

# Artikel

## Words for Wisdom

תושיה and עצה; מזמה and ערמה; בינה and תבונה

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### 1. Introduction

Biblical Wisdom Literature employs a large vocabulary to designate the cognitive powers and actions it describes and inculcates, to which we may give the umbrella term wisdom. The general denotations of most of these terms are clear, and I do not intend to propose fundamentally new definitions. But to do the sages justice, we must attempt to calibrate more finely the definitions of the words in the semantic field so important to them. The terms studied here are typical of Wisdom Literature and occur with disproportionate frequency in Wisdom texts, but most are frequent in other genres as well. I will approach these terms by pairing near-synonyms to highlight the semantic shape of each, leaving for a later study the broad and central concepts designated *hokmah* and *da'at*, as well as a few minor terms. I consider and count the uses in the extant Hebrew of Ben Sira alongside the MT and include the few Biblical Aramaic occurrences, which conform entirely to their Hebrew cognates.

Gerhard von Rad doubted the value of a "Begriffsuntersuchung" of these words, in view of the fact that "Israel auch in seinen theoretischen Reflexionen keineswegs mit einem einigermassen präzisen Begriffsapparat arbeitet".<sup>2</sup> But to judge biblical

<sup>1</sup> The following commentaries are referenced by name of author alone or with abbreviated title:

Peter Craigie, *Psalms 1-50* (WBC), Waco, Tex., 1983.

Edward L. Curtis, *Chronicles* (ICC), Edinburgh, 1910.

Edouard Dhorme, *Job*, Nashville, Tenn., 1984 (orig. 1926).

S.R. Driver, and G.B. Gray, *Job* (ICC), Edinburgh, 1921.

Berend Gemser, *Sprüche Salomos* (HAT I, 16), 2nd edn. Tübingen, 1963.

Robert Gordis, *The Book of Job*, New York, 1978.

Norman Habel, *The Book of Job* (OTL), Philadelphia, 1985.

L.F. Hartman and A.A. DiLella, *The Book of Daniel* (AB), 1978.

William McKane, *Proverbs* (OTL), London, 1970.

W.O.E. Oesterley, *The Book of Proverbs* (WC), London, 1929.

Otto Plöger, *Sprüche Salomos* (BK XVII), Neukirchen, 1984.

Marvin Pope, *Job* (AB 15), Garden City, N.Y., 1973.

Helmer Ringgren, *Sprüche* (ATD 16), Göttingen, 1962.

M. H. Segal, *The Complete Book of Ben Sira* [Hebrew], Jerusalem, 1958.

C.H. Toy, *Proverbs* (ICC), 1959, Edinburgh, 1899.

N.H. Tur-Sinai, *The Book of Job*, Jerusalem, 1967.

N.H. Tur-Sinai, *Proverbs of Solomon* [Hebrew], Tel Aviv, 1947.

John D. W. Watts, *Isaiah 1-33* (WBC 24), Waco, Texas, 1985.

<sup>2</sup> Gerhard von Rad, *Weisheit in Israel*, Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1979, 25.

Hebrew vocabulary imprecise is to assume that reality is segmented into neat compartments and that "we" have a map of the territory against which we can gauge how precisely another language fits into them. In fact, neither biblical Hebrew nor modern languages have a "präzisen Begriffsapparat" in such matters, if by precision we mean that each term has a discrete and invariant semantic range. The boundaries between such terms are necessarily vague, and in many cases two or more of them could fit the context quite well. English "understanding", for example, is different from "wisdom" (it is possible to have *understanding* of an issue but lack the *wisdom* to use that understanding rightly), yet in a great many circumstances either word fits. Similarly, we should not expect to find two discrete types of intellection called *binah* and *ṭ<sup>e</sup>binah*. The goal is to discover why a certain word was chosen for a specific context, but it is dogmatic to think that only one word in the semantic field could have served. Nevertheless, patterns of use show that each term has its own slant, tone, or focus, and these can be recovered only by exegesis. In the absence of living informants, the recovery must inevitably be partial and uncertain.

The working principle of this study is the "presumption of monosemy", as formulated by Charles Ruhl, according to which an analysis of lexical meaning should start with the assumption that each word has a single, highly abstract, core meaning that it brings to the context; hence "what appears to be a number of separate senses, possibly highly different and unrelatable, can better be analyzed as a single general lexical meaning that can be variously 'modulated' by a range of specific interpretations".<sup>3</sup>

*The heuristic principle of monosemy by no means denies the existence or importance of polysemy.* It does, however, hold that if we admit multiple meanings too quickly, we will not advance beyond a paraphrasing of contextual functions and will learn nothing about what the word contributes to new contexts. True polysemy should be conceded only when the different contextual senses prove discontinuous and incompatible, and then unity should be sought within each different meaning granted. For example, "vision" and "mirror" are discrete meanings of *mar'ah* (such cases could also be described as different homonymous words). Within the first category, however, we should not distinguish "prophetic vision" and "dream" as different lexical meanings, as if Hebrew speakers understood these as distinct phenomena which happened to be designated by the same sound.

In sum, rather than viewing a word as bearing a multiple-choice listing of different meanings, it is more productive to view a word – until proved otherwise – as offering a single, flexible "packet" of meaning (= lexical meaning) that assumes different shapes ("senses") under pressure of context (= contextual meanings or applications).

I am attempting to ascertain what meaning an author could expect his readers to bring to context. This meaning, being prior to the sentence and not equivalent to its message, must be abstracted from the actual uses of the words in question. To find this meaning does *not* require finding a single English word that satisfactorily

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<sup>3</sup> Charles Ruhl, *On Monosemy*, Albany, N.Y., 1989, 7 and *passim*.

renders the Hebrew in all contexts; there are usually several appropriate glosses, none of which covers exactly the same semantic territory.

A semantic study has to be alert to the possibility of historical shifts in meaning. In BH, this can be done only approximately, since many words – even some important ones – are attested only skimpily and much of the material is undatable; this is especially true of proverbial wisdom. As far as I can tell, however, within the biblical material (including Ben Sira) there are no important shifts in the uses of the terms studied here. In the case of *binah*, however, one notable use in Daniel is not attested in earlier texts.

The applications of wisdom-terms fall into three categories: faculties, activities, and knowledge. A *faculty* is a power to undertake various types of mental actions; it exists prior to them and is present even when not being used. A *mental activity* is the thinking itself, the exercise of the mind during a definite period of time. *Knowledge* – the communicable content of thoughts and ideas – is the product of mental activity. In the case of the words under study, I do not regard these applications as separate meanings, or even as separate compartments within a single meaning, but as three possible realizations of a single meaning.

## 2. *Binah* and *t<sup>c</sup>binah*

The first difficulty presented by *binah* and *t<sup>c</sup>binah* is to determine how they differ from each other. Absolute synonymy in any language is a rarity and it is fair to assume these words were not completely interchangeable. The LXX translators, however, treated them as such. The most common renderings of both are φρόνησις and σύνεσις, with a few other terms occasionally used for either. As far as I can tell, the particular choice of Greek rendering for a term is not determined either by the translation unit or by its function in context (note how *binah* is rendered ἐπιστήμη in Job 28:12 and σύνεσις in the identical sentence in v. 20).

*Binah* (40x Heb., 1x Aram.) is a qal inf. of *√byn*, "perceive", though its sense seems closer to that of the hiphil, "to understand" (*binah* never means visual perception). *T<sup>c</sup>binah* (44x Heb.) is a *taqtul* formation characteristic of hollow verbs and related to the sense of both the qal and hiphil.<sup>4</sup>

Some significant differences in syntactic usages are that one is said to do things (form heavens, defeat an enemy, make wealth, lead dependents) "in" or "by" (*b-*) *t<sup>c</sup>binah*, but not "in" or "by" *binah*. *Binah* is not a *means* of activity. Moreover, people are said to "know *binah*" but not "know *t<sup>c</sup>binah*".

As an infinitive formation, *binah* bears whatever transitivity the verb has. Nouns of the *taqtul* pattern are implicitly intransitive.<sup>5</sup> Thus there can be "semantic objects" of *binah* (for example, one can have *binah* of a language, a dream or a situation), while *t<sup>c</sup>binah* never refers to an action that, as a verb, might govern a direct object (thus, for example, though a man of *t<sup>c</sup>binah* can fathom someone's plans [Prov 20:5], the knowledge of those plans is not *t<sup>c</sup>binah*). One may have *t<sup>c</sup>binah* and do things in *t<sup>c</sup>binah*, but *t<sup>c</sup>binah* is not an action done *to* something. *Binah* too is a

<sup>4</sup> H. Bauer and P. Leander, *Historische Grammatik der Hebräischen Sprache des ATs*, Bd. I. 1922 (repr. 1962, Hildesheim), §61r7.

<sup>5</sup> An exception is *t<sup>c</sup>rupah*, "healing", which suggests transitivity.

faculty continuously resident in its possessor, but it may also be an mental act or exercise of a mental power upon an object.

