

Recent Developments in Linguistic Semantics and Their Application to Biblical Hebrew*

Pierre Swiggers (Belgian National Science Foundation)

1. As Professor Lyons has shown, semantics is a *field of continuity*, extending between linguistic form and knowledge about the world (or acting in the world). Whether one wants to call this „linguistic semantics“ is a matter of debate: insofar as one can say that language is a *system of / for representation of reality*, the term seems justified¹.

Of crucial importance in semantics is the following issue: given a reality-configuration *Rc* and given a language *L*, what can we say about the probability that *Rc* will be expressed in *L* by a sequence *S* and not by another sequence *S'* and *S''*? Related to this question is another one: if, in a given situation, it is possible to substitute *S'* (*S''*) for *S*, is there any ground in *Rc* itself why this is so? If not, what can speakers of *L* say about the relationship between sequences *S*, *S'* and *S''*?

Surveying the history of linguistic semantics, one can partition it in terms of major „fertilizations“:

(1) a first one, by different forms of *conceptualist* philosophy, such as Platonist, Aristotelian, Thomist, Scotist, Occamist, Cartesian and Lockean trends;

(2) a second one, by diachronic investigations of shifts of meaning: this is the „semasiological“ approach which flourished in the 19th century (Reisig, Darmesteter, Bréal), and which had a specific impact on dialectology;

(3) a third one, by philosophy of logic and mathematics: here we have to mention the foundation-laying work of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and, later, of Austin, Searle, and Davidson. This type of work brought about two major shifts in linguistic semantics:

(a) talk about meaning was abruptly severed from its rhetorical ties, and was straightened out by the introduction of a specific metalanguage;

(b) interest shifted from a semantics based on word-meaning to a semantics of *utterances*, and with the development of speech act theory, to a semantics/pragmatics of *uttering*: this brought into the center of attention notions such as

- reference/denotation (designation)

* Revised version of my response to Sir John Lyons' lecture on „Recent developments in linguistic semantics“ (Bischenberg, June 29, 1992). Grateful acknowledgement is made of the comments by Sir John Lyons, Ida Zatelli, Graham Davies and Jacob Hoftijzer.

Since the lecture of Sir John Lyons is not published in this issue, the interested reader is referred to the following publications: J. Lyons, *Structural Semantics*, Oxford, 1964; *Semantics*, 2 volumes, London 1977; „Semantics“, in: J. Lyons et al., *New Horizons in Linguistics*, London 1987, 152-178.

¹ For a comprehensive theory of semantics, see J. Larochette, *Le langage et la réalité*, volumes I-II, München 1974-1980.

- truth (analytic/synthetic)/verification
- knowledge (a priori/a posteriori)
- context (context-dependence/context-independence)
- implication/presupposition

(4) finally, a fourth one, which is tied up with reflection on lexicographical practice, and which concerns the relationships of terms within one field, or the relationship between features attributed to terms. This type of work, which had a successful impact on the analysis of text structure², has introduced, apart from the notion of „semantic field“ a number of useful terms:

- terms for relationships such as *hyponymy*, *hyperonymy* and *paronymy*
- terms for decomposition such as *seme*, *sememe*, *classeme*
- the term *isotopy*

Apart from these fertilizations, one should mention the attempts to extend semantics well beyond its linguistic implementation: here, horizons have loomed large, first through semiotics, a vast project to study whatever type of significant phenomena (with the more neutral notion of „sign“ replacing the content-oriented concept of „meaning“ as axiomatical prime), and more recently, through the wave of „cognitive (or cognitivist) linguistics“, which in the long run may bring about new insights in semantic structures.

2. We cannot, of course, avoid the practical question: „What can scholars – linguists or theologians – of Biblical Hebrew do with semantics?“ It may be good to recall that in the first place we deal with *texts*, and more particularly with texts for which we (normally) do not raise philosophical problems concerning verifiability, rigid designation of proper names, context-dependency or context-independency, etc. It also seems that as readers of the Bible we automatically accept the „discursive universe“ as given within the text(s). Another fact we know is that in the Hebrew Bible we have *various* text *types*: we do not read with the same expectations, or with the same receptive attitude, the book of Genesis, the two books of Samuel, the book of Proverbs, or those of the prophets.

Dealing with concrete texts such as the Old Testament entails that, in the specific case of semantic investigations, we do not have to fashion in our heads the semantics of Biblical Hebrew; rather, we should look at the texts and see what is at work.

