "my *tušiyyah* might seem more natural than the construction with the dativa suffix on the verb.

[43] Note that a wind occasions both the melting of the sailors' spirits in Ps 107 and Job's *tušiyyah* in Job 30.

path (v. 8). The phrase *ṣpn l-* indicates that *tušiyyah* is not inherent in righteousness, but is rather an advantage that can be granted as a reward. This last observation explains why *tušiyyah* is not something that Lady Wisdom is but something she *has*, along with *ʿeṣah* and *gᵉburah* (Prov 8:14). *Tušiyyah* is a benefaction that attends upon wisdom rather than a goal in itself. The proximity to 8:15-16 suggests that *tušiyyah*, like the other two faculties mentioned in v. 14, is a resource used in governing society.

God employs *tušiyyah* in governing the world. Zophar apparently uses the word (along with *ḥokmah*) in reference to God's ability to order his world justly (Job 11:6).[44] God possesses this power along with might (*ʿoz*) and uses it in confounding counselors (Job 12:16f.). ("Insight", "cleverness", "foresight", "sound wisdom", and most of the other glosses commonly used for *tušiyyah* would not work well here.) Essentially the same faculty is called *ʿeṣah* in Job 38:2 and 42:3. Ben Sira speaks of God's providential rule in 38:8, where he says that God has given medicinal plants to humans to keep them alive, so that his *maʿăśeh* and *tušiyyah* (note the collocation) not be forgotten.[45] Isaiah 28:29 applies the term to God's ability to control history in accordance with shifting circumstances.[46] In sum, *tušiyyah* is not a source of knowledge or understanding, but rather of stability, efficacy, confidence, and resilience.

Like *ʿeṣah*, *tušiyyah* can also refer to the intentions or strategies that the faculty produces. As such, *tušiyyah* is something one can "do" or "carry out" (Job 5:12, using *ʿaśah*;[47] compare *ʿaśah ʿeṣah* in Isa 25:1 and 30:1). Again as in the case of *ʿeṣah*, *tušiyyah* spoken to others is a form of counsel; thus Job tells Bildad sarcastically, "How you have counselled him who lacks wisdom, made the tremulous[48] know (*hodaʿta*) *tušiyyah*" (Job 26:3), in other words, told Job on what he can rely, where he can find resources.[49] A particular type of counsel is in view, for Job is speaking of helping the weak (v. 2).

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[44] Job 11:6b (MT *ki kiplayim lᵉtušiyyah*) is a crux. *Kiplayim* (Isa 40:2; Sir 26:1) means "double", "two-fold", which does not make sense here. There is no justification for the common understanding of *kiplayim* as "two sides" (Pope, et al.), which in any case is not particularly meaningful either. We should probably emend to *ky plym* for *ky plʾym* = *ki pᵉlaʾim* (BHS, sim. Driver-Gray, et al.), lit., "for [God's] *tušiyyah* has wonders". Compare Isa 28:29, where the synonymous parallelism between *hipliʾ ʿeṣah* and *higdil tušiyyah* again associates wondrousness (√*plʾ*) with God's *tušiyyah*. (Note that Isa 25:1 parallels *peleʾ* with *ʿeṣot* ["plans made long ago"] in reference to God's acts.) The *tušiyyah* Zophar is speaking of is virtually the same as the *ʿeṣah* that God employs in designing and running the world, a faculty that God accuses Job of "obscuring" in 38:2. Job later quotes this statement in conceding that he spoke of things too wondrous (*niplaʾot*) for him (42:3). Zophar says that this *tušiyyah* is wondrous, hence not comprehensible without a revelation.

[45] Read *lmʿn lʾ yškḥ* [marg] *mʿśhw wtwšyh mbny ʾdm* [Ms. B].

[46] In CD II 3 *tušiyyah* is one of several divine faculties that in this context cannot be distinguished from one another.

[47] Thus Dhorme: "So that their hands do not achieve what they had planned!"

[48] N.H. Tur-Sinai made a good case for the existence of a Hebrew root *rbb*, "quake", whence *rab* = "shaking", "helpless"; see his commentary on Job 4:3.

[49] Thus Grimm, JAOS 22 (1901), 40.

The Ugaritic cognate *tšyt* has exactly the same meaning as Hebrew *tušiyyah*. Before a battle, *tġdd kbdh bṣḥq, yml ʾu lbh bšmḥt kbd ʿnt tšyt*, "[Anat's] liver swelled with joy, her heart was filled with happiness, the liver of Anat with *tšyt*" (CTA 3, B ii 27). The common rendering "victory" (or "triumph")[50] is a poor parallel to "joy" and "happiness"; we require something that is in the "liver", in other words, a faculty, thought, or emotion. The meaning ascertained for the Hebrew cognate fits *tšyt* because it is a tactical ability that can be directed *against* an adversary (Job 5:12) and can serve to protect (Prov 2:7) and aid (Job 6:13) its possessor. In other words, after her first victory, Anat exulted in an inner power, a psychological resource that she was about to exercise again in battle.

Tušiyyah is usually associated with words for help, strength, aggression, and defense (Job 5:12; 6:13; 12:16; 26:3; Prov 2:7; 3:21 [cf. 22f.]; Prov 18:1); several of these are in a context of strife. This observation does not apply to Job 11:6 and Sir 38:8f., and probably not to Isa 28:29. Still, these associations are frequent enough to suggest that *tušiyyah* designates the ability to devise plans and stratagems of a sort that give one power, particularly in conflicts. *Tušiyyah* is never a source of knowledge, but rather of stability, confidence, and power.[51]

Abstract:

A study of the lexical (as opposed to contextual) meaning of eight words in the semantic field of wisdom and knowledge leads to the following definitions: *Tᵉbunah* (§ 2.1) designates the pragmatic, applied aspect of thought; its domain is action and it aims at efficacy and accomplishment. *Binah* (§ 2.2) is the conceptual, interpretive activity of thought; its domain is meaning and it aims at perception and comprehension. *ʿormah* (§ 3.1) is the talent for devising and using adroit and wily tactics in the attaining of one's goals, whatever these may be. *Mᵉzimmah* (§ 3.2) is private, unrevealed thinking and the faculty for it. *ʿeṣah* (§ 4.1) is essentially deliberation – the activity, the faculty, and its products (the notion of advice is contextually determined). *Tušiyyah* (§ 4.2) denotes clear, proficient thinking in the exercise of power and practical operations, as distinct from thinking as an intellectual act.

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50 E.g., UT, glossary; Gray, Canaanite Myths and Legends, 48; KBL[3] on *tušiyyah*; M. Dahood, Bibl 55 (1974), 386f.

51 In Qumran usage, *tušiyyah* seems to have become an esoteric understanding or body of knowledge rather than a practical faculty. 1QS XI, 6 speaks of *tušiyyah, deʿah*, and *mᵉzimmat ʿormah* as hidden from man; these must all refer to a form of gnosis – the hidden knowledge itself. In 1QS X 24 – "With wise counsel I will declare knowledge" – *ʿṣt twšyh* (a construct of synonyms) is a source of knowledge. In CD II,3, *tušiyyah* is a divine faculty – it is unclear exactly which.

Appendix: Environments of Wisdom Words

Word:	1 in synonymous parallelism with	2 antithetical to	3 in quasi-parallelism with
t^{c}bunah(ot)	*ḥokmah* (13x)[1] *koaḥ; binah;* *d^{c}barim;* *m^{c}zimmah;* *leb* (3x) *da^{c}at;* *^{c}eṣot; g^{c}burah;* *^{ɔ}oraḥ mišpat*	*k^{c}sil; merim* *^{ɔ}iwwelet*[2]; *^{c}ăšot zimmah*	*ḥăkamim;* *koaḥ; leb;* *g^{c}burah*[3]; *tom lebab*[4]
binah(ot)	*ḥokmah* (12x); *musar* (2x); *leqaḥ; šamoa^{c};* *t^{c}bunah; ^{ɔ}imrey* *peh; leb*	*p^{c}ta^{ɔ}im;* *ba^{c}ar;* *^{ɔ}iwwelet*	*ḥakkimin* (Aram.)[5]
^{c}ormah	*da^{c}at* *um^{c}zimmah(-ot)* (2x); *leb*		
m^{c}zimmah(ot)	*maḥšabah;* *t^{c}bunah; da^{c}at;* *meḥqarot;* *^{c}ormah*	*ṭob; maṣliaḥ* *darko; q^{c}ṣar* *^{ɔ}appayim*	*po^{c}al; ra^{c}ah*

1 Including *ḥokmot//t^{c}bunot* in Ps 49:4.
2 *//rab t^{c}bunah*; Prov 14:29.
3 *ḥokmah ug^{c}burah* as a pair parallels *^{c}eṣah ut^{c}bunah* in Job 12:13.
4 *//t^{c}bunot kappayim;* Ps 78:72.
5 *ḥakkamin//yad^{c}eh binah*; Dan 2:21.

Word:	4 in synonymous series with:	5 dir. obj. of:[6]	6 determined (by art., constr., or sfx.)
t^{c}bunah(ot)	*ḥokmah* (7x); *da^{c}at* (6x); *^{c}eṣah* (2x)	*šamar; hepiq;* *natan; male$^{>}$;* *he$^{>}$ĕbid;* *hodia^{c}*[7]	yes
binah(ot)	*ḥokmah* (5x)[8] *g^{c}burah;* *^{c}eṣah*[9]; *śekel; musar*	*natan;* *hiśkil; ḥalaq* *(+b-); hiššah* *(nšḥ); qanah;* *biqqeš;* *yada^{c}*[10]	yes
^{c}ormah		*natan; hebin*	no[11] (but **^{c}orem* + sfx: 1x)[12]
m^{c}zimmah(ot)	*da^{c}at;* *tušiyyah*	*^{c}aśah; heqim;* *ḥašab; ḥamas;* *natan; naṣar;* *šamar*	yes

6 Number of occurrences not noted.

7 Dir. obj. = *derek t^{c}bunot*; Isa 40:14.

8 Incl. the construct of synonyms *ḥokmat binah* in Dan 1:20.

9 The virtues listed in Isa 11:2 are not exact synonyms, but diverse qualities the ideal king will possess. Within the list, *ḥokmah* and *binah* are paired. The phrase *ḥokmat binah* is perhaps a construct of synonyms, equivalent to *ḥokmah ubinah.*

10 *Binah* is the subject of the passive *noda^{c}at* in Sir 4:24, but in the sense of "recognized" rather than "known".

11 *^{c}ormat da^{c}at* occurs in 1QS X 24.

12 Job 5:13, if correct.

Word:	1 in synonymous parallelism with	2 antithetical to	3 in quasi-parallelism with
ʿeṣah	*pʿlilah; maḥšabah* (4x); *maʿăšim; derek-mošab; ruaḥ; gʿburah* (2x); *dabar; tʿbunah; yagon, musar, ḥepeṣ tušiyyah; ʿălilah; ʾimrah; ḥokmah; tokaḥat; taḥbulot*		*maʿăšeh; ruaḥ*[13]; *torah-dabar*[14]; *ḥazon-torah*[15]; *ʾămarim; ʿawon; šaʿăšuʿim; yagon*
tušiyyah	*ʿezrah; maḥšabot; ḥokmah; maʿăšeh; ʿormah*		*ʿazar – hošiaʿ – yaʿaṣ*[16]; *magen*

[13] Isa 40:13.
[14] Jer 18:18.
[15] Ezek 7:26.
[16] In the Dead Sea Scrolls, *tušiyyah* clusters with other terms for wisdom without much distinction; thus *deʿah umʿzimmat ʿormah* (1 QS XI 6) and *ʿormah wʿdaʿat* (CD II, 3).

Word:	4 in synonymous series with:	5 dir. obj. of:[17]	6 determined (by art., constr., or sfx.)
ʿeṣah	*ʿălilah; tᵉbunah; ḥokmah; tušiyyah; yad*	*yaʿaṣ/ʿwṣ; hebiʾ; hebin; hipliʾ; ʿašah; heper; ʿazab; baqaq; histir; sikkel; hab (yhb); šamaʿ; hobiš; ḥikkah; hišlim; milleʾ; hehšik; heʿělim; paraʿ; ʾabah (l-); dalah; billaʿ; šit*	yes
tušiyyah	*mᵉzimmah; ʿoz; ʿeṣah*[18]	*mogeg* ("melt"); *ṣapan*[19]; *naṣar; ʿašah; hitgalaʿ*[20]	no

17 Number of occurrences not noted.

18 Prov 8:14, where the pair *ʿeṣah wᵉtušiyyah* is parallel to *gᵉburah*.

19 Qere, Prov 2:7.

20 Prov 18:1; unclear.

Die Position des Subjekts im hebräischen Verbalsatz, untersucht an den asyndetischen ersten Redesätzen in Gen, Ex 1-19, Jos - 2 Kön

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1. Problemstellung und Untersuchungsmethode

Aus den zahlreichen, bisher nur teilweise erforschten Problemen der Satzteilfolge[1] im Verbalsatz greife ich das Problem heraus, das seit den Anfängen der Hebraistik beachtet wurde, aber bis heute keine einvernehmliche Lösung gefunden hat: Steht das Subjekt „normalerweise" vor oder nach dem verbum finitum, bzw., sachgemäßer formuliert: Unter welchen Bedingungen geht das Subjekt dem Verb voran? Was ist die Funktion der Voranstellung des Subjekts?

Nur generell verweise ich auf die aus der arabischen Nationalgrammatik stammende, lange sehr einflußreiche These, lediglich Sätze, die mit dem Verb beginnen, seien Verbalsätze, Sätze mit Subjekt am Anfang dagegen zusammengesetzte Nominalsätze[2], und auf die entsprechenden Äußerungen der Autoren, die über Verbpositionen und Verbfunktionen handeln. P. Joüon behauptet, „normalement" gehe das Subjekt dem Verb voraus, Spitzenstellung des Verbs zeige dagegen „quelque emphase sur le prédicat"[3] an; „normalement" scheint eher normativ als statistisch gemeint zu sein. Er steht mit seiner These ziemlich allein. Meist wird statt dessen behauptet, die Folge Verb – Subjekt sei die „natürliche"[4], die „Normalstellung"[5], die „meist" realisierte[6], „the basic word order"[7]; die Voranstellung des Subjekts dagegen signalisiere dessen Hervorhebung. T. Muraoka widerspricht sogar beiden Behauptungen

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1 W. Richter, Grundlagen einer althebräischen Grammatik. B. Die Beschreibungsebenen III. Der Satz (Satztheorie) (ATS 13), 1980, 207: „Bei der Behandlung des Satzes und seiner Teile sind bisweilen Wortfolgen beobachtet, aber noch keine Regeln abgeleitet worden."

2 Eigenartigerweise schreibt T. Muraoka auch mir diese Meinung zu, obgleich ich stets (wie Muraoka selbst) alle Sätze mit verbum finitum ohne Rücksicht auf die Position des verbum finitum innerhalb des jeweiligen Satzes als Verbalsätze analysiert habe; vgl. P. Joüon, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew. Translated and Revised by T. Muraoka. Vol. II: Part Three: Syntax (subsidia biblica 14/II), 1991, 587 § 156e. Das Werk wird im folgenden zitiert als: Joüon–Muraoka.

3 P. Joüon, Grammaire de l'Hébreu biblique, Rom 1923. Edition photomécanique corrigée, Graz 1965. Wichtig ist der Hinweis Joüons, daß auch auf dem Verb der Nachdruck liegen kann. Meist wird dies übersehen und nur nach der Hervorhebung dieses oder jenes nominalen Satzteils gefragt.

4 GKa 142 § 142.2.

5 Brockelmann Synt. 49 § 48.

6 R. Meyer, Hebräische Grammatik. Bd. III: Satzlehre (SG 5765), ^{3}1972, 10 § 91.

7 B.K. Waltke – M. O'Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 1990, 129 § 8.3b. Sie formulieren u.a. eine Regel – und nennen für sie unter Nr. 5 auch nur ein poetisches Beispiel (Ps 63,9) –, die auf Prosa-Sätze, auch in Reden, sicher nicht zutrifft, falls „usually" die relative statistische Mehrheit meinen sollte: „This verb-first word order usually obtains where a clause has no introductory material."

Joüons; „normally" gehe das Verb dem Subjekt voraus und es gelte: „In this arrangement neither S nor V receives special emphasis."[8] So formuliert er auch in seiner Überarbeitung der Grammatik Joüons: „The statistically dominant and unmarked word-order in the verbal clause is: Verb-Subject."[9] Unter den zahlreichen Ausnahmen notiert er, was bereits Joüon hervorgehoben hatte, „at the very beginning of a statement" eröffne das Subjekt den Satz[10]. Ausdrücke wie „natürliche" Wortstellung sind zumindest sehr diskussionsbedürftig. Hinweise auf statistische Häufigkeit sind nahezu bedeutungslos, wenn die Bezugsgröße nicht präzisiert wird. Sind etwa einfach alle Verbalsätze gemeint, einschließlich der numerisch überwiegenden Sätze mit wa=yiqtul und w=qatal, deren Verbformation die Spitzenstellung des Verbs erzwingt? Dann besagt dieses Urteil syntaktisch nahezu nichts. Was die „unmarkierte" Satzteilfolge ist, läßt sich doch wohl nur in bezug auf solche Sätze formulieren, die auch eine „markierte" zulassen. Wurden derartige Differenzierungen angebracht, bevor man urteilt, die Voranstellung des Subjekts erweise dessen Hervorhebung?

Speziell wenn man nach der Funktion von syntaktischen Oberflächenerscheinungen fragt, ist es die erste und eine schwierige Aufgabe, ein Belegkorpus zu finden, das aussagekräftig ist und kontrollierbare Austauschproben zuläßt.

Als Beispiel einer aussagekräftigen Kontrollgruppe, die zugleich geeignet ist, Zweifel an der obigen Mehrheitsmeinung zu wecken, aber im folgenden nicht weiter verfolgt wird, nenne ich die ki-Sätze[11]. Unter ihnen gibt es zahlreiche Sätze mit einem Satzteil vor dem Verb. Das sagt bereits viel aus über die Konjunktion ki – sie gehört zu den wenigen Konjunktionen, die überhaupt in beachtlichen Prozentsätzen nach der Konjunktion und vor dem Verb einen Satzteil zulassen –, aber nur wenig über die Satzteilfolgeregeln, weil darunter auch Gruppen von ki-Sätzen sind, die derartiges fast ganz ausschließen, z.B. die temporalen und konditionalen ki-Sätze. Von den ca. 735 Prosabelegen kausaler ki-Sätze mit verbum finitum (ohne *HYY*) in Gen – 2 Kön, Esra, Neh und 1+2 Chr haben ca. 255 Sätze = knapp 35 % einen Satzteil vor dem Verb. Greift man aus den 735 die 308 Sätze mit lexikalisch ausgedrücktem Subjekt heraus, so erhöht sich mit 139 Fällen der Prozentsatz der einschlägigen Belege auf 45 %: 75 dieser Sätze, fast ein Viertel, haben das Subjekt, 64 einen anderen Satzteil vor dem Verb. Grenzt man schließlich alle Sätze aus, in denen die Voranstellung des Subjekts durch dessen Wortart (Fragewort etc.) bedingt ist, so verbleiben 37 Sätze mit frei gewählter Voranstellung des Subjekts; unter diesen zeigen aber nur 20 eine Hervorhebung des Subjekts[12], 14 dagegen lassen derartiges nicht erkennen[13]. Auf dieser Basis können relevante Regeln für die Position des Subjekts eruiert werden.

Die Sätze stehen innerhalb eines Textes untereinander in so vielfältigen inhaltlichen und formalen Bezügen, daß die Gefahr einer Fehldeutung groß ist, wenn die

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8 T. Muraoka, Emphatic Words and Structures in Biblical Hebrew, 1985, 30.

9 Joüon–Muraoka (Anm. 2), 579 § 155k.

10 Joüon–Muraoka (Anm. 2), 581 § 155nd.

11 Vgl. dazu vorerst W. Groß, Satzfolge, Satzteilfolge und Satzart als Kriterien der Subkategorisierung hebräischer Konjunktionalsätze, am Beispiel der ki-Sätze untersucht: W. Groß – H. Irsigler – T. Seidl (Hrsg.), Text, Methode und Grammatik (FS W. Richter), 1991, 97-117. Nachweise der Beleg-Untergruppen: in meiner Monographie zur Satzteilfolge im Verbalsatz (in Vorbereitung).

12 Gen 42,38; Lev 10,14; 21,18; Num 19,13 (Hervorhebung unsicher); Dtn 18,14; Jos 17,6; 1 Sam 16,7; 26,12; 2 Sam 1,16; 4,2; Neh 13,13; 1 Chr 5,2; 5,22; 2 Chr 2,5; 5,11; 7,7; 15,6; 24,7; 30,18; 35,15.

13 Gen 43,5; 44,32; Num 10,29; Dtn 2,7; 15,6; 2 Sam 3,18; 1 Kön 14,11; 2 Kön 2,2; 2,4; 2,6; Esra 7,10; Neh 12,43; 1 Chr 5,9; 2 Chr 31,10.

(text)syntaktische Hauptfunktion einer formalen Satzeigenschaft wie z.B. der Abfolge der Satzteile bestimmt werden soll; dies umso mehr, wenn außer dem Verb mehrere Satzteile im Satz vorkommen, so daß die Zahl möglicher Kombinationen schnell steigt. Einfach interpretierbare Ergebnisse versprechen solche Sätze, die formal relativ einheitlich und relativ unabhängig vom Kontext sind. Diese Bedingungen erfüllen asyndetische[14] Sätze am Beginn von Reden[15] (künftig: erste Redesätze). Enthält ein Satz außer dem Verb nur einen weiteren Satzteil, ist die Zahl möglicher Stellungsvarianten sehr stark eingeschränkt. Daher werden im folgenden nur die asyndetischen ersten Redesätze mit mindestens zwei Satzteilen außer der Konstituente Verb[16] untersucht; als Belegkorpus dienen Gen, Ex 1-19, Jos – 2 Kön[17].

Der Teil des Satzes vor der Konstituente Verb wird im folgenden als *Vorfeld*, der Teil nach ihr als *Hauptfeld*, die Stellung eines Satzteiles im Vorfeld als dessen *Topikalisierung* bezeichnet. Der Terminus Topikalisierung beschreibt somit eine Variante der Satzteilstellung, er impliziert keine funktionale Deutung im Sinn des Oppositionspaares Topik – Kommentar[18]. Eröffnet die Konstituente Verb den Satz, wird von *Spitzenstellung* gesprochen. Die *Konstituente Verb*, im folgenden *Verb* genannt, kann im hier vorausgesetzten Modell außer ihrem Kern, dem verbum finitum, eine unmittelbar vorausgehende Negation, einen vorausgehenden Infinitivus absolutus der gleichen Wurzel und die Partikel *n* umfassen[19]. Die Bestimmung der nominalen/pronominalen Satzteile erfolgte auf der Basis eines Verbvalenz-Modells; die Ergebnisse, die im folgenden mitgeteilt werden, lassen jedoch zumeist die stark vereinfachte Beschreibung des Satzes nach den Konstituenten Verb, Subjekt und sonstige Satzteile zu. Außer dem Subjekt werden allerdings nur die von der Valenz des jeweiligen Verbs geforderten *Ergänzungen* (direkte und präpositionale Objekte sowie weitere Ergänzungen, z.B. Ergänzungen des Ortes oder der Richtung bei Bewegungsverben), nicht die freien Angaben (z.B. Angaben der Zeit, des Grun-

[14] Syndetisch beginnende erste Redesätze sind relativ selten. Sie begegnen in der Regel nicht in Gesprächseröffnungen oder Monologen, sondern in Reden innerhalb eines Dialogs. Auch in diesen Fällen scheint der je erste Redesatz nicht mit wa=yiqtul beginnen zu können.

[15] Asyndetische Sätze mitten in einer Rede sind zwar in vielem vergleichbar, da der Sprecher im Gegensatz zur narrativen Handlungsdarstellung in der Rede jederzeit neu einsetzen und als textsyntaktisches Zeichen dafür einen asyndetisch beginnenden Satz bilden kann. Aber die möglichen Kontextbezüge solcher Sätze mitten in einer Rede sind zahlreicher. Auch könnte z.B. explikative Asyndese oder der erste Satz eines Satzpaares vorliegen. Daher werden solche Sätze nicht ausgewertet.

[16] Zur Definition der Konstituente Verb vgl. unten.

[17] Ex 20ff. – Dtn werden nicht untersucht; das Dtn besteht überwiegend aus wenigen, langen Reden, besitzt daher kaum asyndetische erste Redesätze; die gesetzlichen Partien in Ex 20ff.; Lev; Num könnten eigenen gattungsspezifischen Regeln folgen. Die wenigen poetischen Sätze (nach Ausweis des abweichenden Satzspiegels in BHS) werden aus der Untersuchung ebenso ausgeschieden wie die Sätze mit dem Verb *HYY*, da diese starke Formähnlichkeiten zu den verblosen Sätzen aufweisen und deshalb ebenfalls vielleicht spezifische Satzteilfolgen haben. Alle Behauptungen dieses Artikels beziehen sich, wenn nichts anderes gesagt wird, ausschließlich auf die so umschriebene Beleggruppe.

[18] Zu den Termini „Topikalisierung" und „Topik" vgl. H. Bußmann, Lexikon der Sprachwissenschaft, ²1990, 796 u. 794f.

[19] Vgl. Richter (Anm. 1), 167ff., der diese Elemente „P-Modifikatoren" nennt.

des) auf ihre Topikalisierung hin untersucht, da die ersten Redesätze nur so selten freie Angaben im Vorfeld bezeugen, daß keine Schlüsse möglich sind.

Symbole und Abkürzungen: # = Satzgrenze; ePP = enklitisches Personalpronomen; Infabs = Infin. absolutus; Koh = Kohortativ; PKKF = Kurzform der Präfixkonjugation; Proh = Prohibitiv; PV:Infcs = Präpositionalverbindung mit Infin. constructus; sPP = selbständiges Personalpronomen; Subj. = Subjekt; Vet = Vetitiv.

Über die rein statistische Information hinaus zielt das Hauptinteresse darauf, die Sätze herauszufinden, in denen der Sprecher/Autor sich bei im großen und ganzen gleicher Aussageintention auch mittels einer abweichenden Satzteilfolge hätte ausdrücken können, und dann die Nuancen zu bestimmen, die er seiner Aussage durch die tatsächlich gewählte Satzteilfolge gegeben hat[20]. Bezüglich der Topikalisierung geht in Übereinstimmung mit beiläufigen Bemerkungen der Grammatiken die Vermutung dahin, daß vor allem Gesichtspunkte der Fokussierung, der Thema-Rhema-Funktion und der anaphorischen Anknüpfung eine wichtige Rolle spielen.

Die Phänomene sind schon den älteren Grammatiken bekannt; die terminologische Differenzierung findet aber erst in der gegenwärtigen linguistischen Diskussion statt[21]. Die Fokus-Hintergrund-Gliederung des Satzes gewichtet die durch den Satz gegebenen Informationen. Den *Fokus* tragen die im Satz – vor allem durch Herstellung eines Alternativenbezugs – hervorgehobenen, vom Sprecher als relevant herausgestellten Teile. Der Fokus gewichtet somit die durch einen Satzteil vermittelte Information in bezug auf die anderen Elemente desselben Satzes. Die Thema-Rhema-Gliederung bezieht sich dagegen auf den Umstand, ob ein Satzteil kontextuell bekannte, d.h. alte, oder neue Information enthält. Auf das Kriterium des Akzentes, der Satzmelodie etc. müssen wir bei einer toten Sprachen wie dem Hebräischen leider verzichten; das Kriterium der Satzteilstellung soll erst erarbeitet werden. So werden nur ganz grundlegende Stellungsfunktionen angezielt. Da es keine allgemein anerkannte Theorie über die wechselseitigen Relationen zwischen der Thema-Rhema- und der Fokus-Hintergrundgliederung gibt und da die Fokussierung einerseits nach meinen Untersuchungen häufigeren und größeren Einfluß auf die Vorfeldbesetzung ausübt, andererseits in Hebräischgrammatiken und Exegese die höhere Aufmerksamkeit gefunden hat, frage ich bei Belegen, deren Fokus bestimmt werden konnte, nicht zusätzlich nach der Thema-Rhema-Gliederung. *Rhema*-Funktion stelle ich nur in ganz offensichtlichen Fällen fest, z.B. wo der Satzteil eines Antwortsatzes das im vorausgehenden Fragesatz Erfragte darstellt; in diesem Fall analysiere ich nicht nach Fokus-Hintergrund.

Ich möchte für die hier untersuchten asyndetischen ersten Redesätze im folgenden mit den nötigen Differenzierungen die These erhärten: *Im Gegensatz zu den übrigen Ergänzungen (und den meisten Angaben) steht das Subjekt auch dann im Vorfeld, wenn es nicht fokussiert ist; Spitzenstellung des Verbs überwiegt statistisch keineswegs.* Zumindest in diesem Sinn behält Joüon recht. Um die jeweils relevanten Vergleichs- bzw. Austauschgruppen zu erhalten, werden die Sätze ohne lexikalisch

[20] Selbstverständlich kann es hier nur um generalisierte, normierte Sinn-Nuancen gehen; das präzise individuelle Sinngeflecht eines Textes erschließt sich erst auf Grund einer eingehenden Formbeschreibung, die hier nicht für alle einschlägigen Reden in Gen – 2 Kön geleistet werden kann.

[21] Vgl. für einen ersten Überblick Bußmann (Anm. 18), 245f. u. 784-786. Dort zahlreiche weitere Literaturhinweise.

bezeichnetes Subjekt und diejenigen mit einem derartigen Subjekt als getrennte Gruppen untersucht.
Die Beleggruppen werden im folgenden stets nach denselben Gesichtspunkten abgefragt und nach der Maßgabe eingeteilt, daß ein Beleg, der bereits auf Grund eines Kriteriums genannt wurde, unter einem später erörterten Kriterium, dem er auch genügt, nicht nochmals aufgeführt wird. Diese Untersuchung setzt sich nicht das ehrgeizige Ziel, alle wichtigen Einflüsse, die zur gegebenen Satzteilfolge eines konkreten Satzes geführt haben, zu benennen, sondern beabsichtigt lediglich, die Arten von Einflüssen zu bestimmen, welche generell zu bestimmten Satzteilfolgen, speziell zu Vorfeld- oder Hauptfeldstellung des Subjekts, führen. Gewisse Satzteilfolgen, das wird in den kurzen Bemerkungen der Grammatiken zur Satzteilfolge gar nicht oder viel zu wenig beachtet, sind aus morphologischen, syntaktischen oder semantischen Gründen obligatorisch oder überwiegen zumindest. Sie erlauben daher nicht in gleicher Weise wie frei wählbare Stellungsvarianten die Frage nach Fokus-Hintergrund oder Thema-Rhema und werden deshalb zu Beginn der jeweiligen Beleggruppen zusammengestellt und aus der weiteren Diskussion ausgeschieden.
Die gesamte Belegsammlung umfaßt 542 asyndetische erste Redesätze mit Verb und mindestens zwei Satzteilen[22]. Von diesen beginnen lediglich 175 mit dem Verb, dagegen haben 367 Sätze = knapp 68 % einen topikalisierten Satzteil[23]. Die Sätze – unterteilt in die beiden Hauptgruppen mit und ohne Subjekt – werden jeweils unter folgenden Gesichtspunkten befragt:

1. In welchen Sätzen ist die Spitzenstellung des Verbs durch die Satzart, die Verbfunktion etc. bedingt? Einschlägig sind: Fragesätze mit Fragepartikel; negierte Sätze; Verben mit auslösender Funktion[24]: Jussiv, Vet, Injunktiv, Proh, Koh; Infabs vor verbum finitum.
2. In welchen Sätzen wird die Topikalisierung eines Satzteils durch dessen Wortart erzwungen oder doch stark befördert? Hier ist zu nennen: Der Satzteil gehört zur Fragewortgruppe; er ist ein Deiktikon (z.B. *kh, kn, ᶜth*); spezi-

[22] Ausgeschieden wurden alle Sätze mit solchen Besonderheiten, welche die Satzteilfolge beeinflussen könnten und daher getrennt untersucht werden müßten: Sätze, die mit einer Konjunktion, einer satzbezogenen Modalpartikel (z.B. *ʾwly*) oder einer sonstigen Partikel (z.B. *ʾp* oder *gm*, soweit diese nicht wortgruppenbezogen sind, was bei topikalisierten Satzteilen nicht immer sicher unterschieden werden kann), dem Konjunktionaladverb *lkn* oder dem Satzdeiktikon *hnh* beginnen, sowie Pendenskonstruktionen. Dagegen werden mitanalysiert Fragesätze (mit Fragepartikel oder Fragewort) und verneinte Sätze.

[23] Das besagt allerdings nicht viel; denn dazu zählen z.B. alle Fragesätze mit Fragewort und alle Botenformeln, deren Vorfeld durch *kh* besetzt ist, sowie alle Sätze mit Koh, Injunktiv, Vet, Proh, Jussiv, Negation, Fragepartikel, Infabs, deren Verb in der Regel die Spitzenstellung einnimmt. So leicht ist eine syntaktisch relevante statistische Information nicht zu erhalten. Das gilt freilich erst recht für allgemeine Behauptungen ohne alle Präzisierung von Gruppenmerkmalen, wie man sie gemeinhin in den Grammatiken zu Details der Satzteilfolgen findet.

[24] Der Zusammenhang zwischen auslösender Funktion und Spitzenstellung ist bei diesen asyndetischen Sätzen, die zudem als erste Redesätze kaum je eine Reihe von Verben mit derselben Funktion eröffnen, ausgeprägter als bei Kontextsätzen.

ell beim Subjekt: *ʾyš* in der Funktion eines Indefinitpronomens[25]. Hierher gehört auch Subjekt = sPP, nicht dagegen Subjekt = Gottesbezeichnung. Da diese beiden Fälle aber Fragen aufwerfen, werden sie eigens diskutiert.

3. Ist der topikalisierte Satzteil das Rhema des Satzes?
4. Ist der (frei) topikalisierte Satzteil fokussiert? Es wird jeweils angegeben, auf Grund welcher Indizien die Fokussierung behauptet wird. Zunächst werden formale Indizien im Satz selbst oder im Kontext genannt, z.B.: Der Satzteil hat eine Gradpartikel (*gm*) bei sich; er ist topikalisiert trotz Realisierung als ePP oder PV:Infcs; der topikalisierte Satzteil steht in einem nicht-negierten Satz, der sich im Kontext auf einen negierten Satz bezieht oder umgekehrt; sonstige lexikalisch aufweisbare Opposition zum Kontext (Opposition umfaßt hier ein breites Spektrum von Antithese bis Kontrast). Erst an zweiter Stelle folgen nur aus dem Inhalt erkennbare Indizien: die mitgedachte Opposition und – unter der Bezeichnung „sonstige Fokussierung" – alle anderen Fälle, die dem Leser/Hörer als fokussiert einleuchten, aber in längerer Begründung am Kontext ausgewiesen werden müßten.
5. Ist das Verb in Spitzenstellung fokussiert? Dafür ist, da die Belege von *Infabs + verbum finitum* bereits zuvor ausgegrenzt wurden, meist lediglich eine inhaltliche, nur selten eine formale Begründung möglich.
6. Gibt es topikalisierte Satzteile, auf die keiner der genannten Gesichtspunkte zutrifft?

Es gibt nicht wenige Sätze, die mehrere Satzteile besitzen, auf die eines oder mehrere dieser Kriterien zutreffen. Dann muß beobachtet werden, welches Kriterium sich in Gestalt von Spitzenstellung bzw. Topikalisierung durchsetzt und ob dies regelmäßig so eintrifft.

2. Asyndetische erste Redesätze mit verbum finitum und mindestens zwei nominalen/pronominalen Ergänzungen, aber ohne lexikalisch ausgedrücktes Subjekt

Es gibt genügend Anhaltspunkte dafür und wird auch stillschweigend und undeutlich von den Grammatiken vorausgesetzt, daß sich die von der Valenz des Verbs geforderten Ergänzungen bezüglich der Satzteilfolgen und speziell der Topikalisierung zumindest teilweise anders verhalten als die freien Angaben. Frei topikalisierte Angaben sind aber unter den asyndetischen ersten Redesätzen so selten, daß sich daraus keine Regeln ableiten lassen. Daher wird im folgenden auf die Angaben nicht geachtet.[26] Daraus resultiert eine Eingrenzung der analysierten Beleggruppe.

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[25] Das wurde bereits beobachtet von A. Bloch, Vers und Sprache im Altarabischen. Metrische und syntaktische Untersuchungen (Acta Tropica Supplementum 5), 1946, 37f.; Muraoka, Emphatic Words (Anm. 8), 34f.

[26] Andere Gruppen von Hauptsätzen zeigen, daß einerseits das Subjekt, andererseits aber auch Temporalangaben ohne Fokussierung im Vorfeld stehen, und es stellt sich dann die Frage, welcher der beiden Satzteile topikalisiert wird, wenn beide im selben Satz vorkommen, keinen Fokus tragen und auch kein anderer Satztzeil fokussiert oder obligatorisch topikalisiert ist. Es ist eine sehr umfangreiche Beleggruppe erforderlich, wenn man aus ihr genügend Sätze entnehmen will, die alle diese Bedingungen erfüllen. Dafür ist die Gruppe der asyndetischen ersten Redesätze zu klein. Diese interessante Frage kann somit an diesem Material nicht diskutiert werden.

Wenn Angaben zusätzlich zu den Ergänzungen im Hauptfeld stehen, werden die Sätze aufgeführt, die Anwesenheit der Angaben aber wird einfach ignoriert; die Struktur des Hauptfeldes steht ja hier nicht zur Debatte. Belege mit zwei Ergänzungen im Hauptfeld, aber einer Angabe im Vorfeld oder Sätze mit nur einer Ergänzung und einer Angabe werden dagegen nicht untersucht. Für die Sätze mit Subjekt gilt Entsprechendes.

- Die Spitzenstellung des Verbs ist obligatorisch bzw. stark befördert:
  - weil es auslösende oder kundgebende Funktion hat (Jussiv, Vet, Injunktiv, Proh, Koh):
    Gen 6,7; 22,12; 24,37; 33,15; 34,11[27]; Ex 3,17; Jos 10,6; Ri 8,24; 14,12; 18,25; 1 Sam 18,21[28]; 2 Sam 10,2; 14,18; 1 Kön 2,21; 2 Kön 10,14.
  - im Fragesatz mit Fragepartikel[29]:
    Gen 27,36g[30]; 1 Sam 30,15; 1 Kön 2,42; 2 Kön 4,28b.
  - im negierten Satz[31]:
    Gen 30,31d; Ri 2,3; 1 Sam 24,11; 1 Kön 21,4; 21,6h; 22,18c.
- Die Topikalisierung einer Ergänzung ist obligatorisch bzw. stark befördert, weil sie
  - Teil der Fragewortgruppe ist:
    Gen 12,18; 15,2; 20,9; 26,10; 29,25; 30,31b; 38,16h; 44,4; 44,16; Ex 5,4; 5,15; 17,3; 17,4; Jos 17,14; Ri 21,16; 1 Sam 5,8; 6,2; 10,2; 28,11; 2 Sam 7,7; 21,3; 2 Kön 4,2; 4,43.
  - ein Deiktikon ist:
    Gen 32,5b; 32,20[32]; 50,17; Ex 3,14e; 3,15b; 19,3; 1 Sam 11,9; 18,25; 2 Sam 11,25b; 1 Kön 12,10; 2 Kön 9,12e; 19,6; 19,10a.
- Die topikalisierte Ergänzung ist das Rhema:
  1 Sam 15,15[33].
- Die (frei) topikalisierte Ergänzung ist fokussiert:
  - vgl. die Partikel *gm*:
    2 Kön 23,27.
  - sonstige Fokussierung:
    Gen 12,7; 15,18[34]; 30,8[35]; 34,31[36]; Ri 18,24b[37]; 2 Sam 7,27; 9,9[38]; 2 Kön 21,7[39]; 22,8[40].

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27 Das Verb steht zwar nicht im Koh, aber es liegt ein Wunschsatz vor; vgl. die Kommentare.

28 Äquivalent eines Koh vor ePP; vgl. die finale Weiterführung durch w+PKKF.