There is no evident semantic distinction between the singular and the plural forms. The plural *binot* occurs once, in Isa 27:11, where no notion of plurality is relevant ("for it [Israel] is not a people of *binot*"). The plural *t<sup>c</sup>bunot* is clearly abstract in Ps 78:72, "and by the *t<sup>c</sup>bunot* of his hands he led them", and it seems to be abstract in other occurrences as well (Ps 49:4; Prov 11:12; 28:16; Job 32:11). The lack of a distinction between plural and singular is seen in the fact that *ḥāsar leb* is paralleled by both *ʔiš t<sup>c</sup>bunot* (Prov 11:12) and *ʔiš t<sup>c</sup>bunah* (Prov 15:21). The plural *t<sup>c</sup>bunot* seems to denote a plurality of sayings in Ps 49:4 and Job 32:11 (// *d<sup>c</sup>barim*), but since the singular too can in effect refer to a series of sayings, as in Prov 5:1, the plural is not differentiated from the singular in that way either.

The distinction between *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* and *binah* is essentially this: *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* designates the pragmatic, applied aspect of thought operating in the field of action; it aims at efficacy and accomplishment. *Binah* is the conceptual, interpretive activity of thought, operating in the field of meaning; it aims at perception and comprehension.

### 2.1. *T<sup>c</sup>bunah*

The table at the end of the article notes words that appear in collocation with the wisdom terms, whether in parallelism, antithesis, quasi-parallelism,<sup>6</sup> or synonym sequence. In the body of the article I mention only the data that help define the words in question.

One significant cluster of collocations with *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* that is not shared by *binah* includes *ʕeṣah* (Isa 40:13-14; Job 12:13; Prov 21:30),<sup>7</sup> *m<sup>c</sup>zimmah* (Prov 2:11), *koah* (Job 26:12) and *g<sup>c</sup>burah* (Job 12:13). These are concerned with power and planning for action and point to the practical orientation of *t<sup>c</sup>bunah*. *T<sup>c</sup>bunah*, together with *ḥokmah* and *ʕeṣah* in Prov 21:30, designates powers or plans that might be used *against* someone (though against the Lord, of course, they prove nugatory). *Binah*, by my understanding, does not have that kind of directedness; one would not say that there is (or is not) *binah* "against" the Lord, just as we would not naturally use English "perceptiveness" or "discernment" in that way.

*T<sup>c</sup>bunah* and *binah* parallel each other only once, in Prov 2:3, where they are both epithets of wisdom. This verse does not prove that the terms are identical, since they may designate different aspects of Lady Wisdom.

#### 2.1.1. *T<sup>c</sup>bunah* as a faculty (know-how, competence, good sense)

As a faculty, *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* produces decisions and actions appropriate to the circumstances. It is the competence to deal with circumstances, and it generally implies a follow-up, or at least the possibility of a follow-up, in action. *T<sup>c</sup>bunah* always refers to a practical astuteness or common sense, rather than to an analytical, conceptual exercise of intellect. It is also the knowledge produced by this faculty. *T<sup>c</sup>bunah* does not imply an understanding of causes, significances, and implications. In short, *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* is know-how, whether in the execution of a particular

<sup>6</sup> Quasi-parallelism refers to words that provide similar semantic content to a parallel line but fill a different syntactic function.

<sup>7</sup> In Prov 8:14, personified *binah* says that she *has*, not that she *is*, *ʕeṣah*, *tuṣiyyah*, and *g<sup>c</sup>burah*. The point is that intellectual penetration also supplies practical powers.

task or in social relations generally. English "know-how" may be the closest equivalent of *t<sup>c</sup>bunah*. Sometimes "wit" and "common sense" are the best glosses.

As a faculty, *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* designates a talent from which effective actions spring. God's *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* served him in creating the world (Jer 10:12; 51:15; Ps 136:5; Prov 3:19). (Significantly, *binah* is never said to be the instrument of these deeds.) When God created the world, no one showed him *derek t<sup>c</sup>bunot*, "the way of competence"; in other words, no one had to show God how to do about his work (Isa 40:14). Isaiah 40:28 uses *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* in speaking of God's *abilities* as governor of history: he who was able to create the world "does not tire and does not weary, and his *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* is beyond investigation". Having great *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* is here opposed to weariness rather than to ignorance or lack of understanding. *T<sup>c</sup>bunah* is among the powers God employs in building and healing, in counting and naming the stars (Ps 147:4-5), in defeating Rahab (Job 26:12), and in various acts of decisive power which no man can undo (Job 12:13, alongside *ḥokmah*, *ʿeṣah*, and *t<sup>c</sup>bunah*).

Occupational skills are *t<sup>c</sup>bunah*. A skilled shepherd (Ps 78:72), merchant (Ezek 28:4), and craftsman have *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* (e.g., Exod 31:3; 35:31; 1 Kgs 7:14). (However, since the craftsman also has *binah* (as well as *ḥokmah* and *daʿat*), we cannot be sure exactly just which aspect of his skills is designated by this term; see below, § 2.2.1.2). The amoral skills of political advisors include *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* (Ob 8).<sup>8</sup>

*T<sup>c</sup>bunah* is *phronesis* in Aristotle's usage: "a reasoned and true capacity to act with regard to human goods" (Nic. Eth. VI.5). In Isa 44:19, *daʿat* and *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* are the qualities the idol maker lacks; if he had them he could draw the obvious conclusion that the statues are inanimate. Perhaps *binah* too could have been used here to designate reasoning powers, but by using *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* the author may be suggesting that the stupidity of idolatry is evident even to ordinary good sense (φρόνησις, as *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* is appropriately rendered here), let alone to intellectual penetration.

In Proverbs, the "man of *t<sup>c</sup>bunah*" is competent in human relations; he is patient (14:29; 17:27), quiet (11:12) and reserved (18:2). He draws out other people's thoughts (20:5). He walks the straight path (15:21) and enjoys acting wisely. These virtues are in the realm of attitudes and social skills rather than intellectual penetration and comprehension. One person could, of course, have both, but the term *ʿiṣ t<sup>c</sup>bunah* signifies a particular facet of character. Let me emphasize: all these qualities should not be packed into our definition of *t<sup>c</sup>bunah*. Rather, *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* means "competent", and the sages are teaching us what true competence consists in. Lady Wisdom, who personifies the powers of wisdom taught by Proverbs, is called *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* as well as *binah* and *ḥokmah* in Prov 8:1. She is a personification of the faculty rather than (as happens in Ben Sira) of specific teachings.

Outside Proverbs and Sira,<sup>9</sup> *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* never implies moral virtue. It is only the sages who assert that *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* makes one a better person ethically.

<sup>8</sup> A significant verse in spite of its obscurity is Ob 7, where a *thing*, a *mazor*, is said to lack *t<sup>c</sup>bunah*. The most likely meaning of *mazor* is "trap" (KBL<sup>3</sup> and many; some emend to *mṣwd*). The competence of a fabricator of a product is ascribed to the product, or, in this particular case, denied. The only kind of "understanding" that can be commuted from a maker to the product is practical competence.

<sup>9</sup> And possibly Deut 32:28, where, however the people's lack of *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* may mean just that they are silly-headed and confused, – *ʿobad ʿeṣot*, as they are called there.

### 2.1.2. *T<sup>c</sup>bunah* as content (sensible teachings)

Words and teachings engendered by *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* are themselves *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* or *t<sup>c</sup>bunot*, as in Job 32:11, "I listened for your *t<sup>c</sup>bunot*". The teachings of Proverbs 1-9 are called, among other things, *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* (Prov 2:2, 6; 5:1; cf. Ps 49:4). The Wisdom teacher ascribes all types of intellectual powers to his teaching and thus makes it difficult to differentiate among them. Ben Sira calls personified wisdom *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* as well as *ḥokmah* (14:20). In 14:20-15:10, Ben Sira treats Lady Wisdom as a personification of wisdom *teachings* and identifies her with Torah, which can be mediated on and contemplated (v. 20). In both Proverbs and Ben Sira, the type of teachings designated *t<sup>c</sup>bunah* cannot be distinguished from those called *binah*, *ḥokmah*, or *da<sup>c</sup>at*, since all these terms are applied to the same material.

### 2.2. *Binah*

#### 2.2.1. Uses of *binah*

*Binah* is the faculty of intellectual discernment and interpretation, the exercise of that faculty, or the product thereof, in words or acts. It is intellectual understanding in and of itself. This is not to say that *binah* is *not* practical; rather, the term is not marked for practicality.

*Binah* is the BH term closest to English "understanding" (the usual rendering), in the sense of the comprehension of meanings and a perception of causes. *Binah* includes reason, the intellectual faculty used in solving problems and deducing truths. The raw faculty of *binah*, insofar as it is possessed by an individual independently of application, is similar to the modern concept of intelligence. ("Understanding", "reason", and "intelligence" are not well distinguished even in English, and an attempt to define and describe such concepts would quickly lead into the labyrinths of epistemology and psychology). In Hebrew these faculties and their products are encompassed in *binah* as a single concept. *Binah* is an intellectual, not an inherently moral virtue, although the sages assert that it almost inevitably engenders moral action.

Of the various collocations of *binah*, only the broad terms *ḥokmah* and *ḥakam* (*ḥakim*) are shared with *t<sup>c</sup>bunah*. The unshared collocations of *binah* (*śekel*, *leqah*, *šamoa<sup>c</sup>*, *musar*) cluster around the notion of intellectual understanding more than practical behavior.

#### 2.2.1.1. *Binah* as a faculty (reason, intelligence)

*Binah* resides within a person and enables understanding and mental perception. God favored Solomon with *binah* (as well as *ḥokmah* and *śekel*) to enable him to conduct Israel's affairs wisely (1 Chr 22:12). *Binah* is one of several faculties (as *ruaḥ* is frequently best translated) that the ideal ruler will receive, including *binah*, *esah*, *g<sup>c</sup>burah*, *da<sup>c</sup>at*, and *yir<sup>a</sup>at* YHWH (Isa 11:2). The nouns in the series are not synonymous, but designate several aspects of the ideal.<sup>10</sup> *Binah* here is presumably the same faculty with which Solomon was endowed.

The *binah* that God gave the obscure *śekwi* (whether it means "cock" or "Mercury") (Job 38:36) and that the ostrich (Job 39:17) and Rehoboam (Sir 47:23) lack is certainly intelligence rather than particular knowledge or skill. Zophar's *binah* - "...

<sup>10</sup> Hence the presence of *g<sup>c</sup>burah* among these qualities does not contradict the observation above about the collocations of *binah*.

and a spirit from my *binah* answers me" (Job 20:3b) – is the source of the teaching that he expounds in subsequent verses. Prov 3:5 warns against relying on one's own *binah*, which must be the reasoning power or intelligence that engenders plans ( *ʿešot*).<sup>11</sup>

The *ḥokmah* of the *ḥākamim* and the *binah* of the *n<sup>c</sup>bonim* (both groups refer to either to political advisors or, more generally, to the intelligentsia) will, Isaiah threatens, be obfuscated (29:14). These are intellectual powers of genuine value, for their deprivation is a punishment to the entire people, comparable to the blinding of the prophets threatened in v. 10. This *binah* is not the specific plan or interpretations the wise men offer, but rather their intellect itself, a faculty comparable to the vision ("eyes") of the prophets (v. 10).

*Binah* is the ability to interpret, i.e. to decode signs; these may be in the form of events, language, or texts. Isaiah 27:11 condemns Israel for not being "an intelligent people ( *ʿam binot*)". The failure in this case is not a loss of practical good sense, but a willful inability to comprehend the meaning of events. Isaiah has been condemning the people for this dullness from the beginning of the book (1:3), using the figures of blindness and deafness,<sup>12</sup> for he regards the exercise of intellect (*binah*, *ḥokmah*) as a moral demand. A similar use is Jer 23:20, where Jeremiah says that "in the future you will understand it [God's plan] well", lit., "understand it with *binah* (*titbon<sup>c</sup>nu bah binah*)". Through *binah* Israel will know how to read the meaning in events. *Binah* refers to a similar interpretive intelligence in Sir 38:6; people who use it are able to recognize God's power in events such as the sweetening of the waters of Marah and in the provision of pharmaceutical plants. *Binah* is used of the ability to understand a language: "a people... whose tongue is barbarous (*ni<sup>c</sup>ag*) beyond understanding ( *ʿeyn binah*)" (Isa 33:19). (One would not say that there is no *t<sup>c</sup>binah* of a language, for *t<sup>c</sup>binah* is not the ability to decode signs.) *Binah* is not used of social skills, such as reserve and patience.

#### 2.2.1.2. *Binah* as content (teaching, understanding)

Knowledge produced by *binah*, whether one's own or another's, is itself *binah*. A proverb can convey *binah*; hence Ben Sira speaks of a *mašal binah* (6:35). *Binah* in this sense is sometimes the object of *yada<sup>c</sup>*, "know", and *lamad*, "learn". When the erring Israelites one day see their children in their midst, they will "know *binah*" and "learn a lesson (*leqah*)" (Isa 29:24). These are the particular conclusions that the people will draw from observing the unfolding of God's will. *Binah* here is knowledge that corresponds very closely to the interpretive faculty indicated in Jer 23:20. Although this understanding will certainly affect behavior, the knowledge the Judahites will have according to Isa 29:24 is not intrinsically aimed at action; it is an

<sup>11</sup> That is the sense of *binah* in Prov 23:4, according to the usual interpretation: "don't strain to become rich, "from your intelligence, avoid doing so" (*mibbinat<sup>c</sup>ka ḥḏal*). *Binah* then refers to "intellectual discrimination" (McKane, p. 382). But *ḥadal min* + inf. elsewhere means to desist from or not do something (Exod 23:5; 1 Kgs 15:21). Hence the inf. *binah* here is probably a gerund from the qal of *ʾbyn* used in the same way as in v. 1: "look at", "stare at", with the implicit direct object "wealth" supplied from v. 4a (v. 5 shows that this implicit direct object has indeed been activated).

<sup>12</sup> As observed by Watts, Isaiah 1-33, 1985, 347, 350.

understanding of something that has already occurred, not the knowledge of how to do something.

1 Chr 12:33, which refers to the Issacharites "who have [lit., know] *binah* with respect to the times (*yod<sup>c</sup>ey binah la<sup>c</sup>ittim*), to know what Israel should do". (Compare the idiom *yada<sup>c</sup> binah* in Isa 29:24; Job 38:4; and 2 Chr 2:11, 12.) It is uncertain just what domain of knowledge is meant. Astrology is one possibility,<sup>13</sup> though it seems unlikely that the author of Chronicles would approve of astrologers or imagine the tribe of Issachar as having two hundred of them. A similar phrase is used in Esther 1:13, in which "the wise men who understand the times (*yod<sup>c</sup>ey ha<sup>c</sup>ittim*)" employ reason (though of a foolish sort) rather than astrology to analyze the needs of the "times", i.e., the present circumstances. The Issacharites' *binah* is probably of the same sort.

In Job 38:4, God asks Job, "Where were you when I founded the earth? Tell [sc., me the answers to the following questions], if you have [lit. know] *binah*". Here *binah* is an intellectual understanding of the origins and operations of the world; it is not know-how or skill.

Job 28 attempts to redefine the scope of the concepts *ḥokmah* and *binah*, and in so doing reveals their meaning prior to redefinition. The poem appends *binah* to *ḥokmah* and treats the two as a single entity, asking rhetorically, "But wisdom – where does it come from, and where is the place of *binah*?" (vv. 12, 20). The poem's answer is that it (*ḥokmah-binah*) cannot be located; God alone knows where it is. The poem must be using *ḥokmah* and *binah* with reference to speculative, intellectual knowledge about the world, for only that (and not practical good sense) is what is inaccessible to human investigation, and it is a set of truths – known only to God – rather than a faculty or a mental activity, for those are not objects of *searching*. At the end of the poem, true human wisdom is redefined thus: "See, the fear of the Lord, *that* is wisdom, and the avoidance of evil is understanding" (v. 28). To claim that human "wisdom" and "understanding" are *really* something other than speculative knowledge, v. 28 must first be using the words to designate the speculative knowledge repudiated in the preceding verses, and then be shifting their application to wisdom of a different sort. *Binah* is again used alongside *ḥokmah* in a very similar redefinition of wisdom in Prov 9:10: "The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord, and knowledge of holiness is *binah*". This is not a flat identification of a meaning built into the language, a dictionary definition of the terms, as it were. It is, rather, an insistence that *real* wisdom resides in religious attitudes of which everyone is capable: fear of God and "knowledge of holiness". The latter is not theological learning, but, like "knowledge of God", essentially refers to awareness of God's will and recognition of his power.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> E.g., Curtis (Chronicles), Targum, and many. But there is little argumentation offered on behalf of this view.

<sup>14</sup> *Q<sup>c</sup>došim* refers to God, as in Hos 12:1; thus most commentators, e.g. Toy. (Elsewhere *q<sup>c</sup>došim* as a noun refers to Israelites or angels, but a knowledge of neither of these is relevant to wisdom or religion.) Hence *da<sup>c</sup>at q<sup>c</sup>došim* is equivalent to *da<sup>c</sup>at ʾēlohim*; compare Prov 9:10 with 2:5). Knowledge of God is an awareness of his will, an ethical-religious attitude (Hos 4:1; 6:6). It is equivalent to knowledge of God's ways (see Job 21:14, etc.). Within the extensive literature on the topic see in particular H. Botterweck in TDOT V, 477-78 (ThWAT).