29 Anders Gen 34,31 mit deutlich fokussiertem topikalisiertem Satzteil.

30 Buchstaben bezeichnen Sätze innerhalb eines Verses. Sie werden nur hinzugefügt, wenn Verwechslungen möglich sind.

31 Verneinte Sätze mit Vet oder Proh bzw. verneinte Fragesätze mit Fragepartikel wurden bereits zuvor genannt.

32 Der Satz ähnelt dem Redeauftrag mit unbetont voranstehendem Deiktikon *kh*. Satzteile mit der Präposition *k*= erfordern bezüglich der Satzteilfolge eine eigene Untersuchung.

33 Saul verschiebt durch seine Antwort den Fragepunkt etwas; er antwortet, als habe Samuel gefragt: Woher kommen das Kleinvieh und die Rinder, deren Gebrüll ich höre? Zugleich dürfte folgende Opposition mitgemeint sein: Zwar haben sie die Tiere – entgegen deiner Weisung in V. 3 – aus Amalek, d.h. von dem Banngut, hierhergebracht, aber nur die besten und nur, um sie zu opfern.

34 In den beiden ersten Belegen steht der Adressat im Zentrum des Interesses. Denkbar ist auch eine mitgedachte Opposition: deinem Samen und niemand anders. Trotz Deiktikon rückt daher das direkte Objekt ins Hauptfeld.

35 Vgl. die Steigerung des topikalisierten direkten Objekts durch *ʾlhym*.

Das Verb ist in dieser Beleggruppe, auch wo es bei freier Plazierung die Spitzenstellung einnimmt, nicht fokussiert[41]; die Spitzenstellung ist allerdings, wie die Belege mit Infabs zeigen, für fokussiertes Verb geeignet. Andererseits tragen Ergänzungen, wenn sie topikalisiert sind, entweder – und dies ist überwiegend der Fall – den Fokus, oder sie sind das Rhema des Satzes. Diese Beleggruppe zeigt ein klares Ergebnis, das allerdings nicht überrascht:
#Verb - Ergänzungen [außer Subj.] - (...)# ist die neutrale Satzteilfolge für Sätze ohne Hervorhebungen.
#Ergänzung [außer Subj.] - Verb - Ergänzung [außer Subj.] - (...)# ist die markierte Satzteilfolge; sie signalisiert, daß die topikalisierte Ergänzung fokussiert oder Rhema ist.

3. Sätze mit sPP als Subjekt und mit Subjekt = Gottesbezeichnung

Vor der Analyse aller Sätze mit Subjekt soll im folgenden begründet werden, warum (a) Subjekt = sPP unter den stellungsgebundenen Satzteilfolgen eingereiht und nicht ohne weiteres als fokussiert angesehen wird und warum (b) Subjekt = Gott bezüglich der Stellungsregularitäten keine besondere Aufmerksamkeit verdient.

3.1. Subjekt = sPP

Innerhalb aller asyndetischen ersten Redesätze unserer Kontrollgruppe, d.h. ohne Differenzierung und Reduzierung nach syntaktischen Kriterien, gibt es 58 Sätze mit Subjekt = sPP. Von diesen 58 Sätzen haben 52 Belege das Subjekt = sPP *vor* der Konstituente Verb[42]. Für die 6 Sätze mit Subjekt = sPP *nach* dem Verb gelten spe-

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36 Trotz Fragesatz mit Fragepartikel. In dieser rhetorischen Frage ist der ausschlaggebende Satzteil topikalisiert.

37 Die beiden direkten Objekte nehmen so den Anfang und das Ende des Satzes ein. Das wichtigere der beiden ist topikalisiert.

38 Mit doppeltem *kl*.

39 Der Redesatz steht in Opposition zum ersten Satz des Verses. Die Voranstellung der Ergänzung im Redesatz erklärt sich aber auch allein aus der hier vorliegenden dtr. Formel.

40 Das aufgefundene Buch der Tora ist Gegenstand dieser Erzählung. Der Autor stellt ihn fokussierend voraus und determiniert ihn sogar. Das erklärt sich nicht aus der Perspektive der redenden Person, sondern aus der des Erzählers.

41 Vgl. Gen 4,1 (hier könnte Fokussierung vorliegen, da das Verb volksetymologisch den Namen des Sohnes erklärt; die häufig mit Konjunktion *ki* angeschlossenen Namenserklärungen haben gern das Verb in Spitzenstellung, auch bei Anwesenheit eines Subjekts); Ri 2,1c (problematische Verbform); 1 Sam 5,10; 22,9; 1 Kön 22,17. Belege mit Koinzidenz: Gen 14,22; 2 Kön 9,3; 9,6; 9,12g. Schwieriger ist 1 Sam 18,8d zu beurteilen. Der Satz steht in deutlicher Opposition zu 18e, diese betrifft aber gerade nicht das Verb. Trotz der Entgegensetzung der direkten und der indirekten Objekte ist keines der beiden in 8d topikalisiert; wurde hier vielleicht die neutrale Satzteilfolge gewählt und die Opposition erst im folgenden Satz durch eine abweichende Satzteilfolge mit Topikalisierung angezeigt?

42 Gen 3,12 (nach Pendens); 20,6 (mit *gm*); 21,24; 30,29; 38,17; 44,27; 47,30; Ex 8,24; 10,25 (mit *gm*); 19,4; Jos 9,19; 13,1; 14,6; 22,2; 23,2; Ri 6,8; 6,18; 6,31; 11,7; 15,18; 1 Sam 8,5; 10,18; 17,10; 17,37 (nach Pendens); 19,17; 26,6e (sPP = Rhema); 28,2; 28,9; 2 Sam 1,16; 5,2; 7,5; 7,8;

zielle Bedingungen, die entweder die Spitzenstellung des Verbs oder die Topikalisierung eines anderen Satzteils und als Folge davon die Nachstellung des Subjekts, oder aber dessen Nachstellung direkt begründen:

- Gründe für die Voranstellung des Verbs:
  - Das verbum finitum hat Infabs vor sich:
    1 Sam 23,22; 2 Sam 18,2[43].
  - Der Satz ist negiert:
    Ri 8,23b[44].
- Gründe für die Topikalisierung eines anderen Satzteils:
  - Der topikalisierte Satzteil bildet die Fragewortgruppe:
    2 Sam 15,19[45].
- Gründe für die Nachstellung des Subjekts = sPP:
  - Das Subjekt ist zusammengesetzt aus 1. pers. = sPP und 3. pers.:
    Ri 20,4 („ich und meine Nebenfrau")[46].
  - Im *pn*-Satz folgt generell[47] das Verb unmittelbar auf die Konjunktion:
    Gen 38,11[48].

Extrapolation dieses Ergebnisses führt zu der Regel, die sich auch an anderen Satzarten bewährt: In Verbalsätzen, die Vorfeldbesetzung zulassen, wird Subjekt = sPP stets topikalisiert, falls dem nicht stärkere Gründe entgegenstehen. Für diese grundsätzliche Topikalisierung des Subjekts = sPP sind zwei Erklärungen möglich: (1) Die Topikalisierung ist durch die Wortart sPP begründet und findet sich daher auch bei nicht-fokussiertem Subjekt = sPP. (2) Subjekt = sPP ist stets fokussiert und wird deshalb topikalisiert.
Meist wird die zweite These vertreten. Die sPP der 1. und 2. pers. generell, zumeist (und speziell in ersten Redesätzen) aber auch das anaphorische Pronomen *hwʾ* etc. liefern ja als Subjekte im Verbalsatz keine Information, die das verbum finitum durch seine Kongruenz mit dem Subjekt nach Numerus, Person und Genus nicht schon enthielte. Daher wird häufig angenommen, daß ein zum verbum finitum hinzutretendes sPP besonderen Nachdruck erzeugen soll. So zuletzt Waltke–

12,7; 17,8; 21,6; 24,17; 1 Kön 1,5; 1,13; 1,17; 1,24; 2,15; 2,44; 3,6; 5,17; 5,19 (nach Pendens); 18,22; 21,7; 22,21d (sPP = Rhema); 2 Kön 2,3; 2,5; 6,3; 9,11.

[43] Trotz Hervorhebung des sPP durch *gm*. Das fokussierte Verb hat sich somit gegen das ebenfalls fokussierte Subjekt durchgesetzt.

[44] In den miteinander koordinierten negierten Sätzen 8,23bc ist das Subjekt jeweils nachgestellt, zusammen stehen diese beiden Subjekte in starker Opposition zu dem topikalisierten Subjekt des asyndetisch folgenden Satzes 23d.

[45] Das sPP wird durch *gm* hervorgehoben; die Vorfeldbindung des Fragewortes ist somit stärker als die des fokussierten Subjekts.

[46] In solchen Fällen kongruiert das verbum finitum stets mit dem pronominalen Subjekt der 1. (oder 2.) pers.; dieses sPP muß aber nachstehen, und das zweite Subjekt der 3. pers. muß unmittelbar folgen. Wahrscheinlich handelt es sich gar nicht um das Subjekt, sondern um eine appositionelle Subjektserweiterung zum ungenannten, nur morphologisch im verbum finitum bezeichneten Subjekt; doch läßt sich dies in Belegen wie hier, wo das sPP ohne dazwischentretende andere Satzteile dem verbum finitum unmittelbar folgt, nicht entscheiden. Vgl. Joüon–Muraoka (Anm. 2), 541 § 146c.3+4.

[47] Einzige Ausnahmen: Num 20,18; Spr 25,8.

[48] Das nachgestellte sPP ist durch *gm* unterstrichen.

O'Connor[49]: „logical contrast and psychological focus – both of these may loosely be termed emphatic"[50] und Joüon–Muraoka[51]: „the addition of a pronoun gives some special prominence to the person or persons indicated by it, comparable to the close-up focus in photography." Doch erscheint es fraglich, ob diese Erklärung, die zweifellos den meisten Belegen gerecht wird, auf alle Fälle zutrifft. Denn einerseits gibt es Satztypen, die Subjekt = sPP am Satzanfang fordern, ohne daß irgendein Nachdruck auf diesem sPP läge[52], andererseits kann das sPP aus dem Wunsch nach Präzision des Ausdrucks hinzugesetzt sein, der nicht notwendigerweise fokussierend wirkt. Zwei Untergruppen werden vor allem für fokussiertes Subjekt = sPP genannt:

- Nach Joüon[53] steht sPP als Subjekt häufig vor *YD ᶜ*[54]; ohne weitere Begründung schließt er auf Emphase. De facto geht im hebräischen AT das Subjekt, wo es als sPP realisiert ist, der Verbform von *YD ᶜ* stets voraus[55]. Die meisten Sätze der Form *ʾth ydᶜt* sind, was den Informationscharakter betrifft, pleonastisch; sie dienen insinuierend der Unterstreichung des als gewußt bezeichneten Sachverhalts. Daraus folgt aber keine generelle Fokussierung des Subjekts = sPP, wenn auch manche Belege durchaus mit „du weißt doch selbst am besten, daß" wiedergegeben, die entsprechenden Subjekte als fokussiert verstanden werden können.
- In satzhaften Formulierungen für „ja" auf Fragen oder Bitten steht häufig das Subjekt = sPP vor dem Verb[56]. Doch ist gerade hier eine generelle Fokussierung des sPP nicht erkennbar.[57]

Somit steht zwar Subjekt = sPP generell im Vorfeld, trägt es auch in der Mehrzahl der Fälle den Fokus; ob aber im Einzelfall Fokussierung vorliegt, muß aus dem Kontext eruiert werden. Bei folgenden Sätzen der hier untersuchten Belegsammlung kann ich keine Fokussierung erkennen: Gen 21,24; 38,17; 47,30; Jos 13,1; Ri 6,18; 2 Sam 21,6; 2 Kön 6,3.

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49 Waltke–O'Connor (Anm. 7), 294 § 16.3.2b. Richtig bleibt ihre Weigerung, vorschnell rein „pleonastische" sprachliche Elemente anzunehmen. Dieses Prinzip wird hier nur anders angewendet.

50 Als nicht fokussiert anerkennen sie nur den Gebrauch des sPP im Fall eines „syntactic hole in the language", wo nämlich nur ein Teil des Subjekts im Kontext vorerwähnt ist (z.B. „Und es sagte[n] *er und die Ältesten*..."). Dies wird hier als Subjektserweiterung analysiert.

51 Joüon–Muraoka (Anm. 2), 538 § 146a.

52 Z.B. konjunktionslose temporale Vordersätze (auf diese verweisen auch Joüon–Muraoka), Umstandssätze, erzählender Rückgriff („er aber hatte..."), soweit keine Substantive für das hier obligatorisch topikalisierte Subjekt eingesetzt werden.

53 Joüon (Anm. 3), 449 § 146a.

54 Beispiele aus unserer Beleggruppe: Gen 20,6; 30,29; 44,27; Jos 14,6; 1 Sam 28,2; 28,9; 2 Sam 17,8; 1 Kön 2,15; 2,44; 5,17; 2 Kön 9,11.

55 Anders nur Koh 2,14 (mit *gm*); vgl. auch die Fälle der notwendigerweise nachgestellten Subjektserweiterung.

56 Aus unserer Belegsammlung sind einschlägig: Gen 21,24; 47,30; Ri 6,18; 2 Sam 21,6; 2 Kön 6,3.

57 Joüon (Anm. 3), 449 § 146a sieht darin zwar eine „nuance emphatique". Zurückhaltender urteilt S.R. Driver, A Treatise on the Use of the Tenses in Hebrew and Some Other Syntactical Questions, ³1892, 201f. Anm. 1: „where although no special stress rests upon it, a slight prominence is evidently not unsuitable."

3.2. Subjekt = Gottesbezeichnung

Die Belege von ersten Redesätzen mit topikalisiertem Subjekt gestatten nur zwei Alternativen: Entweder steht auch ein Subjekt, das weder Rhema noch fokussiert ist, regelhaft im Vorfeld, d.h. *#Subjekt - Verb - (...)#* ist die neutrale Satzteilfolge, oder topikalisiertes Subjekt trägt stets den Fokus; dann rückt das Subjekt aber schon bei leisester Hervorhebung, deren Vorliegen im Text im Einzelfall kaum zweifelsfrei erwiesen werden kann, vor das Verb. Wenn es um fast unmerkliche Betonungen geht, ziehen alle Sätze mit Subjekt = Gott besonderes Interesse auf sich, denn es ist zumindest theoretisch denkbar, daß man, vergleichbar der Großschreibung in mittelalterlichen Handschriften, dem Subjekt = Gott generell besonderen Nachdruck verlieh und daß sich dies in der Satzteilfolge als Topikalisierung auswirkte. Tatsächlich hat Muraoka, wenn auch mit Kautelen, behauptet: „It is possible that in certain expressions with the divine name or a divine messenger as the subject, a kind of religious psychology in which God occupies the dominant place determines the arrangement of words giving S [= Subjekt] the initial position." Er nennt vor allem zwei Beleggruppen: „This happens when one blesses another asking for divine protection...and also in the following passages describing theophany."[58] Aus diesem Grund werden im folgenden alle asyndetischen ersten Sätze mit Subjekt = Gott für sich untersucht:

- Das Subjekt = Gott steht *im Hauptfeld*:
  - weil die Fragewortgruppe (= nicht Subjekt) das Vorfeld besetzt:
    Gen 42,28; 1 Sam 4,3; 6,20; 1 Kön 9,8; Subjekt = cstr.-Verbindung mit Gottesname: 2 Sam 6,9; 1 Kön 22,24;
  - weil das direkte Objekt = deiktisches *kh* das Vorfeld in der Botenspruchformel und in der Schwurformel einnimmt:
    Ex 4,22; 5,1; 7,17; 7,26; 8,16; 9,1; 9,13; 10,3; 11,4; Jos 24,2; Ri 6,8; 1 Sam 2,27; 10,18; 14,44; 2 Sam 3,35; 7,5; 7,8; 24,12; 1 Kön 2,23; 12,24; 13,2; 13,21; 14,7; 19,2; 20,10; 20,13; 20,14; 20,28; 20,42; 21,19 (2x); 22,11; 2 Kön 1,6; 1,16; 2,21; 3,16; 6,31; 7,1; 9,3; 9,6; 9,12; 19,6; 19,20; 20,1; 20,5; 22,15; 22,16; 22,18;
  - weil Infabs vor dem verbum finitum dessen Fokussierung anzeigt:
    Gen 50,25; Ex 13,19; 2 Kön 18,30;
  - weil das Verb anderweitig fokussiert ist:
    Gen 30,6; 30,18; 30,20; 30,23; 45,9e; 1 Sam 15,28; 23,7; 26,8; 2 Sam 5,20; 6,12;
  - weil das Verb auslösende Funktion hat:
    Gen 31,49; Ex 5,21; Ri 6,32; 1 Sam 2,20; (5,7); 1 Kön 1,47; 2 Kön 6,27; 19,10;
  - weil im verneinten Satz das Verb den Satz eröffnet:
    Ex 4,1; 1 Sam 16,10;
  - weil ein anderer Satzteil fokussiert bzw. Rhema ist und deshalb im Vorfeld steht:
    Gen 21,6; Ex 13,14; Ri 6,13; 1 Sam 15,1; 16,8; 16,9;
  - weil eine freie Angabe Deiktikon (und evtl. fokussiert) ist und deshalb ins Vorfeld rückt:
    Ex 9,5; 1 Sam 7,12;

58 Muraoka (Anm. 8), 35.

- in zwei weiteren Fällen[59]:
  1 Sam 4,7; 2 Kön 8,13.
- Das Subjekt = Gott steht *im Vorfeld*:
  - es ist fokussiert: kenntlich an
    - der Partikel *gm*: 2 Sam 12,13[60];
    - mitgedachter Opposition: Gen 22,8[61]; 24,40[62];
  - es ist Rhema: Ex 3,15c[63];
  - Fokussierung ist nicht erkennbar:
    Gen 43,29g; 48,3; Ex 3,13d; 3,16d; 3,18; 5,3b; 7,16; Jos 17,4; 21,2; 2 Sam 24,23. Auffällig sind nur die beiden Belege Gen 43,29 und 2 Sam 24,23, denn hier geht nicht-fokussiertes Subjekt = Gott dem Verb voran, obgleich dieses jussivische Funktion hat; beide Sätze gehören zu der ersten der beiden von Muraoka identifizierten Gruppen.

Die geringe Zahl der Subjekte = Gott im Vorfeld, vor allem aber die Sätze mit Subjekt = Gott im Hauptfeld, die Infabs vor Verb bzw. fokussiertes Verb oder Verb mit auslösender Funktion am Satzanfang oder ein fokussiertes anderes Sy/C im Vorfeld haben oder verneint sind, sprechen gegen eine Regel derart, Subjekt = Gott sei auf Grund seiner Semantik stets fokussiert und trete deshalb ins Vorfeld, oder es trete auf Grund seiner Semantik immer ins Vorfeld, auch wenn es nicht fokussiert sei. Vielmehr bestätigen die Sätze mit Subjekt = Gott lediglich die Regel, die sich auch an den übrigen Sätzen zeigen wird: Das Subjekt geht dem Verb voran, wenn es fokussiert oder Rhema ist, aber auch in neutraler Satzteilfolge; die Voranstellung des Subjekts ist nicht auffällig und zeigt auch nicht als solche bereits seine Fokussierung an[64]. Ob besondere Regeln für Segenswünsche mit Subjekt = Gott gelten, wie Muraoka vermutet, kann mittels der hier überprüften Belege nicht entschieden werden; es erscheint möglich.

4. Asyndetische erste Redesätze mit verbum finitum, Subjekt und mindestens einer weiteren Ergänzung

Drei Gruppen von Belegen müssen getrennt analysiert werden: Sätze mit topikalisiertem Subjekt, Sätze mit einer anderen topikalisierten Ergänzung und Subjekt im Hauptfeld, Sätze mit Verb in Spitzenstellung und Subjekt sowie sonstigen Ergänzungen im Hauptfeld. Zuvor sind die Belege auszugrenzen, in denen die Topikalisierung des Subjekts oder einer anderen Ergänzung bzw. die Spitzenstellung des Verbs obligatorisch oder doch stark befördert sind.

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[59] Vielleicht sind die Verben fokussiert, ohne daß der Grund dafür deutlich wird.

[60] Falls *gm* hier satzteil- („YHWH seinerseits") und nicht satzbezogen ist; sonst ist dieser Beleg hier nicht einschlägig.

[61] Nicht wir, sondern Elohim.

[62] Das ist nicht deine Sorge, YHWH wird sorgen.

[63] Antwort auf Frage 3,13f.

[64] Durch die formalen Auswahlkriterien bedingt, wurden keine Sätze des Dtn betrachtet. Über evtl. stilistische Eigentümlichkeiten dtn-dtr. Redeweise kann auf dieser Basis nichts ausgesagt werden. Muraoka (Anm. 8), 35 Anm. 87, schließt die Möglichkeit, daß Topikalisierung des Subjekts = Gott Eigentümlichkeit einer Pentateuchquelle sein könne, allerdings ausdrücklich aus.

- Die Spitzenstellung des Verbs ist obligatorisch bzw. stark befördert:
  - weil es Infabs vor sich hat:
    Gen 43,3; 43,7; 50,25; Ex 13,19; 1 Sam 14,28; 20,6; 20,28; 2 Sam 18,2; 2 Kön 18,30;
  - weil es auslösende oder kundgebende Funktion hat (Jussiv, Vetitiv, Injunktiv, Proh, Koh)[65]:
    Gen 1,9; 1,11; 1,20; 1,24; 24,55; 31,49; Ex 5,21; Ri 6,32; 6,39; 11,37; 16,30; 1 Sam 1,18; 2,20; 5,7; 11,13; 16,22; 17,32; 19,4; 20,3; 22,3; 2 Sam 14,11; 14,12; 19,20; 1 Kön 1,31; 1,47; 1,51; 17,21; 20,11; 22,8; 22,50; 2 Kön 1,13; 6,27; 18,29; 19,10;
  - in Fragesätzen mit Fragepartikel[66]:
    1 Sam 10,22; 23,12; 2 Sam 24,13;
  - in verneinten Sätzen[67]:
    Gen 6,3; 29,26; 42,38; 44,22; Ex 4,1; 11,9; 19,23; Jos 17,16; Ri 8,23; 11,15; 20,8; 1 Sam 16,10; 2 Sam 5,6; 11,10; 1 Kön 2,4; 8,25; 9,5; 2 Kön 5,25f; 19,10.
- Die Topikalisierung einer Ergänzung ist obligatorisch bzw. stark befördert, weil die Ergänzung
  - Teil der Fragewortgruppe ist:
    Gen 3,11; 18,13; 21,7; 42,28; 44,7; Ex 2,14b; 4,11; 16,3; Ri 1,1; 6,29; 15,6; 18,3; 20,18; 1 Sam 4,3; 6,20; 10,27; 17,26; 20,4; 20,10; 20,27; 22,13; 26,6; 2 Sam 6,9; 6,20; 14,31; 15,4; 15,19; 16,9; 19,1; 19,42; 23,15; 1 Kön 9,8; 20,14; 22,20; 22,24; 2 Kön 8,14; 20,14;
  - direktes Objekt = Deiktikon in der Botenspruchformel bzw. in der Schwurformel ist:
    Gen 45,9; Ex 4,22; 5,1; 5,10; 7,17; 7,26; 8,16; 9,1; 9,13; 10,3; 11,4; Jos 22,16; 24,2; Ri 6,8; 11,15; 1 Sam 2,27; 10,18; 14,44; 2 Sam 3,35; 7,5; 7,8; 24,12; 1 Kön 2,23; 2,30 (2x); 12,24; 13,2; 13,21; 14,7; 19,2; 20,3; 20,5; 20,10; 20,13; 20,14; 20,28; 20,42; 21,19 (2x); 22,11; 22,27; 2 Kön 1,6; 1,11; 1,16; 2,21; 3,16; 6,31; 7,1; 9,3; 9,6; 9,12; 9,18; 9,19; 18,19; 19,3; 19,6; 19,20; 20,1; 20,5; 22,15; 22,16; 22,18;

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[65] Ist in solchen Sätze trotz derartiger Verbfunktionen ein Satzteil topikalisiert (sie werden in den entsprechenden Untergruppen nochmals genannt), so liegt eine der folgenden Sonderbedingungen vor:
- topikalisiertes Subjekt = sPP: 2 Sam 5,2; 19,30d (sPP + Nomen); 1 Kön 21,7;
- topikalisiertes Subjekt = *ʾyš*: Ex 16,19; Ri 21,1b;
- der topikalisierte Satzteil ist fokussiert: Gen 32,29; Ri 7,4g; 7,4k; 2 Sam 19,39; 1 Kön 1,24c (vgl. 4d: *whwʾ*); 2 Kön 12,5.

Unklar ist der Grund der Topikalisierung des Subjekts nur in Gen 43,29g und 2 Sam 24,23c (weil Gottesname in Segenswunsch? Dazu vgl.o.). Syndetische Sätze mit Verben dieser Verbfunktion verhalten sich abweichend.

[66] Dagegen ist in solchen Sätzen ein Satzteil topikalisiert, wenn eine der folgenden Sonderbedingungen vorliegt:
- Subjekt = sPP: Ri 6,31; 11,7; 2 Sam 7,5; 1 Kön 1,13;
- der Satzteil ist fokussiert: Ri 6,13; 10,11; 2 Sam 2,26; 19,22.

[67] Bei folgenden Sonderbedingungen ist ein Satzteil in verneinten Sätzen topikalisiert:
- dieser Satzteil ist fokussiert: Ri 16,17; 1 Sam 16,8 (+ *gm*); 16,9 (item); 2 Sam 5,8;
- Subjekt = *ʾyš*: Ri 21,1.

- ein sonstiges Deiktikon ist oder enthält[68]:
  Gen 24,30; 38,28; 39,19; Ri 7,4g; 7,4k; 18,4; 1 Sam 9,17; 17,27; 18,24; 27,11; 2 Sam 9,11[69]; 17,6; 17,15; 2 Kön 5,4; 6,28;
- Subjekt = sPP ist[70]:
  Gen 38,17; 44,27; 47,30; Ex 8,24; 10,25; 19,4; Jos 9,19; 14,6; 22,2; Ri 6,8; 6,18; 6,31; 11,7; 15,18; 1 Sam 10,18; 17,10; 19,17; 26,6; 2 Sam 1,16; 5,2; 7,5; 7,8; 12,7; 17,8; 19,30; 1 Kön 1,13; 1,17; 2,44; 3,6; 5,17; 18,22; 21,7; 22,21; 2 Kön 9,11[71];
- Subjekt = *ʾyš* ist:
  Ex 16,19; Ri 21,1; 1 Sam 21,3[72].

Sätze mit *frei topikalisierter Ergänzung (außer Subjekt):*

- Die topikalisierte Ergänzung (außer Subjekt) ist Rhema:
  Jos 9,9[73]; 1 Sam 5,8f[74].
- Die topikalisierte Ergänzung (außer Subjekt) ist fokussiert:
  - Formale Indizien:
    - Partikel *gm*:
      1 Sam 16,8; 16,9;
    - Realisierung als ePP:
      1 Sam 15,1;
    - Realisierung als Infcs:
      Gen 21,6;
    - Opposition bzw. Verhältnis Bejahung–Verneinung zum Kontext:
      Gen 32,29b (zu 29c); Ri 6,13g (zu 13i)[75]; 2 Kön 12,5 (zu 8d)[76]; 18,27b (zu 27c).
  - Mitgedachte Opposition:
    Gen 24,50[77]; Jos 24,2[78].
  - Sonstige Fokussierung:
    Jos 4,22; Ri 14,14[79]; 20,4[80]; 1 Sam 24,14; 2 Kön 22,10[81].

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[68] Nur in 1 Sam 10,27 wird das Subjekt = Demonstrativpronomen durch ein Fragewort in das Hauptfeld verdrängt.

[69] Aufnahme, noch im Vorfeld, durch deiktisches *kn* als Korrelat.

[70] Vgl. zusätzlich die Belege in Pendenskonstruktionen, die hier nicht analysiert werden: Gen 3,12; 1 Sam 17,37; 1 Kön 5,19. Zu diesen Konstruktionen vgl. W. Groß, Die Pendenskonstruktion im Biblischen Hebräisch. Studien zum althebräischen Satz I (ATS 27), 1987.

[71] Weitere Beobachtungen: Verstärkung des sPP durch *gm*: Ex 10,25; Topikalisierung des jeweils stark fokussierten sPP trotz Fragesatz mit Fragepartikel: Ri 6,31; 11,7; 2 Sam 7,5; 1 Kön 1,13 bzw. trotz Injunktiv: 2 Sam 5,2; 19,30 (hier geht das aus sPP der 2. pers. und einem Substantiv zusammengesetzte Subjekt ausnahmsweise dem Verb voran; oder sollte es sich trotz Injunktiv um Vokative handeln?); 1 Kön 21,7.

[72] Topikalisierung jeweils trotz Vetitiv bzw. verneintem Satz.

[73] Vgl. 9,8e. Zugleich fokussiert: *mʾd*.

[74] Die Frage 5,8d ist wegen 7d verstanden als: „Wohin können wir sie bringen?"

[75] Sogar aus (dem mächtigen) Ägypten – jetzt aber (an das viel kleinere) Midian. Topikalisierung trotz verneinter rhetorischer Frage.

[76] Trotz Injunktiv und Länge des topikalisierten direkten Objekts.

[77] Von YHWH, nicht von Menschen wie uns.

[78] Jenseits, nicht hier.

[79] Ein Rätsel in zwei parallelen Sätzen; jeweils interne Spannung zwischen vorgestellter Ergänzung der Richtung und nachgestelltem Subjekt. Vgl. E. König, Stilistik, Rhetorik, Poetik in

Diese Sätze belegen folgende Regel: Wenn in asyndetischen ersten Redesätzen anstelle des Subjekts eine andere Ergänzung in das Vorfeld tritt, so ist sie fokussiert oder Rhema. *#Ergänzung [außer Subj.] - Verb - Subjekt - (...)#* ist die markierte Reihenfolge.

Sätze mit *topikalisiertem Subjekt*:

- Das Subjekt ist Rhema:
  Ex 3,14f[82]; 3,15c[83]; Ri 6,29f.
- Das Subjekt ist fokussiert:
  - Formale Indizien:
    - Partikel *gm*:
      2 Sam 12,13.
    - Opposition bzw. Verhältnis Bejahung–Verneinung zum Kontext:
      1 Kön 12,4a (zu 4b); 12,10e (zu 10f); 12,10h[84]; 12,14b (zu 14c); 2 Kön 10,18c (zu 18d).
  - Mitgedachte Opposition:
    Gen 3,13d[85]; 22,8; 24,40; Ri 7,2e[86].
  - Sonstige Fokussierung:
    Gen 6,13; 46,31; 47,1; Ri 9,54; 10,11[87]; 16,17; 1 Sam 11,12[88]; 2 Sam 5,8[89]; 19,10b[90]; 1 Kön 1,24c[91].
- Das Subjekt ist evtl. fokussiert:
  Gen 19,9; 47,5[92]; 1 Sam 21,3b; 1 Kön 21,23.
- Das Subjekt ist nicht fokussiert:
  Gen 43,29; 48,3; 50,5; 50,16; Ex 2,19; 3,13d; 3,16d; 3,18; 5,3b; 7,16; Jos 17,4; 21,2; Ri 13,6[93]; 1 Sam 2,30; 25,40; 2 Sam 19,27b; 24,23; 1 Kön 20,17; 20,39; 2 Kön 1,6b; 3,7; 8,9; 14,9; 17,26.
  Vgl. 1 Kön 20,17: *ʾnšym yṣʾw mšmrwn: Männer sind aus Samaria ausgerückt.*

Bezug auf die Biblische Literatur komparativisch dargestellt, 1900, 12: „Speise kam – gegen alle Erwartung – vom Fresser."

80 Um diesen Ort geht es im folgenden.

81 *spr* ist zwar indeterminiert, aber Hauptgegenstand dieser Erzählung; vgl. dazu das ebenfalls topikalisierte *spr htwrh*, dessen Determination nur aus der Perspektive des Erzählers erklärlich ist, in 22,8.

82 Sonderfall: Subjekt ist ein (nominalisiertes) verbum finitum.

83 Antwort auf die Frage 3,13f.

84 Opposition zur Vergleichsgröße im Hauptfeld desselben Satzes.

85 Nicht ich (vgl. Frage 13b), sondern die Schlange.

86 Meine, nicht YHWHs Hand (vgl. 2b).

87 In rhetorischer Frage. Sehr langes Subjekt, teilweise mit *mn*.

88 In rhetorischer Frage ohne Fragepartikel: „Ausgerechnet Saul sollte über uns König sein/werden?"

89 Negierter Satz. Sinn und Kontextbezug sind undeutlich.

90 Vgl. 10c: *whwʾ*.

91 Vgl. 24d: *whwʾ*. Außerdem mitgedachte Opposition: Adonija, nicht Salomo. Topikalisierung trotz Injunktiv.

92 Ist hier wegen der parallelen Wendungen mit jeweils langem Subjekt 46,31 und 47,1 Fokussierung anzunehmen?

93 Falls *hʾlhym* sekundär ist und hier ausgeschieden werden muß. Vgl. die Kommentare.

Die Belege erhärten folgende Regel für asyndetische erste Redesätze: Das Vorfeld ist zwar die angemessene Position für Subjekt = Rhema und für fokussiertes Subjekt. Aber die Vorfeldstellung des Subjekts allein beweist noch nicht, daß dieses Rhema oder fokussiert ist. Im Gegensatz zu den sonstigen Ergänzungen steht nämlich auch nicht-fokussiertes Subjekt im Vorfeld. *#Subjekt - Verb - weitere Ergänzungen - (...)#* ist somit die strukturelle Normalfolge; sie wird auch dann gewählt, wenn kein Satzteil fokussiert ist.

Sätze mit *Verb in Spitzenstellung:*

- Das Verb ist fokussiert, d.h. die Aufmerksamkeit wird auf die Verbalhandlung als solche gelenkt:
  Gen 30,6b[94]; 30,20[95]; 31,1; Ri 21,6; 1 Sam 4,17; 4,21; 4,22; 6,21; 13,4b[96]; 14,29; 15,28; 23,7; 26,8; 2 Sam 5,20; 6,12; 13,30; 15,10; 19,3; 1 Kön 21,13; 2 Kön 9,18i[97].
- Im Kontext kann das Verb als fokussiert aufgefaßt werden, jedoch sind die Indizien nicht zwingend:
  Gen 30,18b[98]; 30,23[99]; 42,30[100]; Jos 10,17; 2 Kön 8,13. In der dreifach bezeugten Wendung 1 Sam 18,7; 21,12; 29,5 geht das Verb voran trotz starker Opposition zweier Subjekte und Präpositionalobjekte[101].
- Das Verb steht zu Beginn, weil die beiden Ergänzungen aus verschiedenen Gründen im Hauptfeld zu stehen kommen: das Subjekt, weil es einen Relativsatz bei sich hat, die Ergänzung der Richtung, weil sie als ePP realisiert ist und bei Topikalisierung infolgedessen starke Betonung angezeigt wäre:
  Gen 39,17[102].
- Es bleibt eine Gruppe von Sätzen, für deren vorausstehendes Verb ich Fokussierung nicht erkennen (aber auch nicht ausschließen) kann. Sie haben alle dasselbe Verb *Bō³*:
  Gen 27,35; Ri 16,2; 1 Sam 4,7; 15,12; 2 Sam 3,23; 2 Kön 8,7.

#Verb - Ergänzungen - (...)#, wobei eine Ergänzung = Subjekt, ist somit die Satzteilfolge für fokussiertes Verb. Es ist unklar, ob sie auch für neutrale Satzteilfolge verwendet wird.

5. Ergebnis

Der Versuch, diejenigen Repräsentanten von Satzteilen, die obligatorisch oder überwiegend im Vorfeld bzw. an der Spitze des Satzes stehen, von denjenigen

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94 Vgl. 6c: *wgm* + Verb.

95 Das Verb bildet zusammen mit dem direkten Objekt am Satzende eine figura etymologica.

96 Vgl. 4c: *wgm* + Verb.

97 Verhältnis Bejahung–Verneinung zu 18k.

98 Betonte Entsprechung von *NTN* in 18b+c?

99 Betont wegen Wortspiel 23d: *³SP* – 24b: *YSP*?

100 Das vorausstehende Verb bildet zusammen mit dem inneren Objekt am Satzende eine auf diese Weise den Satz hervorgehobene rahmende Verbalhandlung: *dbr qšwt*.

101 Diese Opposition ist allerdings durch die Satzteilfolge nicht angezeigt. Vielleicht liegt – in gespielter Naivität? – neutrale Folge vor. Wie Saul diesen Vers versteht, verdeutlicht der Erzähler in 1 Sam 18,8e, indem er die Satzteilfolge fokussierend abändert.

102 Zusätzlich liegt das Verb *Bō³* vor; vgl. dazu das folgende. Schließlich bildet das Verb zusammen mit der entscheidenden Angabe der Absicht (PV:Infcs) den Rahmen des Satzes.

Repräsentanten zu trennen, für die diese Position an der Spitze des Satzes je nach beabsichtigter Aussagenuance frei gewählt werden kann, hat sich bewährt; ebenso erwies es sich als sinnvoll, auch mit der Möglichkeit der Fokussierung des Verbs, nicht nur der nominalen/pronominalen Konstituenten zu rechnen. In diesem Rahmen ergeben sich für asyndetische erste Redesätze mit mindestens zwei Ergänzungen – unter Nichtbeachtung der evtl. vorhandenen freien Angaben – im Hinblick auf die freie Gestaltung des Satzbeginns folgende Satzteilfolgen und deren Funktionen:

- *#Ergänzungen [außer Subj.] - Verb - ...#* ist in allen Fällen – ob der Satz ein lexikalisch ausgedrücktes Subjekt hat oder nicht – die *markierte Satzteilfolge*: Die topikalisierte Ergänzung (außer Subjekt) ist fokussiert oder Rhema. Das entspricht der gängigen Meinung der Grammatiken. Hier verdient eher die gegenläufige Beobachtung Aufmerksamkeit, daß viele der obligatorisch topikalisierten Ergänzungen – z.B. das direkte Objekt *kh* in der Botenspruchformel – keinen Fokus tragen.
- *#Subjekt - Verb - Ergänzung - (...)#* ist im Gegensatz dazu die *strukturelle Normalfolge*. Sie wird für das Subjekt gewählt unabhängig davon, ob es fokussiert, Rhema oder nichtfokussiert ist. Regelhaft steht das Subjekt vor dem Verb. Dies widerspricht den Behauptungen der Mehrheit der Grammatiker. Weil bei asyndetischen ersten Redesätzen nur wenige Zusatzbedingungen aus dem Kontext Einfluß nehmen können, ist es nicht unwahrscheinlich, daß dies die „normale" Gestalt eines Verbalsatzes mit Subjekt ist[103].
- *#Verb - Ergänzungen [außer Subj.] - (...)#* ist bezüglich des Verbs die *strukturelle Normalfolge*; sie wird bei nicht-fokussierten Ergänzungen (außer Subjekt) gewählt für fokussiertes wie für nicht-fokussiertes Verb.
- *#Verb - Ergänzungen [darunter Subj.] - (...)#* ist hinsichtlich seines Status auf der Basis der asyndetischen ersten Redesätze nicht eindeutig zu bestimmen. Wahrscheinlich ist es die *markierte Satzteilfolge* für fokussiertes Verb. Es ist jedoch nicht auszuschließen, daß sie auch bei nicht-fokussiertem Verb möglich ist. In diesem Fall ist nicht klar, wie sie sich zu der Satzteilfolge mit topikalisiertem nicht-fokussiertem Subjekt verhält.

Zusammenfassung (abstract):

Die fast übereinstimmende Behauptung der Hebräisch-Grammatiken, dem Verb komme „normalerweise" die Spitzenstellung im Satz zu, das Subjekt rücke nur vor das Verb, wenn es besonders hervorgehoben sei, erweist sich bei verschiedenen Gruppen von Sätzen mit diesbezüglich variabler Satzteilfolge als falsch. In diesem Artikel wird sie an den asyndetischen ersten Redesätzen mit dem Ergebnis überprüft: Soweit die Vorausstellung des Subjekts nicht durch dessen Wortart etc. bedingt ist, sondern frei gewählt werden kann, gilt: Im Gegensatz zu den anderen von der Valenz des Verbs geforderten Satzteilen geht das Subjekt dem Verb immer, d.h. auch bei neutraler Satzteilfolge, voraus, wenn nicht stärkere Gründe (z.B. Hervorhebung

[103] Es gehört zu den Besonderheiten der hebräischen Verbalsyntax, daß bei allen (kontextuell überhaus häufigen) Und-dann-Folgen das Verb den Satz eröffnen *muß* mit der Konsequenz, daß alle Differenzierungen unter den nominalen/pronominalen Satzteilen nur innerhalb des Hauptfeldes angezeigt werden können, falls nicht eine Pendenskonstruktion gewählt wird.

anderer Satzteile, andere Satzteile als Fragewort oder Deiktikon) entgegenstehen. Bei Austauschproben, die für die Entdeckung von Stellungsregeln unabdingbar sind, muß die Tatsache einbezogen werden, daß außer den nominalen/pronominalen Satzteilen auch das Verb selbst im Fokus stehen kann.