Agur (Prov 30:2-3) makes the distinction between the two kinds of wisdom more radical when he modestly grants that he does not have even human (let alone angelic) *binah* and that he has not learnt *ḥokmah*, but asserts that he *does* have "knowledge of holiness".<sup>15</sup> The wisdom Agur disclaims is something usually *studied* or *learned*, which must be something comparable to "theology" – a knowledge of doctrines and theories derived from human investigation and speculation. The implication is that other men do have this *binah-ḥokmah*, but that it is not the most important sort of wisdom (hence this passage is less skeptical than Job 28). A proper religious attitude and knowledge of religious fundamentals is possible without wisdom of that sort. By my understanding of the words, Agur might have claimed that he lacked *binah* but did possess *t<sup>c</sup>binah*.

In Daniel, *binah* refers to a special kind of knowledge, namely interpretation of esoteric messages. Daniel and his fellows have the ability to respond to queries in "every matter of *ḥokmat binah*", lit., "the "wisdom of understanding", that the king asked of them (1:20).<sup>16</sup> Judging from what the kings ask of Daniel, this refers in practice to dream interpretation. The phrase "wisdom of *binah*" could be rendered "learning in interpretation". In other occurrences, *binah* is not a faculty or activity, but a particular interpretation. Daniel never achieves this *binah* by means of his reasoning powers, but has it granted to him as a reward for faithfulness and prayer. He prays for *binah* of a vision (Dan 8:15) and receives the explication by supernatural communication from Gabriel. Likewise in 9:22 and 10:1,<sup>17</sup> *binah* is an interpretation of a particular revelation. *Binah* is something which the wise may *know*, if God grants them knowledge (2:12; 21).

Almost all occurrences of *binah* accord with the proposed definition, but we should also consider a couple of verses that seem to run against it. In Job 39:26, God asks Job, "Is it from your intelligence" (*mibbinat<sup>c</sup>ka*) that a hawk takes wing...?". *Binah* is here used in the act of creation, much like *t<sup>c</sup>binah* is elsewhere, but I do not think the two are identical. I suggest that whereas *t<sup>c</sup>binah* would designate the skill that went into the production of flying creatures, *binah* points more to the intellectual

<sup>15</sup> Prov 30:3b is, of course, a crux, but the meaning of *binah* in v. 2 does not depend on its meaning. By one common interpretation, the negative applies to v. 3b as well (e.g., Toy, McKane; hence Agur is saying that he does *not* have "knowledge of God". It is, however, doubtful that the negative can be elided in an otherwise complete sentence. Others take v. 3b as a purpose clause dependent on *lamadti*: "so that I might know knowledge of holiness [or 'God']" (Ringgren, Plöger), which also implies that he *lacks* this knowledge. Most commentators do not distinguish *binah*//*ḥokmah* from *da<sup>c</sup>at q<sup>c</sup>došim* and assume that the latter is a theological understanding of divinity. However, "knowledge of God" is never esoteric or particularly cerebral anywhere in the Bible. Most likely, vv. 5-6 allude to the "knowledge of God" that Agur claims he does have: the knowledge that comes from God's word.

<sup>16</sup> Alternatively, *ḥokmat binah* may be a construct of synonyms, equivalent to *ḥokmah ubinah* (see Y. Avishur, *Stylistic Studies of Word-Pairs* (AOAT 210), Neukirchen, 1984, 160); the LXX and Theodotion translate that way.

<sup>17</sup> The end of 10:1 is difficult. A plausible translation is "... He paid attention to the oracle (*ubin<sup>c</sup>et haddabar*), so that he understood the revelation" (*ubinah lo bammar<sup>c</sup>eh*) (Hartman-DiLella). The preceding clause "the oracle was true" (*we<sup>c</sup>emet haddabar*), shows that the last clause refers to Daniel's understanding of this specific revelation rather than to a general interpretive ability.

powers behind the production of such marvels. *Binah* is the word chosen because at issue is the scope of Job's ability to understand how God creates and runs the world, and understanding of that sort could only be called *binah*, not *t<sup>e</sup>bunah*. God sets his own *binah* against Job's. Also *binah* harks back to *binah* in God's challenge in 38:4. A similar notion of creative understanding lies behind 2 Chr 2:12, in which a Tyrian artisan is said to be a wise man who "knows *binah*". *T<sup>e</sup>bunah* is more often used in describing the artist's skills. Nowhere, however, is an artisan said to "know" *t<sup>e</sup>bunah*, a fact indicating distinction between an artisan's *t<sup>e</sup>bunah*, which is a means of production (see above, § 2.1.1), and his *binah*, the body of learned, intellectual knowledge of artistry.<sup>18</sup>

### 2.3. *Binah* and *t<sup>e</sup>bunah* in relation to *ḥokmah*

Assuming that the 44 occurrences of *t<sup>e</sup>bunah* represent the range of its use in the language as a whole, it appears that *t<sup>e</sup>bunah* is a hyponym of *ḥokmah*: everything that could be called *t<sup>e</sup>bunah* could be called *ḥokmah* as well. *Binah*, however, though in most regards encompassed by *ḥokmah*, sometimes refers to mental ability and activity in a way that would not be called *ḥokmah*. *Binah* is understanding per se. *Ḥokmah* is the broader mental capacity that makes understanding possible, as well as the knowledge that understanding produces, but it is not the understanding itself. The understanding of a particular foreign language would not be called *ḥokmah*, nor would the interpretation of a particular book or dream be so designated (using a phrase such as *\*ḥokmat haḥazon* or *\*ḥokmah bammar<sup>2</sup>eh*, meaning the understanding of a specific vision). The understanding of a particular divine plan is *binah* (Jer 23:20), not *ḥokmah*. On the other hand, the art and lore of interpretation could be called *ḥokmah*, which is a more general, constant quality that exists independently of individual minds. (The phrase in Dan 1:20, *ḥokmat binah*, suggests this). In other words, both as faculty and result, *binah* is directed to specific objects in a way that *ḥokmah* is not.

The fact that *ḥokmah* covers a broader range than *t<sup>e</sup>bunah* and is less focused than *binah* explains why *ḥokmah* is always the A-word when parallel to either of the others. The more common and prominent term is set in the A-slot; the B-term in this case does not provide heightening so much as greater specificity.<sup>19</sup>

### 3. *ʿormah* and *m<sup>e</sup>zimmah*

*ʿormah* (6x) and *m<sup>e</sup>zimmah* (19x) are morally neutral intellectual faculties and thoughts. This neutrality adds a certain pungency to some proverbs which is made insipid by moralizing renderings, such as glossing *ʿormah* as "prudence" (NIV) or *m<sup>e</sup>zimmah* as "discretion" (KJ; NIV) or "prudence" (NIV). *ʿormah* is the talent for devising and using adroit and wily tactics in the attaining of one's goals, whatever these may be. *M<sup>e</sup>zimmah* is a type of thought and a faculty for such thought, namely private, unrevealed thought; only in Proverbs (1:4; 2:11) does it refer to the mental faculty or skill employed in devising such thoughts.

<sup>18</sup> Aristotle draws a similar distinction by bracketing the artist's wisdom together with the philosopher's as *sophia* and distinguishing these from practical wisdom, *phronesis* (Nic. Eth. VI.7).

<sup>19</sup> Adele Berlin, *The Dynamics of Biblical Parallelism*, Bloomington, Indiana, 1985, 96-99.

### 3.1. *ʿormah* (cunning, wiliness)

Outside of Proverbs, all occurrences of *ʿormah* and its cognate forms refer to the employment of artifices to achieve ends that cannot be declared openly, such as in the schemes of the serpent (Gen 3:1), the first-degree homicide (Exod 21:14), the Gibeonites (Josh 9:4), and the wicked wise men (Job 5:13). The verb *heʿirim*, to act cunningly, refers to malicious schemes in Ps 83:4 and tricks in 1 Sam 23:22.

In Proverbs alone are the noun and verb used of cunning put to legitimate uses. Here, *ʿormah* is not only native cunning, but also the skill that an inexperienced lad lacks and must acquire (1:4; 8:5). A silly-headed innocent who sees a scoffer beaten and one who heeds chastisement will wise up – *yaʿirim* (19:25; 15:5; sim. Sir 6:32). Lady Wisdom herself legitimizes *ʿormah* when she boasts of proximity to it (8:12). This does not make *ʿormah* an intrinsically virtuous ability; rather it is a practical faculty that wisdom promises its adherents.