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On Ante-Position of the Attributive Adjective in Classical Syriac and Biblical Hebrew

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If there is one rule of syntax which may safely be postulated for proto-Semitic it is post-position of the attributive adjective.[1] In all the classical Semitic languages substantive–adjective is the regular sequence if the adjective functions as attribute, indeed in most of them it is the exclusive sequence.[2] Though in languages belonging to different branches of Semitic the opposite sequence is attested, the distribution of this phenomenon suggests that it is not a part of the proto-Semitic heritage which was preserved in some and lost from other languages, but the result of relatively recent independent parallel developments.[3] The use of the sequence adjective–substantive has been researched fairly extensively for Ge'ez.[4] The phenomenon is noted, though not treated in depth, in the major grammars of Syriac.[5] With regard to Biblical Hebrew the usage has never clearly been recognized.[6]
In the present note some examples of ante-position representing a specific syntactic type will be gathered for Classical Syriac. The same type will then be identified in Biblical Hebrew.

In Syriac, ante-position of the attributive adjective is relatively frequent with the adjectives (ʾ)*ḥrēn* "other" and *saggī* "numerous".[7] Also, it is rather the rule with certain laudatory or blaming adjectives accompanying proper nouns, almost in the way of *epitheta ornantia*, like in *ṭūbānītā Maryam* "blessed Mary" or *šanyā Ma(ʾ)nī* "crazy Mani". Other cases of ante-position are relatively rare and disparate.[8] At least in as far as poetry is concerned, it seems that ante-positioning

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[1] The question may perhaps be raised whether the attributive use of the adjective was not in this way distinguished from its predicative use, which would normally imply the sequence adjective-substantive (i.e. predicate-subject).

[2] C. Brockelmann, Grundriß der vergleichenden Grammatik der semitischen Sprachen, Bd. II (Berlin 1913), 202-203, §§ 125-126.

[3] F.R. Blake, Comparative Syntax of the Combinations Formed by the Noun and its Modifiers in Semitic, JAOS 32 (1912), 135-267, esp. 158.

[4] A. Gai, The Place of the Attribute in Ge'ez, JSS 26 (1981), 257-265, with discussion of earlier literature.

[5] T. Nöldeke, Kurzgefaßte syrische Grammatik (Leipzig 1898[2]; repr. Darmstadt 1977), 160-161, § 211B; R. Duval, Traité de grammaire syriaque (Paris 1881; repr. Amsterdam 1969), 342-343, § 363. No specific information seems to be available for the other Aramaic dialects.

[6] Except for a few cases involving the adjective *rab*. See, e.g., P. Joüon, Grammaire de l'Hébreu biblique (Rome 1923), 435, § 141b.

[7] See the grammars quoted in n. 5. For an example with *zᶜōr* „few" see L. Leloir, Saint Ephrem. Commentaire de l'évangile concordant. Texte Syriaque (Dublin 1963), 188, § 31.

[8] This judgment is based on fairly extensive reading in mostly early Syriac sources.

the attributive adjective was simply an option which might sometimes be exercised by the author.

However, one relatively homogeneous group of examples can be found which allow of a straightforward explanation. When the substantive is an insignificant "prop" carrying no semantic information, the adjective, which then carries the essential information, may precede it. Examples:

Mara b. Serapion,[9] p. 47, l. 27 *hallēn dmeškḥān lamqabbālū ᶜāqāthōn dḥallāšē bnaynāšā* "(... steadfastness and endurance) which are able to bear the griefs of feeble men."

Thomas,[10] p. 316, l. 15 *prīšīn bīšē bnaynāšā* "The bad men have been separated."

Rom 7:24[11] *dāwyā (ᵓ)nā barnāšā mannū npaṣṣēn(y) men pagrā hānā dmawtā* "I am a miserable man![12] Who will deliver me from this body of death?"

Ahiqar, p. 22, l. 1,[13] *ber(y) ḥabbar ḥakkīmē nāšā dāḥlay men ᵓalāhā* "My son, associate with wise men, who fear God."

No subtle or complicated linguistic theory is needed to explain the inversion of the normal sequence substantive–adjective in these examples. The adjectives are in every case the significant element in the nominal phrase; what information is added by the substantive is secondary or even superfluous.[14] The more significant element then received the first position in the nominal phrase, for reasons of expressivity. The correctness of this analysis is buttressed by a few examples in which the substantive, though not merely a prop, adds no new information and takes the second position in the phrase:

Acts 6:1 *wabhōn byawmātā hānnōn kad sgīw talmīdē raṭṭen(w) (h)waw yawnāyē talmīdē ᶜal ᶜebrāyē* "Now in these days, when the disciples increased in number, the Greek disciples murmured against the Hebrew ones."

Since it was already clear from the context that disciples are meant, the second *talmīdē* does not add any meaningful information. It has almost become an empty "prop" as in the examples with *barnāšā/bnay (ᵓ)nāšā* above. This seems to be the reason of the exceptional order adjective–substantive.

Dan 8:21 *wṣeprāyā dᶜezzē malkā dyawnāyē wqarnā rabbtā dᵓīt bēt ᶜaynaw(hy) hūyū qadmāyā malkā* "And the he-goat is the king of the Greeks, and the great horn between his eyes is the first king."

As Brockelmann remarks, ordinal adjectives have a tendency in different languages to take a position before the substantive.[15] However, this may be precisely for the

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[9] The letter of Mara bar Serapion, in W. Cureton, Spicilegium syriacum (London 1885).

[10] The Acts of Thomas, in W. Wright, Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles, Vol. 1 (London 1865).

[11] According to the Peshitta version.

[12] In this example, the sequence adjective–substantive is discontinued by the 1st p. pronoun which functions as the subject of the clause.

[13] S. Grünberg, Die weisen Sprüche des Achikar (1917).

[14] One may wonder, indeed, why the substantives were added at all, since the adjectives – being "substantivized" – could very well have expressed the same meaning by themselves: *ḥallāšē* "weak ones" etc. Possibly, the substantive was added only to give some additional weight to the nominal phrases in question.

[15] VG II (see n. 2), 202.

reason we observe here, namely that with ordinal numbers, the substantive is often well understood.[16]

To recapitulate we may say that, in Syriac, attributive adjectives may take the first position in the nominal phrase when they transmit the decisive information. This is the case when the substantive is a) a "prop" word devoid of semantic value; b) known from the context as the entity under discussion.

There seems to be no modern grammar of Biblical Hebrew which recognizes the sequence adjective–substantive.[17] Yet a number of cases exist that may be analyzed in the same way as the Syriac examples discussed above. The first four examples involve the "prop" word *ʾādām* "man, human being".

Ezek 44:25 *wᵉʾel mēt ʾādām lōʾ yābōʾ lᵉṭomʾāh* "They shall not defile themselves by going near to a dead person." (RSV)[18]

Job 15:7 *hᵃr(ʾ)īšōn ʾādām tiwwālēd* "Are you the first man that was born?" (RSV)

Prov 15:20 *bēn ḥākām yᵉśammaḥ-ʾāb ukᵉsīl ʾādām bōzeh ʾimmō* "A wise son makes a glad father, but a foolish man despises his mother." (RSV).

Prov 21:20 *ʾōṣār neḥmād wāšemen binwēh ḥākām ukᵉsīl ʾādām yᵉballᵉʿennū* "A precious treasure and oil are in the house of the wise, but a foolish man devours it."

The usual analysis of these phrases has been to regard the adjective as *status constructus* and to take *ʾādām* as a genitive expressing *genus*.[19] An argument in favour of this view is the clear case of *status constructus* in Isa 29:19 *ʾebyōnē ʾādām*. This phrase, however, is in any case a bit different form the ones quoted above; it may actually carry a superlative meaning.[20]

A more simple and adequate view is to recognize in the four examples cases of ante-position of the adjective. The RSV, or other modern translations, show that the sense of the phrases so understood fits the context.[21] And the Semitistic parallels from Syriac (and Ge'ez, see below) show this analysis to be linguistically plausible.

Moreover, other examples cannot be explained as *status constructus*. One example involves the plural "prop" word *bᵉnē ʾādām* "human beings, men":

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16 Another example in 1 Cor 15:26.

17 Except the cases with *rab* as noted above (n. 6). To these should be added two cases involving *ʾeḥād*, which on all accounts is to be considered an adjective in BH, Num 31:28, 30. For exceptional cases of ante-position of the adjectival demonstrative, see J. Joosten, The Syntax of *zeh Mošeh* (Ex 32,1.23), ZAW 103 (1991), 412-415.

18 G.R. Driver, Ezechiel: Linguistic and Textual Problems, Bibl 35 (1954), 310, criticizes the RSV because it is "grammatically impossible"; that, however, is precisely the question. He analyzes *mēt* as *status constructus* and takes "a man's dead" in the sense of "someone else's dead". In view of the parallel Lev 21:1-2 I find this exegesis unconvincing.

19 GKC, 416, § 128l.

20 GKC, 428; § 132c; add, perhaps, the difficult *ḥakmōt nāšīm*, Prov 14:1.

21 Compare also the renderings in the Vulgate: Ezek 44:25 mortuum hominem; Job 15:7 primus homo; Prov 15:20 stultus homo; 21:20 imprudens homo.

Psalm 57:5 *napšī bᵉtōk lᵉbāʾīm ʾešᵏᵉbāh lohᵃṭīm bᵉnē ʾādām šinnēhem ḥᵃnīt wᵉḥiṣṣīm* "I lie in the midst of lions, fiery men, whose teeth are spears and arrows."[22]

In the following example, the substantive is probably not to be regarded as a "prop" word, but since it has been mentioned several times in the immediate context, it functions as such:

Gen 17:14 *wᵉᶜārēl zākār ʾᵃšer lōʾ-yimmōl ʾet-bᵉśar ᶜorlātō*... "Any uncircumcised male who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin..." (RSV).[23]

In both Psalm 57:5 and Gen 17:4 the masoretic accents separate the adjective from the following substantive. This indicates that the masoretes did not recognize the grammaticality of the sequence adjective–substantive.[24]

Conclusion

The remarkable parallelism – if the validity of the examples be granted – between Syriac and Biblical Hebrew syntax on this point, is further reinforced by a comparison with Ge'ez. It was observed by Amikam Gai that ante-position of the attributive adjective occurs under specific circumstances which, we now see, resemble those of Syriac and Hebrew:

> In special contexts, however, it is the attribute which can have the main informative value. In a sentence like "I want to drive the red car", the concept "car" is understood in relation the the verb "to drive", and in this particular instance it is only the colour which is the really new information of the entire noun-phrase. In other cases the noun has no informative value at all, and serves only as a basis, i.e. a grammatical prop, to the attribute. In such cases the attribute in Ge'ez can (but need not!) precede the noun.[25]

No one will attempt to derive the concurrence of Syriac, Hebrew and Ge'ez on this point from a common parent-language. We may be certain, therefore, to have traced a striking instance of independent parallel development in the syntax of the three languages.

Abstract:

The attributive adjective's following the substantive it describes is part of the proto-Semitic heritage in the different Semitic languages, as is confirmed by the reviews of Brockelmann and Blake. Yet in languages of different branches of Semitic, cases of ante-position of the attributive adjective occur, manifestly as the result of later development of the syntax of these languages.

In the present note, one set of cconditions under which anteposition occurs is investigated with regard to Classical Syriac and Biblical Hebrew. When the substantive has little or no informa-

[22] In The Dutch translation of the Bible Society: "Ik lig neder te midden van leeuwen, *vlammen spuwende mensenkinderen*, hun tanden zijn speer en pijlen."

[23] F.E. König, Historisch-kritisches Lehrgebäude der hebräischen Sprache, Bd. III (Leipzig 1897), 407, § 334ϑ, holds that *ᶜārēl* is the substantive and *zākār* the adjective. Note, however, that in the immediate context *zākār* figures several times as a substantive.

[24] As indeed this type of syntax seems to be absent from post-biblical Hebrew.

[25] A. Gai, JSS 26 (1981), 257-258. Gai speaks of the attribute in general since his study includes other types of adnominals, besides adjectives.

tive value, the attributive adjective may, in these languages, be positioned before it. This is the case when a) the substantive is a mere "prop" word (like 'man' or 'human being'); b) the substantive has been mentioned earlier in the context and is well understood.
Ante-position has been shown to occur under the same conditions in Geʾez by A. Gai. The concurrence of Hebrew, Syriac and Geʾez on this point is certainly due to independent parallel development in the syntax of these languages.

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Les Sémites selon Gen 10,21-30 et 1 Chr 1,17-23

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Le relevé des «fils de Sem», énumérés dans la Liste des Peuples après les «fils de Japhet» et les «fils de Cham»[1], comptait à l'origine 28 noms. La structure de cette troisième section de la Liste a été quelque peu bouleversée par le télescopage de deux noms, dont est issu celui d'Arpakshad, et par l'omission de Qénân après Aram dans le texte hébreu. La liste primitive comprenait 7 fils de Sem et 21 (3x7) petits-fils et arrière-petits-fils, dont 14 (2x7) formaient la famille de Yoqṭân.

Le nom de *ʿrpkšd* se décompose aisément en *ʿrp*, «bédouin», «Arabe», et en *kšd*, «Késed», «Chaldée». L'orthographe *ʿrp* en *p*, au lieu de *ʿrb*, dénote un emprunt au néo-assyrien qui avait perdu la distinction phonémique de la sonore *b* et de la sourde *p*[2] au point que les lettres de Ṭab-ṣill-Ešarra, gouverneur d'Ashur au temps de Sargon II, nomment les Arabes ^{kur}*Ar-pa-a-a*[3] ou ^{kur}*Ár-pa-a-a*[4], en se servant du signe cunéiforme *pa*[5]. Par contre, l'orthographe du nom de la Chaldée ou des Chaldéens, *kšd*, reflète la pratique araméenne et hébraïque de noter la latérale fricative /ś/ au moyen d'un *shin*, alors que les textes akkadiens s'efforcent de rendre la composante latérale du phonème en l'écrivant *-ld-*: ^{kur}*Kal-du/-di*, $^{kur/lú}$*Kal-da/-dà-a-a*[6]. La disparition du nom d'Arpakshad dans la Liste des Peuples a des implications chronologiques pour les généalogies bibliques de Gen 11,10-32 et 1 Chr 1,24-28 qui comportent ce nom hybride et présupposent déjà la télescopage de *ʿrp* et de *kšd*. Elles ne pourront guère remonter au delà de la période perse.

Le nom de Qénân, qui manque dans les manuscrits hébreux, est en revanche préservé par la LXX sous la forme Καιναν. C'est la transcription de *qynn* qui est attesté en hébreu dans Gen 5,9-14 et 1 Chr 1,2. La section καὶ Αρφαξαδ ἐγέννησεν τὸν Καιναν de Gen 10,24 est évidemment un doublet de καὶ Καιναν ἐγέννησεν τὸν Σαλα (Gen 10,25), destiné à harmoniser la *Vorlage* de la LXX avec celle du TM,

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[1] E. Lipiński, «Les Japhétites selon Gen 10,2-4 et 1 Chr 1,5-7», ZAH 3, 1990, p. 40-53; id., «Les Chamites selon Gen 10,6-20 et 1 Chr 1,8-16», ZAH 5, 1992, p. 134-161.

[2] GAG, Erg. § 27b; E. Lipiński, Studies in Aramaic Inscriptions and Onomastics I (OrLovAn 1), Leuven 1975, p. 92 et 112.

[3] S. Parpola, The Correspondence of Sargon II, Part I: Letters from Assyria and the West (State Archives of Assyria I), Helsinki 1987, nº 82,5 et r. 10.

[4] Ibid., nº 84, r. 4.

[5] Il résulte, en réalité, de l'étude inédite de K. Deller, Lautlehre des Neuassyrischen, Wien 1959, p. 241, que le signe cunéiforme PA servait en néo-assyrien à noter un *ba* étymologique, mais il ne s'ensuit pas que PA avait alors la valeur phonétique de *bá*.

[6] D.O. Edzard, «Kaldu», RLA V, Berlin – New York 1976-80, p. 291-297 (voir p. 296), semble compliquer inutilement le problème. C'est probablement de la même manière qu'il faut expliquer l'origine de l'orthographe *A/Il-tam-meš-* et *A/Il-te-eḫ-ri-*, avec variantes, des éléments théophores *Śameš-* et *Śehr-* dans les noms propres araméens de l'époque néo-babylonienne, quand *-lt-* servait à noter la même latérale fricative /ś/. Cette orthographe en *A/Il-* se retrouve dans d'autres noms araméens, ainsi *A/Il-ta-gi-bi* = *Śagīb(ī)*. Le signe *al/il* ne peut être interprété dans le sens de «dieu».

selon lequel «Arpakshad engendra Shélah» (Gen 10,24a). Cette dernière leçon est certainement secondaire, car l'énumération des fils d'Aram (Gen 10,23) doit être suivie de celle des descendants d'un fils de Sem mentionné après Aram, – comme c'est le cas de Qénân dans la LXX, – et pas d'un fils de Sem qui précède Aram dans la liste de Gen 10,22. Par conséquent, il faut suivre ici le texte de la LXX en y supprimant toutefois les mots «et Arpakshad engendra Qénân», qui contredisent du reste la mention de Qénân parmi les fils de Sem, en Gen 10,22.

Selon la Liste des Peuples, les «fils de Sem» sont les peuples et les pays de l'Orient, ce que souligne déjà la notice géographique de Gen 10,30. Le nom même de Sem, *Šēm*, ne comporte toutefois aucune connotation d'ordre géographique ou climatique, mais semble signifier tout simplement «nom», probablement dans l'acception de «premier-né», qui perpétue le nom, comme dans Dtn 25,6 et, très souvent, dans l'anthroponymie sémitique. Les «fils de Sem» sont donc les descendants par excellence de Noé et, du reste, c'est Sem qui est nommé en premier lieu parmi les enfants de Noé dans Gen 10,1. Le groupe des «fils de Sem» manque cependant d'homogénéité raciale ou linguistique, puisqu'il comprend les Élamites et les Lydiens. C'est uniquement la localisation géographique, réelle ou présumée, de ses membres qui explique la constitution de ce groupe «oriental».

1. Fils de Sem: «Fils de Sem: Élam, Ashur, Arabie, Késed, Lud, Aram, Qénân» (Gen 10,22; 1 Chr 1,17a).

1.1. Élam – L'hébreu *ʿÊlām* (*ʿylm*) n'a pas la désinence *-tu* de l'*Elamtu* akkadien et dérive par conséquent du gentilice *Elamû/Elamî*, connu peut-être par l'intermédiaire de l'araméen[7]. Pays de haute culture, où une écriture pictographique, puis linéaire, partiellement déchiffrée en 1961, était en usage dès le milieu du IIIe millénaire, l'Élam eut toujours des rapports avec la Mésopotamie, avec laquelle il fut très souvent en conflit[8]. Devenu vassal de l'Empire d'Akkad, l'Élam adopta l'écriture cunéiforme mésopotamienne et se servit même de l'akkadien à l'époque de l'apogée de l'«Ancien Empire» élamite, aux XVIIIe et XVIIe siècles. Au XVIIIe siècle, il entretenait des relations avec Mari et, sous Kuter-Naḫḫunte I (XVIIe siècle), les Élamites menèrent en Mésopotamie une campagne mémorable dont le souvenir persista au moins jusqu'au temps d'Assurbanipal, au VIIe siècle av J.-C. On en trouve peut-être un écho légendaire dans la mention du roi Kedor-Laomer d'Élam dans Gen 14. Les XIIIe et XIIe siècles furent une nouvelle époque glorieuse de l'histoire d'Élam dont les rois régnaient sur Suse et Anshan. Les troupes conduites par Shutruk-Naḫḫunte pillèrent Sippar et Babylone, emportant à Suse, comme trophées de guerre, la stèle du Code d'Hammurabi et la statue de Marduk, le grand dieu de Babylone. Le déclin de l'Élam fut cependant rapide et c'est seulement au VIIIe siècle qu'on le

[7] Cf. «les Élamites», *ʿĒlmāyē᾽*, dans Esd 4,9.

[8] Pour l'histoire de l'Élam, en général, on peut se reporter à CAH I/1[3], p. 154-155; I/2[3], p. 644-680; II/1[3], p. 256-288; II/2[3], p. 379-416 et 482-506; III/2[2], cf. l'index. Voir aussi DBS II, col. 920-962; EncJud VI, col. 562-564; TRE IX, p. 491-493; The Cambridge History of Iran I-II, Cambridge 1968-85; F. Vallat, Suse et l'Élam, Paris 1980; E. Carther – M.W. Stolper, Elam, Berkeley 1984.

retrouve allié aux tribus chaldéennes et à Marduk-apla-iddina II en lutte contre l'Assyrie[9]. Les guerres élamites tinrent les Assyriens en haleine depuis le début du règne d'Assurbanipal jusqu'à la prise de Suse en 639 av. J.-C. Les invasions assyriennes, dont le récit est regroupé dans les Annales d'Assurbanipal sous les titres de cinquième et de huitième campagnes, semèrent la destruction dans l'Élam, qui ne se releva plus de ses ruines. L'oracle de Jér 49,35-38 s'inspire peut-être de ces événements. À la chute de l'Empire néo-assyrien, l'Élam fut incorporé à la Médie. Sa mention aux côtés de la Médie dans les prophéties d'Is 21,2 et de Jér 25,25 doit se rapporter à cette période, mais la Liste des Peuples nomme l'Élam juste avant l'Assyrie et semble ainsi comporter une réminiscence des rapports récents et belliqueux entre l'Élam et l'Assyrie, notamment dans les années 669-639 av. J.-C.

1.2. Ashur – L'orthographe hébraïque *ʾšwr*, toujours avec la *mater lectionis* à l'exception de 1 Chr 5,6, correspond à celle de la plupart des attestations du toponyme dans les inscriptions araméennes des VIIIe et VIIe siècles av. J.-C.[10]. Ce n'est pas la ville d'Ashur qui est mentionnée ici, mais l'Assyrie avec laquelle Israël et Juda avaient des contacts au moins depuis le début du IXe siècle, puisque Israël était connu en Assyrie sous le nom de «Maison d'Omri», *Bīt-Ḫumrî*[11]. Il est douteux que la Liste des Peuples eût placé l'Assyrie parmi les tout premiers «fils de Sem» si l'État assyrien avait déjà disparu de la scène de l'histoire, laissant le champ libre à la Babylonie de Nabopolassar qui n'est même pas mentionnée comme telle dans la Liste.

1.3. Arabie – C'est l'Arabie du Nord, le Nord du Sinaï et la steppe syrienne qui étaient la patrie des Arabes au sens propre du terme[12]. Les sources néo-assyriennes les distinguaient, par exemple, des Sabéens[13] et les inscriptions sud-arabiques de l'époque biblique, voire des premiers siècles de notre ère, qualifient d'Arabes les

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9 J.A. Brinkman, «Elamite Military Aid to Merodach-Baladan», JNES 24, 1965, p. 161-166.

10 KAI 215 = TSSI II, 14.7.11.12.13.15.16.17.(18: *ʾšr*); TSSI II,15,9; KAI 217 =TSSI II,16,9; KAI 233 = TSSI II,20,11.16.17.18.

11 Ces rapports ont souvent été étudiés; cf., entre autres, E. Lipiński, «Aram et Israël du Xe au VIIIe siècle av.n.è.», Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 27, 1979 (1981), p. 49-102, en particulier p. 72-101; H. Spieckermann, Juda unter Assur in der Sargonidenzeit (FRLANT 129), Göttingen 1982.

12 Pour les sources anciennes, on peut se référer à M. Weippert, «Die Kämpfe des assyrischen Königs Assurbanipal gegen die Araber», WO 7, 1973-74, p. 39-85; I. Ephʿal, «'Ismael' and 'Arab(s)': A Transformation of Ethnological Terms», JNES 35, 1976, p. 225-235; id., «'Arabs' in Babylonia in the 8th Century B.C.», JAOS 94, 1979, p. 108-115; id., The Ancient Arabs, Jerusalem 1982; F.M. Donner, «Xenophon's Arabia», Iraq 48, 1986, p. 1-14; E.A. Knauf, Ismael. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Palästinas und Nordarabiens im 1. Jahrtausend v. Chr., 2e éd., Wiesbaden 1989. On se reportera aussi aux deux recueils d'articles de J. Henninger, Arabica sacra (OBO 40), Freiburg – Göttingen 1981, et id., Arabica varia (OBO 90), Freiburg – Göttingen 1989. Pour l'ancienne onomastique, on peut consulter G. Lankester Harding, An Index and Concordance of Pre-Islamic Arabian Names and Inscriptions, Toronto 1971, et R. Zadok, On West Semites in Babylonia during the Chaldean and Achaemenian Periods: An Onomastic Study, 2e éd., Jerusalem 1978, p. 193-239.

13 Cf. E. Lipiński, art.cit. (n. 1), ZAH 5, 1992, p. 146-148.

bédouins qui menaçaient les populations sédentaires de l'actuel Yémen ou qui, au contraire, se mettaient à leur service[14]. Le nom générique des Arabes était en hébreu biblique *ʿărāb*[15] ou *ʿărābî*/ *ʿarbî*[16], un dérivé gentilice. L'orthographe *ʿrp* ne se rencontrait que dans la source de Gen 10,22 et 1 Chr 1,17, certainement sous l'influence de la prononciation néo-assyrienne[17]. La plus ancienne attestation du terme en akkadien (kur*Ar-ba-a-a*) remonte au début du règne de Salmanasar III (858-824 av. J.-C.). Comme les Israélites et surtout les Judéens ont été en contact avec les tribus nord-arabiques tout au long de leure histoire, il est vraisemblable que, dès le commencement du Ier millénaire avant notre ère, le terme «Arabe» était employé aussi en hébreu, bien que l'on fît plutôt usage des noms spécifiques des tribus nommément connues. Les inscriptions royales assyriennes attribuent le qualificatif d'Arabes aux gens de la grande tribu de Qédar[18], à ceux de Sumuʾil, qui n'est pas une variante du nom d'Ismaël, à ceux d'Idibaʾil, identique à l'Adbéel biblique[19], puis à Épha, en réalité *ʿAyappāh*[20], Thamoud, Ibadidi et Marsîmani, dont une erreur scribale (*r* > *b*) a fait peut-être le *Mibśām* de la Bible[21], qu'il faudrait alors corriger en *Maršīm*, dont *Marsīmāni* serait le pluriel[22]. Il y a cependant d'autres tribus que les textes assyriens mettent en rapport avec les Arabes sans leur attribuer explicitement cette dénomination. Ce sont les gens de Téma, de Massa, les Méûnites, les Nebayot, les *Ḫattiaya* et les *Badanaya*[23]. Plusieurs de ces tribus se retrouvent parmi les descendants d'Ismaël, en Gen 25,13-15 et 1 Chr 29-31, d'où il résulte que ces textes nous donnent une liste de tribus et d'oasis, dont plusieurs sont attestées dès le VIIIe siècle av. J.-C. Les Arabes en

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14 Cf., par exemple, CIS IV, 79,9-10; 343,14; 350,9; 353,10; 397,7-8; 540,2; 541,8; G. Ryckmans, «Inscriptions sud-arabes. Dixième série», Mus 66, 1953, p. 267-317 (voir p. 285-286, nº 507,2). On rencontre le nom collectif *ʿrb* et le pluriel *ʾʿrb* ou *ʿrbn-*. Les fouilles italiennes sur le site d'ad-Durayb, dans le Wādī Yalā (Yémen), prouvent qu'il faut remonter considérablement les dates de la «chronologie basse» des inscriptions sud-arabiques; cf. A. de Maigret - Ch. Robin, «Les fouilles italiennes de Yalâ (Yémen du Nord): nouvelles données sur la chronologie de l'Arabie du Sud préislamique», CRAI 1989, p. 255-291.

15 Is 21,13 (?); Jér 25,24; Éz 27,21; 2 Chr 9,14.

16 Is 13,20; Jér 3,2; Néh 2,19; 4,1; 6,1; 2 Chr 17,11; 22,1; 26,7.

17 On notera que la désonorisation du *b* final semble être à la base de la forme grecque Ἄραψ, attestée p.ex. chez Flavius Josèphe (A. Schalit, Namenwörterbuch zu Flavius Josephus, Leiden 1968, p. 15), puis chez Nonnos de Panopolis, Dionysiaques XXXVI, 326, etc., avec un pluriel Ἄραβες, cependant (XXVI, 23, etc.). On trouve aussi Ἄραψ en épigraphie.

18 Gen 25,13; 1 Chr 1,29. Cf. I. Ephʿal, op. cit. (n. 12), The Ancient Arabs, p. 54-56, 147-169, 223-227; E.A. Knauf, op.cit. (n. 12), *passim*.

19 Gen 25,13; 1 Chr 1,29. Cf. I. Ephʿal, ibid., p. 215-216.

20 Cette tribu (Gen 25,4; Is 60,6; 1 Chr 1,33), dont certaines familles se sont mêlées au clan qenizzite de Caleb (1 Chr 2,46), puis se sont établies à Netopha, au sud de Bethléem (Jér 40,8; cf. Esd 2,22; Néh 7,26), est mentionnée sous le nom de *Ḫayappâ* dans les inscriptions néo-assyriennes de la fin du VIIIe siècle, qui la localisent en Arabie du Nord. Sargon II affirme avoir déporté des survivants d'Épha en Samarie. Cf. I. Ephʿal, ibid., p. 216-217.

21 Gen 25,13; 1 Chr 1,29. Cf. I. Ephʿal, ibid., p. 218. Le nom propre *Mibśām* en 1 Chr 4,25 doit cependant être correct, puisqu'il est attesté en safaïtique, cf. G. Lankester Harding, op.cit. (n. 12), p. 525, s.v. *Mbšm*.

22 On notera que le «s» néo-assyrien correspond généralement au «š» ouest-sémitique.

23 I. Ephʿal, ibid., p. 179-191 et 216-223.

question étaient des «grands nomades», c'est-à-dire des éleveurs de dromadaires, qui les obligeaient à se déplacer sur des distances parfois considérables à la recherche de pâturages et de points d'eau. Des campements d'hiver dans le Nefūd aux lieux d'estivage en Syrie du Nord, les tribus chamelières transhument sur 600 ou 800 km. Il en était de même dans l'Antiquité, et c'est ainsi qu'en 853 av. J.-C., le cheikh arabe Gindibu prit part à la bataille de Qarqar, sur l'Oronte, avec un millier de chameliers. D'autres tribus se déplaçaient vers l'Euphrate, où elles entraient en contact avec la civilisation sédentaire de la Mésopotamie. C'est à ces bédouins que fait probablement allusion la Liste des Peuples qui mentionne *ʿrp* entre l'Assyrie (*ʾšwr*) et la Chaldée (*Kśd*). Encore aux IIe-IIIe siècles de notre ère, les souverains de Hatra, au sud-ouest de Mossul, se donnaient le titre de «roi d'Arabie» ou «des Arabes», *mlkʾ dy ʿrb*[24].

1.4. Késed – Ce n'est pas la Babylonie, mais la Chaldée (*Kśd*), qui est mentionnée après l'Arabie. Ceci semble indiquer que les informations de l'auteur de la Liste des Peuples sont antérieures à la fondation de l'Empire néo-babylonien par Nabopolassar (625-605 av. J.-C.). Les Chaldéens du Pays de la Mer, à l'extrémité septentrionale du Golfe Persique, sont attestés à partir du IXe siècle av. J.-C. Leur éponyme Késed est frère d'Aram, non seulement selon la Liste des Peuples (Gen 10,22; 1 Chr 1,17), mais aussi selon la liste des tribus araméennes qui donne la «descendance» de Nahor (Gen 22,21-22). Le nombre d'anthroponymes chaldéens actuellement connus est trop limité pour livrer une preuve décisive de la parenté des Araméens et des Chaldéens, dont la plupart adoptèrent l'onomastique babylonienne. En revanche, il est important de noter que les noms des grandes tribus chaldéennes dérivent de noms propres araméens.

Bien que la transcription *Byt ʾwkn* de *Bīt-Amukkani* dans la lettre araméenne d'Ashur[25] reflète une prononciation néo-babylonienne, caractérisée par le changement *m* > *w* en position intervocalique, il ne fait guère de doute que le toponyme dérive de *ʿAmūqān*, dont la forme *ʿAmōq*/Αμουκ, sans l'afformante *-ān*, est attestée par deux noms de la liste de Néh 12,7.20. *Bīt-Dakkūri* comporte évidemment l'anthroponyme *Ḏakkūr*, identique à *Zakkūr*, tandis que *Bīt-Yakīn(i)* comprend le nom abrégé *Yākîn*, connu également en hébreu[26]. *Bīt-Saʾalli/Salli/Sāla/Šaʾalla* contient l'anthroponyme araméen *Šaʾal*, attesté parmi les Araméens d'Égypte[27] et dans Esd 10,29, et *Bīt-Sillāni/Sillāna/Šilāni* comporte le nom *Šillān*, dont on trouve les variantes *Šallūn* dans Néh 3,15 et *Salilānu* en néo-assyrien[28], ce qui correspond à **Šalilān* en araméen. Ces composantes des noms de tribus confirment l'étroite parenté des Chaldéens et des Araméens.

En revanche, les liens présumés des Chaldéens avec l'Arabie orientale ne se basent que sur les quelques inscriptions dites «chaldéennes», qui sont écrites en caractères

[24] F. Vattioni, Le iscrizioni di Ḥatra (AION, Suppl. 28), Napoli 1981, n°s 193,2; 195,1-2; 196,1-2; 197; 198,2-3; 199; 203,2-3; 231,2.

[25] KAI 233 = TSSI II, 20,4.9.13.

[26] Gen 46,10; Ex 6,15; Num 26,12.

[27] W. Kornfeld, Onomastica Aramaica aus Ägypten, Wien 1978, p. 72: *Šʾl*; F. Preisigke, Namenbuch, Heidelberg 1922, col. 355: Σαάλ.

[28] Th. Kwasman – S. Parpola, Legal Transactions of the Royal Court of Nineveh, Part I (SAA VI), Helsinki 1991, p. 333b (index).

sud-arabiques et ont été trouvées en Babylonie méridionale[29]: trois à Ur, une à Uruk, une à Nippur et une à Tell Abu Ṣalabikh[30]. La présence de ces inscriptions dans cette région n'est guère surprenante, car des inscriptions en écriture sud-arabique ont été trouvées aussi dans l'oasis d'al-Ḥasā[31], région du Nord-Est de l'Arabie Séoudite qui est encore peu explorée du point de vue archéologique, mais qui a dû connaître, dans l'Antiquité, un niveau relativement élevé de civilisation et a été très tôt en contact avec la Mésopotamie méridionale.

1.5. Lud – Lud, la «Lydie», était déjà mentionné parmi les descendants de Cham[32] et, sous le nom de Magog, parmi les fils de Japhet[33]. Rien ne justifie une correction de *Lwd*, si ce n'est en **Lwr*, en raison de la quasi-identité des lettres *d* et *r*. **Lûr* pourrait être une référence aux Lurs qui habitaient le Luristan, mais aucune source ne les mentionne vers le milieu du Ier millénaire av. J.-C. Il vaut donc mieux s'en tenir ici au texte reçu et supposer que la mention de Lud parmi les «fils de Sem», c'est-à-dire les gens de l'Orient, s'explique par la source assyrienne de la Liste qui faisait état des relations entre Assurbanipal et le roi Gygès de Lydie[34]. L'auteur de la Liste des Peuples en aurait profité pour mentionner la Lydie également parmi les «fils de Sem».

1.6. Aram – La mention des Araméens parmi les «fils de Sem» ne demande aucun commentaire particulier. Leurs tribus se sont établies surtout en Syrie et en Mésopotamie, constituant divers petits royaumes que l'Assyrie avait déjà conquis et annexés à l'époque dont datent les informations de l'auteur de la Liste des Peuples[35].

1.7. Qénân – Ce nom de «fils de Sem», préservé par la LXX, est identique à celui du fils d'Énosh, «Homme», le seul connu de la Bible hébraïque (Gen 5,9-14; 1 Chr

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29 W.F. Albright, «The Chaldean Inscriptions in Proto-Arabic Script», BASOR 128, 1958, p. 39-45.

30 E. Burrows, «A New Kind of Old Arabic Writing from Ur», JRAS 1926, p. 795-806, avec une photographie dans C.L. Woolley – M.E.L. Mallowan, Ur Excavations IX. The Neo-Babylonian and Persian Periods, London 1962, pl. 36; B. Kienast, «Mitteilung von einer Tontafel mit altsüdarabischer Beschriftung», Uruk. Vorläufiger Bericht 13 (Abh. der Deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft 3), Berlin 1958, p. 43-44 et pl. 46; G. Roux, «Recently Discovered Ancient Sites in the Hammar Lake District (Southern Iraq)», Sumer 16, 1960, p. 20-31 (voir p. 27-28 et pl. 6); R.D. Biggs, «A Chaldaean Inscription from Nippur», BASOR 179, 1965, p. 36-38.

31 A. Jamme, Sabaean and Hasaean Inscriptions from Saudi Arabia (Studi semitici 23), Roma 1966.

32 Gen 10,13; cf. E. Lipiński, art.cit. (n. 1), ZAH 5, 1992, p. 150-151.

33 Gen 10,2; cf. E. Lipiński, art.cit. (n. 1), ZAH 3, 1990, p. 41-43.

34 Cf. E. Lipiński, loc.cit., p. 42.

35 Parmi les ouvrages récents traitant de l'histoire des Araméens, on peut mentionner W. Pitard, Ancient Damascus, Winona Lake 1987; H.A. Sader, Les États araméens de Syrie depuis leur fondation jusqu'à leur transformation en provinces assyriennes, Beirut 1987; G.G.G. Reinhold, Die Beziehungen Altisraels zu den aramäischen Staaten in der israelitisch-judäischen Königszeit, Frankfurt/M – Bern 1989; S. Ponchia, L'Assiria e gli Stati transeufratici, Padova 1991.

1,2). Il s'agit toutefois de deux Qénân distincts, du moins au niveau de la rédaction; ils apparaissent comme des personnages différents également dans Jub 4,13 et 8,1.
Le nom de Qénân (*qynn*) semble bien être le mot *qayn*, «Forgeron», augmenté de l'afformante araméenne *-ān* qui s'ajoute surtout à des noms monosyllabes. Il n'évoque pas un peuple, mais l'ancêtre présumé d'une ancienne caste professionnelle, en l'occurrence celle des forgerons. Une tradition sémitique rattachait les castes des nomades pasteurs, musiciens, forgerons ambulants, à des ancêtres éponymes dont le nom rappelait le métier de leurs descendants. On en trouve la trace dans Gen 4,20-21 et chez Philon de Byblos qui assigne un ancêtre aux chasseurs et aux pêcheurs, à savoir Agreus, «Chasseur» (hébreu *ṣayyād*), et Halieus, «Pêcheur» (hébreu *dayyāg*, ugaritique *dgy*), auxquels il donne une généalogie fictive[36].
Le Livre des Jubilés, dont des fragments de l'original hébreu ont été découverts à Qumrân[37], attribue à Qénân (Kaïnam) la science de la divination par les astres (Jub 8,2-4): «Son père lui apprit l'écriture. Il partit se rechercher un endroit où il pourrait posséder une ville. Il découvrit une inscription que des anciens avaient gravée sur le roc. Il lut et copia ce qui s'y trouvait et s'égara de ce fait: il s'y trouvait la doctrine des Veilleurs selon laquelle ils pratiquaient la divination par le soleil, la lune et les étoiles dans tous les signes du ciel. Il la mit par écrit mais n'en dit mot».
Le Yosippon hébraïque 2,18 attribue cette science à Qénân, fils d'Énosh, qui aurait gravé tous les secrets de l'avenir sur des tables de pierre que Alexandre le Grand découvre en Inde. Selon Flavius Josèphe, en revanche, l'invention de l'astronomie revient aux descendants de Seth, le troisième fils d'Adam: ils auraient gravé leur enseignement sur deux stèles, l'une de brique, l'autre de pierre, de manière à le préserver de la conflagration universelle et du déluge à venir[38]. Une histoire comparable à celle de Qénân est transmise par Diodore de Sicile, selon lequel Évhémère de Messène aurait découvert, sur l'île de Panchaïa, une stèle d'or dont les inscriptions révélaient l'origine historique des mythes religieux[39].
Il ne semble toutefois pas que la légende de Qénân soit inspirée de celle d'Évhémère, car la pratique de la divination est atrribuée par Philon de Byblos à l'un des descendants des éponymes des chasseurs et des pêcheurs[40], plus précisément au forgeron Chousor-Héphaïstos. La science de l'avenir découverte par Qénân, selon Jub 8,3, apparaît ainsi comme un apanage de forgerons itinérants, dont Qénân semble être l'éponyme. Il faut en effet relever dans Jub 8,3 que cette science l'égare, alors qu'il était à la recherche d'un endroit où il pourrait se sédentariser et posséder une ville. Il convient de noter du point de vue ethnographique que les tziganes étaient pareillement connus jusqu'à notre époque comme diseurs de bonne aventure et comme forgerons. L'image de Qénân, telle

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36 Eusèbe de Césarée, Préparation évangélique I,10,11. Les noms d'Agros, Agrouhèros et Agrotès (ibid., I,10,12), «Paysan», sont à rapprocher de ce groupe d'ancêtres de castes professionnelles.

37 Les fragments reconnus ont été regroupés par J.C. VanderKam, Textual and Historical Studies in the Book of Jubilees, Missoula 1977.

38 Flavius Josèphe, Antiquités judaïques I,2,3; cf. la Vie latine d'Adam et d'Ève 49,3.

39 Diodore de Sicile, Bibliothèque historique VI.

40 Cf. ci-dessus, note 36.

qu'elle résulte de l'étymologie de son nom et de la notice de Jub 8,2-4, paraît donc correspondre à un type déterminé de population nomade en quête d'un lieu pour s'établir. L'examen de la descendance de Qénân confirmera cette conclusion.

2. Fils d'Aram: «Fils d'Aram: Uṣ, Hul, Géter, Mash» (Gen 10,23; 1 Chr 1,17b). Cette liste est reprise, sous une forme quelque peu différente, dans le *Règlement de la Guerre* trouvé à Qumrân: «Ils combattront contre le reste des fils d'Aram: contre Uṣ (*ʿwṣ*) et Hul (*Ḥwl*), Tôgar (*Twgr*) et Maššaʾ (*Mšʾ*), qui sont dans la Transeuphratène (*ʿbr Pwrt*)» (1QM 2,11). C'est le plan prévu pour la troisième année de la guerre. Dans la première année, la guerre devait être menée contre Aram-Naharaïm (1QM 2,10), ce qui explique la mention du «reste» (*šʾr*) d'Aram à la ligne 11 et indique que la Transeuphratène est la région située à l'ouest de l'Euphrate.

2.1. Uṣ – Le nom de Uṣ (*ʿwṣ*) correspond phonétiquement à *ʿwṣ*, *ʿwḍ* et peut-être *ʿḍ*, voire à *Ġḍ* des inscriptions nord-arabiques[41]. Le Livre de Job connaît un «pays de Uṣ» (Job 1,1), la patrie de Job, et la liste des descendants de Séïr mentionne un Uṣ (Gen 36,28), que l'on serait donc porté à localiser dans la région d'Édom[42]. Par ailleurs, Uṣ est qualifié de premier-né de Nahor dans la liste des tribus araméennes, en Gen 22,21, mais il y apparaît comme un oncle d'Aram, alors que la Liste des Peuples en fait un fils. Ils n'est pas possible de concilier ces diverses données, mais il semble que Uṣ soit également le nom d'une tribu, d'une région, d'une ville ou d'un sheikh araméens. Flavius Josèphe y voit le fondateur de Damas et de la Trachonitide[43], sans révéler l'origine de cette information. Une localisation plus septentrionale de Uṣ est suggérée par les Annales du 28e *palû* de Salmanasar III, c'est-à-dire de l'année 831 ou 830 av. J.-C.
Selon ce texte, le prince Lubarna II du Pattin, dans la région du Bas-Oronte, a été assassiné par ses sujets et remplacé par un certain Ṣurri. Salmanasar III envoya dès lors le *turtānu* Dayyan-Aššur pour rétablir la situation et installer sur le trône *Sa-a-si mār* KUR *Uṣ-ṣa-a*[44], «Sâsi le Uṣéen». Ce pays de *Uṣṣa* ne devrait pas se trouver loin du Pattin et l'on pourrait donc penser à une région de la Syrie du Nord, entre le Bas-Oronte et l'Euphrate. Il se fait pourtant qu'une ville ^{uru}*Ku-ru-uṣ-ṣa-a* est mentionnée en Cilicie par les Annales de Téglat-Phalasar III[45] et qu'on a voulu identifier les deux toponymes en lisant *Kur-uṣ-ṣa-a* dans les Annales de Salmanasar

41 G. Lankester Harding, An Index and Concordance of Pre-Islamic Arabian Names and Inscriptions, Toronto 1971, p. 424, 448, 456. On connaît également une divinité d'Arabie centrale appellé *ʿAwḍ* ou *ʿAwṣ*; cf. M. Höfner, dans H.W. Haussig, Götter und Mythen im Vorderen Orient (Wörterbuch der Mythologie I/1), Stuttgart 1965, p. 428. Le mot *ʿawḍ* signifie en arabe «compensation» et peut donc s'employer comme nom propre de personne. En revanche, on ne voit pas bien quelle serait la nature d'une divinité de ce nom.

42 Voir la discussion des localisations proposées chez F. Horst, Hiob (BKAT XVI/1), Neukirchen-Vluyn 1968, p. 8-9.

43 Flavius Josèphe, Antiquités judaïques I,6,4.

44 E. Michel, «Die Assur-Texte Salmanassars III. (858-824)», WO 2, 1954-59, p. 226.

45 P. Rost, Die Keilschrifttexte Tiglat-Pilesers III., Leipzig 1893, vol. I, p. 36, ligne 207, en attendant la nouvelle édition de H. Tadmor, The Inscriptions of Tiglath-Pileser III, King of Assyria, Jerusalem (sous presse).

III, sans le déterminatif KUR ou URU des noms de lieux[46]. Cette identification ne s'impose toutefois pas et la question doit rester ouverte[47].

2.2. Hul – Le nom *Ḥûl* pourrait être l'abréviation du toponyme *Ḫul-ḫu-li(-ti)*, attesté par les Annales d'Assurbanipal[48] et localisé au village de Ḫalḫaleh, dans le Nord-Est du Leǧa, à quelque 60 km au sud-est de Damas[49]. Il est cependant plus probable que ce soit la région d'el-Ḥūleh, s'étendant dans la plaine à l'est des monts Nosaïris et au sud-ouest de Ḥama, où un village porte encore le nom de Būs el-Ḥūleh[50]. Cette région située à l'ouest du Moyen-Oronte ne serait pas très éloignée du pays de Uṣṣa, si ce dernier se trouvait près du Bas-Oronte.

2.3. Géter – Le nom de Géter (*Gtr*) est remplacé dans 1QM 2,11 par celui de Tôgar (*Twgr*). Ce changement semble indiquer que l'auteur du *Règlement de la Guerre* ne connaissait pas Géter et qu'il a jugé préférable de lui substituer un toponyme connu. S'il identifiait Hul au lac Ḥūleh de la haute vallée du Jourdain, il donnait peut-être le nom de Tôgar à la *Toqrā* ou *Tôqrat* des écrits talmudiques, localisée à Khirbet Turrīṭa, une vingtaine de kilomètres au nord du lac Ḥūleh[51]. Il faut toutefois noter que ce dernier toponyme manque dans le texte parallèle de la mosaïque de la synagogue de Rehob (Tell es-Sarem), au sud de Beth-Shéan, où il est remplacé par *Msb Spnḥh*[52]. Par ailleurs, Y. Yadin a proposé de reconnaître dans *Twgr* le pays des «Tocharіens»[53], ce que Flavius Josèphe semble confirmer, puisqu'il considère Géter comme l'ancêtre des Bactriens[54]. Cette substitution d'un nom par un autre ne résout cependant pas le problème de l'identification de Géter.

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[46] Cette identification est faite notamment par S. Parpola, Neo-Assyrian Toponyms (AOAT 6), Kevelaer – Neukirchen–Vluyn 1970, p. 218, et J.D. Hawkins, «Ḫattin», RLA IV, Berlin – New York 1972-74, p. 160-162 (voir p. 161a); id., «Kinalua», RLA V, Berlin – New York 1976-80, p. 597-598 (voir p. 597b); id., «The Neo-Hittite States in Syria and Anatolia», CAH III/1², Cambridge 1982, p. 372-441 (voir p. 395).

[47] Ceci est souligné à juste titre par G. Frantz-Szabó, «Kuruṣṣâ», RLA VI, Berlin – New York 1980-83, p. 373a.

[48] S. Parpola, op.cit. (n. 46), p. 168. Cf. I. Eph^{c}al, The Ancient Arabs, Jerusalem 1982, p. 163-164.

[49] F. Delitzsch, Wo lag das Paradies?, Leipzig 1881, p. 299. Cf. R. Dussaud, Topographie historique de la Syrie antique et médiévale (BAH 4), Paris 1927, p. 376.

[50] R. Dussaud, op.cit. (n. 49), p. 102-103.

[51] F.-M. Abel, Géographie de la Palestine I, Paris 1933, p. 309. Le toponyme est corrigé arbitrairement en *Ywqrt* dans G. Reeg, Die Ortsnamen Israels nach der rabbinischen Literatur (TAVO B, 51), Wiesbaden 1989, p. 292-293.

[52] J. Naveh, On Stone and Mosaic. The Aramaic and Hebrew Inscriptions from Ancient Synagogues (en hébreu), Jérusalem 1978, p. 81, n° 49, ligne 16. Cf. J. Sussmann, "The Inscription of the Synagogue at Rehob" (en hébreu), Qadmoniot 8, 1975, p. 123-128; id., «The 'Boundaries of Eretz-Israel'» (en hébreu), Tarbiz 45, 1975-76, p. 213-257 (voir p. 232); cf. G. Reeg, op. cit. (n. 51), p. 415-416.

[53] Y. Yadin, The Scroll of the War of the Sons of Light against the Sons of Darkness, Oxford 1962, p. 31 et n. 2-3. L'auteur se réfère aux Τοχάροι de Strabon, Géographie XI,8,2, à la Θογάρα πόλις de Ptolémée, Géographie VI,16,8, et aux *reges Thogarorum* de Trogue-Pompée, Histoire universelle XLI.

[54] Flavius Josèphe, Antiquités judaïques I,6,4.

Si l'auteur du *Règlement de la Guerre* n'avait aucune connaissance de Géter au Ier siècle av. J.-C., on a de bonnes raisons de croire que les vocalisations du TM (*Geter*) et de la LXX (Γαθερ) ne s'appuient pas sur une tradition solide. Or, une cité-état attestée dans nombre de textes bibliques et située expressément «en Aram» (2 Sam 15,8) est celle de Geshur, dont l'ancien nom hébreu devait se prononcer *Geššūr*, comme l'indique la dissimilation en Γεδσουρ dans la plupart des passages de la LXX. Le toponyme semble se rattacher à la racine sémitique *gṯr*, «être très fort», ce qui donnerait à **Gaṯṯūr* le sens de «forteresse». C'est **Gaṯṯūr*, puis **Gattūr* que l'endroit devait s'appeler en araméen, et *Gtr* serait alors la forme normale du toponyme dans l'orthographe purement consonantique. On peut s'attendre à cette forme dans la Liste des Peuples, d'autant plus que les transcriptions assyro-babyloniennes du /*ṯ*/ sémitique sont bien en «t» dès la fin du VIIIe siècle av. J.-C. Ainsi, le nom du Sabéen *Yiṯaʿ ʾamara* est écrit *It-ʾ-am-(a-)ra* dans les inscriptions de Sargon II[55] et le nom du chef qédarite *Yawṯaʿ* apparaît dans les Annales d'Asarhaddon et d'Assurbanipal sous les formes *Ia-ta-ʾ*, *Ia-ta-a*, *Ia-u-ti/te-ʾ*, *Ia-ú-ta-ʾ*, *Ú-a-a-te-ʾ*, toujours avec un signe en «t»[56], tandis que le nom de la ville de *Yaṯrib* est transcrit *Ia-at-ri-bu* dans les inscriptions de Nabonide[57]. On pourrait aisément multiplier les exemples.
Si Géter est bien Geshur, que l'on localise à l'est du lac de Tibériade, c'est le site de Tel Hadar, sur la rive orientale du lac, qui semble être le meilleur candidat pour la localisation de cette cité-état, pour laquelle on manquait jusqu'ici de données topographiques précises. Les fouilles menées sur le site depuis 1987 permettent d'affirmer d'ores et déjà que Tel Hadar était un important centre régional au XIe-Xe siècle av. J.-C., époque à laquelle remontent les mentions bibliques de Geshur, et qu'il était une ville fortifiée au IXe-VIIIe siècle, quand l'Aram de Damas était à l'apogée de sa puissance[58].

2.4. Mash – Le nom *Maš* du TM de Gen 10,23 est incomplet, comme l'indiquent les leçons *Mšʾ* du Pentateuque samaritain et de 1QM 2,11, ainsi que le *Mšk* de 1 Chr 1,17 et de la *Vorlage* de la LXX (Μοσοχ). Comme *Mšk* apparaît déjà dans la Liste des Peuples en Gen 10,2; 1 Chr 1,5 et que ce nom ne convient pas à un descendant d'Aram, il faut lire *Mšʾ* en Gen 10,23 et 1 Chr 1,23. La lecture *Mšk* s'explique par une confusion *ʾ/k* qui peut se produire dans l'écriture paléohébraïque si la lettre est partiellement effacée.
Maššāʾ apparaît parmi la descendance d'Ismaël en Gen 25,14 et 1 Chr 1,30. C'est également à une tribu nord-arabique que paraissent se référer ses mentions en Prov 30,1; 31,1 et dans les inscriptions néo-assyriennes des VIIIe-VIIe siècles av. J.-

55 Cf. K.L. Tallqvist, Assyrian Personal Names, Helsingfors 1914, p. 108a.

56 D.J. Wiseman, «Jataʾ», RLA V, Berlin – New York 1976-80, p. 271-272; I. Ephʿal, op.cit. (n. 48), p. 129-130.

57 C.J. Gadd, «The Harran Inscriptions of Nabonidus», AnSt 8, 1958, p. 35-92 et pl. I-XVI (voir p. 58, col. I, 25).

58 P. Beck – M. Kochavi, «The Land of Geshur – 1987», Excavations and Surveys in Israel 6, 1987-88, p. 75-78; M. Kochavi, «Land of Geshur – 1988», ibid., 7-8, 1988-89, p. 110-113 (voir p. 111-112); id., «The Land of Geshur Project: Regional Archaeology of the Southern Golan (1987-1988 Seasons)», IEJ 39, 1989, p. 1-17 et pl. 1-2, en particulier p. 9-11 et 15-17; id., «The Land of Geshur Project, 1989-1990», IEJ 41, 1991, p. 180-184 (voir p. 181-182).

C.[59]. Les Annales de Téglat-Phalasar III placent les $^{uru}Ma\text{-}as\text{-}{}^{\flat}\text{-}a\text{-}a$ en tête d'une liste de tribus arabes de l'Occident[60] et une lettre adressée à Sargon II[61] paraît indiquer que l'on atteignait le territoire de cette tribu en passant par Damas[62]. Ceci expliquerait que Maššaʾ soit nommé parmi les descendants d'Aram dans la Liste des Peuples et confirmerait, en même temps, la direction nord-sud de leur énumération: Uṣ près du Bas-Oronte, Hul à l'ouest du Moyen-Oronte, Géter à l'est du lac de Tibériade et Maššaʾ du côté du Wādī Sirḥān. Cette dernière localisation, bien qu'approximative, est suggérée par deux données.

Une lettre néo-babylonienne adressée à Assurbanipal rapporte l'attaque d'une caravane par Ayakabaru, fils de ʿAmyaṯaʿ $^{lú}Mas\text{-}{}^{\flat}\text{-}a\text{-}a$[63], sur une route menant vers le Sud-Ouest de la Babylonie[64]. Par ailleurs, une inscription du Ǧebel Ġunaym, au sud-ouest de Téma, mentionne une guerre contre Maššaʾ: *Ṯr nṣr bḏ*[*r*] *Mš*[ʾ][65], «Ṯôr a aidé dans la guerre contre Maššaʾ». Ces deux mentions de Maššaʾ indiquent que c'était une tribu de «grands nomades» qui se déplaçaient à travers la steppe bordant le désert du Nefūd et transhumaient vers la vallée de l'Euphrate.

L'orthographe *Mš*[ʾ] dans l'inscription du Ǧebel Ġunaym montre que la forme correcte du nom est *Mšʾ* et pas *Mśʾ*, ce que confirment les transcriptions néo-assyriennes en *s*, puisque le «s» néo-assyrien correspond au /š/ ouest-sémitique.

3. Descendance de Qénân: «Qénân engendra Shélah et Shélah engendra Éber. À Éber naquirent deux fils: le nom du premier était Péleg» (Gen 10,24-25a; 1 Chr 1,18-19a).

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[59] Les données relatives à la tribu de *Maššāʾ* ont été discutées par W.F. Albright, «The Biblical Tribe of Massaʾ and Some Congeners», Studi orientalistici in onore di G. Levi Della Vida, I, Roma 1956, p. 1-14; F.V. Winnett – W.L. Reed et al., Ancient Records from North Arabia, Toronto 1970, p. 90-91 et 101-102; I. Ephʿal, «'Arabs' in Babylonia in the 8th Century», JAOS 94, 1979, p. 108-115, en particulier p. 114-115; id., op.cit. (n. 48), en particulier p. 95-98, 183-184 et 218-219; E.A. Knauf, Ismael. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Palästinas und Nordarabiens im 1. Jahrtausend v. Chr., 2e éd., Wiesbaden 1989, *passim*.

[60] Voir I. Ephʿal, op.cit. (n. 48), p. 34, ligne 27, en attendant l'édition de H. Tadmor, op.cit. (n. 45).

[61] S. Parpola, The Correspondence of Sargon II, Part I: Letters from Assyria and the West (SAA I), Helsinki 1987, nº 177. Malgré l'absence d'un des trois clous verticaux sur la tablette, la lecture $^{KUR}Ma\text{-}sa^{!}\text{-}{}^{\flat}$ (r. 14), proposée par I. Ephʿal, op.cit. (n. 48), p. 96, n. 322, est préférable à $^{KUR}Ma\text{-}ni\text{-}{}^{\flat}$, qui serait le nom d'une contrée totalement inconnue.

[62] Cf. I. Ephʿal, op.cit. (n. 48), p. 95-98 et 218-219.

[63] ABL 260, transcription et traduction chez L. Waterman, Royal Correspondence of the Assyrian Empire I, Ann Arbor 1930, nº 260, et R.H. Pfeiffer, State Letters of Assyria, New Haven 1935, nº 91; traduction seule chez A.L. Oppenheim, Letters from Mesopotamia, Chicago 1967, nº 118.

[64] Pour la chronologie et le cadre géographique, on se reportera à I. Ephʿal, op.cit. (n. 48), p. 95-98 et 218-219.

[65] F.V. Winnett – W.L. Reed et al., op.cit. (n. 59), p. 101, nº 16.

3.1. Shélah – Shélah (*Šlḥ*) est un anthroponyme attesté en safaïtique[66]; il est probablement identique à l'arabe *Salīḥ*[67], très probablement «envoyé» d'après l'araméen *šalīḥ*, plus précisément «apôtre» en arabe chrétien. C'est l'interprétation du nom de Shélah que l'on trouve déjà dans Jub 8,5 où Kaïnam (Qénân) explique le nom de Sala (Shélah) donné à son fils: «car j'ai été envoyé, oui, envoyé». Il est cependant plus probable que l'«envoyé» était Shélah lui-même, d'après un récit qui ne nous est pas parvenu.

3.2. Éber – Flavius Josèphe avait déjà compris que le nom des Hébreux dérive de celui d'Éber[68], mot qui désigne «l'autre côté» d'une rivière (Gen 50,10-11), d'une vallée (1 Sam 31,7), d'une mer (Jér 25,22), d'une frontière (Jos 22,11). Il n'a cependant pas remarqué que l'acception préexilique de *ʿibrî*, qui qualifiait l'Israélite de condition inférieure, sans attaches tribales et sujet à l'asservissement définitif, diffère considérablement du sens que *ʿibrî* possède dans les textes tardifs de Gen 14,13 et Jon 1,9[69]. Le qualificatif y sert désormais à distinguer l'Israélite de la satrapie perse de Transeuphratène, dont la Judée faisait alors partie, de celui qui habitait la Babylonie. C'est cette acception de *ʿibrî* qui se rattache au nom d'Éber de la Liste des Peuples, où *ʿeber* est une abréviation de *Eber-nāri*, nom des pays à l'ouest de l'Euphrate, considérés du point de vue de la Mésopotamie septentrionale.
Eber-nāri apparaît dans les textes néo-assyriens dès le règne de Sargon II (721-705 av. J.-C.)[70]. Au VIIe siècle, l'expression est même employée dans le traité conclu vers 675 entre Asarhaddon et le roi Baal I de Tyr[71], ce qui témoigne bien de sa diffusion. L'emploi du toponyme *ʿEber(-nāri)* correspond très bien au système suivi par l'auteur de la Liste des Peuples, mais il n'est pas évident pourquoi Éber est censé être le fils de Shélah. Peut-être ce dernier a-t-il été «envoyé» à l'ouest de l'Euphrate selon un récit perdu. Si Éber représente les pays à l'ouest de l'Euphrate, c'est dans les mêmes régions qu'il faudra localiser ses fils Péleg et Yoqṭân.

3.3. Péleg – Le nom de Péleg, Φαλεκ selon la LXX, signifie «moitié» ou «part». Il est peu probable que ce mot, dont le sens était parfaitement intelligible, fût utilisé par l'auteur de la Liste des Peuples pour désigner l'aîné des «fils» d'Éber, bien qu'un anthroponyme [m]*Pal-gu* soit attesté en Babylonie au début de la seconde moitié du VIIe siècle av. J.-C.[72]. Le mot akkadien *palgu*, «canal», ne convient pas

[66] G. Lankester Harding, op.cit. (n. 12), p. 324.

[67] F. Wüstenfeld, Register zu den genealogischen Tabellen, Göttingen 1853, p. 405; W. Caskel, Ǧamharat an-Nasab, das genealogische Werk des Hišam ibn Muḥammad al-Kalbi, Leiden 1966, vol. II, p. 507a (index).

[68] Flavius Josèphe, Antiquités judaïques I,6,4.

[69] O. Loretz, Habiru-Hebräer. Eine sozio-linguistische Studie über die Herkunft des Gentiliziums *ʿibrî* vom Appellativum *ḫabiru* (BZAW 160), Berlin – New York 1984, p. 89-182; cf. E. Lipiński, «ʿApīrū et Hébreux», BiOr 42, 1985, col. 562-567 (voir col. 564-566).

[70] S. Parpola, op.cit. (n. 61), n° 204, r. 10.

[71] S. Parpola – K. Watanabe, Neo-Assyrian Treaties and Loyalty Oaths (SAA II), Helsinki 1988, n° 5, IV, 9.

[72] H.H. Figulla, Ur Excavations. Texts IV, London 1949, n° 23,30. Transcription et traduction chez M. San Nicolò, Babylonische Rechtsurkunden des ausgehenden 8. und des 7. Jahrhunderts v. Chr., München 1951, p. 86-87, n° 36.

non plus au contexte et les anciens renvois à des toponymes peu connus[73] ne justifient pas le choix de ce nom pour le descendant d'Éber. Un nom propre *Plg* se rencontre aussi dans les inscriptions safaïtiques[74] et il faut vraisemblablement le rapprocher de l'arabe *Fāliğ*[75], dont le sens approximatif est «fendeur». Par ailleurs, le judéo-araméen et le syriaque font usage du participe *pᵉlīg*, *pᵉlīgā*, et des substantifs *palīgā* et *pallāg* pour désigner celui qui est en désaccord, qui est irrité, un querelleur. Cette acception convient assez bien à l'explication étiologique donnée au nom dans Gen 10,25 et 1 Chr 1,19: «car c'est de son temps que la terre fut divisée». L'expression est attestée également en akkadien, par exemple dans *ša erṣeti palāku tīdû*, «qui sait diviser la terre»[76]. Ce n'est pas une référence anticipée au récit de la Tour de Babel et de la dispersion des peuples (Gen 11,1-9), mais une allusion à la division de la terre entre deux propriétaires, comme s'il s'agissait du partage d'un patrimoine entre deux héritiers. C'est ainsi que le texte est déjà interprété dans Jub 8,8-9,15, dont l'auteur met le nom de Péleg en rapport avec le partage de la terre entre les enfants de Noé, «qui se la répartirent mal» (Jub 8,9). Il est cependant plus probable qu'il s'agit d'un partage opéré entre les fils d'Éber: Péleg, l'irrité personnifiant peut-être les nomades, et Yoqṭân, en qui on pourrait reconnaître un ancêtre fictif des sédentaires.

4. Yoqṭân et ses fils: «Le nom de son frère était Yoqṭân et Yoqṭân engendra Almodad, Shéleph, Haṣṣarmawet, Yeraḥ, Hadoram, Uzal, Diqla, Obal, Abimaël, Shéba, Ophir, Hawila, Yobab» (Gen 10,25b-29; 1 Chr 1,19b-23).

4.1. Yoqṭân – Le nom Yoqṭân n'est pas attesté jusqu'ici dans d'autres sources et son assimilation traditionnelle à Qaḥṭān, l'ancêtre légendaire des Arabes du Sud, ne repose que sur l'identification de certains de ses «fils» avec des régions ou des tribus de l'Arabie méridionale, comme dans le cas évident du Ḥaḍramaout. Comme son frère aîné s'appelait Péleg, c'est-à-dire «moitié» ou «part» selon l'interpretation du TM dans Gen 10,25 et 1 Chr 1,19, on pourrait comprendre le nom de Yoqṭân ou Ιεκταν, selon la LXX, au sens du verbe hébreu *qāṭan*, donc «qu'il soit petit» ou «il sera petit», éventuellement dans l'acception «plus jeune». C'est une explication possible, puisqu'il s'agit d'un frère puîné, mais elle suppose que le nom est hébreu. Or, les noms des prétendus descendants de Yoqṭân nous orientent vers l'Arabie et *qaṭana* veut dire en arabe «habiter» un endroit ou «s'y établir», «s'installer». Le substantif ou l'adjectif sud-arabique *qṭn* signifie «petit» selon certains, mais «indigène» selon d'autres[77]. L'acception «habiter» doit de toute façon être très ancienne dans les langues sémitiques de l'Ouest, car le nom de la ville syrienne de

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[73] J. Skinner, Genesis (ICC), Edinburgh 1910, p. 220, cite trois identifications géographiques.

[74] G. Lankester Harding, op.cit. (n. 12), p. 470.

[75] W. Caskel, op.cit. (n. 67), vol. II, p. 244b (index).

[76] E. Ebeling, «Sammlung von Beschwörungsformeln teils in sumerisch-akkadischer, teils in sumerischer oder akkadischer Sprache», ArOr 21, 1953, p. 357-423 (voir p. 377, ligne 16). Il est généralement question de la division des champs: *pilik eqlēti*.

[77] A.F.L. Beeston – M.A. Ghul – W.W. Müller – J. Ryckmans Dictionnaire sabéen, Louvain-la-Neuve – Beyrouth 1982, p. 109.

Qaṭna, sur le Moyen Oronte, se rattache à cette racine[78] et ne peut désigner qu'un «habitat», – sûrement pas la «petitesse» du lieu. Dans cette perspective, *yqṭn* veut dire «qu'il s'établisse» ou bien «il s'est établi», si le nom remonte à l'époque où les formes verbales à préformante *y/t-* servaient encore à marquer le prétérit dans les langues ouest-sémitiques. Ce pourrait aussi être un substantif à préformante *ya-* du type *yaf ᶜal-*, mais la plupart de ces formes dérivent d'un verbe et un nom déverbal *yqṭn* désignerait dès lors celui qui s'est établi, sédentarisé. Dans les deux cas, Yoqṭân serait l'ancêtre fictif des populations sédentaires de la Péninsule arabique et de la steppe syrienne, spécialement de leur partie orientale.

4.2. Almodad – Bien que le Ελμωδαδ des LXX suggère la présence de l'élément *ᵓEl*, cette interprétation ne semble pas pouvoir être retenue. En effet, l'anthroponyme ouest-sémitique *Môdad*, «chéri» ou «ami»[79], est attesté à Tell Ḥalaf/Gōzân (*Mu-da-di*)[80], à Nimrud/Kalḫu (*Mu-da-da*)[81], à Ninive (*Mwdd*)[82], dans les Annales d'Adad-Nirari II (*Mu-da-ad-da*) et de Téglat-Phalasar II (*Mu-da-da*)[83], dans l'Ancien Testament, en Num 11,26.27 où il faut lire *Mwdd* avec la LXX (Μωδαδ), au lieu de *Mydd*[84], également dans les inscriptions sud-arabiques de Saba (*Mwddm*)[85] et de Qatabân (*Mwddn*)[86], et déjà en amorrhéen (*Mu-da-du, Mu-da-du-um*)[87], mais l'élément *mwdd* n'est jamais précédé d'un théonyme. Ce n'est donc pas un hypocoristique, mais un nom profane qui désigne directement la personne en question.

Dans ces conditions, le *ᵓal-* d'Almodad peut être une transcription soit de l'akkadien *ālu*, «ville», «localité», soit du néo-assyrien ^{lú}*ᵓ-lu* qui servait à rendre le mot arabe *ᵓahl*, «clan», «famille»[88]. Plusieurs toponymes de Mésopotamie, attestés à l'époque de l'Empire assyrien, sont constitués du mot *ālu* et d'un nom propre de personne ou d'un théonyme, par exemple URU.EN-*li-bur* = *Āl-Bēl-lībur*, URU-*šá-*

[78] Se basant sur l'orthographe *Qaṭanum* de Mari (ARM XVI/1, p. 26-27), I.J. Gelb, Computer-Aided Analysis of Amorite, Chicago 1980, p. 342, rattache résolument le toponyme à la racine *qṭn*. La variante *Qatanum* s'explique de la même manière que le *qatnu*, «petit», de l'akkadien vis-à-vis du *qāṭān* de l'hébreu.

[79] DISO, p. 144; KAI II, p. 221. C'est un substantif ou un participe substantivé qui se rattache à la racine *wdd*.

[80] E.F. Weidner – A. Ungnad – J. Friedrich, Die Inschriften vom Tell Halaf (AfO, Beih. 6), Berlin 1940, n°s 28,2; 33,1.

[81] J.N. Postgate, The Governor's Palace Archive (Cuneiform Texts from Nimrud II), London 1973, n° 119,5. Cf. F.M. Fales, «West Semitic Names from the Governor's Palace», Annali di Caᵓ Foscari 13, 1974, p. 179-188 (voir p. 185, n° 26).

[82] CIS II, 43 B 6 = F.M. Fales, Aramaic Epigraphs on Clay Tablets of the Neo-Assyrian Period (Studi semitici, n.s. 2), Roma 1986, p. 157, n° 13, Rev. 6.

[83] APN, p. 139a; RLA VI, p. 493.

[84] La forme *Mêdād* est néanmoins conservée par R. Zadok, The Pre-Hellenistic Israelite Anthroponomy and Prosopography (OrLovAn 28), Leuven 1988, p. 121 et 204.

[85] CIS IV,95,4, avec la mimation.

[86] RÉS 3902,98, avec la nunation.

[87] I.J. Gelb, Computer-Aided Analysis of Amorite (AS 21), Chicago 1980, p. 624, n°s 4731 et 4732.

[88] AHw, p. 39a, s.v. *aᵓlu*; M. Weippert, «Die Kämpfe des assyrischen Königs Assurbanipal gegen die Araber», WO 7, 1973-74, p. 39-85 (voir p. 68, n. 114).

$^{m.d}$*Da-gan*-EN.PAP = *Āl-ša-Dagan-bēl-uṣur* ou URU.^{d}IM = *Āl-Adad*[89]. On ne connaît cependant aucune localité appelée **Āl-Mudadi*. Vu que le nom de Môdad n'est pas assyro-babylonien et qu'il est porté notamment par un chef du pays de Laqê, qui correspond au territoire situé à l'embouchure du Ḫabur[90], puis par un membre de la tribu araméenne des Ruqaḫaya[91], on sera plutôt porté à voir en Almodad un «clan de Môdad», sans toutefois pouvoir le localiser.

4.3. Shéleph – Le nom *Šlp* est attesté comme anthroponyme en safaïtique et en sabéen[92]; il correspond vraisemblablement à *Sālif* dans les généalogies dressées par al-Kalbi[93]. Par ailleurs, une tribu yéménite de la région d'Aden portait le nom d'*as-Sālif* ou d'*as-Sulaf*, au témoignage du géographe arabe al-Hamdani (?-945 ap. J.-C.)[94]. Les antiques attestations du nom sont toutefois plus intéressantes. Ainsi, un toponyme *S^{1}lf* est mentionné dans une inscription minéenne[95] et *S^{1}lfn*, avec nunation, doit être un nom de lieu du Hadramaout[96], que l'on a rapproché d'as-Salf, dans la région de ᶜAwāliq, et de Wādī Salaf[97]. Comme Shéleph précède immédiatement le Hadramaout dans la Liste des Peuples, c'est bien à une ville, une tribu ou un territoire de cette région d'Arabie méridionale que l'on doit penser. En revanche, les Σαλαπηνοι (var. Αλαπηνοι) de Ptolémée[98] paraissent se situer plus au nord.

4.4. Ḥaṣṣarmawet – La forme *Ḥṣrmwt* de la Liste des Peuples rend exactement le nom du Hadramaout, *Ḥḍrmwt*, des inscriptions sud-arabiques. C'était un des royaumes de l'Antiquité sud-arabe, qui occupait la vallée de l'actuel Wādī Hadramaout, au nord-est d'Aden, le littoral parallèle du golfe d'Aden et les vallées transversales qui constituaient autant de routes commerciales reliant le coeur du pays à la mer[99]. Le Hadramaout a livré quelques dizaines d'inscriptions publiées, relevées au Yémen et au Ḍofar, province méridionale du sultanat d'Oman. C'était une des régions les plus peuplées de l'Arabie du Sud, comme l'indiquent ses nombreux systèmes d'irrigation antiques. Cet afflux de population, notamment à

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89 J.N. Postgate, op.cit. (n. 81), n°s 3,27; 43,4; 135,3.

90 J.N. Postgate, «Laqê», RLA VI, Berlin – New York 1980-83, p. 492-494.

91 J.N. Postgate, op.cit. (n. 81), n° 119,5, cf. ligne 8.

92 G. Lankester Harding, op.cit. (n. 12), p. 324-325.

93 W.Caskel, op.cit. (n. 67), vol. II, p. 507a (index).

94 D.H. Müller (éd.), *Al-Hamdânî's Ṣifat Ǧazīrat al-ᶜArab* II, Leiden 1891, p. 71; cf. E. Osiander, «Ueber den Joktaniden Selef שֶׁלֶף Genes. 10,26», ZDMG 11, 1857, p. 153-155.

95 RÉS 2965,1.

96 CIS IV,621,5; 648,2-3.

97 K. Conti Rossini, Chrestomathia Arabica meridionalis epigraphica, Roma 1931, p. 196b.

98 Ptolémée, Géographie VI, 6, 23.

99 Sur le Hadramaout et son exploration, on peut voir D. van der Meulen – H. von Wissmann, Ḥaḍramaut, Leiden 1932; F. Stark, «An Exploration in Hadhramaut and the Journey to the Coast», The Geographical Journal 93 (1939), p. 1-17; D. van der Meulen, Aden to Hadhramaut, London 1947; H.St.J.-B. Philby, Sheba's Daughters, London 1939, chap. IV; G. Caton Thompson, The Tombs and Moon Temple of Hureidha (Hadhramaut), Oxford 1944; A. Grohmann, Arabien, München 1963, *passim*; H. von Wissmann, Zur Geschichte und Landeskunde von Altsüdarabien, Wien 1964; id., Zur Archäologie und antiken Geographie von Südarabien, Leiden 1968, p. 28-55.

Shabwa, la capitale du Hadramaout[100], s'explique par la culture d'arbres à encens et à myrrhe, qui se pratiquait surtout dans cette région et constituait une exceptionnelle source de richesse commercialisable[101]. Le monde méditerranéen en était grand demandeur et Hérodote notait à ce propos: «Du côté du Midi, la dernière des terres habitées est l'Arabie; c'est le seul pays du monde qui produise l'encens, la myrrhe, la cannelle, le cinnamone et le ladanum»[102].

La capitale du Hadramaout, *S²bwt* dans les inscriptions sud-arabiques, Σαυβαθα[103], Σαββαθα ou *Sabota*[104] chez les auteurs grecs et romains, était le centre où se formaient les caravanes transportant l'encens et d'autres produits de luxe. L'auteur anonyme du *Périple de la Mer Érythrée* 27, composé vers la fin du Ier siècle ap. J.-C.[105], y voit la métropole du «pays de l'encens», Χώρα λίβανος, «producteur d'encens», λιβανωτοφόρος. L'abondance des monnaies de bronze au modèle athénien, du Ve ou IVe siècle av. J.-C., découvertes à Shabwa, prouvent que les routes commerciales menaient du Hadramaout jusqu'en Grèce, au moins dès le Ve siècle av. J.-C. La splendeur de la capitale et ses richesses étaient légendaires et, au Ier siècle de notre ère, Pline l'Ancien lui attribuait 60 temples[106]. C'était le siècle du roi appelé Ελεαζος par le *Périple de la Mer Érythrée* 27 et probablement identique à

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100 Sur Shabwa, on peut voir en particulier R.A.B. Hamilton, «Six Weeks in Shabwa», The Geographical Journal 100, 1942, p. 107-123; W.L. Brown – A.F.L. Beeston, «Sculptures and Inscriptions from Shabwa», JRAS 1954, p. 43-62; J. Pirenne, «Première mission archéologique française au Ḥaḍramout (Yémen du Sud)», CRAI 1975, p. 261-279; ead., «Deuxième mission archéologique française au Ḥaḍramout (Yémen du Sud)», CRAI 1976, p. 412-426; ead., «Les fouilles française à Shabwa, capitale du Hadhramout», Dossiers de l'archéologie 33, 1979, p. 74-79; ead., Les témoins écrits de la région de Shabwa et l'histoire (Fouilles de Shabwa 1; BAH 134), Paris 1990. On trouvera une présentation d'ensemble des résultats de fouilles françaises chez J. Pirenne, «Ce que trois campagnes de fouilles nous ont déjà appris sur Shabwa, capitale au Ḥaḍramaut antique», Raydān 1, 1978, p. 125-142. Tout le volume de Syria 68, 1991, est consacré aux fouilles de Shabwa.

101 Voir, à ce sujet, G.W. Van Beek, «Frankincense and Myrrh in Ancient South Arabia», JAOS 78, 1958, p. 141-151; R.L. Cleveland, «The 1960 American Archaeological Expedition to Dhofar», BASOR 159, 1960, p. 14-26; G.W. Van Beek, «Frankincense and Myrrh», BA 23, 1960, p. 69-95 = The Biblical Archaeologist Reader II, Garden City 1964, p. 99-126; G.W. Van Beek – G.H. Coole – A. Jamme, «An Archaeological Reconnaissance in Hadhramaut, South Arabia – A Preliminary Report», Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution 1963, p. 521-545 et pl. 1-8; J. Pirenne, «The Incense Port of Moscha (Khor Rori) in Dhofar», The Journal of Oman Studies 1, 1975, p. 81-96 et pl. 1-5; H. von Wissmann – W.W. Müller, Das Weihrauchland Sa'kalan, Samarum und Mos-cha, Wien 1977.

102 Hérodote, Histoires III,107; traduction de Ph.-E. Legrand, Hérodote III, Paris 1949, p. 149.

103 Périple de la Mer Érythrée 27.

104 Ptolémée, Géographie VI,6,38; Strabon, Géographie XVI,4,2; Pline, Histoire naturelle VI, 104 (*Saue*).155; XII, 52.63, où Pline précise qu'il s'agit de la capitale des «Atramites».