*ʿormah* never is determined by the article or suffixes, nor does it occur in construct. The significance of this is unclear, but we may note that we do not usually say "the cleverness" in English without adding a possessive. However, the suffixed form *ʿormam*, from the apparently synonymous \**ʿorem*, does occur (Job 5:13).<sup>20</sup>

### 3.2. *mʿzimmah* (private thoughts, caginess)

The notion common to derivatives of *ʾzmm* is that of hidden, private thinking. The verb refers not only to illegitimate intentions, but also to God's just and beneficial designs (e.g., Jer 23:20; 51:11; Lam 2:17; Zech 8:14, 15) and to legitimate human planning (Ps 17:3; Prov 31:16; Sir 51:18<sup>21</sup>). The noun accords with this range of use. The notion of scheming (the meaning usually given in the lexicons) is a contextually determined extension of the primary sense of *mʿzimmot*, namely, hidden thoughts. Though another person's *mʿzimmot* may be known or deduced, one is never said to declare his *mʿzimmot*, in the way that one may declare his *hokmah* or *ʿesah*. Sometimes *mʿzimmot* are not actually plans or schemes, i.e. secret plans for achieving something, but just private reflections (e.g., Ps 17:3; cf. Sir 32:2, 4). For example, the wicked man's *mʿzimmot* in Ps 10:4 are summed up as "there is no God". The *mʿzimmot* of Job's friends are their belief that Job's wickedness has caused his suffering (21:27-28), not some plot against him. But since scheming generally requires keeping one's thoughts secret, *mʿzimmah* is the term often applied to plans or schemes; and since secret plans tend to be hostile to others, the word usually bears negative connotations, as in Prov 12:2: "A good man will receive God's favor, while he will condemn the man of *mʿzimmot*" (sim. 14:17, 24:8). (English "scheme" picks up a negative connotation by the same process.) The collocation with "evil" and the locution "man of *mʿzimmot*" as a sinister type suggest associations with wicked scheming, though the term does not always imply this. But even when they are just – as in the case of God's own plans – *mʿzimmot* are, except in Zech 8:15, hostile and destructive.

It is an audacious move, then, when Proverbs appropriates both *ʿormah* and *mʿzimmah* for its catalogue of virtues (1:4; 2:11; 5:2). In Prov 3:21, *mʿzimmah*

<sup>20</sup> Were it not for the risk of special pleading, I would suggest emending this hapax to *ʿormah* (LXX<sup>B</sup> ἐν τῇ φρονήσει): "He captures the wise by *ʿormah*" – i.e., God's own cleverness, which is the concern of this doxology.

<sup>21</sup> Reading *zmoty* with 11QPs<sup>a</sup> xxi 15.

apparently refers to the father's words themselves. Lady Wisdom herself attains "knowledge of *m<sup>c</sup>zimmot*" (8:12). The reason for this appropriation is not that "the educational process was more occupied with developing mature intellectual skills than with morality" (McKane, *Proverbs*, p. 265), but that the sages relegated all effective intellectual powers to the realm of wisdom and mustered them in the inculcation of morality. By proffering *ʿormah* and *m<sup>c</sup>zimmah*, the prologue of Proverbs wants us to know that this book – and not, say, the flashy wise-guy down the street – is the place to turn for the prized powers of cunning and caginess.

At the same time, Proverbs assigns a special function to *m<sup>c</sup>zimmah*. *M<sup>c</sup>zimmah*, private thinking, is to be used in keeping your own counsel and thinking for yourself. This power will protect you from the temptations of the wicked man and woman (2:11f.; 5:2f.), because when they try to seduce you to their ways, you will be able to look inward, maintain independence of thought, and stand up to their inveiglements. (*ʿormah* would presumably work in a similar way, but the text does not happen to specify this.)

#### 4. *ʿeṣah* and *tušiyah*

##### 4.1. *ʿeṣah* (planning, design) (88x Heb.; 1x Aram. *ʿeṭa* ʾ)

The meaning of *ʿeṣah*, commonly rendered "plan" and "advice", is not a matter of dispute, but its definition can be refined. *ʿeṣah* is essentially *deliberation*: careful thinking and planning (Prov 20:18), the resolution arrived at by such thinking (1 Chr 12:20), and the capacity for such thought (Isa 11:2; Jer 32:19; Job 12:13; 38:2; 42:3<sup>22</sup>; Isa 19:3<sup>23</sup>; Jer 49:7).<sup>24</sup> In the LXX, *ʿeṣah* is usually translated βουλή, which has almost the same semantic shape as the Hebrew.

A plan recommended to others is advice or counsel, as *ʿeṣah* is usually glossed (e.g. Job 29:21; Prov 12:15; 19:20; Ezra 10:8; and often). Planning that takes the form of deliberation among several people rather than by an individual is counsel or consultation (Judg 20:7; 2 Kgs 18:20; Isa 8:10; 29:15). An *ʿeṣah* is not necessarily advice to others (see, e.g., Isa 5:19; 14:26; 19:17; Jer 49:30; Job 38:2; most clearly in Ps 13:3; Prov 20:5). The notions of "advice" and "consultation" are not inherent in the lexical meaning, nor are these distinct lexical meanings of the word. They are rather contextually determined functions of the lexical meaning. Hence when Proverbs praises *ʿeṣah* and the *yo ʿeṣ*, it is urging deliberate, careful planning and planners, not the giving of advice (Prov 20:18; 11:14; 24:6).<sup>25</sup>

Sometimes when *ʿeṣah* is used there is little implication of extended planning, and "intention" may be the best rendering; e.g., Ps 73:24; Job 10:3; Prov 20:5 (it is a man's intentions generally, rather than his "plans", that are hard to fathom); Ezra 10:3 ("... as the Lord intends"); 1 Chr 12:20 ("the leaders of the Philistines sent him away intentionally"). Still, the notion of deliberation and careful thought is integral

<sup>22</sup> It seems more likely that God is accusing Job of impugning his ability to design and run the world rather than obscuring the design itself.

<sup>23</sup> Parallel to *ruah*; Egypt's capacity for rational thought seems to be what God is threatening to destroy.

<sup>24</sup> Similarly, the plural in Deut 32:28 refers to the ability to calculate and make effective plans. It is this, rather than specific plans, that is "lost".

<sup>25</sup> Note that the parallel term in all three verses is *taḥbulot*, which is a type of thought, not the act of giving counsel.

to the meaning, and the word is never used of thoughtless decisions or spontaneous wishes.

"Plan" or "planning" is usually a good gloss for <sup>ע</sup>*eṣah*, but sometimes the deliberations called <sup>ע</sup>*eṣah* do not propose a specific future action or program, as English "plan" would imply. The <sup>ע</sup>*eṣah* of the wicked that Job repudiates in Job 21:16, is quoted in v. 14f.: "And they say to God, 'Get away from us; we don't want to know your ways. What is Shadday that we should serve him, and what good would it do us to beseech him?'" Such thoughts express intentions or determinations rather than plans. The psalmist speaks of his incessant <sup>ע</sup>*eṣot*, parallel to the misery (*yagon*) in his heart (Ps 13:3), where the function of the B-term is closer definition of the A-term.<sup>26</sup> These <sup>ע</sup>*eṣot* are not counsels, nor do they seem to be specific plans formulated for future action. They are simply thoughts mulled over constantly, if not obsessively, and in that sense, they are deliberations.<sup>27</sup> The marginal reading (Ms. B) of Sir 30:21, if correct, uses the word in the same way.<sup>28</sup> Deut 32:28 condemns Israel: "They are a nation "devoid of <sup>ע</sup>*eṣot*" [lit., "that lost <sup>ע</sup>*eṣot*"], in whom there is no <sup>ע</sup>*bunah*". Lacking plans or counsel would not be cause for moral condemnation. Israel's lack is rather the ability to figure out what is good for them (NJV: "a folk devoid of sense"). In these cases, <sup>ע</sup>*eṣah* means deliberate, calculated thought, a notion that cannot be separated from "plan"/"counsel" as a distinct "meaning".

Valid contextual translations of <sup>ע</sup>*eṣah*, depending on the quality of the thoughts so designated and whether they are communicated with the purpose of influencing others, are "plans", "advice", "calculation", "intention", "deliberation", and even "brooding". Defining <sup>ע</sup>*eṣah* as deliberation and careful thinking, rather than assuming that the word is identical to English "plan" and "advice", obviates the need to emend certain verses or to create new words.<sup>29</sup>

#### 4.2. *Tuṣiyyah* (resourcefulness; competence) (13x)

The meaning of *tuṣiyyah* must be abstracted from its thirteen occurrences, two of which are obscure.<sup>30</sup> The word appears almost exclusively in Wisdom literature: six

<sup>26</sup> Emending to <sup>ע</sup>*aṣṣebet* or <sup>ע</sup>*aṣṣabot* (BHS and many) is thus unnecessary.

<sup>27</sup> Craigie (Psalms, ad loc.) says that <sup>ע</sup>*eṣot*, literally "counsels", provides a curious sense and that the combination of an intellectual activity with soul is unlikely. He follows G.R. Driver (WO 1 [1947-52], 410) in giving the word the sense of "pain". But <sup>ע</sup>*āṣat nepeš* appears in Prov 27:9, where "pain" or "sorrow" would be meaningless. V. 9b means (as Tur-Sinai argues in Proverbs, p. 26), that taking counsel [Tur-Sinai has identified a word *meteq* meaning counsel, ibid.] with another person makes one happier than taking counsel with oneself alone.

<sup>28</sup> Ms. B reads "Do not give your soul to judgment (*dyn*), and do not stumble in your iniquity (<sup>ע</sup>*wnk*). We should probably read *dwn* (*dawon* = Gk λύπη, for *dyn*, with Segal et al.). The margin has *b* <sup>ע</sup>*ṣtk* (thus too Gk, and Syr), for *b* <sup>ע</sup>*wnk*. Segal's emendation of *b* <sup>ע</sup>*wnk* to *b* <sup>ע</sup>*ṣbk* is unnecessary.

<sup>29</sup> Additional lexemes proposed to explain these cases are <sup>ע</sup>*ṣh* II = strife (G.R. Driver, WO 1 [1947-52], 411f. and JSS 13 [1968], 45f.; see above, n. 27 and <sup>ע</sup>*ṣh* = "fellowship, circle", esp. in the phrase <sup>ע</sup>*āṣat r* <sup>ע</sup>*ša* <sup>ע</sup>*im* (R. Bergmeier, "Zum Ausdruck רשעים עצה in Ps 1:1, Job 10:3, 21:16, und 22:18", ZAW 67 [1966], 229-232). I agree with John Worrell (VT 20 [1970], 65-74) that the word never clearly means "council" in the OT and possibly not in Qumran either.

<sup>30</sup> Micah 6:9 is undoubtedly corrupt. Prov 18:1 is too uncertain to help in defining the word, but *tuṣiyyah* there seems to refer to plans or intentions that the unsociable man (*niṣrad*) in

of the occurrences are in Job, four in Proverbs, one in Sirah.<sup>31</sup> The LXX is not much help, since it offers a different rendering for each occurrence<sup>32</sup>; modern translators are likewise inconsistent.

The lexicons give the term two distinct meanings, one referring to a faculty (e.g., "Umsicht" [KBL<sup>3</sup>]), another to its consequences (e.g. "Gelingen, Erfolg" [KBL<sup>3</sup>]). E. Dhorme (Job, p. 65) emphasizes the first sense, defining *tušiyyah* as denoting first of all "the foresight which plans ahead", whence "prudence" and "intelligence". Driver and Gray<sup>33</sup> explain it as "effective counsel, effective wisdom". H. A. Brongers<sup>34</sup> says that the frequent association of *tušiyyah* and *ʿešah* shows that the former belongs to "der Sphäre des Nachsinnens und der Überlegung" it has not, "wie von einigen Interpreten behauptet wird, das Resultat des Überlegens (effects, effectual working, success, Erfolg) im Auge". The term could, of course, apply to both "spheres" (cf. *hiškil*, "be perspicacious", "succeed"), but that is not borne out in the case of *tušiyyah*.

The word's skimpy attestation might justify an appeal to etymology. The root is  $\sqrt{yšy}$ , which might also be the root of *yeš*, "there is", "substance" (thus BDB, KBL<sup>3</sup> et al., as well as several medieval commentators, e.g. Radaq, Sefer Hashorashim; Hame'iri on Prov 2:7). On the basis of this etymology, J.F. Genug asserts that in all occurrences one senses "the relation of its essential idea to truth absolute, or as we may express it, the *yeš* of things".<sup>35</sup> H. Bauer gives the term's "primary meaning" as "was vorhanden ist", dann "Kraft, Fähigkeit".<sup>36</sup> Gemser (p. 24) incorporates the notion of existence by defining *tušiyyah* as "was das Dasein fördert", "was den Versuch gelingen lässt", also sowohl "Hilfe" als "Klugheit, Takt". In fact, one can extract almost anything from the notion of "what is in existence".

*Tušiyyah* (like *ʿormah*, see above) occurs only as a bare noun, even when parallel to a determined noun (Job 6:13; Sir 38:8). This suggests that the word refers first of all to an abstract power or quality that exists independently of a particular manifestation of it in someone's mind.

In my view, *tušiyyah* denotes clear, proficient thinking in the exercise of power and practical operations, as distinct from thinking as an intellectual act. Like *t<sup>c</sup>bunah*, *tušiyyah* is a competence rather than a form of understanding and knowledge. All the occurrences accord with this definition. The word also refers to decisions

some way repudiates or dissociates himself from (*yitgallea<sup>c</sup>*, cf. MH *nigla<sup>c</sup>* and *hitgallea<sup>c</sup>*, "be scraped off", "exposed" [M. Jastrow, Dictionary]; cf. Tur-Sinai, Proverbs, 90).

<sup>31</sup> Three occurrences in the Dead Sea Scrolls may be mentioned for comparison: 1QS X 24, XI 6; and Dam. II 3.

<sup>32</sup> σωτηρία (Prov 2:7), βοήθεια (Job 6:13); ἀσφάλεια (Prov 8:14), βουλή (Prov 3:21), δύναμις (Job 26:3), ἰσχύς (Job 12:16), ἀληθείς (Job 5:12); σώζειν (Mic 6:9); εἰρήνη (Sir 38:8). Isa 28:29 (ματαιάν παράκλησιν), Job 11:6 (τῶν κατὰ σέ), and Prov 18:1 (καίρος) do not seem to render *twšy*. In LXX Job 30:22a, which corresponds to MT 22b (H. Orlinsky, HUCA 29 [1958], 270), ἐν ὀδύναϊς probably renders the ketiv *tšwh* by association with *šo<sup>a</sup>ah* (cf. Dhorme); Theod has σωτηρία in 22b. It may be significant that most of these glosses refer to strength and assistance rather than to intellectual capacities.

<sup>33</sup> Job, part II, 30f.

<sup>34</sup> "Miscellanea Exegetica", in Festschr. Alexander R. Hulst, Nijkerk, 1977, 47.

<sup>35</sup> "Meaning and Usage of the Term תושייה", JBL 35 (1911), 115.

<sup>36</sup> ZAW 48 (1930), 77.

produced by such thinking. In all cases, *tušiyah* is used in addressing a conflict or crisis, or at least a tension. Good renderings are "resourcefulness" (thus NJV at Job 6:13) and "wits" as in "to have one's wits about him". Unlike *t<sup>c</sup>bunah*, *tušiyah* seems to connote cleverness and inner strength.

The set of collocations with *tušiyah* – "strength", "help",<sup>37</sup> "might", "shield" – shows that the concept belongs to the domain of powers and is used in planning (*maḥšabah*, *ʿešah*) directed at action (*ma<sup>c</sup>āšeh*).<sup>38</sup> Worth reconsidering is the etymology suggested by K.H. Grimm,<sup>39</sup> associating the term with Heb. *ʾošyah*, Aram. *ʾušiya<sup>c</sup>*, "support", "pillar", cf. Jer 50:15, qere, *ʾošyoteyha*, "buttresses". The concept of support and firmness accords nicely with the word's uses in the HB. (From this etymology, Grimm [p. 36] derives the idea of "help", whence "success, power, source of help, reliability". This array of senses is close to the mark but not sufficiently focussed.)

*Tušiyah* is a *power*, one that is not deeply intellectual. It is used in determining a course of action and dealing with difficulties rather than in comprehending intricacies or deducing conclusions. It is an inner resource that Job feels he has lost (6:13b), along with his strength (*koah*, 6:11-12); hence he is "helpless" (6:13a).<sup>40</sup> Job is not confessing a lack of insight or understanding, nor is he lamenting loss of some sort of success. His grievance is far more severe. He is complaining that he lacks the fortitude and the clarity of thought to stand up to God (again in 9:14-21 he fears his feebleness and confusion in confrontation with God). In the same vein, Job complains that his *tušiyah* has dissolved at God's hands (30:22b, qere).<sup>41</sup> The phrase *t<sup>c</sup>mog<sup>c</sup> geni tušiyah* may be translated, "you make the ability to think clearly dissolve for me".<sup>42</sup> To make someone "ride on the wind" (the parallel in 22a) is the kind of act that causes disorientation rather than ignorance. The verb is used of the soul in Ps 107:26, describing the fear and confusion of sailors in a storm (thus they become drunk and their skill is lost; v. 27).<sup>43</sup> Just so has God made *tušiyah* dissolve for Job.

*Tušiyah* (alongside *m<sup>c</sup>zimmah*) provides *protection* to those upon whom it is bestowed (Prov 3:21-26). This power is not intrinsically virtuous; crafty, tricky men have it, though God may frustrate it (Job 5:12). God holds *tušiyah* in store for the upright as a reward; it will shield them (Prov 2:7) and help them hold to the right

<sup>37</sup> Or "strength", as *ʿezrah* should perhaps be translated in Job 6:13, cf. Ugaritic *g<sup>c</sup>zr* (P. D. Miller, Jr., UF 2 [1970], 172). English "help" usually refers to assistance coming from someone else; yet in English too one who lacks strength is "helpless".