105 C'est la datation que nous retenons en suivant A. Dihle, Umstrittene Daten. Untersuchungen zum Auftreten der Griechen am Roten Meer, Köln 1965, p. 9-35, et M.G. Raschke, «New Studies in Roman Commerce with the East», ANRW II, 9/2, Berlin – New York 1978, p. 604-1361 (voir p. 663-665), contre J. Pirenne, «Un problème-clef pour la chronologie de l'Orient: la date du 'Périple de la mer Érythrée'», JA 249, 1961, p. 441-459.

106 Pline l'Ancien, Histoire naturelle VI,155.

ʾIlᶜaḏḏ Yalūṭ bin ᶜAmmḏaḫar, connu par les inscriptions hadramaoutiques[107]. Les plus anciennes inscriptions monumentales, actuellement connues, remontent au moins au Vᵉ siècle av. J.-C. Leur qualité atteste le haut degré de culture que le Hadramaout avait atteint dès le milieu du Iᵉʳ millénaire avant notre ère et témoigne d'un long passé qui explique la mention du Hadramaout dans la Liste des Peuples.

4.5. Yéraḥ – Le nom de Yéraḥ ne peut désigner la ville de *Yariḫ* et la tribu yaminite des *Yariḫū*, attestée dans la région du Moyen-Euphrate et dans le Haut-Pays à l'époque des archives royales de Mari, au XVIIIᵉ siècle av. J.-C.[108]. L'ancien rapprochement de Yérah avec le toponyme ^{uru}*Ia-ar-ki* du récit des campagnes d'Assurbanipal contre les Arabes[109] est une hypothèse défendable, si l'on tient compte de la spiration du /k/[110], qui peut être noté par *ḥeth* en araméen[111]. On a proposé d'identifier ce ^{uru}*Ia-ar-ki* avec l'actuelle localité d'Arak, à 27 km à l'est de Palmyre[112]. Cette importante station caravanière, où l'on a trouvé un milliaire romain[113], est attestée par la Table de Peutinger, par un milliaire et par Ptolémée sous les noms de *Harac* (corr. de *Harae*) et d'*Aracha* (CIL III, 6719). Il est cependant plus probable qu'il faille lire ^{uru}*Ia-ar-qí* dans les Annales d'Assurbanipal et identifier ce toponyme au *Beriarac* d'un milliaire romain trouvé à 9 km à l'ouest de Palmyre[114] et à la *Veriaraca* de la *Notitia Dignitatum in partibus Orientis* 32,34, qui se situerait à 33 km à l'ouest de Palmyre, à ᶜAin el-Beiḍa[115]. Le toponyme complet **Beʾr-Yaraq* signifie «Puits de Verdure» et possède donc un sens excellent

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[107] A. Jamme, Pièces épigraphiques de Ḥeid bin ᶜAqīl, la nécropole de Timnaᶜ (Haǧr Koḥlân) (Bibl. du Muséon 30), Louvain 1952, p. 1, n. 3; J. Ryckmans, «La chronologie sud-arabe du premier siècle avant notre ère», BiOr 10, 1953, p. 205-211 et pl. XV (voir p. 207-208). Le texte de référence est RÉS 3958.

[108] J.-R. Kupper, «Jariḫū», RLA V, Berlin – New York 1976-80, p. 260-261. Cf. ARM XVI/1, p. 40.

[109] J. Skinner, op.cit. (n. 73), p. 221, en note.

[110] GAG et Erg. § 25d; W. von Soden, «Die Spirantisierung von Verschlusslauten im Akkadischen: ein Vorbericht», JNES 27, 1968, p. 214-220 (voir p. 217-218); E.E. Knudsen, «Spirantization of Velars in Akkadian», *Lišān mitḫurti* (AOAT 1), Kevelaer – Neukirchen-Vluyn 1969, p. 147-155.

[111] C'est le cas du théonyme *Nusku* écrit *Nsḥ* dans le nom propre *Nsḥnghy*; cf. St.A. Kaufman, «An Assyro-Aramaic *egirtu ša šulmu*», Essays on the Near East in Memory of J.J. Finkelstein (éd. M. de Jong Ellis), Hamden 1977, p. 119-127 (voir p. 121). Il faut toutefois noter que le phénomène inverse, à savoir la notation d'un /ḫ/ akkadien par *kāph* en araméen, est plus fréquent: E. Lipiński, «In Search of the Etymology of Some Semitic Loan-Words», Fucus: A Semitic / Afrasian Gathering in Remembrance of A. Ehrman (éd. Y.L. Arbeitman), Amsterdam – Philadelphia 1988, p. 325-333 (voir p. 329-331).

[112] I. Ephᶜal, op.cit. (n. 48), p. 160-161 et 162 avec la note 555 contenant les références à la littérature plus ancienne.

[113] R. Mouterde, «La Strata Diocletiana et ses bornes milliaires», MUSJ 15, 1930-31, p. 219-233 et pl. I-II (voir p. 232-233), réédité par H. Seyrig, «L'incorporation de Palmyre à l'empire romain», Syria 13, 1932, p. 266-277 (voir p. 276-277).

[114] CIL III, 14177,4.

[115] M. Weippert, art.cit. (n. 88), p. 64-65; cf. E. Honigmann, «Historische Topographie von Nordsyrien im Altertum I», ZDPV 46, 1923, p. 149-193 (voir p. 170, nº 105); cf. OLZ 28, 1925, col. 701.

qui appuie la lecture ^{uru}*Ia-ar-qí*; or, du point de vue phonétique, celle-ci exclut toute identification avec Yéraḥ.
Un toponym *Wrḫn*, avec nunation, est attesté par une inscription sabéenne[116] et pourrait correspondre à Yéraḥ. Ce n'est toutefois qu'une simple possibilité, privée de toute justification concrète.

4.6. Hadoram – Hadoram est un anthroponyme araméen attesté dans la Bible[117], probablement dans l'inscription araméenne de Bar-Hadad[118] et souvent dans les textes assyro-babyloniens qui l'écrivent *Ad-ra-me/mu/mi*[119], *Ad-ra-am*[120], U-*ra-me*[121], U-*ra-a-mu*[122], ^{d}IM-*ra-am*[123], ^{d}IM-*ra-ma*[124], ^{d}IM-*ra-mu*[125], etc. Le même nom est probablement attesté sous la forme *Hdrwm* dans une inscription sabéenne[126], où l'orthographe en *-rwm* révèle une origine «cananéenne». Les scheiks arabes portaient parfois des noms araméens, tel Hazaïl, «roi» de Qédar au début du VIIe siècle av. J.-C.[127], et il est donc possible que Hadoram soit l'un d'eux, mais il est par ailleurs inconnu. En tout cas, l'auteur de la Liste des Peuples semble être déjà à court de toponymes et d'ethniques. Il est peu probable, en effet, que l'Οδορρα (Gen 10,27) et le Κεδουραν (1 Chr 1,21) des LXX supposent une *Vorlage* différente de *Hdwrm*.

4.7. Uzal – Uzal, *ʾwzl* selon le TM, mais *ʾyzl* selon le Pentateuque samaritain et les LXX (Αιζηλ), est l'ancien nom de Ṣanʿāʾ, la capitale du Yémen, selon une tradition yéménite juive, consignée en arabe dans le midrash *Nūr al-Ẓalam* de

116 RÉS 3946,3.

117 1 Chr 18,10; 2 Chr 10,18. *ʾĂdorām* n'en est qu'une variante orthographique: 2 Sam 20,24; 1 Rois 12,18.

118 É. Puech, «La stèle de Bar-Hadad à Melqart et les rois d'Arpad», RB 99, 1992, p. 311-334 et pl. XV-XVI (voir p. 315-316 et 325-327).

119 V. Donbaz, «Two Neo-Assyrian Stelae in the Antakya and Kahramanmaraş Museums», Annual Review of 'the Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia Project' 8, 1990, p. 5-24 (voir p. 9, recto, ligne 11: *Ad-ra-me*; le même souverain, semble-t-il, est appelé ailleurs *A-ra-me/mu*: APN, p. 28a, s.v. Aramu 1-2); Th. Kwasman – S. Parpola, Legal Transactions of the Royal Court of Nineveh, Part I (SAA VI), Helsinki 1991, n° 252, rev. 6' (^{f}*Ad-ra-mi* soeur de la reine-mère Naqiʾa/Zakūtu); APN, p. 5b, s.v. *Abi-rāmu* (*Ad-ra-mi/mu*, éponyme de l'an 677; cf. RLA II, p. 426-427); G. Lanfranchi - S. Parpola, The Correspondence of Sargon II, Part II (SAA V), Helsinki 1990, n° 228,14' (*Ad-ra-me*); ND 2414,23 (*Ad-ra-mu*; cf. R. Zadok, Or 51, 1982, p. 391); D. Homès-Fredericq – P. Garelli – E. Lipiński, Archives d'un centre provincial de l'Empire assyrien, Bruxelles 1993, n°s 4,21; 10,2.19 (*Ad-ra-mu*).

120 ADD, App. 1, col IX,10; ND 2095,3; CBS 12940 + 12972,2, publié par M.. Stolper, Managment and Politics in the Later Achaemenid Babylonia, Ann Arbor 1974, p. 392.

121 E.F. Weidner – A. Ungnad – J. Friedrich, op.cit. (n. 80), n° 56,3.

122 D. Homès-Fredericq – P. Garelli – E. Lipiński, op.cit. (n. 119), n° 39,13.

123 R.Ph. Dougherty, Goucher College Inscriptions II. Archives from Erech: Neo-Babylonian and Persian Periods, New Haven 1933, n° 382,13.

124 H.F. Lutz, Neo-Babylonian Administrative Documents from Erech (UCP IX/1), Berkeley 1927, n° 24,40.

125 A. Tremayne, Records from Erech (YOS 7), New Haven 1925, n° 37,13.

126 CIS IV, 572,1: *ʿrbm ʿbd bn Hdrwm*, «ʿArbum, serviteur des Banī Hadrawm».

127 I. Ephʿal, op.cit. (n. 48), p. 118-119, 124-128, 224, 226-227.

Nethanel ibn Yeshāyāh[128], qui vivait au XIVe siècle. Il se référait à une tradition locale qui considérait *ʾAzāl* comme le nom préislamique de Ṣanᶜāʾ, mais dont l'origine est probablement biblique et juive[129]. Le fait est que *Yʾzl* était un anthroponyme très répandu en sabéen[130] et qu'une localité appelée *Yāzil* se trouve entre Meṭne et Sûq Bauᶜān, sur la route menant de Ṣanaᶜāʾ au port d'el-Ḥudaida[131]. On pourrait rapprocher aussi *ʾwzl* ou *ʾyzl* du nom de la localité yéménite de *ʾUṣil*, au nord de Haǧēila[132], et de l'éthiopien *ʾazzāl*, «homme fort»[133], mais ce substantif ou ce nom n'est pas attesté en sud-arabique[134]. L'identification d'Uzal avec l'*Azalla* des Annales d'Assurbanipal[135], que l'on a proposé de situer à l'est de Palmyre, à l'extrémité de la vallée de ʾAzzāleh[136], est liée au problème de la localisation de Yéraḥ et donc difficilement acceptable dans le cadre de la famille de Yoqṭân. Bref, il convient de laisser la question ouverte, tout en soulignant qu'il n'est pas possible d'identifier cet Uzal à celui d'Éz 27,19, surtout si ce dernier est l'Izalla du Ṭūr ᶜAbdīn, en Turquie du sud-est[137], ou la ville hittite d'Ušalawaš, en Anatolie[138], ce qui n'est guère probable.

4.8. Diqla - *Diqlāh* est le nom araméen du «palmier»[139] et désigne vraisemblablement une oasis. Aucun toponyme déterminé ne peut être mis actuellement en relation avec ce nom de la Liste des Peuples. La racine *dql* sert aussi à former quelques rares anthroponymes nord-arabiques[140].

4.9. Obal - Le nom de *ᶜwbl* correspond à celui d'une localité du Yémen septentrional, appelée *ᶜObāl* ou *ᶜUbāl* et située entre Bāǧil et Ḥaǧēila[141], ainsi

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128 Le midrash a été publié avec une traduction en hébreu par Y. Kafaḥ, Nathanel b. Yeshāyāh: Meʾōr ha-ʾAfelāh, Jerusalem 1957, p. 58.

129 C'était déjà l'opinion de E. Glaser, Skizze der Geschichte und Geographie Arabiens II, Berlin 1890, p. 427-428. Cf. Enzyklopaedie des Islam IV, Leiden 1914, p. 153-154.

130 G. Lankester Harding, op.cit. (n. 12), p. 654. Ce nom se rattache à la même racine que l'éthiopien *ʾazzala*, «être fort», «l'emporter»; cf. W. Leslau, Comparative Dictionary of Geᶜez, Wiesbaden 1987, p. 52b.

131 E. Glaser, op.cit. (n. 129), p. 427; C. Rathjens - H. von Wissmann, Landeskundige Ergebnisse, Hamburg 1934, carte III, 1d/2d.

132 C. Rathjens - H. von Wissmann, op.cit. (n. 131), carte II, 3b.

133 W. Leslau, loc.cit. (n. 130).

134 En revanche, on connaît un nom propre *ʾḏl* en safaïtique: G. Lankester Harding, op.cit. (n. 12), p. 34.

135 E. Glaser, op.cit. (n. 129), p. 277; J. Skinner, op.cit. (n. 73), p. 221, en note.

136 A. Musil, Palmyrena. A Topographical Itinerary, New York 1928, p. 86, n. 22, suivi par I. Ephᶜal, op.cit. (n. 48), p. 162.

137 C'est l'opinion de A. Millard, «Ezekiel XXVII.19: The Wine Trade of Damascus», JSS 7, 1962, p. 201-203.

138 Cette hypothèse a été avancée par M. Elat, «The Iron Export from Uzal (Ezekiel XXVII 19)», VT 33, 1983, p. 323-330.

139 M. Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic of Byzantine Period, Ramat-Gan 1990, p. 154b.

140 G. Lankester Harding, op.cit. (n. 12), p. 241.

141 H.St.J.-B. Philby, Routes in Southwest Arabia, Simla 1915, p. 417 et 477; C. Rathjens - H. von Wissmann, op.cit. (n. 131), carte II, 2c.

qu'au nom de la tribu yéménite des *Banū ʿUbāl*[142]. Il est cependant impossible de savoir s'il existe quelque lien réel entre ces noms. Le Pentateuque samaritain et le texte de 1 Chr 1,22 lisent *ʿybl*, leçon qui n'apporte aucun élément de solution.

4.10. Abimaël - Abimaël, peut-être à l'origine *ʾbwmʾl*, est un anthroponyme qui est attesté en amorrhéen, notamment à Mari[143], et que l'on peut comparer au nom du clan sud arabique *ʾbmʿṯtr*[144], variante dialectale de *ʾbʿṯtr*[145]. Il s'agit apparemment du nom propre d'un individu ou d'un clan qatabanites, vu que l'enclitique *-m* est fréquente en qatabanite et s'attache également aux substantifs, ce qui ne semble pas être le cas en sabéen[146]. Il signifie «Le/Mon père est Él/Il».

4.11. Shéba - L'auteur de la Liste des Peuples, manifestement à court de noms qu'il pourrait raisonnablement attribuer à la descendance de Yoqṭân, a répété ici le nom de Shéba, qu'il avait déjà cité dans la généalogie des Chamites[147].

4.12. Ophir - «L'énigme d'Ophir»[148], «le pays de l'or», comme l'appelle Flavius Josèphe[149], se complique en Gen 10,29 du fait que c'est le seul passage de la Bible où ce toponyme est écrit *ʾwpr*, sans la *mater lectionis yōd* (*ʾwpyr*), et où les manuscrits de la LXX ne le transcrivent jamais avec l'initiale Σ, comme ils le font pour l'Ophir de Salomon. V. Christidès en a conclu à l'existence d'un «Ophir yoqṭanéen», distinct de l'«Ophir salomonien», et a proposé de le localiser en Oman, dans le sud-est de la Péninsule arabique[150].
L'existence de deux *Ophirs* distincts, ayant chacun une orthographe propre, nous paraît devoir être admise, d'autant plus que le *Périple de la Mer Érythrée* 23 mentionne une Ἀφὰρ μητρόπολις, ἐν ᾗ Χαριβαὴλ, ἔνθεσμος βασιλεὺς ἐθνῶν δύο, τοῦ τε Ὁμηρίτου καὶ τοῦ παρακειμένου λεγομένου Σαβαίτου, «Aphar, la métropole dans laquelle (se trouve) Kariba'el, roi légitime de deux peuples, le Himyarite et celui qui lui est contigu, appelé Sabéen». On s'accorde à identifier la Ἀφάρ du *Périple de la Mer Érythrée* à la Σαπφάρ/*Sapphar* de Ptolémée et Pline[151], la *Ẓfr* des inscriptions sabéennes[152] et la *Ẓafar* des auteurs arabes[153], au coeur du Yémen. On va jusqu'à corriger la Ἀφάρ du texte du *Périple* en Σαφάρ, sans se rendre compte de l'étrange coïncidence des formes Ἀφάρ et *ʾwpr* (Gen 10,29), peut-être à l'origine

142 Ṯağ al-ʿarūs, Le Caire 1307/1889, vol. X, p. 254,1.
143 I.J. Gelb, Computer-Aided Analysis of Amorite (AS 21), Chicago - London 1980, p. 555, nº 165; ARM XVI/1, p. 49: *A-bu-um*-DINGIR.
144 RÉS 2740,4.
145 CIS IV, 290,6: sabéen.
146 A.F.L. Beeston, Sabaic Grammar, Manchester 1984, p. 67, § Q 30:1. La mimation est fréquente dans les noms propres sabéens, mais n'apparaît pas normalement à l'intérieur du nom, entre ses parties composantes.
147 Cf. E. Lipiński, art.cit. (n. 1), ZAH 5, 1992, p. 147-149.
148 C'est le titre d'un article de V. Christidès, dans RB 77, 1970, p. 240-247.
149 Flavius Josèphe, Antiquités judaïques VIII,6,4.
150 V. Christidès, art.cit. (n. 148).
151 Ptolémée, Géographie VI, 7,41; Pline, Histoire naturelle VI,104.
152 CIS IV,312,6; RÉS 4158,10; G. Ryckmans, «Inscriptions sud-arabes», Le Muséon 66, 1953, p. 295-303, nº 508,3.
153 W. Caskel, op.cit. (n. 67), vol. II, p. 613a (index).

ʾpr, à moins que **ʾŌfar* ne provienne de *ʾĀfar*, ce qui serait une évolution normale en hébreu. V. Christidès, qui n'a pas relevé la Ἀφάρ du *Périple*, a cependant attiré l'attention sur le livre XII d'une chronique syriaque attribuée à Zacharie de Mytilène, qui abrège et commente la *Géographie* de Ptolémée. Or, la chronique identifie Ophir avec les Sabéens[154], ce qui ne manque pas d'évoquer le *Périple*, où Ἀφάρ est la métropole des Himyarites et des Sabéens.
La notation du *ẓāʾ* initial de *Ẓafar* par un *ʾaleph* dans *ʾ(w)pr* demande toutefois une explication. Celle-ci peut se prévaloir de la nature des consonnes emphatiques en éthiopien, auquel les anciens parlers de l'Arabie du Sud étaient apparentés. Or on sait que les emphatiques de l'éthiopien sont caractérisées par l'occlusion de la glotte et un certain report en arrière du point d'articulation[155]. C'est cette «glottisation» de l'articulation du *ẓāʾ*, inconnu de l'hébreu et de l'araméen, que noterait le *ʾaleph* de Gen 10,29 et qu'impliquerait le «zéro» orthographique du *Périple*, à supposer, bien sûr, que l'ancienne prononciation sud-arabique des consonnes emphatiques était semblable à celle des parlers sémitiques d'Éthiopie.
On est très mal renseigné sur les origines de Himyar, dont Ẓafar était la capitale, et le roi Kariba'el du *Périple* n'était qu'un souverain du Ier siècle de notre ère[156]. On pense toutefois que les Himyarites étaient une tribu de la mouvance qatabanite, ce qui justifierait la mention biblique de l'«Ophir yoqṭanéen» ou (Ẓ)afar après Abimaël, dont le nom semble être qatabanite.

4.13. Hawilah - À court de toponymes et d'ethniques qu'il pouvait classer raisonnablement dans la descendance de Yoqṭân, l'auteur de la Liste des Peuples a repris le nom de Hawilah, déjà mentionnée parmi les Chamites[157], tout comme il l'a fait pour Shéba. Peut-être ne distinguait-il pas «l'Ophir yoqṭanéen» de «l'Ophir salomonien» et un «pays de l'or» lui a suggéré l'autre, celui de Hawilah, situé sur la rive occidentale de la Mer Rouge.

4.14. Yobab – *Yôbab* est le nom d'un roi édomite selon Gen 36,33-34; 1 Chr 1,44-45, d'un roi cananéen selon Jos 11,1, d'autres personnages selon 1 Chr 8,9.18 et des tablettes néo-assyriennes mentionnant un *Ia-bi-bu* et une *fIa-bi-bi-e*[158]. En revanche, l'anthroponyme ne semble pas être attesté dans les inscriptions arabes préislamiques, sinon sous la forme *Yhybb*[159], nom porté par une tribu ou un clan sabéens. On ne saurait cependant pas prouver l'identité de *Ywbb* et de *Yhybb*.

Les limites du territoire habité par les fils de Yoqṭân sont indiquées en Gen 10,30, probablement du nord au sud. *Mēšāʾ*/Μασση semble être identique à *Maššaʾ*, nom

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154 F.J. Hamilton – E.W. Brooks, The Syriac Chronicle known as that of Zachariah of Mitylene, London 1899, p. 326. L'identification subséquente d'Ophir avec Ἀσαβα ὄρη de Ptolémée, Géographie VI,7,29, s'appuie vraisemblablement sur l'homophonie de Saba-Asaba.
155 E. Ullendorff, The Semitic Languages of Ethiopia. A Comparative Phonology, London 1955, p. 151-157. – À noter que le *ʿayin* serait marqué en hébreu et en araméen, s'il s'agissait de la ville forte de ʿAffār, au nord-ouest de Ṣanaʿāʾ, entre le Wādī Maur et le Wādī Laǧa.
156 Pour son identification, voir M.G. Raschke, op.cit. (n. 131), p. 958-959, n. 1225.
157 Cf. E. Lipiński, art.cit. (n. 1), ZAH 5, 1992, p. 142-145.
158 APN, p. 90b.
159 G. Lankester Harding, op.cit. (n. 12), p. 691.

du quatrième descendant d'Aram selon la leçon la plus probable du texte hébreu. On le situe en Arabie du Nord[160]. *Sᵉpārā* est un toponyme muni de l'enclitique *-h* de direction. On ne peut identifier cette «montagne de l'Orient» à Ẓafar, dont le nom s'écrirait en hébreu *Ṣpr* ou *ʾpr*, comme nous l'avons proposé, et qui n'est d'ailleurs pas un oronyme. Nous proposons d'identifier *Spr* à l'actuel Mont *Sabir* qui s'élève à 3006 m d'altitude au sud de Taᶜizz, dans le Yémen méridional. La différence de sonore et de sourde *b/p* ne crée pas plus de difficultés que dans le cas de *ᶜrb/p*, rencontré plus haut[161]. La vocalisation Σωφηρα des LXX pourrait même être correcte, si l'ancienne prononciation de l'oronyme était *Sāb/pir*, ce qui donnerait normalement en hébreu *Sōp̄ēr*. Si l'auteur de la Liste des Peuples qualifie ce sommet de «montagne de l'Orient», c'est qu'il situe tous les Sémites en Orient.

Sous la forme d'un tableau généalogique de la descendance des trois fils de Noé, l'auteur de la Liste des Peuples s'est efforcé de donner un aperçu de toutes les nations de la terre. Du moins, tel était son but. En effet, le nombre de 70 peuples énuméres correspond à celui des fils de Dieu dans la mythologie d'Ugarit[162] et, sans doute, dans celle d'autres Sémites du Nord-Ouest. Ce rapport numérique était exigé par la tradition, suivant laquelle les limites des nations avaient été fixées suivant le nombre des fils de Dieu[163].

Les peuples sont répartis sur trois des quatre régions de la terre: le Nord échoit à Japhet, le Sud à Cham, l'Est à Sem, l'Ouest étant occupé par la Grande Mer, la Méditerranée. L'ombilique de cet univers, à partir duquel les points cardinaux sont fixés, n'est pas Jérusalem, puisque la Syro-Palestine est rangée dans la zone de Cham, mais un point situé au nord de la Syrie, probablement le Mont Ṣaphon, l'actuel Ǧebel el-ʾAqraᶜ. Ce «mont Chauve» d'une altitude de 1770 m, à une quarantaine de kilomètres au nord d'Ugarit, fut en effet divinisé et la Bible elle-même voit en lui une montagne sacrée en concurrence avec Sion[164]. Philon de Byblos, qui l'appelle Κάσιος, la compte au nombre des quatre montagnes saintes des Phéniciens[165], l'auteur de Job 26,7 en fait le point de suspension de la terre et Is 14,13 y reconnaît encore la «montagne de l'assemblée» des dieux.

La fonction de la Liste des Peuples dans le Livre de la Genèse n'est plus, en premier lieu, celle de dresser un tableau des nations de l'univers. Elle consiste à faire le pont entre les récits du déluge (Gen 8-9) et l'histoire d'Abraham (Gen 12ss.). La Liste fait donc double emploi avec la généalogie de Gen 11,10-26, qui est de date plus récente et présuppose déjà la fusion des noms d'Arap et de Késed en Arpakshad. Ce dernier est censé être l'ancêtre d'Abraham, dont le pays natal serait Ur des Chaldéens (Gen 11,28). Éber, l'éponyme des peuples de Transeuphratène (Gen 10,21), fait également partie de cette généalogie très tardive (Gen 11,14-16), qui s'inspire de la Liste des Peuples; celle-ci, dans sa forme originale, semble

160 Cf. ci-dessus, p. 202-203.
161 Cf. ci-dessus, p. 193.
162 KTU 1.4,VI,46.
163 Dtn 32,8-9.
164 Is 14,12-15; Job 26,7-13; Ps 48,2-3; 89,13.
165 Eusèbe de Césarée, Préparation évangélique I,10,9.

remonter à la fin du VIIe siècle av. J.-C. ou, à tout le moins, se base sur des informations qui reflètent cette époque.

Sommaire (abstract):

La liste des Sémites en Gen 10,21-30 et 1 Chr 1,17-23 contenait 7 noms de fils de Sem et 21 noms (3x7) de ses petits-fils et arrière-petits-fils, dont 14 (2x7) formaient la famille de Yoqtân. Ce sont des noms ethniques, attestés en Orient, auxquels se joignent quelques anthroponymes, comme Hadoram et Abimaël, et quelques noms symboliques, tels Yoqtân et Péleg, semble-t-il. Comme plusieurs noms de la liste des Sémites ne peuvent être identifiés avec quelque vraisemblance, il est difficile de dater sa composition. Elle fait néanmoins partie intégrante de la Liste des Peuples et devait contenir 28 noms de manière à parvenir à un total de 70 noms de peuples, qui correspond au nombre de 70 dieux d'un panthéon semblable à celui d'Ugarit. La répartition des peuples entre les descendants de Japhet, au nord, de Cham, au sud, et de Sem, à l'est, indique qu'elle est faite à partir d'un point de la Syrie du Nord, probablement du Mont Ṣaphon, que Job 26,7 considère encore comme le pivot de la terre.

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Simple Nominal Clause (SNC) or Verbless Clause in Biblical Hebrew Prose

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Definition

The simple nominal clause (SNC) is the clause that does not contain any finite verb form-not even the verb *hyh*. It is the simple nominal clause in contradistinction to the complex nominal clause (CNC) which has a finite verb form in the second position of the sentence, i.e. x-qatal, or x-yiqtol.

These definitions do not conform to common grammatical analysis.[1] Contrary to most grammarians, I think that, first, the verb *hyh* is not a copula but a normal verb since its presence is not optional in a main sentence (see below); and, second, when a verb form takes the second position, the sentence has the function of a noun phrase, i.e. it is used as a nominal or adverbial element of a larger unit of the text.

The basic presupposition is that correct syntactic analysis is impossible if one remains bound to the sentence level; only on the larger level of the text are the relationships between sentences correctly understood.

In this paper, I shall define criteria and analyse texts in order to clarify the basic structure of the SNC. I shall not treat the SNC with *ʾšr* since this would require a paper by itself.[2]

Criteria

In spite of monographic studies on the subject, nobody seems able to provide criteria that determine what the subject and the predicate are in the SNC. The problem is left for the grammarian to decide – not always an easy task. Another unsolved problem is the principle which lies behind the word order, i.e. why sometimes we find the order predicate (P) – subject (S) and sometimes S – P.

My assumption is that the problem of subject and predicate is solved by taking into consideration two basic principles: first, the traditional doctrine of universals and particulars, and second, the position in the sentence.

In Aristotelian terms, universals and particulars correspond to accidental properties and substances respectively.

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[1] Details of this theory can be found in two recent books of the author: The Syntax of the Verb in Classical Hebrew Prose, Sheffield 1990, and Lettura sintattica della prosa ebraico-biblica, Jerusalem 1990.

[2] I hope to publish soon a monographic study on the SNC in Biblical Hebrew prose. I refrain from giving a bibliographical list here. A brief overview of the current research on the verbless clause is available in N.M. Waldman, The Recent Study of the Hebrew, Cincinnati – Winona Lake 1989, 68.

Substances were persons or things of which accidental properties (of quantity, quality, relation, action, place, state, etc.) could be predicated (or asserted) in logically well-formed propositions...
Proper names, as well as pronouns and phrases which identify a definite person or thing (like *John*, *he* and *my friend*...) are to be regarded as the most 'substantival' — the most truly 'nominal' — of the expressions in a language (hence the traditional term 'substantive' for 'noun'). They are *particular* (or 'singular') terms, denoting some definite, *individual* substance. Other words and phrases, including indefinite 'common' nouns (*man, book,* etc.) and 'abstract' nouns (*goodness, beauty,* etc.), as well as verbs, adjectives and adverbs, are *universal* (or 'general') terms: they do not of themselves denote individual substances (unless they are syntactically determined, in the descriptive specification of an individual, e.g. *the man over there*), but they denote either a class of individuals or qualities, states, actions, etc., which may be associated with individuals.[3]

In principle, substances (or particulars) function as subject while accidental properties (or universals) function as predicate.
The other main principle of my analysis is that the first position of the sentence belongs to the predicate in Biblical Hebrew. I already have applied this principle to the sentence with finite verb form.[4] Accordingly, a sentence is predicative when the finite verb form is found right at the beginning of it; it is nominal when the finite verb form takes the second position (i.e. a CNC). I hope to show that, *mutatis mutandis*, this same principle applies to the sentence without a finite verb form (i.e. a SNC).
Two more specifications are needed at this point. First, a distinction is to be made between "unmarked" and "marked" sentences; second, a special sentence is to be defined which shall be termed "presentative".
A definition of unmarked and marked is normally given by resorting to "the traditional logical distinction of subject and predicate".[5] In Biblical Hebrew, the following definition can be given: when the first position of the sentence is taken by an expression belonging to the class of the predicate the sentence is predicative, or unmarked, or neutral; on the contrary, when the first position is taken by an expression not belonging to the class of the predicate, the sentence is non-predicative, or marked, or detail-oriented. In the first case, class and function coincide since the emphasis falls on an expression which is destined to function as the predicate by its own nature, and therefore the information is general (it states 'what the subject did'). In the second case, on the contrary, class and function diverge because the emphasis falls on an expression which is not expected to function as the predicate, and therefore the information is not general but concerned with a certain detail ('who is the subject', or 'how did something happen'). I hope that things shall become clear later on.
Presentative sentences are clearly discernible by their specific word order and semantic setting. "Presentative" is not the usual terminology in English, however. Presentative sentence has been clearly described in Italian and French. In Italian it

[3] J. Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics, Cambridge etc. 1968, § 8.1.3.
[4] See note 1.
[5] See J. Lyons, Semantics 2, Cambridge etc. 1977, § 12.7, p. 502.

is sometimes marked by *c'è, ci sono*; in French by *il y a; c'est; voici, voilà*.[6] In English there might correspond the "*there* construction" although it is not analysed in this way by grammarians.[7] The prominent feature of the presentative sentence is that the subject takes the second position instead of the first (as in the normal word order). Its specific setting is description not evaluation (as in a predicative sentence). The speaker describes what he sees (in reality or in a dream), or he portrays as present an event which happened in the past or far away from himself and/ or from the listener. In English this type of sentence is indicated as "descriptive" (J. Lyons), "descriptive statement" (J. R. Searle), or "proposition" (J. L. Austin).[8]

Type 1 of SNC

By combining the two main principles we have just described, i.e. classes of subject and predicate, and position in the sentence, all types of SNCs can be described and accounted for. The two basic types of SNC are as follows: type 1, with word order P – S, and type 2, with word order S – P.
Type 1 is a predicative sentence. It is unmarked or neutral when P belongs to the class of the predicate; it is marked when it does not belong to this class. This means that when an element not belonging to the class of the predicate takes the first position, it bears the emphasis and it functions as the predicate of the sentence. The element belonging to the class of the predicate is then demoted to function as the subject.

(1) Lev 11:35 | (P) *ṭm'ym* | (S) *hm*
(Everything upon which a part of their carcass shall fall...) they are unclean...
(2) 1Kgs 20:32 | (P) *'ḥy* | (S) *hw'*
(Ben-hadad...) he is my brother.

These two examples illustrate different terms belonging to the class of the predicate (universals): an adjective and a 'common' noun respectively. These are unmarked, plain sentences because the predicate is a term belonging to the class of the predicate.
Note, however, that particular terms denoting individual substances can also function as P as shown in the following examples:

(3) Dt 3:21b | (P) *'ynyk* | (S) *hr't 't kl-'šr 'śh yhwh 'lhykm*
(To Joshua I said...) It is your eyes which have seen all that Yahweh your God (did to those two kings...)
(4) Gen 37:16 | (P) *'t-'ḥy* | (S) *'nky mbqš*
(Gen 37,15 What are you looking for?) It is my brothers that I am looking for.

[6] See L. Renzi (ed.), Grande grammatica italiana di consultazione, Bologna 1988, 36-37, and J.-C. Chevalier et al. (ed.), Grammaire Larousse du français contemporain, Paris 1964, §§ 121.125.

[7] According to R. Huddleston, Introduction to the Grammar of English, Cambridge etc. 1984, § 14.7, this "dummy *there*" is the subject of the sentence.

[8] See index at the end of the respective books: Lyons, Semantics, 1-2; J.R. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge etc. 1969; J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford – New York 1975.

(5) Gen 29:4 | (P) *m'yn* | (S) *'tm*
| (P) *mḥrn* | (S) *'nḥnw*
(Jacob said to the shepherds ...) Where are you from? (They said:) From Harran are we.

Examples (3) - (5) illustrate cases where a particular term (a substantive with a personal pronoun in (3) and (4), a prepositional phrase in (5)) functions as a predicate. In all three the information is not general, or unmarked, or neutral, but rather detail-oriented, or marked. It states who the subject is in (3), who the object is in (4), and the place from where in (5). Emphasis falls in the first element of the sentence, i.e. it is the predicate. In examples (3) and (4) we find a participle (*hr't, mbqš*, respectively) which belongs to the class of the predicate. Because of its position in the second place, this participle is demoted to the role of subject;[9] in (5) a prepositional phrase, which is normally not classified as predicate, is promoted to the role of the predicate.

Type 2 of SNC

Type 2 shows a word order S – P. In this case the P is demoted from its leading function in the sentence. This happens in circumstantial and in presentative SNCs. The fact that the circumstantial SNC shows the word order S – P is well known. One example is enough:

(6) 1Sm 17:41 *wylk hplšty hlk wqrb 'l-dwd*
| (S) *wh'yš nś' hṣnh* | (P) *lpnyw*
The Philistine came on, continually getting closer to David, while the shield-bearer was in front of him.

The clearest case of the presentative sentence is that of someone introducing himself to the listener (as in the so-called "self-presentation formulas"):

(7) Gen 28:13 | (S) *'ny* | (P) *yhwh 'lhy 'brhm 'byk w'lhy yṣḥq*
(God said to Jacob:) I am Yahweh the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac.

With the same sentence type we find the case of someone introducing a third party to the listener (8), describing something which is happening in that very moment (9), reporting on some event (10), or submitting to the listener a proposition of his own (11):

(8) Gen 24:65 *my-h'yš hhlk bśdh lqr'tnw*
| (S) ... *hw'* | (P) *'dny*
(Rebekah said to the servant:) Who is that man that is walking in the field to meet us? (He answered:) He is my master.

(9) Gen 38:13 | (S) *hnh ḥmyk* | (P) *'lh tmnth lgz ṣ'nw*
(It was reported to Tamar as follows:) Behold your father in law is going up to Timnah to shear his sheep.

(10) Nb 11:27 | (S) *'ldd wmydd* | (P) *mtnb'ym bmḥnh*
(A young man reported to Moses as follows:) Eldad and Medad are prophesying in the camp.

[9] The 'subject' is an embedded SNC in (4) with *'nky* as the (grammatical) S and *mbqš* as the (grammatical) P.

(11) Gen 19:31 | (S) *ʾbynw* | (P) *zqn*
| (S) *wʾyš* | (P) *ʾyn bʾrṣ lbwʾ ʿlynw*
(The firstborn said to the younger daughter of Lot:) Our father is old and there is no man in the country to come unto us.

We conclude that the normal word order of the predicative independent SNC is P – S (exactly as in the corresponding sentence with a finite verb form). The first element of the SNC functions as the predicate and on it the emphasis falls. If the first element belongs to the class of the predicate, the SNC is unmarked, otherwise it is marked, i.e. it communicates information not in general terms but stressing only a detail of it. When, however, the SNC is presentative (independent) or circumstantial (dependent) the normal word order is S – P. No emphasis falls on the first element of the presentative sentence simply because the sentence is not predicative, i.e. there is no predicative nexus in it between (grammatical) subject and (grammatical) predicate. In fact, the presentative sentence communicates information in a global way (see next section). No emphasis falls in the first element of the circumstantial SNC, either. In fact, the effect of the circumstantial SNC is to demote the predicate (thus making the whole sentence syntactically dependent) simply by putting the subject in the first position.

Presentative and predicative SNC

It is advisable to show the difference between predicative and presentative SNC by means of examples:

(12) Gen 24:23 | (P) *bt-my* | (S) *ʾt*
Gen 24:24 | (P) *bt-btwʾl* | (P) *ʾnky*
(Abraham's servant asked:) Whose daughter are you? (Rebekah answered:) A daughter of Bethuel I am.
(13) Gen 27:32 | (P) *my-* | (S) *ʾth*
| (S) *ʾny* | (P) *bnk bkrk ʾśw*
(Isaac asked:) Who are you? (Jacob answered:) I am your firstborn Esau.

In (12) a complete reply would also be simply *bt-btwʾl*, while in (13) it would be *bnk bkrk ʿśw*. It is clear that these two noun phrases are the predicate. In (12) we find a predicative sentence, with the word order P – S, since it states a quality of the subject. On the contrary, (13) is a presentative sentence since it simply reveals the identity of the man who is coming along. In (12) Rebekah states something of herself while in (13) Jacob simply presents himself (falsely!).
We can now understand the variant word order of identical SNCs such as the following:

(14) Gen 26:20 *wyrybw rʿy grr ʿm rʿy yṣḥq lʾmr*
| (P) *lnw* | (S) *hmym*
The shepherds of Gerar strove with the shepherds of Isaak saying: Ours is the water!
(15) 1Kgs 2:14 *wyʾmr*
| (S) *dbr* | (P) *ly ʾlyk*
(Adonijah) said (to Bath-sheba): I have something to say ('a word') to you.
(16) Lev 11:35 | (P) *ṭmʾym* | (S) *hm*
wṭmʾym yhyw lkm

(Everything upon which a part of their carcass shall fall...) they are unclean and unclean they should be unto you.

(17) Nb 9:7 | (S) *ʾnḥnw* | (P) *ṭmʾym*

(The men who had become unclean because of touching a corpse said to Moses:) We are unclean...

Since in (14) the two groups of shepherds are arguing one against the other, the prepositional phrase *lnw* clearly states a claim on the water. The prepositional phrase is the predicate and takes the first position. This word order is distinctive of the predicative sentence (P – S). On the contrary, no such claim occurs in (15) where the speaker simply announces that he has something to say to the addressee. The word order is therefore that of the presentative sentence (S – P), and not that of the predicative one. Accordingly, (16) is a predicative SNC with the word order P – S while (17) is a presentative sentence with the word order S - P. The context, in fact, justifies this analysis. In Lev 11 God is giving instructions concerning pure and impure animals. Starting from v. 4b, the structure of several sentences is as follows: a description ("As for this and this...", a casus pendens) followed by a statement ("it is clean", or "it is unclean"). The statement consists of a SNC of the predicative type having the adjective *ṭmʾ* "unclean", or *ṭhwr* "clean" in the first position, and an independent personal pronoun in the second position. The adjective belongs to the class of the predicate and functions as the predicate; the pronoun, on its part, belongs to the class of the subjects and functions as such. Every such sentence conveys God's verdict on food matters.

The second sentence of (16) is not a SNC with the copula but a CNC of the type waw-x-yiqtol. This is one of the clearest examples that contradicts the analysis of the verb *hyh* as a copula (see below). Otherwise, it would be rather difficult to explain the repetition of the same sentence in (16). It is, in fact, no repetition since the second sentence is totally different. The (waw-x-) yiqtol has a jussive force in contrast to the declarative force of the preceding SNC: "They are unclean and they must be unclean for you". This same type of sentence is found in Lev 11:10-11 and Ex 30:32.

In contrast with (16), the SNC of (17) is not predicative. The people who speak have already undergone impurity. They are not issuing a statement on themselves; rather they are presenting their state to Moses so that a solution can be found allowing them to celebrate the passover.

A SNC very similar to (3) is found in Gen 45:12:

(18) Gen 45:12 | (S) *hnh ʿnykm* | (P) *rʾwt*
| (S) *wʿny ʾḥy bnymyn* | (P) —
| (P) *ky-py* | (S) *hmdbr ʾlykm*

(Joseph said to his brethren:) And, behold, your eyes see, as do the eyes of my brother Benjamin, that it's my mouth that speaks unto you.

Gen 45:12 consists of three SNCs, the first two showing the word order S – P (in the second we find an ellipsis of the P, which is the same as the preceding). They are presentative sentences as the context shows. In order to reassure his brethren, Joseph invites them to consider what they see with their own eyes (note the presence of *hnh* which is characteristic of visual experience). On the contrary, in (3) the emphasis rests on the first term *ʿynykm*, which consequently has the function

of the predicate, and the following participle *hr ʾt* functions as the subject, with a particular article characteristic of the subject. Here we find, therefore, a complete reversal of roles: the substantive which is normally a subject functions as the predicate, and the participle which is normally a predicate functions as the subject. The same type of sentence is found in Dt 4:3; 11:2,7. It also occurs in the third SNC of (18), where the substantive *py* functions as the predicate and the participle *hmdbr* (again with a particular article!) functions as the subject.
A sentence of the type *ʾny* + personal noun, "I am N.N.", represents the basic pattern of the presentative SNC showing the word order S - P. In specific cases, however, the syntactic function of the two members changes. From the context it is clear that in the following examples *ʾny* is not the subject but the predicate:

(19) 1Sm 9:18 *wyʾmr hgydh-nʾ ly*
| (P) *ʾy zh* | (S) *byt hrʾh*
1Sm 9:19 *wyʿn šmwʾl*
| (P) *ʾnky* | (S) *hrʾh*
(Saul) said: Please tell me, which is the seer's house?
Samuel answered: It's me the seer.

Clearly, the SNC of 1Sm 9:19 is not presentative but predicative. Samuel does not simply identify himself; rather he qualifies himself as the one Saul is looking for. This SNC is not a "self-presentation formula". The same is true sometimes with the sentence *ʾny yhwh* meaning "it's me Yahweh", i.e. I am the only one capable of being in the future what I was in the past. It is then a "formula of incomparableness", as I have shown elsewhere.[10]

Word order in circumstantial SNC

In circumstantial SNC the word order S - P is prevalent but by no means mandatory. Consider the following examples:

(20) Gen 24:29 *wlrbqh ʾḥ*
| (S) *wšmw* | (P) *lbn*
Now, Rebekah had a brother whose name was Laban ('while his name was Laban').
(21) 1Sm 17:4 *wyṣʾ ʾyš-bnym mmḥnwt plštym*
cf. 17:23 | (P) *glyt* | (S) *šmw*
A champion came out of the camp of the Philistines whose name was Goliath ('while Goliath was his name').

A difference between (20) and (21) is the absence of waw in the latter before the SNC (*glyt šmw*, as compared to *wšmw lbn*) but this makes no difference in terms of syntax. Waw does not affect the function of the sentence, exactly as it does not affect a sentence with a finite verb form (except of course when it is a constituent of the verb form itself, i.e. wayyiqtol, wᵉqatal, and wᵉyiqtol). It is reasonable to assume that in (20) and (21) the 'new' information, i.e. the predicate, is the personal name. In both cases the SNC (with or without waw) indicates a background information related to the preceding sentence. In (20) this is another SNC introducing

[10] See Esodo 3,14a: 'Io sarò quello che ero' e un parallelo egiziano, FrancLA 35, 1985, 7-26.

antecedent information previous to a story;[11] in (21) the circumstantial SNC is related to the preceding first level verb form wayyiqtol. This means (as already mentioned) that circumstantial SNC can have both the word order S – P and P – S. Further examples of the type S – P are Gen 38:1,2; for the type P – S we can quote 2Sm 20:21 and 1Kgs 13:2.

The circumstantial function can also be expressed by the conjunction *ky*. When this happens, the SNC has the word order P – S. I do not have complete evidence to show that this word order is mandatory. In the following examples the circumstance is expressed by both waw + SNC and the conjunction *ky* + SNC. In the first case the word order is S – P, in the second it is P – S.

(22) Gen 48:14 *wyšlḥ yśrʾl ʾt-ymynw wyšt ʿl-rʾš ʾprym*
| (S) *whwʾ* | (P) *hṣʿyr*
wʾt-śmʾlw ʿl-rʾš mnšh śkl ʾt-ydyw
| (P) *ky mnšh* | (S) *hbkwr*

Israel stretched out his right hand and put it upon Ephraim's head who was the younger, and his left hand (he put) upon Manasseh's head, thus guiding his hands purposely because Manasseh was the firstborn.

(23) Nb 22:22 *wyḥr-ʾp ʾlhym*
| (P) *ky hwlk* | (S) *hwʾ*
wytyṣb mlʾk yhwh bdrk kṣṭn lw
| (S) *whwʾ* | (P) *rkb ʿl-ʾtnw*
| (S) *wšny nʿryw* | (P) *ʿmw*

God's anger was kindled because he was going (with the messengers of Balak). The angel of Yahweh stood in the way as an adversary against him while he was riding upon his ass, and his two servants were with him.

These two ways of expressing a circumstance are equally effective. The conjunction *ky* makes things explicit, of course. But the SNC alone effectively expresses the circumstance simply by its word order S – P. In fact, a term which is normally a predicate is indicated to function as the subject simply by taking the second position of the sentence. As a consequence, the sentence itself becomes dependent and thus it can express a circumstance of the main sentence.

The SNC as a two-member construction

Contrary to what is normally assumed, the essential constituents of the SNC are only two: the predicate and the subject. The copula is not a category of the Biblical Hebrew syntax. This conclusion is drawn from two facts: first, the verb *hyh* behaves as any other verb and not as the copular verbs; second, the pronoun (personal independent or demonstrative) which is sometimes found in the SNC does not function as a copula, either.

As I have shown elsewhere, the situation of the verb *hyh* is not comparable with that of the copular verbs of the classical languages which are optional elements of the sentence.[12] The situation of verb *hyh* is different since its occurrence in the

[11] Antecedent information conveys the setting of the following story. Examples of different verb forms and constructions used in this function are given in my book, *The Syntax*, §§ 18, 19, 91)

[12] See: A. Niccacci, Sullo stato sintattico del verbo *hāyâ*, FrancLA 40, 1990, 9-23.

sentence is governed by definite rules. It is mandatory when there is a need to indicate a time setting for the information which is different from the present. The SNC indicates present setting by itself; for past and future settings a finite verb form (qatal and yiqtol, respectively) is needed. In the SNC no form of *hyh* is found simply because the participle of this verb is not used in Biblical Hebrew (it is only found in Ex 9:3). When a finite verb form of *hyh* occurs, we have either a verbal sentence (if the verb form is in the first position) or a CNC (if the verb form is in the second position), not a (verbless) SNC. The nominal complement found with the verb *hyh* functions as a predicative complement since it completes the predication of the verb. In fact, in such cases, *hyh* is a verb of incomplete predication (it can also be a "full" verb of complete predication, as in Gen 1:3).

The analysis of a SNC where three members occur is a matter of debate. The third member is a pronoun, personal or demonstrative. According to some authorities, it is a "pleonastic or dummy pronoun"; according to others, one of the members is "focus". For instance: *ʾśw hwʾ ʾdwm* (Gen 36:8) can be analysed as follows: "Esau (, he) is Edom" (i.e. subject – pleonastic pronoun – predicate), or: "As for Esau, he is Edom" (i.e. focus – subject – predicate).[13] Still other authorities take the pronoun to function as the copula.

R.S. Driver is one of the few authors who find hard to accept the existence of the copula in Biblical Hebrew. Driver's analysis of the evidence is not without flaws but it is sound in this respect. He also refers to some texts which beautifully demonstrate, in my opinion, the non-existence of the copula.[14] Some of the relevant texts are as follows (note that the casus pendens is indicated as "pd"):

(24) Dt 9:3

(pd) *wydʿt hywm ky yhwh ʾlhyk*
| (P) *hwʾ* | (S) *haʿōbēr lpnyk*
(pd) *ʾš ʾwklh*
| (P) *hwʾ* | (S) *yšmydm*
| (P) *whwʾ* | (S) *ykny ʿm lpnyk*

And so you shall experience today that Yahweh your God, it's Him that is about to go over before you; a consuming fire, it's Him that will destroy them, it's Him that will bring them down before you.

The parallelism between a (verbless) SNC (*hwʾ haʿōbēr lpnyk*) and CNCs (*hwʾ yšmydm, whwʾ ykny ʿm lpnyk*, with a finite verb form in the second position) is instructive. It shows that the pronoun cannot be taken as pleonastic, or as a copula. Understandably, this analysis is impossible with a following finite verb form. Rather, the pronoun is the predicate, the subject being, in the first instance, a participle (*haʿōbēr*, with a particular article). In the other two instances the role of the subject is played by a finite verb form. The SNC shows the word order P – S with a total reversal of roles since what is normally subject functions as predicate, and vice versa.

Other texts with the same sentence structure can be quoted:

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[13] See B.K. Waltke – M. O'Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, Winona Lake 1990, 131.

[14] R.S. Driver, A Treatise on the Use of the Tenses in Hebrew and Some Other Syntactical Questions, Oxford [3]1892, §§ 198-201.

(25) Dt 31:3 (pd) *yhwh ʾlhyk*
| (P) *hwʾ* | (S) *ʿōbēr lpnyk*
| (P) *hwʾ-* | (S) *yšmyd ʾt-hgwym hʾlh ...*
(pd) *yhwšʿ*
| (P) *hwʾ* | (S) *ʿōbēr lpnyk...*

Yahweh your God, it's Him that is about to go over before you, it's Him that will destroy those peoples (from before you, so that you shall inherit them). Joshua, it's him that is about to go over before you (as Yahweh promised).

(26) Dt 31:8 (pd) *wyhwh*
| (P) *hwʾ* | (S) *hahōlēk lpnyk*
| (P) *hwʾ* | (S) *yhyh ʿmk*

And Yahweh your God, it's Him that is about to march before you, it's Him that will be with you.

(27) Jos 22:22 (pd) *ʾl ʾlhym yhwh ʾl ʾlhym yhwh*
| (P) *hwʾ* | (S) *yōdēaʿ*
(pd) *wyśrʾl*
| (P) *hwʾ* | (S) *yēdaʿ*

The God of the gods Yahweh, the God of the gods Yahweh, it's Him that knows; and Israel, it's him that shall know.

(28) Jos 23:3b (pd) *ky yhwh ʾlhykm*
| (P) *hwʾ* | (S) *hannilḥām lkm...*
Jos 23:5a (pd) *wyhwh ʾlhykm*
| (P) *hwʾ* | (S) *yhdpm mpnykm*

Because Yahweh your God, it's Him that fought for you...
And Yahweh your God, it's Him that shall expel them from before you.

In all these examples we find a personal pronoun functioning as the predicate, the structure of the sentence being as follows: casus pendens, P – S. The pronoun can also function as the subject and the sentence pattern can change; e.g., casus pendens, S (pronoun) – P (as in 29), and casus pendens, P – S (pronoun) (as in 30).

(29) Gen 36:8b (pd) *ʿśw*
| (S) *hwʾ* | (P) *ʾdm*

As for Esau, he is Edom.

(30) Gen 41:25 (pd) *ḥlwm prʿh*
| (P) *ʾḥd* | (S) *hwʾ...*
Gen 41:26 (pd) *šbʿ prt hṭbt*
| (P) *šbʿ šnym* | (S) *hnh*
(pd) *wšbʿ šblym hṭbt*
| (P) *šbʿ šnym* | (S) *hnh*
(pd) *ḥlwm*
| (P) *ʾḥd* | (S) *hwʾ*

(Joseph said to the Pharaoh:) The dream of the Pharaoh, it is one. (...)
The seven good cows, they are seven years, and the seven good ears, they are seven years. The dream, it is one.

Demonstrative pronouns behave in the same way as the personal pronouns. They can function as the predicate, thus being related to what follows ("cataphoric pronouns") (31), or they can function as subjects, thus being related to what precedes ("anaphoric pronouns") (32).

(31) Gen 5:1	(P) *zh*	(S) *spr twldt ʾdm...*
Gen 20:13	(P) *zh*	(S) *ḥsd ʾšr tʿśy ʿmdy...*
Gen 25:12	(P) *wʾlh*	(S) *tldt yšmʿʾl bn-ʾbrhm...*

The following is the book of the generations of Adam...
The following is the kindness that you shall show unto me...
And the following are the generations of Ishmael son of Abraham...

(32) Gen 27:21	(P) *hʾth*	(S) *zh bny ʿśw*
	ʾm-lʾ (P) -	(S) - [15]
Gen 27:24	(P) *ʾth*	(S) *zh bny ʿśw...*
	(P) *ʾny*	(S) -
Gen 32:3	(P) *mḥnh ʾlhym*	(S) *zh*

(Isaac said to Jacob: Come near that I might feel you) whether you are (this, i.e.) my son Esau, or (you are) not (my son Esau).
Are you (this, i.e.) my son Esau?
(Jacob answered:) I am.
(Jacob said:) A God's camp is this.

The reply *ʾny* (alone) in Gen 27:24 confirms that the personal pronoun in the first position of the sentence functions as the predicate while the demonstrative pronoun functions as the subject. The personal noun is in apposition with the subject. The same sentence pattern occurs in the following examples:

(33) 2Sm 7:28	*wʿth ʾdny yhwh*	
	(P) *ʾth-*	(S) *hwʾ hʾlhym...*
2Chr 20:6	(P) *wʾth*	(S) *mwšl bkl mmlkwt hgwym*

And now, Lord Yahweh, it's you (it, i.e.) the true God...
And it's you that rules over all the kingdoms of the nations.

In 2Sm 7:28, *hwʾ* is the subject and *hʾlhym* follows in apposition with it (the same in 2Kgs 19:15). The parallel text of 2Chr 20:6 shows this same construction but soon after, there follows another SNC without the personal pronoun, the subject being the participle *mwšl*. This same pattern (with and without a personal pronoun) occurs in the following example:

(34) 1Chr 22:1	(P) *zh*	(S) *hwʾ byt yhwh hʾlhym*
	(P) *wzh-*	(S) *mzbḥ lʿlh lyśrʾl*

(David said:) This is (it, i.e.) the house of Yahweh the God, and this is the altar for the burnt offering of Israel.

A proof that in this kind of sentence the term that follows the personal (or demonstrative) pronoun is really apposition comes from the fact that different terms can fill that position. These are a noun (32-34), a participle (35), a relative phrase with *ʾšr* (36-37), and a clause introduced by *ky* (38). Normally, a substantive occurs with the *ʾšr* clause instead of the pronoun (37).[16]

(35) Gen 27:33	(P) *my-ʾpwʾ*	(S) *hwʾ ḥṣd-ṣyd*

(Isaac said:) Who then is he that hunted game (and brought it to me) ?

(36) 2Chr 2:5b	(P) *wmy*	(S) *ʾny ʾšr ʾbnh-lw byt...*

And who am I that I should build a house for Him...?

[15] The particle *ʾm-lʾ* introduces a disjunctive question where both P and S are elliptical.
[16] 2Chr 2:5b is the only example I know with the personal pronoun before the particle *ʾšr*.

(37) Dt 4:7 | (P) *ky my-* | (S) *gwy gdwl ʾšr-lw ʾlhym...*
For who is a great nation that has gods (near to them as Yahweh...)?
(38) Ex 3:11 | (P) *my* | (S) *ʾnky ky ʾlk ʾl-prʿh*
(Moses said unto God:) Who am I that I should go to the Pharaoh (and that I should bring the Israelites out of Egypt)?

In (35) a participle with article follows the pronoun with the force of an adjective, the same as the *ʾšr* clause in (36). The same position is filled by a circumstantial *ky* clause in (37). Thus we find a paradigmatic substitution of the following terms and functions: noun in apposition, attributive participle, attributive *ʾšr* clause, circumstantial *ky* clause. These functions express similar relationship with different terms. We conclude that the SNC consists of two members only, i.e. S and P. All different patterns consist of these two basic members with a possible addition of a third member functioning as a casus pendens. As such it is not really a third member because it is not a part of the sentence.

Abstract:

The author gives a description of the verbless clause (SNC) based on new criteria. The basic types of the SNC are as follows: type 1, with predicate + subject, and type 2, with subject + predicate. The first type is predicative, the second is 'presentative' or circumstantial. Both types can have an extra element at the beginning or at the end. At the beginning it functions as a *casus pendens*; at the end it functions as an apposition with the subject. The copula does not exist in Biblical Hebrew. The SNC is basically a two-member sentence.

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Nominativ Dual **yariḥau* im Gezer-Kalender

Josef Tropper (Berlin)

Der sogenannte Gezer-Kalender (KAI 182), eine 1908 in Gezer gefundene, aus dem 10. Jh. v. Chr. stammende siebenzeilige Inschrift, birgt trotz jahrzehntelanger Forschung immer noch erhebliche Probleme in sich. Neben der fundamentalen Frage, ob die Sprache der Inschrift Hebräisch oder Phönizisch ist, wird in der Forschung vor allem die insgesamt viermal bezeugte Form *yrḥw* (Z. 1[2x].2.6) intensiv diskutiert. Die wichtigsten Erklärungsversuche für die betreffende Form lauten:

1. *yrḥw* ist ein Dual cs. Nominativ: */yariḥō/* < **yariḥā* „zwei Monate" (Waw als mater lectionis für */ō/*).[1]
2. *yrḥw* ist ein Dual pron. mit proleptischem Pronominalsuffix 3.m.sg.: */yariḥêu/* < **yariḥêhū* „seine zwei Monate".[2]
3. *yrḥw* ist ein Dual cs. (Obliquus-Form): */yariḥau/* „zwei Monate". Die betreffende Form ist eine archaische oder dialektale Variante zu der Standardform */yariḥai/*. Die These beruht auf der Annahme, daß die semitische Dualendung (Obliquus) sprachgeschichtlich eine Entwicklung *au* > *ai* > *ê* erfahren habe.[3]
4. *yrḥw* ist ein Plural cs. Nominativ: */yariḥū/* „Monate".[4]
5. Die Lesung *yrḥw* ist falsch und zu *yrḥ* 2 „Monat 2" → „zwei Monate" zu korrigieren (Lesung des Zeichens nach Ḥet als Zahlzeichen für „2").[5]

Keiner der genannten Vorschläge ist frei von Problemen: Der Vorschlag 1 ist unvereinbar sowohl mit der althebräischen als auch mit der phönizischen Orthographie. Der Vorschlag 2 läßt sich aus syntaktischen Gründen kaum halten[6] und wirft außerdem neue orthographische Probleme auf[7]. Der Vorschlag 3 setzt eine unbewiesene und wohl auch unbeweisbare sprachliche Entwicklung voraus. Der beliebte[8] Vorschlag 4 beruht auf der schwierigen Annahme, daß *w* in der hebräischen Orthographie bereits im 10. Jh. v. Chr. als *mater lectionis* für auslautendes */ū/* fungieren konnte; außerdem führt der betreffende Vorschlag zu kaum überwindbaren inhaltlichen Problemen, weil auf diese Weise die bewährte

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1 H.L. Ginsberg, in: Bullentin of the Jewish Palestine Exploration Society 2 (1935), 49; ders, in: ArOr 8 (1936), 146.

2 W.F. Albright, The Gezer Calendar, BASOR 92 (1943), 22 (mit Anm. 28) und 24.

3 A. Lemaire, Zāmīr dans la tablette de Gezer et le cantique des cantiques, VT 25 (1975), 17.

4 G. Garbini, Note sul „calendario" di Gezer, AION 6 (1954-56), 123-130.

5 J.B. Segal, „*yrḥ*" in the Gezer „Calendar", JSS 7 (1962), 212-221.

6 Siehe I. Young, The Style of the Gezer Calendar and Some „Archaic Biblical Hebrew" Passages, VT 42 (1992), 362-375, bes. 364.

7 Dem Vorschlag zufolge würde nämlich auch die viermal bezeugte singularische Form *yrḥ* (Z. 3.4.5.7) ein proleptisches Suffix 3.m.sg. enthalten. Die geforderte Form müßte aber angesichts des orthographischen Befundes in den frühen byblischen und hebräischen Inschriften entweder *yrḥh* oder *yrḥw* lauten.

8 Der betreffende Vorschlag wurde neuerdings unter anderem von Young (a.a.O.) ausführlich verteidigt.

Interpretation des Textes im Sinne eines 12-Monate-Kalenders für landwirtschaftliche Tätigkeiten nicht aufrechterhalten werden kann. Der Vorschlag 5 ist schließlich aus paläographischen Gründen entschieden abzulehnen.[9]

Angesichts der genannten unbefriedigenden Vorschläge sollen im Folgenden zwei bislang nicht in Erwägung gezogene Deutungsmöglichkeiten für die umstrittene Form *yrḥw* vorgestellt werden. Beide beruhen auf der vom Kontext geforderten Annahme, daß *yrḥw* eine Dualform darstellt. Ausgangspunkt der Überlegungen ist die Frage, welches Morphem ursprünglich für die Markierung des Duals im Semitischen zuständig ist. Dabei wird im Anschluß an Fontinoy[10] und Moscati[11] vorausgesetzt, daß der Dual bereits eine ursemitische Kategorie darstellt und daß er in Übereinstimmung mit dem Befund in den älteren semitischen Sprachen im Verbal-, im Pronominal- und im Nominalbereich anzusetzen ist.

Die Rekonstruktion des ursemitisches Dualmorphems ist umstritten.[12] Es gibt zwei ernstzunehmende Vorschläge: a) Langvokal *ā*, b) Diphthong *ai* bzw. *āi*. Denkbar wäre theoretisch auch, daß beide Morpheme bzw. Morphemvarianten nebeneinander im Ursemitischen existiert haben.

Für ein ursprüngliches Dualmorphem *ā* spricht vor allem das verbale Dualparadigma, wie es im Akkadischen, Klassisch-Arabischen und Ugaritischen bezeugt ist[13]:

	Präfixkonjugation (Kurzform)	Suffixkonjugation
3.m.	*yqtl-ā*	*qtl-ā*
3.f.	*y/tqtl-ā*	*qtl-at-ā*
2.c.	*tqtl-ā*	*qtl-tum-ā*
1.c.	**nqtl-ā*	*qtl-na-yā*

Diesem Paradigma zufolge wird der Dual durchgehend durch einen Langvokal *ā* markiert. Die Endung *-yā* der Suffixkonj. 1.c. fällt nur scheinbar aus dem Rahmen: Der Halbvokal *y*, der hier zwischen die Personalendung *-na* und die Dualendung *-ā* tritt, fungiert nämlich lediglich als Gleitlaut zwischen zwei Vokalen (*a* + *ā* > *ayā*).[14] Zu diesem Befund stimmen auch die dualischen Pronominalformen auf *-ā*, wie sie etwa das Klassisch-Arabische bezeugt (*humā* „sie beide", *ʾantumā* „ihr beide" etc.).

Für ein ursprüngliches Dualmorphem *ai* bzw. *āi* könnte dagegen der altsüdarabische, insbesondere der sabäische und minäische Befund (Dualendung *-y* = */-ai/* bzw. */āi/* im Verbal-, Pronominal- und Nominalbereich [Stat. constr.]) und der neusüdarabische Befund (Dualendung *-i* im Nominal- und Pronominalbereich sowie in der Suffixkonjugation der 1. und

[9] Siehe Lemaire, a.a.O., 16f.

[10] Ch. Fontinoy, Le duel dans les langues sémitiques, Paris 1969, bes. 213.

[11] S. Moscati (ed.), An Introduction to the Comparative Grammar of the Semitic Languages. Phonology and Morphology, Wiesbaden ³1980, § 12.59.

[12] Zur Diskussion siehe vor allem: W. Vycichl, Die Bildung des Duals im Ägyptischen. Die Vokalisation des Zahlwortes *snau* „zwei", Mus 70 (1957), 357-365; ders., Numerus und Kasus im Klassichen Arabisch, RSO 33 (1958), 176f; Fontinoy, a.a.O., 184-204.

[13] Moscati (a.a.O., §§ 16.49-16.51 und 16.64-16.65) und Fontinoy (a.a.O., 190) halten das betreffende Paradigma für ursemitisch.

[14] Siehe E. Wagner, Die erste Person Dualis im Semitischen, ZDMG 102 (1952), 232.

2. Personen[15]) sprechen. Eventuell könnte auch der ägyptische Befund (Dualmarker *j* mit unsicherer Vokalisierung[16]) die Rekonstruktion eines ursemitischen Dualmorphems *ai* stützen.
Die Frage, ob das ursemitische Dualmorphem *ā* oder *ai* (bzw. *āi*) lautet, kann und muß in diesem Rahmen nicht definitiv entschieden werden. Stattdessen wollen wir uns konkret dem nominalen semitischen Dualparadigma zuwenden, das bisher nur am Rande zur Sprache kam, und dessen besondere Problematik erörtern. Diese besondere Problematik besteht darin, daß im Nominalbereich[17] beim Dual ähnlich wie beim Plural zwischen zwei Kasus, Nominativ und Obliquus, zu unterscheiden und somit von zwei verschiedenen Dualendungen auszugehen ist.[18]
Die Endungen für Plural und Dual sind nach Fontinoy[19] und Moscati[20] beim maskulinen Nomen unter Ausklammerung von Mimation bzw. Nunation für das Ursemitische wie folgt zu bestimmen:

	Plural	Dual
Nominativ	*-ū*	*-ā*
Obliquus	*-ī*	*-ai*

Die angeführten Dualendungen *-ā* (Nominativ) und *-ai* (Obliquus) bestehen jeweils aus einer Kombination von Dual- und Kasusmorphem und können deshalb sequentiell weiter analysiert werden.
Die Obliquusendung *-ai* ist problemlos als Kombination von Dualmarker und Kasusmarker (für Obliquus) *i* zu verstehen. Geht man von einem Dualmarker *ā* aus, so gilt: *ā + i > āi > ai* (Kürzung des Langvokals in geschlossener Silbe); geht man von einem Dualmarker *ai* aus, so gilt: *ai + i > aii > ai*.
Stimmt diese Analyse, dann kann konsequenterweise die Nominativendung *-ā*, die im Akkadischen, im Klassisch-Arabischen und in Resten auch im Athiopischen[21] in dieser Form bezeugt ist, nur das Kontraktionsprodukt desselben Dualmarkers und des Kasusmarkers (für Nominativ) *u* sein. Geht man von einem Dualmarker *ā* aus, so gilt: *ā + u > â*; geht man von einem Dualmarker *ai* aus, so gilt: *ai + u > â*. Beide Kontraktionsprozesse sind im Semitischen theoretisch denkbar, aber nicht häufig nachzuweisen. Deshalb ist auch die Möglichkeit in Erwägung zu ziehen, daß die betreffende nominativische Dualendung *-ā* eine Analogiebildung zur Dualendung *-ā* beim Verbum und Pronomen darstellt.
Aufgrund der vorgestellten sequentiellen Analyse der nominativischen Dualendung im Sinne einer Kombination des Dualmarkers *ā/ai* und des Kasusmarkers *u* ist aber zugleich damit zu rechnen, daß es semitische Sprachen bzw. Dialekte gibt, die im Unterschied zu den oben genannten (klassischen) Sprachen eine (nominativische) Dualendung *-au* aufweisen. Eine solche

15 Siehe Wagner, a.a.O., 229f.
16 Vgl. W. Schenkel, Einführung in die klassisch-äyptische Sprache und Schrift. Materialien zur Vorlesung (Wintersemester 1989/90), Tübingen 1989, 96 (§ 5.1.1.2).
17 Nach Ausweis des Akkadischen gab es im Semitischen ursprünglich auch im Pronominalbereich und damit auch beim pronominalen Dual eine ausgeprägte Kasusdifferenzierung. Für das archaische pronominale Dualparadigma des Akkadischen siehe R.M. Whiting, The Dual Personal Pronouns in Akkadian, JNES 31 (1972), 331-337, bes. 336.
18 Siehe zur Argumentation Fontinoy, a.a.O., 188f.
19 A.a.O., 186.
20 Moscati, a.a.O., § 12.64.
21 Siehe Fontinoy, a.a.O., 111f.

Endung könnte auf zweierlei Weise entstanden sein: a) Dualmarker *ā* + Kasusmarker *u* > *āu* > *au*; b) Dualmarker *ai* + Kasusmarker *u* > *aiu* > *au*[22].
Nun scheint eine Dualendung *-au* in der Tat im altsüdarabischen Qatabanischen bezeugt zu sein.[23] Sie findet sich dort als Endung am Nomen constr. (Endung *-w*), am Zahlwort für „zwei" (*tnw*) und am dualischen Determinativpronomen (*dw*). Sie kann entweder der oben vorgestellten sequentiellen Analyse zufolge als Kontraktionsprodukt von Dualmarker *ā/ai* + Nominativendung *u* oder – im Anschluß an die traditionelle Auffassung[24] – als diphthongisierte und damit sekundäre Variante zu der in anderen semitischen Sprachen bezeugten nominativischen Dualendung *-ā* (Entwicklung *ā* > *au*) erklärt werden.

Kehren wir nach diesen sprachtheoretischen Exkursen zurück zu der umstrittenen Form *yrḥw* im Gezer-Kalender, so ergeben sich angesichts der vorangegangenen Ausführungen für diese Form zwei neue Deutungsmöglichkeiten, die zumindest als ernstzunehmende Alternativen zu den bisherigen Erklärungen in Erwägung gezogen werden können:

1. *yrḥw* stellt eine archaische nominativische Dualform im Status constructus dar. Sie ist als */yariḥau/* zu vokalisieren und ist aus **yariḥ-ā-u* bzw. **yariḥ-ai-u* (Stamm + Dualmorphem *ā/ai* + Kasusmorphem *u*) entstanden.
2. *yrḥw* stellt (ebenso) eine nominativische Dualform im Status constructus lautend auf */yariḥau/* dar. Die Endung *-au* ist in diesem Fall jedoch als diphthongisierte und damit sekundäre Variante zur bekannten Dualendung *-ā* zu erklären. Für das Phänomen der Diphthongisierung der Dualendung *ā* zu *au* im Status constructus wäre auf das Qatabanische zu verweisen.

Beide Deutungen, von denen hier die erstere favorisiert wird, implizieren, daß die Sprache des Gezer-Kalenders eine weder im späteren Hebräischen noch im Phönizischen nachweisbare nominativische Dualendung bewahrt hat, und würden damit einen morphologischen Archaismus der betreffenden Sprache nachweisen. Die Bewahrung (bzw. Neubildung) eines diphthongischen Auslautes im Status constructus würde die Sprache der Inschrift eher in die hebräische als in die phönizische Tradition einordnen.

Zusammenfassung (abstract):

Aufgrund sprachtheoretischer Überlegungen zum semitischen Dualmorphem werden in diesem Artikel zwei neue Deutungsmöglichkeiten für die umstrittene Form *yrḥw* im Gezer-Kalender vorgestellt. Beiden Deutungen zufolge ist *yrḥw* eine nominativische Dualform im Status constructus, die als */yariḥau/* zu vokalisieren ist.

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22 Vgl. zu dieser Entwicklung die Kontraktion von *aiū* > *au* im Klassischen Arabisch: *ramau* < **ramaiū* „sie warfen"; *yalqauna* < **yalqaiūna* „sie begegnen"; *yalqau* < **yalqaiū* „sie mögen begegnen" (dazu C. Brockelmann, Arabische Grammatik, Leipzig [14]1960, § 13b).

23 Siehe M. Höfner, Altsüdarabische Grammatik, Leipzig 1943, §§ 102.104; A.F.L. Beeston, A Descriptive Grammar of Epigraphic South Arabian, London 1962, § 29:5; Fontinoy, a.a.O., 103-108.

24 Siehe Höfner, a.a.O., §§ 17.102, vgl. auch Fontinoy, a.a.O., 106.

Miszellen

Eine neue Lesart zu 4Q180: *kllh* vice *klh*

Die Vernichtung von Sodom und Gomorrha als Ganzopfer

Armin Lange (Münster)

Mit Hilfe der vor kurzem in dieser Zeitschrift publizierten Methode computergestützter Text-Rekonstruktion und Transkription (Computer Aided Text-Reconstruction and Transcription CATT)[1] ist es gelungen, den Text 4Q180 (פשר על הקצים) an einer wichtigen Stelle neu zu transkribieren.
Schon Weiss hatte darauf hingewiesen, daß es sich bei 4Q180 2-4.8 II 4-7 um ein Zitat aus Gen 18,20f handelt.[2] Zeile 7 wurde dabei in Anlehnung an Gen 18,21 wie folgt rekonstruiert:

[אלי אע]שה כלה [ואם]לא אֵדֹ[עה פשר] הדבר [על כול][3]

Das mit Hilfe der Grauwertmanipulation bearbeitete Bild (s. die Abbildung S. 234) läßt jedoch anstelle des bis jetzt gelesenen und mit Gen 18,21 übereinstimmenden כלה ein כללה erkennen, also statt eines einzelnen *lamed* ein doppeltes *lamed*. Die Transkription der Zeile muß somit wie folgt lauten:

[אלי אע]שה כללה [ואם] לא אֵדֹ[עה פשר] הדבר [על כול]

Bei כללה dürfte es sich um eine Defektivschreibung des Nomens כליל ("Ganzopfer", "Brandopfer") handeln, wie sie auch in einer phönizischen Inschrift aus dem 3. Jh. v. Chr. belegt ist (CIS I 165, 3.5.7.9).[4] Das *he* ist Pronominalsuffix und bezeichnet als genitivus objectivus[5] den Gegenstand des Ganzopfers, das Opfer

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[1] ZAH 5, 1992, 224f.; die endgültige Publikation der Methode wird im Kongreßband zum Treffen der International Organisation of the Qumran Society (IOQS), herausgegeben von G. Brooke und F. Garçía Martínez (StDJ), erfolgen, vgl. auch das im November 1993 erscheinende Handbuch zur Methode: Computer Aided Text-Reconstruction and Transcription, CATT Manual.

[2] R. Weiss, Fragments of a Midrash on Genesis from Qumran Cave 4, Textus 7 (1969), S. 132-134; unabhängig von Weiss kommt J. Strugnell zu dem gleichen Ergebnis [Notes en marge du Volume V des ‚Discoveries in the Judean Desert of Jordan', RQu 7 (1969-1971), S. 163-276, S. 253f.; vgl. auch D. Dimant, The 'Pesher on the Periods' (4Q180) and 4Q181, Israel Oriental Studies 9 (1979), S. 77-102, S. 84].

[3] So zuletzt Dimant, S. 82.

[4] Zum Gebrauch des Nomens in der Inschrift s. KAI II, S. 84; vgl. auch A. S. Kapelrud (Art. כָּלִיל, *kālîl*, ThWAT IV, Sp. 193-195), Sp. 193f.; zur Datierung s. KAI II, S. 84.

[5] Wie auch sonst im Hebräischen, bezeichnet das durch den Genitiv umschriebene Objekt im oben besprochenen Text das *indirekte* Objekt ("etwas an jemandem tun"); zum genitivus objectivus im Hebräischen vgl. B.K. Waltke/M. O'Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, Winona Lake 1990, S. 146f. Zum Pronominalsuffix als genitivus objectivus s. z.B. auch Ps 56,13: אֱלֹהִים נְדָרֶיךָ

selbst. Auffallend ist der Singular des Suffixes, da noch in Zeile 5 eine Pluralform gewählt wurde, um die Sünden der beiden Städte zu bezeichnen: חטאתמה. Es handelt sich um einen distributiven Singular. Es soll die Absicht betont werden, jede einzelne der beiden Städte als Ganzopfer darzubringen.[6] Übersetzung und Transkription von 4Q180 2-4.8 II 6f lauten somit:

[וארד]ה נא ואראֿה הֿזֿעֿקֿתֿ[המה] הבאהֿ [אלי אע]שה כללה [ואם] לא אֿדֿ[עה]

"Ich will hinabsteigen, um ihr Geschrei zu betrachten, das zu mir hinaufkommt; ob ich an einer jeden von ihnen ein Ganzopfer vollziehen soll oder nicht, will ich erkennen."

כליל ist im AT mehrfach in der Bedeutung "Ganzopfer" belegt.[7] Von entscheidender Bedeutung für das Verständnis von 4Q180 2-4.8 II 7 ist der Beleg Dt 13,17: Dt 13,13-19 bestimmt, daß eine Stadt, die Götzendienst betreibt, vollkommen zerstört werden soll, und ihre Einwohner und ihr Vieh erschlagen werden sollen. Dt 13,17b führt dabei aus, was mit der auf diese Weise verwüsteten Stadt zu geschehen hat:

וְשָׂרַפְתָּ בָאֵשׁ אֶת־הָעִיר וְאֶת־כָּל־שְׁלָלָהּ כָּלִיל לַיהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ

"... und du sollst die Stadt und die ganze Beute von ihr als Ganzopfer verbrennen, für den Herrn deinen Gott ..."

Daß dieser Beleg auch in späterer Zeit nicht ohne Bedeutung war, zeigt 11QTemp LV 2-14: Hier wird Dt 13,13ff. in einem Kontext zitiert, der den Umgang mit Götzendienern regelt.

Auf den gleichen Thorabeleg spielt nun auch 4Q180 2-4.8 II 7 an, wenn in diesem Text das in Gen 18,21 gebrauchte כלה durch כללה (כליל mit Suffix 3. fem. sing.) ersetzt wird. Der Text wurde bewußt verändert. Ein Abschreibfehler ist durch die Anspielung auf Dt 13,13ff ausgeschlossen. 4Q180 interpretiert die Vernichtung von Sodom und Gomorrha (Gen 18,16-19,29) mit Hilfe von Dt 13,13ff als ein wegen des Götzendienstes der beiden Städte notwendig gewordenes Ganzopfer.

Zusammenfassung (abstract):

In 4Q180 2-4.8 II 7 ist statt des כלה defektiv geschriebenen כליל mit Suffix der 3. Person femininum singularis zu lesen: כללה. Auf diese Weise wird die in den Zeilen 4-7 durch ein Zitat von Gen 18,20f. thematisierte Vernichtung von Sodom und Gomorrha interpretiert als ein wegen des Götzendienstes der beiden Städte notwendig gewordenes Ganzopfer (Dt 13,13ff.).

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[6] Zum distributiven Singular bei Pronominalsuffixen s. W. Gesenius, Hebräische Grammatik: Völlig umgearbeitet von E. Kautzsch, 3. Nachdruckauflage der 28. vielfach verbesserten und vermehrten Auflage, Leipzig 1909, Hildesheim 1977, § 145m, S. 486. Im AT findet sich der distributive Singular beim Pronominalsuffix u.a. in Jes 2,8.20; 5,26; 8,20; Sach 14,12; Koh 10,15.

[7] Vgl. KBL³, S. 457; s. z.B. Lev 6,15f. und Dt 33,10; vgl. auch 1 Sam 7,9 und Ps 51,21 (auf Lev 6,15f. wird in Sir 45,14 angespielt). Zum Begriff und seiner Herleitung s. Kapelrud, a.a.O., Sp. 194f.