<sup>38</sup> William McKane, correctly identifies *tušiyah* as a "'power', 'capacity', 'competence'" (Prophets and Wise Men, p. 80).

<sup>39</sup> K. H. Grimm, "The Word חושיה in the OT", JAOS 22 (1901), 43f.

<sup>40</sup> *Ha<sup>c</sup>ʾim* and *ʾeyn* are conflated synonyms; only one negation makes sense here. On *ʿezrah* see n. 37.

<sup>41</sup> Most commentators point the ketiv *tšwh* as *t<sup>c</sup>šuwwah*, supposedly equivalent to *t<sup>c</sup>šūʾah*, "storm" (e.g., Pope, Gordis), but nothing is gained by creating this hapax. The qere is quite comprehensible.

<sup>42</sup> *Tušiyah* appears as a bare noun even here, where "my *tušiyah* might seem more natural than the construction with the datival suffix on the verb.

<sup>43</sup> Note that a wind occasions both the melting of the sailors' spirits in Ps 107 and Job's *tušiyah* in Job 30.

path (v. 8). The phrase *špn l-* indicates that *tušiyah* is not inherent in righteousness, but is rather an advantage that can be granted as a reward. This last observation explains why *tušiyah* is not something that Lady Wisdom is but something she *has*, along with *‘ešah* and *g<sup>c</sup>burah* (Prov 8:14). *Tušiyah* is a benefaction that attends upon wisdom rather than a goal in itself. The proximity to 8:15-16 suggests that *tušiyah*, like the other two faculties mentioned in v. 14, is a resource used in governing society.

God employs *tušiyah* in governing the world. Zophar apparently uses the word (along with *hokmah*) in reference to God's ability to order his world justly (Job 11:6).<sup>44</sup> God possesses this power along with might (*‘oz*) and uses it in confounding counselors (Job 12:16f.). ("Insight", "cleverness", "foresight", "sound wisdom", and most of the other glosses commonly used for *tušiyah* would not work well here.) Essentially the same faculty is called *‘ešah* in Job 38:2 and 42:3. Ben Sira speaks of God's providential rule in 38:8, where he says that God has given medicinal plants to humans to keep them alive, so that his *ma<sup>c</sup>‘āšeh* and *tušiyah* (note the collocation) not be forgotten.<sup>45</sup> Isaiah 28:29 applies the term to God's ability to control history in accordance with shifting circumstances.<sup>46</sup> In sum, *tušiyah* is not a source of knowledge or understanding, but rather of stability, efficacy, confidence, and resilience.

Like *‘ešah*, *tušiyah* can also refer to the intentions or strategies that the faculty produces. As such, *tušiyah* is something one can "do" or "carry out" (Job 5:12, using *‘ašah*;<sup>47</sup> compare *‘ašah* *‘ešah* in Isa 25:1 and 30:1). Again as in the case of *‘ešah*, *tušiyah* spoken to others is a form of counsel; thus Job tells Bildad sarcastically, "How you have counselled him who lacks wisdom, made the tremulous<sup>48</sup> know (*hoda<sup>c</sup>ta*) *tušiyah*" (Job 26:3), in other words, told Job on what he can rely, where he can find resources.<sup>49</sup> A particular type of counsel is in view, for Job is speaking of helping the weak (v. 2).

<sup>44</sup> Job 11:6b (MT *ki kīplayim l<sup>c</sup>tušiyah*) is a crux. *Kīplayim* (Isa 40:2; Sir 26:1) means "double", "two-fold", which does not make sense here. There is no justification for the common understanding of *kīplayim* as "two sides" (Pope, et al.), which in any case is not particularly meaningful either. We should probably emend to *ky plym* for *ky pl<sup>2</sup>ym* = *ki p<sup>c</sup>la<sup>2</sup>im* (BHS, sim. Driver-Gray, et al.), lit., "for [God's] *tušiyah* has wonders". Compare Isa 28:29, where the synonymous parallelism between *hipli<sup>2</sup> ‘ešah* and *higdil tušiyah* again associates wondrousness (*√pl<sup>2</sup>*) with God's *tušiyah*. (Note that Isa 25:1 parallels *pele<sup>2</sup>* with *‘ešot* ["plans made long ago"] in reference to God's acts.) The *tušiyah* Zophar is speaking of is virtually the same as the *‘ešah* that God employs in designing and running the world, a faculty that God accuses Job of "obscuring" in 38:2. Job later quotes this statement in conceding that he spoke of things too wondrous (*nīpla<sup>2</sup>ot*) for him (42:3). Zophar says that this *tušiyah* is wondrous, hence not comprehensible without a revelation.

<sup>45</sup> Read *lm<sup>c</sup>n l<sup>2</sup> yškh [marg] m<sup>c</sup>šhw wtwšyh mbny<sup>2</sup>dm* [Ms. B].

<sup>46</sup> In CD II 3 *tušiyah* is one of several divine faculties that in this context cannot be distinguished from one another.

<sup>47</sup> Thus Dhorme: "So that their hands do not achieve what they had planned!"

<sup>48</sup> N.H. Tur-Sinai made a good case for the existence of a Hebrew root *rbb*, "quake", whence *rab* = "shaking", "helpless"; see his commentary on Job 4:3.

<sup>49</sup> Thus Grimm, JAOS 22 (1901), 40.



The Ugaritic cognate *tšyt* has exactly the same meaning as Hebrew *tušiyyah*. Before a battle, *tgdđ kbdh bšhq, yml ʿu lbh bšmḥt kbd ʿnt tšyt*, "[Anat's] liver swelled with joy, her heart was filled with happiness, the liver of Anat with *tšyt*" (CTA 3, B ii 27). The common rendering "victory" (or "triumph")<sup>50</sup> is a poor parallel to "joy" and "happiness"; we require something that is in the "liver", in other words, a faculty, thought, or emotion. The meaning ascertained for the Hebrew cognate fits *tšyt* because it is a tactical ability that can be directed *against* an adversary (Job 5:12) and can serve to protect (Prov 2:7) and aid (Job 6:13) its possessor. In other words, after her first victory, Anat exulted in an inner power, a psychological resource that she was about to exercise again in battle.

*Tušiyyah* is usually associated with words for help, strength, aggression, and defense (Job 5:12; 6:13; 12:16; 26:3; Prov 2:7; 3:21 [cf. 22f.]; Prov 18:1); several of these are in a context of strife. This observation does not apply to Job 11:6 and Sir 38:8f., and probably not to Isa 28:29. Still, these associations are frequent enough to suggest that *tušiyyah* designates the ability to devise plans and stratagems of a sort that give one power, particularly in conflicts. *Tušiyyah* is never a source of knowledge, but rather of stability, confidence, and power.<sup>51</sup>

#### Abstract:

A study of the lexical (as opposed to contextual) meaning of eight words in the semantic field of wisdom and knowledge leads to the following definitions: *T<sup>c</sup>bunah* (§ 2.1) designates the pragmatic, applied aspect of thought; its domain is action and it aims at efficacy and accomplishment. *Binah* (§ 2.2) is the conceptual, interpretive activity of thought; its domain is meaning and it aims at perception and comprehension. *ʿormah* (§ 3.1) is the talent for devising and using adroit and wily tactics in the attaining of one's goals, whatever these may be. *M<sup>c</sup>zimmah* (§ 3.2) is private, unrevealed thinking and the faculty for it. *ʿešah* (§ 4.1) is essentially deliberation – the activity, the faculty, and its products (the notion of advice is contextually determined). *Tušiyyah* (§ 4.2) denotes clear, proficient thinking in the exercise of power and practical operations, as distinct from thinking as an intellectual act.

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<sup>50</sup> E.g., UT, glossary; Gray, Canaanite Myths and Legends, 48; KBL<sup>3</sup> on *tušiyyah*; M. Dahood, *Bibl* 55 (1974), 386f.

<sup>51</sup> In Qumran usage, *tušiyyah* seems to have become an esoteric understanding or body of knowledge rather than a practical faculty. 1QS XI, 6 speaks of *tušiyyah*, *de ʿah*, and *m<sup>c</sup>zimmat ʿormah* as hidden from man; these must all refer to a form of gnosis – the hidden knowledge itself. In 1QS X 24 – "With wise counsel I will declare knowledge" – *ʿšt twšyh* (a construct of synonyms) is a source of knowledge. In CD II,3, *tušiyyah* is a divine faculty – it is unclear exactly which.

## Appendix: Environments of Wisdom Words

Word:	1 in synonymous parallelism with	2 antithetical to	3 in quasi-parallelism with
<i>t<sup>ḥ</sup>bunah(ot)</i>	<i>ḥokmah</i> (13x) <sup>1</sup> <i>koah</i> ; <i>binah</i> ; <i>d<sup>ḥ</sup>barim</i> ; <i>m<sup>ḥ</sup>zimmah</i> ; <i>leb</i> (3x) <i>da<sup>ḥ</sup>at</i> ; <i>ḥešet</i> ; <i>g<sup>ḥ</sup>burah</i> ; <i>ʔorah mišpat</i>	<i>k<sup>ḥ</sup>sil</i> ; <i>merim</i> <i>ʔiwwelet</i> <sup>2</sup> ; <i>ʔšet zimmah</i>	<i>ḥākamim</i> ; <i>koah</i> ; <i>leb</i> ; <i>g<sup>ḥ</sup>burah</i> <sup>3</sup> ; <i>tom lebab</i> <sup>4</sup>
<i>binah(ot)</i>	<i>ḥokmah</i> (12x); <i>musar</i> (2x); <i>leqah</i> ; <i>šamoa<sup>ḥ</sup></i> ; <i>t<sup>ḥ</sup>bunah</i> ; <i>ʔimrey</i> <i>peh</i> ; <i>leb</i>	<i>p<sup>ḥ</sup>taʔim</i> ; <i>ba<sup>ḥ</sup>ar</i> ; <i>ʔiwwelet</i>	<i>ḥakkimin</i> (Aram.) <sup>5</sup>
<i>ḥormah</i>	<i>da<sup>ḥ</sup>at</i> <i>um<sup>ḥ</sup>zimmah(-ot)</i> (2x); <i>leb</i>		
<i>m<sup>ḥ</sup>zimmah(ot)</i>	<i>maḥšabah</i> ; <i>t<sup>ḥ</sup>bunah</i> ; <i>da<sup>ḥ</sup>at</i> ; <i>meḥqarot</i> ; <i>ḥormah</i>	<i>ṭob</i> ; <i>mašliaḥ</i> <i>darko</i> ; <i>q<sup>ḥ</sup>šar</i> <i>ʔappayim</i>	<i>po<sup>ḥ</sup>al</i> ; <i>ra<sup>ḥ</sup>ah</i>

<sup>1</sup> Including *ḥokmot* // *t<sup>ḥ</sup>bunot* in Ps 49:4.

<sup>2</sup> // *rab t<sup>ḥ</sup>bunah*; Prov 14:29.

<sup>3</sup> *ḥokmah ug<sup>ḥ</sup>burah* as a pair parallels *ḥešet ut<sup>ḥ</sup>bunah* in Job 12:13.

<sup>4</sup> // *t<sup>ḥ</sup>bunot kappayim*; Ps 78:72.

<sup>5</sup> *ḥakkamin* // *yad<sup>ḥ</sup>eh binah*; Dan 2:21.

Word:	4 in synonymous series with:	5 dir. obj. of: <sup>6</sup>	6 determined (by art., constr., or sfx.)
<i>t<sup>c</sup>bunah(ot)</i>	<i>ḥokmah</i> (7x); <i>da<sup>c</sup>at</i> (6x); <i>ʿeṣah</i> (2x)	<i>šamar</i> ; <i>hepiq</i> ; <i>natan</i> ; <i>male<sup>?</sup></i> ; <i>he<sup>?</sup>ʿēbid</i> ; <i>hodia<sup>c7</sup></i>	yes
<i>binah(ot)</i>	<i>ḥokmah</i> (5x) <sup>8</sup> <i>g<sup>c</sup>burah</i> ; <i>ʿeṣah<sup>9</sup></i> ; <i>šekel</i> ; <i>musar</i>	<i>natan</i> ; <i>hiškil</i> ; <i>ḥalaq</i> (+b-); <i>hiššah</i> (nšh); <i>qanah</i> ; <i>biqqeš</i> ; <i>yada<sup>c10</sup></i>	yes
<i>ʿormah</i>		<i>natan</i> ; <i>hebin</i>	no <sup>11</sup> (but * <i>ʿorem</i> + sfx: 1x) <sup>12</sup>
<i>m<sup>c</sup>zimmah(ot)</i>	<i>da<sup>c</sup>at</i> ; <i>tušiyah</i>	<i>ʿašah</i> ; <i>heqim</i> ; <i>ḥašab</i> ; <i>ḥamas</i> ; <i>natan</i> ; <i>našar</i> ; <i>šamar</i>	yes

<sup>6</sup> Number of occurrences not noted.

<sup>7</sup> Dir. obj. = *derek t<sup>c</sup>bunot*; Isa 40:14.

<sup>8</sup> Incl. the construct of synonyms *ḥokmat binah* in Dan 1:20.

<sup>9</sup> The virtues listed in Isa 11:2 are not exact synonyms, but diverse qualities the ideal king will possess. Within the list, *ḥokmah* and *binah* are paired. The phrase *ḥokmat binah* is perhaps a construct of synonyms, equivalent to *ḥokmah ubinah*.

<sup>10</sup> *Binah* is the subject of the passive *noda<sup>c</sup>at* in Sir 4:24, but in the sense of "recognized" rather than "known".

<sup>11</sup> *ʿormat da<sup>c</sup>at* occurs in 1QS X 24.

<sup>12</sup> Job 5:13, if correct.

Word:	1 in synonymous parallelism with	2 antithetical to	3 in quasi-parallelism with
<sup>ε</sup> eṣah	<sup>p</sup> lilah; maḥṣabah (4x); ma <sup>ε</sup> āšim; derek-mošab; ruah; g <sup>ε</sup> burah (2x); dabar; t <sup>ε</sup> bunah; yagon, musar, ḥe peṣ tušiyah; <sup>ε</sup> lilah; <sup>ʔ</sup> imrah; ḥokmah; tokaḥat; taḥbulot		ma <sup>ε</sup> āšeh; ruah <sup>13</sup> ; torah- dabar <sup>14</sup> ; ḥazon- torah <sup>15</sup> ; <sup>ʔ</sup> amarim; <sup>ε</sup> awon; ša <sup>ε</sup> āšu <sup>ε</sup> im; yagon
tušiyah	<sup>ε</sup> eṣrah; maḥṣabot; ḥokmah; ma <sup>ε</sup> āšeh; <sup>ε</sup> ormah		<sup>ε</sup> azar – hošia <sup>ε</sup> – ya <sup>ε</sup> aṣ <sup>16</sup> ; magen

<sup>13</sup> Isa 40:13.

<sup>14</sup> Jer 18:18.

<sup>15</sup> Ezek 7:26.

<sup>16</sup> In the Dead Sea Scrolls, *tušiyah* clusters with other terms for wisdom without much distinction; thus *de<sup>ε</sup>ah um<sup>ε</sup>zimmat<sup>ε</sup>ormah* (1 QS XI 6) and *ormah w<sup>ε</sup>da<sup>ε</sup>at* (CD II, 3).

Word:	4 in synonymous series with:	5 dir. obj. of: <sup>17</sup>	6 determined (by art., constr., or sfx.)
<sup>ע</sup> ešah	<sup>ע</sup> älilah; <sup>ל</sup> bunah; <sup>ח</sup> okmah; <sup>ט</sup> ušiyah; <sup>י</sup> yad	<sup>י</sup> ya <sup>ע</sup> aš/ <sup>ע</sup> wš; <sup>ב</sup> hebi <sup>?</sup> ; <sup>ב</sup> hebin; <sup>פ</sup> hipli <sup>?</sup> ; <sup>א</sup> ašah; <sup>פ</sup> he per; <sup>ע</sup> azab; <sup>ב</sup> baqaq; <sup>ס</sup> histir; <sup>כ</sup> sikkel; <sup>ב</sup> hab ( <sup>י</sup> hb); <sup>ש</sup> sama <sup>ע</sup> ; <sup>ב</sup> hobiš; <sup>ח</sup> hikkah; <sup>ל</sup> hišlim; <sup>מ</sup> mille <sup>?</sup> ; <sup>ח</sup> heḥšik; <sup>ה</sup> he <sup>ע</sup> elim; <sup>פ</sup> para <sup>ע</sup> ; <sup>א</sup> abah ( <sup>ל</sup> -); <sup>ד</sup> dalah; <sup>ב</sup> billa <sup>ע</sup> ; <sup>י</sup> šit	yes
<sup>ט</sup> ušiyah	<sup>מ</sup> zimmah; <sup>ע</sup> oz; <sup>ע</sup> ešah <sup>18</sup>	<sup>מ</sup> mogeg ("melt"); <sup>ש</sup> sapan <sup>19</sup> ; <sup>נ</sup> našar; <sup>ע</sup> ašah; <sup>ח</sup> hitgala <sup>ע20</sup>	no

<sup>17</sup> Number of occurrences not noted.

<sup>18</sup> Prov 8:14, where the pair <sup>ע</sup>ešah w<sup>ע</sup>tušiyah is parallel to <sup>ג</sup>burah.

<sup>19</sup> Qere, Prov 2:7.

<sup>20</sup> Prov 18:1; unclear.