Israel Antiquities Authority (Ausschnitt aus 4Q180 2; PAM 41719)
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Das nachgestellte erläuternde Partizip - eine Stileigentümlichkeit des Amosbuches

Gerhard Pfeifer (Ansbach)

Auf dem International Meeting der Society of Biblical Litarature in Sheffield am 3.8.1988 verwies ich bei der Untersuchung der hymnischen Abschnitte im Amosbuch auf das Vorkommen einer Stilform, die ich als „nachgestelltes erläuterndes Partizip" bezeichnete.[1] Sie findet sich auch außerhalb der Doxologien an mehreren Stellen bei Amos, die hier im Zusammenhang behandelt werden sollen.

Am. 2,7. Die Israeliten (*yiśrāʾel*), die in V. 6 bedroht werden, „weil sie wegen Geld den Rechtschaffenen, wegen eines Paars Sandalen den Armen (in die Schuldsklaverei) verkaufen", werden in V. 7 charakterisiert als Leute, deren Antrieb zu solchem Handeln darin besteht, „daß sie nach dem Erdenstaub auf dem Kopf der Geringen trachten/schnappen (*haššoʾᵃfîm*)".[2] Danach wird ihre Tätigkeit in finiten Verbformen beschrieben.

Am. 3,1. Die zum Hören des Gotteswortes aufgeforderten Israeliten (*bᶜnê yiśrāʾel*) werden durch eine nachgestellte Erläuterung, hier allerdings nicht im Partizip, bestimmt als „die ganze Sippe (*kål-hammišpāḥāh*), die ich aus dem Lande Ägypten heraufgeführt habe". Damit greift Amos eine dem Nordreich eigentümliche Tradition auf.

Am. 3,10. Die Einwohnerschaft von Samaria (*šomrôn* V. 9), „unfähig, das Rechte zu tun", wird bezeichnet als „in ihren Palästen mit Gewalt und Raub erworbene Schätze sammelnd (*hāʾôṣᶜrîm*). Ein Gottesspruch bildet die Fortsetzung.

Am. 3,12. Die ihrer Bewahrung und Errettung in einer kommenden Katastrophe gewissen Israeliten (*bᶜnê yiśrāʾel*) werden näher bestimmt als „in Samaria Wohnhafte (*hayyôšᵉbîm bᶜšomrôn*)". Das Partizip bezeichnet sie nicht etwa als in Samaria faul herumliegende Nichtstuer. Die Fortsetzung ergänzt auch nicht diese Angabe durch Nennung der Möbel, auf denen sie herumflacken („eine Ecke der Liegestatt und eines Damaskusbettes"), sondern gibt mit Beth essentiae die Möbelreste an, in deren Gestalt ihre „Rettung" erfolgen wird.[3]

Am. 4,1. Die „Baschankühe (*pārôt habbāšān*)", nach einhelliger Meinung der Exegeten die wohlgenährten und wohlproportionierten Damen der Oberschicht, näherbestimmt als „die auf dem Berge Samaria (*ʾᵃšær bᶜhar šomrôn*)",[4] werden durch drei Partizipialaussagen negativ charakterisiert: Sie sind solche, „die bedrük-

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[1] G. Pfeifer, Jahwe als Schöpfer der Welt und Herr ihrer Mächte in der Verkündigung des Propheten Amos, VT 41, 1991, 475-481, hier 476. Mit einem förderlichen Beitrag von Professor Hans-Peter Müller in der Aussprache.

[2] Zu dieser Übersetzung vgl. G. Pfeifer, Denkformenanalyse als exegetische Methode, erläutert an Amos 1,2-2,16, ZAW 88, 1976, 56-71, hier 66.

[3] Zu diesem Verständnis der Stelle vgl. G. Pfeifer, „Rettung" als Beweis der Vernichtung (Amos 3,12), ZAW 100, 1988, 269-277, hier 273f.

[4] *ʾᵃšær* ist nach BHS wahrscheinlich Zusatz.

ken (*hāᶜošᶜqôt*) Geringe", „die mißhandeln/unterdrücken (*hāroṣᶜṣôt*) Arme", die sagen (*hāᵓomᶜrot*) zu ihren Eheherren: ‚Schafft her, daß wir trinken'". Diese drei Aussagen hängen zusammen, wobei die letzte ein Beispiel für die in den ersten beiden beschriebene Haltung sein könnte: Der Wein, nach dem sie verlangen, wird von den Geringen und Armen erpreßt.[5]

Am. 5,7. V. 4-9 sind als Einheit aufzufassen. Die Anrede gilt „dem Haus Israel (*lᶜbêt yiśrāᵓel*; V. 4)", das V. 6 „Haus Josefs (*bêt yôsef*)" genannt wird. Beide Male ist die gleich Größe gemeint, das Nordreich Israel. Die Angeredeten werden V. 7a durch ein Partizip näher erläutert: „Es sind die, die da verkehren (*hahofᶜkîm*) das Recht in Wermut."[6] Die Partizipialkonstruktion wird V. 7b weitergeführt durch eine Aussage mit finiten Verbformen im Perfekt.

Am. 5,9. Nachdem V. 8 mit drei Partizipien und zwei finiten Verbformen die Tätigkeit des Weltschöpfers und -erhalters beschrieben hat, von dem gilt: „YHWH ist sein Name (*yhwh šᶜmô*)", nennt V. 9 seine Tätigkeit in der Menschen- und Geschichtswelt: „Er, der aufblitzen läßt (*hammablîg*) Verheerung über den Starken", fortgeführt mit einer Aussage im Imperfekt: „so daß Verheerung über die befestigte Stadt kommt."[7]

Am. 6,1-7. In diesem Abschnitt sind mit „Wehe (*hôy*; V. 1)" bedroht „die Sorglosen auf dem Zion (*haššaᵓᵃnannîm bᶜṣiyyôn*)[8] und die Vertrauensseligen auf dem Berg Samaria (*wᶜhabboṭᶜḥîm bᶜhar šomrôn*)". Sie werden weiter ironisch angeredet als „die Ausgezeichneten des Erstlings der Völker, und (die), zu denen das Haus Israel kommt". V. 2 fordert sie auf, nach Kalneh, Groß-Hamath und Gath der Philister zu gehen, um festzustellen, ob diese Reiche besser sind, ihr Gebiet größer als das ihre.[9]

Ehe ihnen V. 7 die Exilierung androht, wird in V. 3-6 in zahlreichen Partizipien, zum Teil durch finite Verbformen fortgeführt, dargestellt, wie ihre sorglose und vertrauensselige Art beschaffen ist. Sie sind a) „die sich ferne Wähnenden (*hammᶜnaddîm*) vom bösen Tag - aber sie ziehen herbei (*wattaggîšûn*) ein Ende mit Gewalt" (v. 3),

b) „die Herumliegenden (*haššokᶜbîm*) auf elfenbeinerne Lagern und die Hingeräkelten (*ûsᶜruḥîm*) auf ihren Betten" (V. 4a),

c) „und die Essenden (*wᶜᵓokᶜlîm*) Lämmer aus der Herde und Kälber, die noch angebunden sind" (V. 4b),

d) „die Johlenden (*happorᶜṭîm*) zum Klang der Laute - wie David erdichten sie sich Liedsammlungen" (V. 5),

e) „die Trinkenden (*haššotîm*) Wein aus Humpen, und bestes Öl versalben sie (*yimšāḥû*) - aber nicht grämt sie der Zusammenbruch Josefs".

Am 8,14. Die Jungfrauen, die schönen, und die Jünglinge (*habbᶜtûlot hayyāfôt wᶜhabbaḥûrîm*)", die V. 13 mit dem Tod durch Verdursten bedroht wurden, werden

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[5] Vgl. Am. 2,8b.

[6] Dadurch erübrigt sich die von BHS vorgeschlagene Einfügung eines *hôy* am Anfang von V. 7.

[7] Zur Übersetzung und Interpretation des Verses vgl. G. Pfeifer, VT 41 (s. Anm. 1), 476. 479.

[8] Zu der vielverhandelten Problematik dieses Wortes bei Amos vgl. die Kommentare.

[9] Vgl. W. Rudolph, Joel-Amos-Obadja-Jona, Gütersloh 1971, KAT XIII 2, z. St.

V. 14 durch ein mit finiter Verbform fortgesetztes Partizip dreifach charakterisiert. Sie sind diejenigen,
a) „die da schwören (*hannišbāᶜîm*) bei der Aschima von Samaria,
b) und sie sagen (*wᵉᵓāmᵉrû*): , So wahr dein Gott lebt, Dan,
c) so wahr die Wallfahrt nach Beer Scheba lebt".
Am. 9,10. Den Tod durchs Schwert droht YHWH an „allen Sündern meines Volkes (*kol ḥaṭṭāᵓê ᶜammî*)", charakterisiert als „diejenigen, die da sagen (*hāᶜomᵉrîm*): ‚Uns zugut wirst du nicht herbeiführen und eintreten lassen das Unheil'".
Fassen wir zusammen. Als Größen, die durch eine nachgestellte Erläuterung charakterisiert oder näher bestimmt werden, begegnen im Amosbuch der Gottesname *yhwh* (5,9), weiterhin die Angehörigen des Nordreiches, die Israeliten, die verschieden bezeichnet werden: *yiśrāᵓel* (2,6), *bᵉnê yiśrāᵓel* (3,1.12), *bêt yiśrāᵓel* (5,4), *bêt yôsef* (5,6).
Weiter werden Teile der Bevölkerung genannt: *kol ḥaṭṭāᵓê ᶜammî* (9,10), *habbᵉtûlot hayyāfôt wᵉhabbaḥûrîm* (8,13), *pārôt habbāšān* (4,1), die vertrauensselige Oberschicht (6,1), die Bewohner von Samaria (3,10; 4,1; 6,1).
Als nachgestellte Erläuterungen finden sich ein Nomen mit Artikel: *kål-hammišpāḥāh* (3,1), ein Partizipium Hiphil im Singular mit Artikel: *hammablîg* (5,9), drei feminine Partizipien Qal im Plural mit Artikel: *hāᶜošᵉqôt, hāroṣᵉṣôt, hāᵓomᵉrot* (4,1), acht Partizipien Qal im Plural mit Artikel: *haššoᵓᵃfîm* (2,7), *hāᵓôṣᵉrîm* (3,10), *hayyošᵉbîm* (3,12), *hahofᵉkîm* (5,7), *haššokᵉbîm* (6,4), *happorᵉṭîm* (6,5), *haššotîm* (6,6), *hāᵓomᵉrîm* (9,10). Weiter kommen vor ein Partizip Piel im Plural mit Artikel: *hammᵉnaddîm* (6,3), ein passives Partizipium Qal im Plural ohne Artikel: *wᵉᵓokᵉlîm* (6,4) und ein Partizipium Niphal im Plural mit Artikel: *hannišbāᶜîm* (8,14).
Bedenkt man den geringen Umfang des Amosbuches, so kann man die verhältnismäßig häufig vorkommende Form des nachgestellten erläuternden Partizips durchaus als eine ihm eigentümliche Stilform bezeichnen.
Fragt man nun, wie es bei Amos zu dieser Stilform kommt, so hat man von der Feststellung auszugehen, daß die nachgestellte Erläuterung stets eine Präzisierung des Bezugswortes nachbringt. Der unter dem Namen YHWH bekannte Gott ist der, dessen machtvolles Wirken in der Welt der Menschen unübersehbar geschieht (5,9). Die angeredeten Israeliten werden eingegrenzt als die Bewohner von Samaria (3,12), als die aus Ägypten heraufgeführte Sippe (3,1), und die bescholtenen Israeliten, Samarier, Damen der Oberschicht, die frommen Jünglinge und Jungfrauen werden charakterisiert durch die Anführung ihrer Worte und Taten, durch die sie die vom Propheten angekündigte Katastrophe schuldhaft herbeigezogen haben (2,7; 3,10; 4,1; 5,7; 6,1-7; 8,14; 9,10).
Das sich in Texten niederschlagende Denken prägt durch seine charakteristische Denkform auch deren sprachliche Gestalt. Da die Denkform des Propheten Amos neben ihrer Identifizierung von Gottes- und Prophetenwort und ihrer unausweichlichen Konsequenz durch ihre starke Konkretheit bestimmt ist, dürfte sich von daher die Stilform der nachgestellten Erläuterung erklären. Amos meint mit seiner Verkündigung nicht allgemein irgendwen, sondern die durch die nachgestellten erläuternden Partizipien präzise und konkret bezeichneten Personen.

Zusammenfassung (abstract):

Amos 2,7; 3,1.10.12; 4,1; 5,7.9; 6,1-7; 8,14; 9,10 findet sich die Erläuterung einer zuvor genannten Größe durch eine nachgestellte Erläuterung, zumeist ein Partizipium mit Artikel. Diese Stileigentümlichkeit des Propheten Amos erklärt sich aus dem seinem Denken und Reden eigenen Streben nach präziser Konkretheit der Aussagen.

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Bericht

The Dead Sea Scrolls: The New Critical Edition and Translation Prepared on Computers

James H. Charlesworth – Richard E. Whitaker (Princeton/NJ)

Readers of *Zeitschrift für Althebraistik* should appreciate hearing that the two volumes of critical texts and translations of all the sectarian Dead Sea Scrolls will be available by the spring of 1993/4. The series of volumes is published by J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) in Tübingen and Westminster/John Knox in Louisville. The editior is J.H. Charlesworth; the advisors are F.M. Cross, D.N. Freedman, J. Sanders, and S. Talmon. The series was launched in 1985 at a gathering of internationally recognized experts on the Dead Sea Scrolls. 38 scholars serve as subeditors in the project; most of them are from Germany, Israel, and the United States. A full list of the contents of these volumes, with the names of the subeditors, will be published in a later issue of this periodical.

The Goal of the Princeton Project

The project is preparing critical editions (with translations, introductions and notes) of all the documents among the Dead Sea Scrolls that are not copies of book in the Hebrew Bible. Better photographs have been obtained or taken. On the basis of improved readings a more accurate text, sometimes with an *apparatus criticus*, is prepared. On the basis of the reedited text a literal translation is prepared, with notes to variant readings (sometimes in manuscripts now published for the first time) and to philological observations. A succinct introduction precedes each document.

The First Two Volumes:

Rules I

The first volume is dedicated to the Rule of the Community and related documents. It includes:

Document:	*Subeditors:*
Rule of the Community (1QS)	E. Qimron with J.H. Charlesworth
AQ A-J	E. Qimron with J.H. Charlesworth
5Q11	J.H. Charlesworth
Rule of the Congregation (1QSa)	J.H. Charlesworth with L.T. Stuckenbruck
Rule of Blessings (1QSb)	J.H. Charlesworth with L.T. Stuckenbruck
Sectarian Rule (5Q13)	L. Schiffman
Ordinances (4Q159)	L. Schiffman
Rules (4Q513)	L. Schiffman
Purification Rule (4Q514)	J. Milgrom

Rules II

The second volume is focused on the Damascus Document, the War Scroll and other rules.

Damascus Document (CD)	J. Baumgarten and D. Schwartz
4Q Fragments	J. Baumgarten with M.T. Davis
5QD	J. Baumgarten
War Scroll (1QM)	J. Duhaime
1QM 33, 4Q Fragments	J. Duhaime
War-Scroll-Like Fragment (4Q497)	J. Duhaime
Wicked and Holy (4Q181)	J.J.M. Roberts
[E]ternal Fragment (1Q51)	J.H. Charlesworth
Juridical Fragments (2Q25)	J.H. Charlesworth
Judgment Fragment (2Q28)	J.H. Charlesworth

Volume one contains not only the unpublished fragments to the Rule of the Community but a critical text of the major copy of the document, 1QS, with a critical apparatus citing the readings in these fragments.

Preparation and Use of Computers

The Princeton Project is making extensive use of computers at a number of levels. To begin with, all of the best editions of the sectarian texts were entered into the computer. The Ibycus system was chosen for this task because of its on-screen display of Hebrew characters and its ease of screen editing of the Hebrew text.

The entry format chosen allowed us to mark where superlinear insertions belonged in the line. It also saved keystrokes by ignoring line numbers and dispensing with right justification of lines. Since the Dead Sea Scrolls are not vocalized, we were able to use the characters normally used for pointing to indicate scribal and editorial marks that we wanted in the final copy. Our software then reformatted the pages so that they could be displayed on the screen or printed out for proofreading.

The resident capacity of the Ibycus to print Hebrew on either an Epson LQ-850 or an HP Laserjet proved particularly helpful at the beginning. After a while we developed our own downloadable fonts and print drivers in order to be able to print ligatures and other non-standard characters (such as Paleo-Hebrew) that occur in the scrolls. This print driver also allowed us to print the interlinear insertions in a smaller font for easier recognition. Because the number of characters needed was greater than the memory capacity of the Epson printer, we also incorporated into the print driver the ability to use a graphics font. Rarely used characters were graphically created, so the printing was slowed little by this addition. The entered texts could thus be proofread from hard copy in characters that corresponded fairly closely to the printed text from which they had been entered.

The major purpose of the entry of the original publications was the production of a concordance that could be used in further study of the texts, including study by scholars on the project team. It was anticipated that it would be used primarily to identify forms in obscure contexts by comparison with places where they occured in clear contexts. This proved particularly useful with fragmentary texts. For this purpose we chose to make a concordance of the forms as they are written in the

text, i.e., a graphical concordance. Practically, it meant that lemmatization of the text was not necessary. This concordance was published as the *Graphic Concordance to the Dead Sea Scrolls* (see final section).

Since the scrolls include a number of features that are not found in a normal Hebrew text – such as erasures, delete signs, insertions, and lacunae, as well as editorial marks for uncertain readings and restorations – it was necessary for the project to develop its own concordance program that could account for all of these peculiarities of the text. The concording program was designed so that deletions or insertions of letters which created new words resulted in concording of the new words in the context. Whole words that were either deleted or inserted were concorded as separate words in the context. Insertions were marked by pointed brackets in the concordance as well as with italic citations. The latter were used because insertions were often long enough that the whole line in the concordance was an insertion and no brackets were present. Deletions were marked by whatever method the scribe had used originally. Erasures were placed in parentheses. Restorations were limited to completing partial words, and the completed word was concorded. Where no restoration had been proposed, the partial words were concorded. There was a separate section in the concordance for Paleo-Hebrew and the four dots sometimes used by the scribe in place of the divine name. Words with ligatures were placed where they would belong if not ligatured.

A modified version of the font and print driver developed for printing the texts for proofreading was used to print the concordance, using an Epson LQ-1050 printer. This allowed for the inclusion of Paleo-Hebrew as well as the four dots. The modifications included adding a routine to do page makeup in double columns.

The next step of the project was the retranscription and retranslation of the texts. Since the original publications had already been converted to electronic form, it was possible to enter the texts for the new publications as corrections to the earlier texts. Comparison could then be made to check what changes had been made in the text. The software used for printing the original texts for proofreading was used at this stage as well. However, as the publication time came nearer, it was possible to use the new print software developed for publication to print the texts for proofreading.

For the publication of the new transcriptions of the text it was decided that a proportionally spaced font on the HP Laserjet would be much more desirable than the fixed width characters of the Epson printer. The project developed software for designing soft fonts for the HP Laserjet and a print driver for printing the texts with proportional spacing. The font design software actually allowed for the conversion of Epson LQ fonts into HP Laserjet fonts as well as for the modification of characters and the creation of new characters.

The computer will be used at two further steps in the project that we can foresee at this time. The first of these is the preparation of a morphologically tagged Hebrew text that can serve as the basis for a lexical concordance of the new transcriptions of the scrolls. Present plans are to enter the morphological analysis and lemmas by hand into a text structure created by the computer. This plan may change as software is developed so that some automation of the process is possible. This would depend on software that can remember the analysis of forms as it proceeds

and can be taught to recognize when forms are ambiguous. The concordance programs will be modified to take into account the lemmatization and morphological analysis. The concordance printing programs will be modified to work with the HP Laserjet with proportional fonts.

The same process will be necessary to create a concordance of the new English translation of the text, except that the project already has available software for lemmatizing the English. Since the English translations will be printed by the publisher, they will have to be imported into the project computer from the publisher.

Eventually we expect to have all of the texts and concordances available in electronic form to those outside of the project, perhaps with software for searching and exporting portions of the text. We will certainly have this available within the project for work on texts published in the future. Vendors who have software available for searching and displaying the text of the Hebrew Bible may be relied on for the development of these possibilities. We will follow the format of the Westminster project for lemmatization and morphological tagging of Hebrew so that those who have developed software to work with biblical Hebrew from that source can work with these texts as well.

Appreciations

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The Graphic Concordance

The Princeton Project has published one volume already. It is the *Graphic Concordance to the Dead Sea Scrolls* (Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck] and Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1991)

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Bibliographische Dokumentation

Lexikalisches und grammatisches Material

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I. Lexikalisches Material: Fortsetzung zu ZAH III, 1990, 221-231; IV, 1991, 95-114.194-209; V, 1992, 91-112.226-236; VI, 1993, 128-148.

nkrj (*nŏkrî*)

- Chr. Bultmann, Der Fremde im antiken Juda (FRLANT 153), Göttingen 1992.
- Diachronische Untersuchung des Begriffs *nkrj* im Vergleich zu *gr.* Das Wort bezeichnet einen „Vertreter fremder Völker im Bereich der judäischen Monarchie ..., für den aus seinen wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zu der Schicht der selbständigen Bauern zu folgern ist, daß er dauerhaft im Land ansässig sein kann." (213). Entfaltet wird dies im Zusammenhang der „Abgrenzung des Gottesvolkes gegen den *nåkrî*" (93-102). Im dtrG führt dieser Ortsfremde „eine ökonomisch selbständige Existenz" (102). Zu beachten ist v.a. der religiöse Unterschied, der den Fremdstämmigen von der landsässigen Bevölkerung trennt: „Innerhalb der Deuteronomistik zeichnet sich der Zutritt des Typus des *nåkrî* zur verfaßten Religionsgemeinschaft nur als eine Möglichkeit ab, deren religionsgesetzlicher Aspekt noch nicht entfaltet wird." (144).

nmlh (*nᶜmālāh*)

- W. Eilers, Apokopierte Vollreduplikation (OrS 33-35, 1984-86, 85-95, hier 93).
- *nᶜmālāh* „Ameise" geht auf eine Vorform **namn* zurück (Dissimilation des 3. Radikals). *nmn* ist die apokopierte Vollreduplikation zu einer Basis *NM* „wimmeln, kribbeln".

nᶜljm (*naᶜᵃlājîm*)

- Sh.M. Paul, Amos – A Commentary on the Book of Amos, Hermeneia, Minneapolis 1991, 78f.
- *nᶜljm* bezeichnet Am 2,6 eine Art Bestechungsgeld (vgl. Sir 46,19; 1 Sam 12,3LXX).

nᶜm I

- B. Margalit, The Ugaritic Poem of AQHT (BZAW 182), Berlin/New York 1989, 379[51].
- „«Sweetness» may ... be basic to Heb./Ug. *nᶜm*, a synonym of *ṭb* (cf. Ps 133:1): cp. Ruth 1:20, where *mrʾ* «bitterness» is assumed to be the antonym of PN *nᶜmy*".

n^{c}m I
- G.A. Rendsburg, Additional Notes on „The Last Words of David" (2 Sam 23, 1-7) (Bibl 70, 1989, 403-408).
- Vf. behandelt dialektgeographische Besonderheiten der Wurzel *N^{c}M*. Nach einer Analyse der biblischen Belege im Horizont der phön. und ugar. Belege läßt sich *N^{c}M* der nördlichen Sprachgestalt des Hebr., dem „Israelian Hebrew" (403), zuweisen.
- Vgl. ders., The Northern Origin of „The Last Words of David" (Bibl 69, 1988, 113-121).

n^{c}m (*na^{c}am*) PN
- F. al-Khraysheh, Die Personennamen in den nabatäischen Inschriften des Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum, Marburg/Lahn 1986, 121.
- Beim nabat. PN *n^{c}jmt* Verweis auf hebr. PN *n^{c}m* bei M. Noth, Die israelitischen Personennamen, 1928, 166.

n^{c}r (*na^{c}ar*)
- T. Hildebrandt, Proverbs 22:6a: Train up a Child (Grace Theological Journal 9, 1988, 3-19, bes. 9-14).
- Vf. diskutiert Bedeutungsbreite von *na^{c}ar*, besonders im Hinblick auf Spr 22,6 – „child", „personal attendant", „military cadet" – mit dem Ergebnis, daß *na^{c}ar* „was a term of status, rather than merely of youthfulness" (13). „He is a royal squire who in the process of being apprenticed in wisdom for taking on royal responsibilities consistent with his status as a נער" (14).

n^{c}r (*na^{ca}rā*)
- S. Levin, The Hebrew of the Pentateuch (Y. Arbeitman [ed.], Fucus. A Semitic/Afrasian Gathering in Remembrance of A. Ehrman [Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science IV, 58], Amsterdam/Philadelphia 1988, 291ff.), 297 mit Anm. 7.
- Das Q *na^{ca}rā* für K *n^{c}r* („Mädchen") neben *na^{c}ar* („Junge") stellt vielleicht keine genusneutrale Form dar, sondern „the feminin *n^{c}r* differed from the masculine just in some purely vocalic feature – as *puerā* from *puer* in archaic Latin".

n^{c}rh (*na^{ca}rāh*) PN
- F. al-Khraysheh, siehe zu *n^{c}m*, S. 121.
- Zum nabat. PN *n^{c}rt*: „b. Dur. Ištiqāq 559, 5 führt an-Nā^{c}ir als Personennamen an, dem die Bedeutung «Fliege» zugrunde liegt." Vgl. *n^{c}rt* (thamudischer männlicher PN, safait. PN) sowie *n^{c}ry* (palmyr. PN).

np → *nwp*

npwsjm (*n^{c}pûsîm*)
- E.A. Knauf, Ismael. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Palästinas und Nordarabiens im 1. Jahrtausend v.Chr. (ADPV), Wiesbaden ^{2}1989 [Exzerpt bezieht sich auf die Addenda der 2. Aufl.].

- „Daß die Nephusiter/*npwsym* Esr. 2,50 = Neh. 7,52 etwas mit Naphis zu tun haben sollen (so R. Zadok, ZAW 94, 1982, 296-298), ist angesichts des verschiedenen Vokals und Sibilanten unmöglich." (152).

npjljm (*nᵉpîlîm*)
- L. Perlitt, Riesen im Alten Testament (Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, phil.-hist. Kl. 1990,1), 38ff.
- Die allgemein übliche Herleitung von *NPL* „tot hinfallen" ist problematisch, da ein Ptz. Qal zu erwarten gewesen wäre. „Das im G-Stamm kausative akkadische Verbum *napālu* I (zu Fall bringen, zerstören) hilft hier auch nicht weiter, das Partizip G *nāpilu* wäre mit dem kurzen *i* nicht mit נפיל zu gleichen, ebensowenig aber das substantivierte Verbaladjektiv des Nominaltyps *parīs*." Etymologie und ursprüngliche Bedeutung des Wortes müssen offen bleiben.
- Gen 6,4; Num 13,33.

npl
- H. Stegemann, Zu Textbestand und Grundgedanken von 1QS III,13-IV,26 (RQu 13, 1988, 95-131, hier 108).
- Zu [*kj ʾ ʾl*] *jpjl gwrlwt* in 1QS IV,26.

npš (*næpæš*)
- E.R. Brotzman, Man and the Meaning of נפש (Bibliotheca Sacra 145, 1988, 400-409).
- Der semantische Gehalt von *næpæš* wird im Hinblick auf die Rolle des Menschen in der Schöpfung, seiner „essential nature" (407) und der Frage der Unsterblichkeit untersucht.

npš → *ḥṭʾt* Zohar

npš → *lb* Lauha

nṣb I
- U. Seidel, Studien zum Vokabular der Landwirtschaft im Syrischen II (Altorientalische Forschungen 16, 1989, 89-139, hier 98-101).
- Vgl. zu hebr. *nṣb* niph „sich hinstellen" syr. *nṣb* allgemein „pflanzen".

nṣb I
- C. Uehlinger, Der Herr auf der Zinnmauer (BN 48, 1989, 89-104, 96).
- Vf. deutet das niph. von *NṢB* in Am 7,7aβ als „energisch herrscherliches Sich-Hinstellen bzw. Aufrechtstehen" (96).

nṣb I → *jd* Loretz

nṣbw → *ṣbh*

nṣwrjm (*nᵉṣûrîm*) Kontextform
- J. Tropper, Nekromantie (AOAT 223), Kevelaer/Neukirchen-Vluyn 1989, 324f.
- „*nṣwrym* entspricht semantisch dem akkadischen Wort *niṣirtu* «verborgener Ort = Grab»" (325).

nṣḥ I (*neṣaḥ*)
- J.A. Emerton, The Interpretation of Proverbs 21,28 (ZAW 100 Supplement, 1988, 161-170).
- *lānæṣaḥ* Spr 21,28 ist als Superlativ in der Bedeutung „completely", „utterly" (168) gebraucht. → *dbr* II.
- Vgl. D.W. Thomas, The Use of *neṣaḥ* as a Superlativ in Hebrew, JSS 1, 1956, 106-109.

nṣjb I (*nᶜṣîb*)
- V.Ph. Long, The Reign and Rejection of King Saul (SBL,DissSer 118), Atlanta 1990, 44[9].
- „For a possible parallel to the semantic relationship between נצב und נציב cf. Akk. *šakānu* «(hin)stellen ...» (AHw 1134f) with *šaknu* «gestellt ...; Statthalter» (AHw 1141)". Daher ist 1 Sam 13,3 die Bedeutung „governor" anzusetzen.

nqb/nqbh (*nᶜqebāh*)
- J.G. Janzen, Rivers in the Desert of Abraham and Sarah and Zion (Isaiah 51: 1-3) (HAR 10, 1986, 139-155).
- Vf. erläutert *NQB* in Opposition zu *ḤṢB*. Zu KAI 189: „Yet *NQB* does not describe the digging and tunnelling process as a whole, but only the climactic point, when the pick-axes of the two parties broke through to one another" (143). „*ḤṢB* occurs elsewhere in reference to quarrying. But this verb is not specific to hewing out stones, for in Jer 2:13 it is used of hewing out cisterns to hold water." (142). Die Diskussion der Bedeutungsbreite von *næqæb* II ergibt, daß (im Widerspruch zu Albright) für Ez 28,13 die Lesart „Steinbruch" der „Mine" vorzuziehen ist. „The place name *ʾădāmî hanneqeb* (Josh 19:33) apparently identifies a pass, in which ... the basic meaning is that of penetrating through". Zu *nqbh* gilt nach Diskussion der Bedeutungsnuancen: „I propose that, as a word for a female whose womb has been opened or is openable for conception and issue, *nĕqēbā* is to be associated with the imaging of human fertility as ground water" (148). Vgl. akkad. *naqbum* „the deep, as the source of ground water" und *naqābum* „durchbohren, deflorieren" (AHw 743a), „to deflower, rape" (CAD N/1, 328a). → *nqr*

nqb → *mᶜlh*

nqb (*næqæb*)
- M.C. Astour, Remarks on KTU 1.96 (Cananea Selecta [Studi Epigraphici e Linguistici sul Vicino Oriento Antico 5], 1988, 13-24, hier 18).
- Hebr. *nqb* (Ez 28,13) von der Wurzel *NQB* bezeichnet „hollowed, perforated musical instruments", also eine Flöte; vgl. in derselben Bedeutung arab. *naqīb*.

nqbh → *nqb/nqbh*

nqwdʾ (*nᶜqôdāʾ*) PN
- F. al-Khraysheh, siehe zu *nᶜm*, S. 122f.
- Der nabat. PN *nqjdw* wird in CIS 161 C „mit dem hebr. Personennamen *nᶜqōḏā*, verglichen, ... weiterhin ist *nqd* zweimal als safait. Personenname ... belegt."

nqm
- M. Greenberg, More Reflections on Biblical Criminal Law (ScrHier 31, 1986, 1-19, hier 11-14).
- Der Terminus bezeichnet eine Todesstrafe „by extraordinary procedure", d.h. eine Bestrafung durch die israelit. Justiz. Die Strafe erfolgt dann, wenn eine Blutrache unmöglich ist, trifft also schuldig gewordene Menschen, deren Opfer keine Verwandtschaft in der Umgebung haben, sie zu rächen. Die Wurzel *NQM* bezeichnet im AT niemals eine Geldstrafe.
- Ex 21,20 u.a.

nqm
- H.G.L. Peels, De wraak van God. De betekenis van de wortel *NQM* en de functie van de *NQM*-teksten in het kader van de oudtestamentische godsopenbaring (Diss. Apeldoorn), 1992.
- Nach umfassender Studie der bibl. und nachbarsprachlichen Belege kommt der Verfasser zu dem Schluß: „In general, *NQM* denotes punitive retribution and is closely related with the idea of justice and legality. ... We can distinguish between forensic, a general retributive, a liberating, an emotional and a vindicative vengeance ... The view of G. E. Mendenhall [The Tenth Generation, Baltimore/London 1973, 69-104], that *NQM* offers an ambivalent semantic picture, should be rejected." (270 f.).

nqm
- K.L. Younger, Jr., Ancient Conquest Accounts (JSOT,Suppl.Ser 98), 1990, 234-236.
- „In Joshua 10,13, although not in a strict legal context, נקם has the nuance of «just recompense for a crime»." (234). In den Erzählungen Jos 9-12 ist das Verb auf dem altorientalischen Hintergrund eines „concept of total war (i.e. the destruction of the population as well as the military)" (235) zu verstehen.

nqr
- J.G. Janzen, siehe zu *nqb/nqbh*, S. 146f.
- Vf. erläutert *NQR* im Zusammenhang mit anderen Verben des „Schneidens" oder „Hauens". Eine Wortgruppe *NQB, NQR, QWR* wird vorgeschlagen; vgl. zu einer weiteren Gruppe der „Verben des Hauens und Stechens" die Verben mit den Radikalen *ḥ* und *ṣ*.

nqr Deir ᶜAllā
- B.A. Levine, The Plaster Inscriptions from Deir ᶜAlla: General Interpretation (J. Hoftijzer – G. van der Kooij [edd.], The Balaam Text from Deir ᶜAlla Re-Evaluated, Leiden 1991, 58-72, hier 68-70).
- *nqr* bedeutet in Combination II „corpse". Ein Bezug auf Kinderopfer (mit Jes 14,19) ist abzulehnen, vielmehr ist an die nachbiblische Form *nṣl* zu erinnern. Vgl. auch Jes 49,6: *wnṣry*.
- Vgl. auch J.A. Hackett, Response to Baruch Levine and André Lemaire, a.a.O., 73-84, bes. 78f., die im wesentlichen zustimmt, aber den Zusammenhang mit *nṣl* ablehnt.

nś'
- W.A van Gemeren, *'ABBĀ'* in the Old Testament (Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 31, 1988, 385-398, hier 393).
- „The verb *nāśā'* signifies here the fatherly activity of lifting up and bringing one's child closer to oneself."
- Dtn 1,31.

nś'
- N. Lohfink, Kohelet und die Banken: Zur Übersetzung von Kohelet V 12-16 (VT 39, 1989, 488-495, hier 491).
- Im Kontext von Koh 5,12-16 kann aufgrund der dort bezeugten Bank- und Finanzterminologie für *NŚ'* die Sonderbedeutung „(etwas vom Konto) abheben", „sich auszahlen lassen, für eigene Transaktionen in Anspruch nehmen" angesetzt werden.

nś'
- O. Loretz, Ugarit-Texte und Thronbesteigungspsalmen. Die Metamorphose des Regenspenders Baal-Jahwe (Ugaritisch-Biblische Literatur 7), Münster 1988, 259-263.
- „Aus der Parallelität von akkadisch *rēša našû*, ugaritisch *nś' riš* und hebräisch *nś' r'š* dürfte sich zweifelsfrei ergeben, daß hier eine weit verbreitete Redewendung vorliegt und kein Grund dafür besteht, *nś' r'š* in Ps 24,7.9 hiervon abzusondern." Gemeint ist die „Umschreibung einer Aufforderung, die engen Tore zu weiten" (262f.).

nś'
- W. von Soden, „Die Sündenlast" in Hos 14,3 (ZAH 2, 1989, 91-92).
- Anstelle der in MT gebotenen Verbalform *tś'* ist das Substantiv *mś'* „Last, Bürde" von *nś'* zu lesen. Die Verlesung erklärt sich durch die Annahme einer interlinearen Variante.

nś' → *kwkb* Tsukimoto

nś' → *jd* Loretz

nś' npš (*nāśā' næpæš*)
- M.L. Barré, Mesopotamian Light on the Idiom *nāśā' næpæš* (CBQ 52, 1990, 46-54).
- Von den semantischen Äquivalenten sum. z i t ú/ù m und akk. *napištam wabālum* her wird der hebr. Ausdruck *nś' npš* als „to flee for protection to (Yahwe), to seek refuge in (Yahwe)" (54) gedeutet.
- Ps 25,1-3; 86,1-4; 143,8-10.

nśj' I (*nāśî'*)
- U. von Arx, Studien zur Geschichte des alttestamentlichen Zwölfersymbolismus I: Fragen im Horizont der Amphiktyoniehypothese von Martin Noth (EHS XXIII,397), 1990, v.a. 199-246.
- „Die ganze Breite des Vorkommens ... wird am besten verständlich, wenn man annimmt, daß es sich um einen Ausdruck handelt, der in der gentilizischen Tri-

balstruktur beheimatet ist." (245). Es „scheint in erster Linie das »Vaterhaus« (*bēt-ʾāb/ʾābōt*) ... die Referenzgröße zu sein" (243), nicht der „Stamm" (*šbṭ/mṭh*). Der *nśjʾ* steht „einer der möglichen, die Einzelfamilien übergreifenden Vergemeinschaftungen ... (vor) und repräsentiert sie nach außen (245f.). Man wird „die Blütezeit dieses Sprachgebrauchs in das ausgehende 8. und ins 7. Jh. a<nte Chr.> datieren" (246).

nśjʾ I
- M.A. Knibb, The Interpretation of *Damascus Document* VII,9*b*-VIII,2*a* and XIX,5*b-14* (RQu 15, 1991, 243-251, hier 250).
- Zur Verwendung von *nśjʾ kl hʿdh* in Qumran auf dem Hintergrund von P und Ez.

nśjʾ I
- C. Newsom, Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice (Harvard Semitic Studies 27), Atlanta 1985.
- Vf. bespricht S. 23ff. die Angelologie von 4QShirShabb. *nśjʾ* meint den Hohepriester der Engel.
- 4QShirShabb passim.

nśjʾ I (*nāśîʾ*)
- I.W. Provan, Hezekiah and the Book of Kings (BZAW 172), Berlin/New York 1988, 103.
- „This term is used in an Israelite context ... only to refer to the tribal heads of Israel, and never to the king". *nśjʾ* ist hier also nicht abwertend gemeint, sondern ein Synonym für *mælæk* „König".
- 1 Kön 11,34b.

nśjʾ I (*nāśîʾ*)
- Ch.R. Seitz, Theology in Conflict. Reactions to the Exile in the Book of Jeremiah (BZAW 176), Berlin/New York 1989, 123-132, bes. 129.
- Zur Unterscheidung *nāśîʾ* – *mælæk* bei Ez. Für den Gebrauch des Titels *nāśîʾ* in der Bedeutung „Herrscher" bei Ez können u.a folgende Beobachtungen namhaft gemacht werden:
  1. Die Parallelisierung des Exils mit Israels Zeit in Ägypten sowie die Zeit des Wüstenzugs und der Landnahme unter der Führung von *nᵉśîʾîm*, da die in dieser Zeit erfahrene Auseinandersetzung mit den „Königen" der Ammoniter, Moabiter, Kanaanäer usw. ihre Entsprechung in der Bedrückung und Gefährdung durch die Könige der Fremdvölker der Exilszeit hat.
  2. Das gewaltsame Ende der davidischen Königsdynastie Jerusalems durch die Babylonier, da unter babyl. Oberhoheit dem „Herrscher" in Jerusalem nicht der Titel *mælæk*, sondern *nāśîʾ* zukommt.
  3. Die ungeklärte Königs- und Machtfrage unter Jojakim, Jojachin, Zedekia und deren Söhnen.

nšk (*næšæk*)
- T. Veerkamp, Eine einseitige Ökonomie. Auslegung von Lev 25,1-26,2 (Texte und Kontexte 44, 1989, 3-25, hier 18f.).

- *nšk* (Lev 25,36.37) meint die private Abschöpfung (wörtlich: „Abbiß") in „Form eines Tributs ..., einer fixen ertragsunabhängigen Abgabe" (19) im Alten Orient, im Gegensatz zur Abschöpfung des Mehrwertes durch staatliche Instanzen.

nšmh
- D. Dimant – J. Strugnell, The Merkabah Vision in Second Ezekiel (4Q*385* 4), (RQu 14, 1990, 331-348, hier 338).
- *nšmh* ist in 4Q*385* 4,8 entweder mit „spirit" analog zu Ez 1,20-21 (*rwḥ ḥḥjh*) oder mit „Seele", „a sense current in Mishnaic Hebrew", zu übersetzen.

nšmh (*nᵉšāmāh*)
- K. Koch, Der Güter Gefährlichstes, die Sprache, dem Menschen gegeben ... Überlegungen zu Gen 2,7 (BN 48, 1989, 50-60).
- „*nᵉšamā* bedeutet denjenigen Odem, den der Mensch – oder auch Gott – zur Sprache benötigen, der erst zur Sprachlichkeit befähigt." (57).
- Spr 20,27; Ijob 26,4; 27,3; 32,8; Jes 42,5b; Dan 5,23; 10,17.

nšp (*næšæp*)
- N.L. Collins, The Start of the Pre-exilic Calendar Day of David and the Amalekites: A Note on 1. Sam XXX 17 (VT 41, 1991, 203-210, bes. 203f.).
- *nšp* ist hier Bezeichnung für das Zwielicht bei Sonnenaufgang. → *mḥrt*

nšq
- J. Sanmartín, Glossen zum ugaritischen Lexikon (VI) (UF 21, 1989, 335-348, hier 344f.).
- Zu hebr. *nšq* vgl. arab. *nasaqa* „aufreihen, aufstellen, zusammenfügen" (vgl. H. Wehr, Arabisches Wörterbuch, Wiesbaden ⁵1985, 1269). Eine Verbindung mit ugar. *nṯq* „eine Art Pfeil oder Wurfspieß" wird abgewiesen.

nšr (*næšær*)
- B. Margalit, siehe zu *nᶜm* I, S. 340⁴.
- Da im Ugar. (z.B. KTU 1.2 IV 13f.) *nšr* den Jagdfalken bezeichnet, besteht Wahrscheinlichkeit, „that Semitic *nšr* was originally a generic term for any carniverous bird belonging to the hawk or falconic family".

nšr (*næšær*)
- H.-P. Müller, Die Funktion divinatorischen Redens und die Tierbezeichnungen der Inschrift von Tell Deir ᶜAllā (J. Hoftijzer – G. van der Kooij [edd.], siehe zu *nqr* Levine, S. 189-205, hier 195f.).
- *nšr* ist ein konturschwacher Begriff, der sowohl den Adler wie auch den Geier umfaßt. Da für andere Raubvogelarten im Hebräischen andere Begriffe belegt sind (*prs* „Lämmergeier", *ᶜznjh*, *ᶜjṭ*), wird die terminologische Unterscheidung von Tierarten wohl weniger biologischen Kategorien folgen als vielmehr durch die Relevanz dieser Differenzierung für das praktische Leben bedingt sein.
- Vgl. M. Dijkstra, Response to H.-P. Müller and M. Weippert, a.a.O., 206-217, hier 211): „Of course, an eagle and a vulture are different species, but they belong to the overall family of birds of prey and that is what the word *nšr* actually means."

ntn (*nātān*) PN
- F. al-Khraysheh, siehe zu *nᶜm*, S. 124f.
- *ntn* als nabat., thamudischer und safait. PN (124).

ntnjh (*nᵉtanjāh*) PN
- F. al-Khraysheh, siehe zu *nᶜm*, S. 124.
- Der nabat. PN *ntnwj* wird in CIS 320 C „mit dem hebr. Personennamen Natanyah" verglichen. „... *ntnj* als palmyr. Eigenname ... nachweisbar."

ntq
- J.M. Baumgarten, The 4Q Zadokite Fragments on Skin Disease (JJSt 41, 1990, 153-165, hier 165).
- Vgl. zu *ntq* LevRabba 15,3.

sʾh (*sᵉʾāh*)
- E. Lipiński, Emprunts suméro-akkadiens en hébreu biblique (ZAH 1, 1988, 61-73, hier 70).
- Vgl. die akk. Pluralform *sa-a-ti/sa-(a-)at* zu *sūtu*. „À partir de *sʾh* on a formé en hébreu un pluriel *sᵉʾîm* (Gen 18,6; 1 Sam 25,18), parallèle au pluriel araméen *sʾn*, ce qui permettrait d'envisager un emprunt par l'intermédiaire de l'araméen."
- 2 Kön 7,1.16.18.

sb (*sob*) Kontextform
- H.-P. Müller, Das Hohelied (H.-P. Müller - O. Kaiser - J.A. Loader, Das Hohelied / Klagelieder / Das Buch Ester, ATD 16/2, 1-90, hier 32[85]).
- In Hld 2,17 ist die Kontextform *sob* mit „Komm!" wiederzugeben: „Das bedachtsam gewählte hebräische Wort *sōb* - genauer: «wende dich her» - könnte den Beiklang von «verwandle dich» gehabt haben." Eine Emendation zu *šûb* ist daher überflüssig.

sgn (*sægæn*, bzw. *sāgān*)
- E. Lipiński, siehe zu *sʾh*, S. 70.
- Vgl. akk. *šaknu* „prefet", „gouverneur": „Plus exactement, il provient de l'état construit *šakan* du mot néo-assyrien ...". „Il est probable que l'emprunt a été réalisé par l'intermédiaire de l'araméen ...".

sgn → *ʾḥšdrpn*

sgr (*sᵉgor*)
- H. Ringgren, Psalteren 1-41 (Kommentar till Gamla Testamentet), Uppsala 1987, 205.
- *sgr* (Ps 35,3) ist ein Teil einer Lanze bzw. die Lanze selbst. Es wird auf ein an nicht näher bezeichneter Stelle in den Qumranschriften belegtes *sgr* verwiesen.

swʾ (*sô*)
- J. Day, The Problem of „So, King of Egypt" in 2 Kings XVII 4 (VT 42, 1992, 289-301).

- „There can be little doubt that So reflects the Egyptian place name Sais" (300f.). Die Verwechslung mit dem dort regierenden König Tefnakht beruht auf der Auslassung eines *ʾl* vor dem Toponym.
- Vgl. H. Goedicke, BASOR 171, 1963, 64-66.

swd (*sôd*)
- A. Malamat, The Secret Council and Prophetic Involvement in Mari and Israel (R. Liwak - S. Wagner [edd.], Prophetie und geschichtliche Wirklichkeit im alten Israel [Festschr. S. Herrmann], 1991, 231-236).
- Zu hebr. *swd* „Ratsversammlung" kann nun in der Sache der etymologisch nicht verwandte Begriff *pirištum* „geheime Ratsversammlung" (ARM 26/1,101.104. 206; 26/2,307.429) verglichen werden.

swd(h) → *mʾd* Stegemann

swḫh → *šj/wḥ*

sws → *ssʿgr*

swp I (*sûp*)
- H. Cazelles, Autour de l'Exode (Études) (Sources Bibliques), Paris 1987, hier 207f.
- „Le *souf* sémitique évoque la pierre (*sâpu* en accadien), le sable ou le grès en arabe ... En Ex., II,3 et 5 il s'agit des plantes qui poussent le long du Nil, en Is., XIX,6 des plantes qui poussent près des canaux ou dans les prairies qui sont sur les bords du Nil ... le *swf* n'est donc pas tout à fait la même chose que le roseau ...".

swp → *jtrwn* Berger

sjg (*sîg*)
- H.H.P. Dressler, The Lesson of Proverbs 26:23 (L. Eslinger - G. Taylor [edd.], Ascribe to the Lord. Biblical and Other Studies in Memory of Peter C. Craigie [JSOT,Suppl.Ser 67], 1988, 117-125, hier 257f.).
- „The Hebrew term *kesep sîgîm* means, indeed, *spuma argenti*, i.e. monoxide of lead, or, silver dross, silver-leaf" (124). Vgl. ugar. *spsg*; das Verständnis H.L. Ginsbergs (BASOR 98, 1945, 21 n.55) „glaze" ist abzulehnen.
- KTU 1.17 VI 36-37.

sjḥ(w)n (*sîḥo/ôn*)
- E.A. Knauf, Hesbon, Sihons Stadt (ZDPV 106, 1990, 135-144).
- „Zusammenfassend läßt sich sagen: wenn Num 21,27b-29a auf ein ammonitisches Sieges- oder Spottlied zurückgeht, läßt sich *syḥn* mit dem *Ǧabal Šīḥān* identifizieren, einem Toponym, das wegen seines Affixes *-ān* Anspruch darauf erheben kann, ins 3. oder 2. Jahrtausend v. Chr. zurückzugehen" (140).

sjnj (*sînaj*)
- M. Görg, Der Sinai: „(Der Berg) des Erzgebietes"? (BN 54, 1990, 12-18).

- Vf. schlägt vor, das Toponym „Sinai" in Beziehung zu akk. *s/šinnu* sowie äg. *sjn* „Kupfererzland" (16) zu setzen. Gemeint ist das „Erzgebiet im Süden Palästinas" (17).
- EA Nr. 77.

sjnj (*sînaj*)
- E.A. Knauf, Midian (ADPV), Wiesbaden 1988, 48-50.
- *zh sjnj* ist eine altüberlieferte Prädikation Jahwes „*ḏū/ī S$_3$NY*" (48), die analog gebildet ist wie *ḏu-šarā* („Dusares"). Die Verbindung *JHWH ḏ-S$_3$NY* deutet „darauf hin, daß es in seiner Heimat noch weitere, lokale Ausprägungen des Gottes gab" (49). Die Lage des Berges (?) und die Etymologie des Namens sind unklar, die Verbindung mit dem babyl. Mondgott Su'en und dem „Dornbusch" überlieferungsgeschichtlich sekundär.

skwt (*sukkôt*) Ortsname
- H. Cazelles, siehe zu *swp* I, S. 220-223.
- Vf. erläutert ausführlich die Entwicklung von äg. *tjekon* zu *sukkôt*.

skk I → *spsg*

skk I → *śkk I*

skl → *jtrwn* Berger

skn (*soken*)
- E. Lipiński, siehe zu *s'h*, S. 70.
- Vgl. sum. s a g i n a , „qui est lui-même un emprunt au paléo-akkadien *šā/akin*"; vgl. auch *sūkinu* aus den Amarnabriefen und *sākinu* in Ugarit und Alalaḫ.
- Jes 22,15.

skn → *jd* Loretz

sknt (*sokænæt*)
- M. Heltzer, The Neo-Assyrian *šakintu* and the Biblical *sōkenet* (I Reg. 1,4) (J.-M. Durand [ed.], La femme dans le proche-orient antique [CRRA 33], Paris 1987, 87-90).
- Die nassyr. Personenbezeichnung *šakintu* meint „female housekeeper" (87) (im Palast); sie befiehlt über eigene (nicht ausschließlich weibliche) Untergebene und hat auch mit der Aufsicht über den Harem zu tun. Die hebr. *sknt* entspricht ihr funktional. Vielleicht ist das Amt ursprünglich westsemit.; „the word by itself is not of West-Semitic origin" (89).
- 1 Kön 1,4.

skt → *kjwn*

sl'/slh II
- S.A. Geller, „Where is Wisdom?": A Literary Study of Job 28 in its Settings (J. Neusner et al. [edd.], Judaic Perspectives on Ancient Israel, Philadelphia 1987, 155-188, hier 181[23]).
- „*tĕsalleh* seems to have a cognate in ESA *śl'* «pay», *śl'm* «tribute»".
- Ijob 28,16.

slḥ
- E. Talstra, Het gebed van Salomo. Amsterdam 1987 (= Diss. Leiden 1987), 156ff.
- Der Verfasser bietet einen Überblick zum Gebrauch von *slḥ* im AT aus primär traditions-, nicht begriffsgeschichtlichem Interesse; Gliederung der Belegstellen nach syntaktischer Position und Analyse der Bedeutungsnuancen.
- 1 Kön 8,30.34.36.39.50.

smdr (*sᶜmādar*)
- H.-P. Müller, siehe zu *sb*, S. 31[82].
- „*sᶜmādar*, das wir hier ‹Hld 2,15› vor allem nach den lateinischen Versionen ‹sinngemäß› mit «blühen» übersetzen, ist, wie der Hinweis auf ihr Sich-Öffnen ‹Hld› 7,13 unterstreicht, dort die «Blüten*knospe*», nicht die Blüte".

smgr (*samgar*)
- E. Lipiński, siehe zu *sʾh*, S. 71.
- „Le *samgar* de Jér 39,3 n'est pas un élément d'un nom propre, mais le titre néo-babylonien de *simmagir*, porté par un dignitaire. Il est possible que ce titre soit d'origine élamite."

smr
- A. Lemaire, *SMR* dans la petite inscription de Kilamuwa (Zençirli) (Syria 67, 1990, 323-327).
- „... *smr* devrait probablement se comprendre «amulette», «phylactère», ou «talisman», dont le but était d'obtenir une longue vie heureuse" (327). Vgl. *msmr* und arab. *mismār*.
- Jes 41,7; Jer 10,4; 1 Chr 22,3; 2 Chr 3,9.

smr Deir ᶜAlla
- J. Hoftijzer, What Did The Gods Say? Remarks on the First Combination of the Deir ᶜAlla Plaster Texts (J. Hoftijzer – G. van der Kooij [edd.], siehe zu *nqr* Levine, S. 121-142, hier 126f.136).
- *smr* ist mit *ḥt* parallelzusetzen. Übersetzung der gesamten Zeile (I 9): „do not spread the shuttering for you" (136).

smr Deir ᶜAllā
- B.A. Levine, siehe zu *nqr*, S. 63.
- Vergleichbare babylonische astronomische Texte erlauben die Übersetzung von *smr* mit „to bristle". „The point is that visible features of heavenly bodies can be referred to as «bristling»".
- Vgl. dagegen J.A. Hackett, siehe zu *nqr*, S. 74, die die Korrektheit der babylonischen Parallele bestreitet.

snh → *ʾṭd*

ssᶜgr Deir Allā
- H.-P. Müller, siehe zu *nšr*, S. 197f.
- *sws ᶜgwr* in Jes 38,14 MT und Jer 8,7 (Q *sîs*) findet eine Parallele in TDA I,7: „Als Bezeichnung einer *Spezies* der Gattung Schwalbe ist *ssᶜgr/sîs ᶜāgûr* wohl

auch durch seine Struktur als Kompositbezeichnung aus Nomen + Attribut (Dehnungsstufe des beschreibenden Adjektivs nach *qatul*) kenntlich".

s^{c}jp (*s^{c} ^{c}îp*)
- D.J.A. Clines, Job 1-20 (WBC 17), Dallas 1989, 23.
- *s^{c}jp* (bzw. *ś^{c}p*, beide Wörter auch mit „epenthetic *resh*") bedeutet „anxious", vgl. arab. *šaġifa* „be disquieted".

s^{c}r (*j^{c}so ^{c}er*) Kontextform
- Z. Bezer, The Tone on the Penultima in *$^{>}$ojaḇtî* (Mi 7,8.10), Leshonenu 48/49, 1983/84), 5-8.
- Die Form *j^{c}so ^{c}er* in Hos 13,3 ist als Überbleibsel einer alten Pō^{c}el-Konjugation nach Analogie der arabischen Stämme mit gelängtem Wurzelvokal zu erklären.

spḥt
- J.M. Baumgarten, The 4QZadokite Fragments on Skin Disease (JJSt 41, 1990, 153-165, hier 159f.).
- „*spḥt* is associated here with a wound inflicted by an instrument of wood or stone" (160).
- Vgl. E. Qimron, Notes on the Zadoqite Fragment on Skin Disease (JJSt 42, 1991, 256-259, bes. 256).

spjr (*sappîr*)
- S. Powels, Indische Lehnwörter in der Bibel (ZAH 5, 1992, 186-200, hier 198).
- *sappîr* ist kein indisches Lehnwort, da die Sanskrit-Vokabel *śanipriya-* im Indischen „kein feststehender Edelsteinname" ist. Gemeint ist vermutlich der Lapislazuli.

spn
- P.A. Verhoef, The Books of Haggai and Malachi (NICOT 13, 1988, 58f.).
- Zur Diskussion um *s^{c}pûnîm* in Hag 1,4: „the point of reference could have been either the decoration or the finishing of the houses." Vgl. das im Aram. u. Babyl. identische Verb *sapānu*, „meaning 'flattened (crushed)', a sidelong glance at the contrasting state of the Lord's House".
- Hag 1,4.

spsg*
- B. Margalit, siehe zu *n^{c}m*, S. 316-319.
- Das Wort *spsg* (vgl. Apparat d. BHS zu Spr 26,23) bezeichnet den „more or less *general* term for the superimposed «covering» (*√skk*) ... whereas the B-term *ḥrṣ* ‹hebr. *ḥrś*› is the specifiying term" (318f.). Diese ugaritologische Überlegung erläutert den Vergleich in Spr 26,23.

spr
- M. Hengel – J.H. Charlesworth – D. Mendels, The Polemical Character of „On Kingship" in the Temple Scroll: An Attempt at Dating 11QTemple (JJSt 37, 1986, 28-38, hier 31).
- Die ins „Buch" geschriebene Tora ist die Tempelrolle, nicht etwa das Dtn (11QTS 56,21).

spr
- B.Z. Wacholder, The „Sealed" Torah Versus the „Revealed" Torah: An Exegesis of Damascus Covenant V,1-6 and Jeremiah 32,10-14 (RQu 12, 1986, 351-368, hier 353).
- „The *sefer hattorah* was sealed in the ark which had been closed since the death of Eleazar." (CD 5,2).
- Vgl. J. Maier, Von Eleazar bis Zadok: CD V, 2-5 (RQu 15, 1991, 231-241).

spr → *lwḥ*

sprʾ aram.
- J.T. Milik, Les modèles araméens du Livre d'Esther dans la grotte 4 de Qumrân (RQu 15, 1992, 321-396, hier 331f.).
- *bjt sprʾ* (4QprEsther^{b} 4) meint weder „la maison du livre" noch „la maison du scribe", sondern einen Eigennamen: „la (terreur de la) famille de *SPRʾ*.

srwḥ (*sārûʾaḥ*)
- Ph.J. King, The *marzeaḥ*: Textual and Archeological Evidence (EI 20, 1989, 98-106).
- *srḥjm* beschreibt Am 6,4 die Haltung der Teilnehmer am Marzeaḥ-Mahl als ein Sich-Räkeln auf einem Eisenbett.

srjs (*sārîs*)
- M. Görg, Die Amtstitel des Potifar (BN 53, 1990, 14-20).
- Vf. weist für den Titel *srs/srjs* auf das äg. *srs* hin, einen Kausativ zu *rs* mit der Bedeutung „überwachen, beaufsichtigen" (WbÄS IV, 201,8). Dieser Titel bezeichnet einen vom Pharao ernannten Beamten, der in erster Linie mit der Kontrolle der Leibwächter beauftragt ist.

srjs (*sārîs*)
- E. Lipiński, siehe zu *sʾh*, S. 71.
- Lehnwort aus nassyr. *ša rēši* „majordome".

srn (*sœrœn*)
- G. Garbini, On the Origin of the Hebrew-Philistine Word *seren* (A.S. Kaye [ed.], Semitic Studies [Festschr. W. Leslau] I, 1991, 516-519).
- *srn* ist eine Zusammensetzung aus einer anatolisch-indoeuropäischen Wurzel *sar*, bzw. *ser*, „which means something like «superior»", und einem Suffix *-en*, das im Phrygischen und Lykischen als Suffix für politische Autoritäten belegt ist.

srᶜph → *sᶜp*

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Dokumentation über neu entdeckte Texte

Armin Lange – K.F. Diethard Römheld (Münster)

1. D.T. Ariel, Excavations at the City of David 1978-1985 Directed by Y. Shiloh. Vol. II: Imported Stamped Amphora Handles, Coins, Worked Bone and Ivory, and Glass (Qedem 30, 1990), 99 ff. (# C 25 ff.).
Es wird eine Zusammenstellung der aus dem 2./1. Jh. vor Chr. stammenden Münzen judäischer Herrscher geboten. Sie zeigen stereotype (hebr. und aram.) Inschriften (Titel und PN, z.T. mit Datierung) und sind teilweise schon anderweitig ediert.

2. P. Bordreuil, Flèches phéniciennes inscrites: 1981-1991 (RB 99, 1992, 205-213).
Neben 18 bekannten Texten werden Faksimiles und Transkriptionen vier bislang unpublizierter phönizischer Inschriften auf Pfeilspitzen veröffentlicht:

ḥṣ šlm bn .....y (Louvre AO 29855)
ḥṣ bnʾ ʾš šlṭ (Louvre AO 29856)
ḥṣ ʿzm bn mlkq̊ (Louvre AO 29857)
ḥṣ pʾ b[n] (in Privatbesitz)

3. J. Briend, Les manuscrits de Massada (Le monde de la Bible 79, 1992, 32).
Dem Artikel ist eine Teilphotographie einer bei den Yadin-Ausgrabungen auf der Massada gefundenen stichischen Psalmenhandschrift beigegeben. Auf der Photographie sind gut lesbar Ps 85,1-6 zu erkennen, davon Vers 1 nahezu vollständig. Von den Versen 2-6 ist jeweils der erste Halbvers erhalten. Im Konsonantenbestand finden sich keine Abweichungen vom masoretischen Text (BHS). Soweit erkennbar, stimmt die stichische Gliederung der Handschrift ebenfalls mit der BHS überein.

4. G.I. Davies, Ancient Hebrew Inscriptions. Corpus and Concordance, Cambridge 1991.
Der Band enthält alle bislang publizierten hebräischen Inschriften, Siegel, Stempel, Münzen und Gewichtaufschriften bis 200 vor Chr. in neu überprüfter Umschrift, jedoch ohne Abbildung, Übersetzung, Kommentar oder Bibliographie. Es werden, soweit bekannt, Fundort, Erstpublikation und Datierung sowie einige ausgewählte Neubearbeitungen genannt. Eine vollständige, alphabetisch nach unflektierten Lemmata geordnete Konkordanz (keyword-in-context) erschließen das Textkorpus. Eine morphologische Analyse der Texte und eine entsprechend differenzierte Konkordanz sind geplant. Das EDV-lesbare Textkorpus (ohne Konkordanz) soll demnächst auch als Datenträger ediert werden.

5. H. Gitler, The Excavations of an Ancient Boat in the Sea of Galilee [Lake Kinneret] (ed.: Sh. Wachsmann): The Coins (Atiqot, English Ser. 19, 1990, 101 ff.).
Bei dem bei Ausgrabungen 1986 im See Genezareth entdeckten Schiff (1. Jh. vor Chr. bis 1. Jh. nach Chr.) wurden unabhängig vom Schiff (!) 57 Münzen unterschiedlicher Epochen gefunden. Münze # 17 stammt aus Tyrus (2. Jh. vor Chr.) und zeigt verso die Inschrift *lṣr*.

6. G.L. Kelm & A. Mazar, Tel Batash (Timnah) Excavations: Third Preliminary Report, 1984-89 (W.E. Rast [ed.], Preliminary Reports of ASOR-Sponsored Excavations 1982-89 [BASOR Supplements 27], 1991, 47 ff.), 56.
Bei Ausgrabungen in Timna wurde in einem wahrscheinlich als Handwerkergebäude zu deutenden „pillared building" eine mit geritzten Buchstaben beschriftete Tonscherbe des 10. Jh. vor Chr. (!) gefunden: *...n.ḥnn*(...?) ([*be*]*n ḥanan*), „belonging to the son of Hanan" (vgl. 1 Kön. 4,9; Jos. 19,43). Es besteht paläographische Verwandtschaft mit dem Gezer-Kalender.

7. A. Kempinski & J. Naveh, A Phoenician Seal Impression on a Jar Handle from Tel Kabri (Tel Aviv 18, 1991, 244-247).
Während der Ausgrabungen von 1990 in Tel Kabri wurde auf dem Griff eines Kruges ein stark beschädigter phönizischer Siegelabdruck gefunden. Der noch erhaltenen Text lautet wie folgt:

ṣ oder *ʾ*[...]
šm[..]*b*[.]
št 100 10
9
ṣ[.]

Es wird vermutet, daß die ersten beiden Zeilen des Siegels entweder zu *ṣr*[*tʾ*] *šmnb*[.], oder zu *ʾd*[*nʾ*] *šmn*[.]*b*[.] zu rekonstruieren sind, und die letzte Zeile zu *ṣ*[*r*]. Die Zahl 119 würde dann auf das 119. Jahr der Ära von Tyrus verweisen. Die Inschrift wäre somit in die Herrschaft Antiochus VII Sidites zu datieren, und zwar in das Jahr 156 vor Chr.

8. A. Kloner, Ḥorvat Alim, Weight from the Time of Bar Kokhba (Excavations and Surveys in Israel 6, 1987/88, 1).
Auf einem Bleigewicht aus der Zeit Bar Kochbas findet sich folgende in Quadratschrift geprägte Inschrift: *šmʿwn bn ksbʾ nśjʾ jśrʾl wprnšw prs*.

9. Y. Meshorer, The Coins of Masada (Masada 1, The Y. Yadin Excavations 1963-5, Final Reports [The Masada Reports]), Jerusalem 1989, S. 69-132, Tf. 61-81.
Auf hasmonäischen Münzen finden sich (u.a.) folgende hebr. oder aram. Inschriften (z.T. mehrfach belegt): # 19: *hmlk yhwntn* („der König Jehonatan"), # 21: *mlkʾ ʾlksndrs šnt kh* („der König Alexander, Jahr 25"), # 96: *jhwntn hkhn hgdl whbr hjdm* („Jehonatan der Hohe Priester und Genosse der Juden"), # 109: *mttjh* („Mattathias"). Der überwiegende Teil der gefunden Münzen entstammt der Zeit des jüdischen Krieges 66-70 nach Chr. und trägt dementsprechend althebr. Inschriften. Neben den üblichen Wert- und Jahrangaben finden sich u.a. Prägungen wie: *jrwšlm qd(w)šh* („Jerusalem ist heilig"), *ḥr(w)t ṣjwn* („Freiheit des Zion") und *lgʾlt ṣjwn* („Für die Befreiung des Zion").

10. B. Porten, An Aramaic Papyrus Fragment from the First Half of the Fifth Century B.C.E. (JNES 49, 1990, 291-292).
Ergänzend zur Veröffentlichung einer Abtretungsurkunde aus der ersten Hälfte des 5. Jh. vor Chr. (JNES 48, 1989, 170-172; s. ZAH 3, 1990, 126f.) wird hier die dazugehörige Photographie publiziert.

11. R. Reich, Caiaphas Name Inscribed on Bone Boxes (BAR 18.5, 1992, 38-44).
In einer Grabhöhle nahe der Jerusalemer Altstadt fanden sich mehrere beschriftete Särge aus dem 1. Jh. nach Chr. Die Inschriften sind in einer schwer lesbaren kursiven Quadratschrift geschrieben:

jhwsp br qpʾ
jhwsp br qjpʾ
qpʾ
mrjm brt šmʿwn
šm
šlwm

Den Transkriptionen der Inschriften sind mehrere Farbphotographien beigegeben. Im Artikel wird spekuliert, ob es sich bei dem erwähnten *jhwsp br qjpʾ* um den aus dem NT bekannten Hohepriester *Caiaphas* handele.

12. Y. Yadin & J. Naveh (edd.), The Aramaic and Hebrew Ostraca and Jar Inscriptions (Masada 1, The Y. Yadin Excavations 1963-5, Final Reports [The Masada Reports]), Jerusalem 1989, S. 1-68, Tf. 1-60.
Die Edition umschließt mehr als 700 Ostraka und Kruginschriften aus den Jahren 66-73 nach Chr. in hebr. und aram. Sprache:

„Tags with letters" und „specific names" machen mehr als 50% der Ostraka aus und stehen ihrem Fundort entsprechend in Zusammenhang mit dem System der Lebensmittelrationen. Bei den „specific names" handelt es sich um (die Offiziere, Priester oder Leviten?) *jhwḥnn* („Jehohanan", 49 Belege), *jhwdh* („Jehuda", 9 Belege) und *šmʿwn* („Simeon", 21 Belege).

„Tags with single names" stellen Besitzerangaben oder Lose dar (39 Belege): *ʾbj* oder (*ʾbjj*) („Ab[b]i"), *ʿwšʿjh* („Oschaja"), *ʾljʿzr* („Eliezer"), *ʾlʿzr* („Eleazar"), *ʾšʿjh* ... (var. zu *jšʿjh*), *ʾšt ṭjbw* („Frau des ?"), *ʾtt* [*z*]*bjdʾ* („Frau des [Ze]bida"), *ʾtt jʿqwb* („Frau des Jakob"), *brkh* („Beraka"), *dwsts* („Dositheos"), *bt dmlj* („Tochter des Domli"), *ḥzqjh* („Hiskia"), *ḥzqjn* (var. zu *ḥzqjh*), *bn ḥ̊klh* (var. zu *ḥkljh*?), *ḥnnjh* („Hananja"), *ṭwbj* („Tobi"), *jhwʿ br brqj* („Jehu [?], Sohn des Barkaj"), *jwʿzr* („Joezer"), *br smwn* („Sohn des Simon"), *ʿzrʾ* („Ezra"), *pṭj* (?), *pṭrjn br ʿʿjstm̊kws* („Patrin,Sohn des ?"), *br qrzlh* („Sohn des Karzela"), *bt qtrʾ* („Tochter des Katra"), *rbʾ* („Rabba"), *šʾwl* („Saul"), *br šwʿ* (var. zu *jšwʿ*), *šlwm hglj*[*ljt*] („Schalom [oder Salome?], der Gali[läer]").

„Lists of names" verwaltungstechnischen oder militärischen Zwecks; auf die PNN folgen jeweils Zahlen unbekannter Referenz.
Liste # 420: (1) *br hlqj 10+1+* ... (2) *hgdrʾjn 10+* ... (3) *br qrzlʾ 20+1* (4) *zwmljt zʿrʾ 10* (5) *br jšwʿ 20+1* (6) *br qsʾ 10+2* (7) *jšwʿ gjrʾ 10* – (1) „Sohn des Hilki (var. von *ḥlqj*) 11[+?] (2) Die Leute von Gadara (ON) 10[+?] (3) Sohn des Karzela 21 (4) „Kleine Suppenkelle" (ζωμάρυστρον) (?) 10 (5) Sohn des Jeschua 21 (6) Sohn des Kesa 12 (7) Jeschua der Proselyt (?) 10".
Liste # 421: (1) *br ḥnwn d* (2) *jʾḥz g* (3) *ʾljʿzr d* (4) *šʾwl d* (5) *br ḥršʾ g* (6) *br bnjh g* (7) *br qrzlʾ* ... (8) *šmʿwn* ... (9) *br* ... – (1) „Sohn des Hanun 4 (2) Jaahaz 3 (3) Eliezer 4 (4) Saul 4 (5) Sohn des Harscha 3 (6) Sohn des Benaia 3 (7) Sohn des Karzela ... (8) Simeon ... (9) Sohn des ...".
Liste # 422: (1) *br ḥgj* (2) *jʾḥz g* – (1) „Sohn des Haggai (2) Jaahaz 3".

Liste # 424: (1) *hqrnj* (2) *2 š* – (1) „Der Mann aus Karnaim / Kyrene (?) (2) 2 Sch[ekel]".
Liste # 425: (1) *šmwʾl p* (2) *br ḥlbtʾ p* – (1) „Samuel 1/2 (2) Sohn des Halabta 1/2" (var. für *ḥlptʾ*).
Liste # 426: (1) *qlṣ š 2* (2) *brh p* – (1) „? 2 Sch[ekel] (2) Sein Sohn 1/2".
Die Listen ## 423.427.428 sind unleserlich oder in der Deutung unsicher.

„Lots": 12 Ostraka tragen einzelne PNN (bzw. Spitznamen) und werden als Lose (?) im Zusammenhang des kollektiven Suizids (Josephus Bell. Jud. VII,8-9) diskutiert: *grjdʾ* („Gerida"), *ḥwnj* („Onias"), *bnj* oder *bn j...* (?), *bn jʾjr* („Sohn des Jair"), *jwʾb* („Joab"), *bn knbwn* („Sohn des »Rundkuchens«"), *mltʾ* („das Wort / Ding" [Spitzname?]), *bn hnhtm* („Sohn des Bäckers"), *hʿmqj* („Der aus dem Tal / dem Ort Imki"?), *ṣjdʾ* („der Jäger"), *ṣjpwn* („Sippun ?"), *bn ptj* („Sohn des ?").

Inscriptions designating priestly shares: 20 Ostraka und Kruginschriften verweisen auf kultische Zusammenhänge. Die interessanteren Texte sind anderweitig bereits publiziert oder erwähnt.

Names of owners inscribed on store-jars: Unter den über 50 Einträgen finden sich (ohne Mehrfachnennungen und fragmentarische Belege) u.a.: *ʾlʿzr br ḥ̊dd* („Eleazar, Sohn des Hadad"), *bsj wbr[jh]* („Besaj und [sein] Sohn"), *ḥnjnʾ* („Hanina"), *zbjdw br jšmʿl* („Zebidu, Sohn des Ismael"), *ḥwnjh* („Onias"), *jhwdh* („Jehuda"), *jhwḥnn* („Jehohanan"), *jhwsp br ʾlʿzr* („Jehosef, Sohn des Eleazar"), *jhwsp qnj* („Jehosef, der Zelot / der Silberschmied"), *br jswn* ... („Sohn des Jason ..."), *jʿqwb* („Jakob"), *mtjh* („Mattia"), *br pnḥj* („Sohn des Pinhi" [< *pjnḥs*]), *qṣbʾ* („Metzger"), *šʾl* („Saul"), *šmʿwn br jhwsp* („Simeon, Sohn des Jehosef"), *šmʿwn bn jwʿzr* („Simeon, Sohn des Joezer"), *šmʿwn br nwṭws* („Simeon, Sohn des Notos"), (1) *šmʿwn* (2) *nsn* („Simeon, Nisan"), *tʾbʾ* (?).

Contents: Knapp 40 Krugaufschriften benennen den Inhalt, darunter: *bṣq* („Teig"), (1) *bśr* (2) *jhwd̊*[*h*] („Fleisch, Jud[a]"), (1) *gr*[*gr*] (2) *dbl̊*[*h*] („getrocknete Feigen"), (1) *dblh ktwšh* (2) *jph* („gut gepreßter Feigenkuchen"), *dgʾ*, var.: *dwgʾ* („Fisch"), ... *kjsh* („Heu" oder eine Maßeinheit), *kršnjn* („Linsenwicke"), *mz̊ blsnh* („Balsam-Saft[?]"), *m̊rwr*? (ein bitteres Kraut), *nṣḥ* („Saft"?), *qddjn* (Pl. zu *qjdh* [eine Gewürzpfanze]?).

„Letters": Die drei stark fragmentarischen Briefe werden erstmals vollständig (!) ediert: # 554: (1) *...m br mʿzj šlm dj trḥmwn ʿlj* (2) *...š̊lmw lkspʾ zwzjn ḥmšh mnjn* (3) ... *[l]ḥ̊m ltqlʾ dj ʾjtj lj bdkwn* (4) ... *[r]ḥ̊mw di ʾnh m...* (5) ... *ʾwlʾ ʾjtj lj* ... (6) ... – (1) „[ ]m son of Maʿuzi, Peace [sic]. Have pity on me (2) [and please] pay (me) the silver, five denarii, (according to the) account (3) [of X loaves of b]read (?) for a *sheqel* (= 2 denarii) that you owe me. (4) [Have p]ity, because I am [ ] (5) [ ] and I do not possess [ ] (6) ..." (50). # 555 und # 556: weitgehend unverständlich.

„Instructions for supplying bread": „These instructions, after indicating the date (the day and the month; no year is mentioned), say, »give (to) PN bread, number so and so.« ... twenty-eight dockets of the same formula" (52). Hier einige besser erhaltene Beispiele:
561: (1) [*b*] *10+4 lʾdr kl* [*jwm*? *3*?] *hb lsjmw* (2) *bn̊j̊ m*[*n* ...] *lḥm ʿš̊r̊j̊n wšt* – (1) „Am 14. Adar, jeden [dritten? Tag?], gib Simo, (2) dem Erbauer? von ..., Brot:

sechsundzwanzig!" – Alternativlesung: (2) *b 2x100 m*[*ʿh*] usw. – (2) „für 200 O[boli] ..."

571: (1) *b 2 sjwn lḥm* (2) *mʾh wḥmšjn* (3) *wḥmš* – (1) „Am 2. Siwan: Brot, (2/3) hundertfünfundfünfzig!"

574: (1) *b 10+2 ldr 2* (2) *ḥb ljrḥmjḥ lḥm* (3) [...] *8* – (1) „On the 12th of Adar the 2nd (?) (2) give Yeraḥemyah bread (3) [+]8"(56).

577: (1) *b 10+3 lʾb* (2) *lbr lwj lḥm* (3) [*1x*] *lp* (+) *20 nqj* – (1) „Am 13. Ab: (2) für den Sohn des Levi Brot, (3) 1020, weiß?!" (oder: „quittiere!" [lies: *ktb*]?)

„Amounts": Unter den 21 „amounts" finden sich zwei mehrzeilige Auflistungen:

585: (1) *ʾrbʿ ʾmwt* (2) *wṭpḥjm* (3) *wštj ʾmwt* (4) *wṭpḥjm* – (1) „vier Ellen (2) und zwei Handbreit (3) und zwei Ellen (4) und zwei Handbreit".

605: (1) *„1357* (2) *47* (3) *14* (4) *1180"*. Bemerkenswert ist die Schreibung der „1000" mit *p* statt *lp*! Als Beispiel für die kurzen Notizen vgl. etwa # 599: *r 10+1 m 3* („11 Drachmen, 3 Oboli").

Writing exercises and scribbles: Unter den 36 Ostraka finden sich zwei fragmentarische ABCs, ein (oder zwei?) Fragment(e) einer bekannten, als Schreibübung benutzten Namensliste (vgl. RB 87, 1980, 118-26), ferner: # 611: (1) *ʾsrṭj*[*n*] (2) *ʾsrṭjn* – („[römische] Soldaten" oder „Bande", < στρατός?). # 614: [...]*jlʾ ktb*[*h*] (erinnert an Unterschriften der amtlichen Dokumente von Wadi Murabbaʿat und Naḥal Ḥever).

Varia, darunter unleserliche, unverständliche (Schreibfehler?) und nicht-klassifizierbare Texte, solche in syr. oder palmyr. Schriftstil sowie eine mögliche Fälschung (Fundumstände und Paläographie höchst verdächtig). # 642: *pjlk*[*h*] („spinning"[65] – ein Gefäß zur Aufnahme des Rohmaterials bzw. des Garns). # 643: *tmwtw* („Ihr werdet / sollt sterben!"). # 644: *hmnwḥ* („Rastplatz" o.ä.). # 668: (1) *lʾbnjʾ* (2) *br ṣwnmjn* (3) ... – („[belonging] to the »Stones«, son of »Rocks«"?) # 670: *ntwqʾ* (?).

Dem Band sind sehr gute Fotographien beigegeben.

13. O. Yogev u.a., Tel Yizreʿel 1987/88 (Excavations and Surveys in Israel 7-8, 1988/89, 189-195, hier 192f.).

Nahe einer Zisterne wurde der mit einem Stempel versehene Griff eines Kruges gefunden. Der Stempel besteht aus zwei mit Flügeln versehenen Sonnenscheiben und der paläohebräischen Inschrift *mlk m*[*šṭ*]. „The presence of this rare find at the northern site of Yizreʿel can perhaps be explained as the result either of payment of tribute to an Assyrian garrison in the late 8th century BCE, or of trade in food surpluses by the king of Judah after the threat of the Assyrian siege of Jerusalem had been lifted in the early 7th century BCE" (193).

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Register zu Artikeln und Miszellen

bearbeitet von Frank Zeeb

Die Aufnahme von Stichwörtern erfolgt in den Originalsprachen der jeweiligen Beiträge und richtet sich weitgehend nach den Wünschen der Autoren.

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Kohlhammer

Mensch – Umwelt – Eigenwelt

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Hans-Peter Müller
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