3. For this purpose, I have selected as a specimen 2 *Sm* XII, 1-13, given here in the Hebrew text.

וַיִּשְׁלַח יְהוָה אֶת-נְתַן אֶל-דָּגֵד וַיָּבֵא אֵלָיו וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ שְׁנֵי אַנְשִׁים הֵיוּ בְעִיר
 אַחַת אֶחָד עֶשְׂרִי וְאֶחָד רֹאשׁ:
 לְעֶשְׂרִי הָיָה צֹאן וּבֶקֶר הֶרְבֵּה מְאֹד:
 וְלָרֹשׁ אֵיזֶר-כֶּל כִּי אִם-בְּבִשָּׁה אַחַת קָטְנָה אֲשֶׁר קָנָה וַיַּחֲזֶק וַתִּגְדֹּל עִמּוֹ וְעַם-בְּנָיו
 יַחֲדוּ מִמֶּתוֹ תֹאכַל וּמִכֶּסוֹ תִשָּׂתֵה וּבְחִיקוֹ תִשָּׁקֵב וַתְּהִי-לוֹ כְּבַת:

² See especially A.J. Greimas, *Sémantique structurale*, Paris 1966; id., *Du sens*, Paris 1970.

וַיִּבֹא הַלֵּל לְאִישׁ הָעֶשִׂיר וַיַּחְמַל לְקַחַת מִצֹּאֲנוֹ וּמִבְּקָרוֹ לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאַרְחֵי הַבָּאֵל-לוֹ
 וַיִּקַּח אֶת-כִּבְשֶׁת הָאִישׁ הַרְאֵשׁ וַיַּעֲשֶׂה לְאִישׁ תְּבֵא אֵלָיו׃
 וַיַּחֲרֵאֵף דָּוִד בְּאִישׁ מֵאֹד וַיֹּאמֶר אֶל-נָתָן חַי-יְהוָה כִּי בְזֹ-מִנְתָּ הָאִישׁ הָעֵשָׂה זֹאת׃
 וְאֶת-הַכִּבְשֶׁה יְשִׁלֵּם אַרְבַּע־עֶשְׂרִים עֶקֶב אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה אֶת-הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה וְעַל אֲשֶׁר לֹא-חָמַל׃
 וַיֹּאמֶר נָתָן אֶל-דָּוִד אַתָּה הָאִישׁ כֹּה-אָמַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲנֹכִי מִשְׁחַתִּיךָ לְמַלְאָךְ
 עַל-יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאַנְכִי הַצֹּלְתִיךָ מִיַּד שָׂאוֹל׃
 וְאֶתְנֶה לְךָ אֶת-בַּיִת אֲדֹנֶיךָ וְאֶת-נְשֵׂי אֲדֹנֶיךָ בְּחֵיקְךָ וְאֶתְנֶה לְךָ אֶת-בַּיִת יִשְׂרָאֵל
 וַיְהוּדָה וְאֶם-מֵעַט וְאֶסְפָּה לְךָ כֶּהֱנָה וְכַהֲנָה׃
 מִדּוּעַ בְּזִיתָ אֶת-דָּבָר יְהוָה לַעֲשׂוֹת הַכַּע בְּעֵינֵינוּ אֵת אֹרְיָה הַחֹתֵי הַכִּיתָ בְּחֶרֶב וְאֶת-
 אֲשֶׁתּוֹ לְקַחְתָּ לְךָ לְאִשָּׁה וְאֵתוֹ הִרְגָתָ בְּחֶרֶב בְּנֵי עִמּוֹן׃
 וְעַתָּה לֹא-תִסּוּר חֶרֶב מִמִּיתְךָ עַד-עוֹלָם עֶקֶב כִּי בְזִיתָנִי וַתִּקַּח אֶת-אִשְׁתִּי אֹרְיָה הַחֹתֵי
 לְהָיוֹת לְךָ לְאִשָּׁה׃
 כֹּה אָמַר יְהוָה הַנְּנִי מִקִּים עֲלֶיךָ רָעָה מִבֵּיתְךָ וְלְקַחְתִּי אֶת-נְשֵׂיךָ לְעִינֶיךָ וְנָתַתִּי
 לְהַעֲרִיךָ וְשָׁכַב עִם-נְשֵׂיךָ לְעֵינֵי הַשָּׁמֶשׁ הַזֹּאת׃
 כִּי אַתָּה עָשִׂיתָ בְּסֹתֵר וְאֲנִי אֶעֱשֶׂה אֶת-הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה נֶגֶד כָּל-יִשְׂרָאֵל וְנֶגֶד הַשָּׁמַיִם׃
 וַיֹּאמֶר דָּוִד אֶל-נָתָן חֲסָאֲתִי לִיהוָה וַיֹּאמֶר נָתָן אֶל-דָּוִד גַּם-יְהוָה הַעֲבִיר חֲסָאֲתְךָ
 לֹא תָמוּת׃

What type of text is this? The fragment concerns a particular situation, brought about by Nathan's story: Nathan acts on David, with the result that David recognizes his mischief. In other words: we have here a *commitment*-situation (A brings B to a certain commitment), which is „instaurated“ through the narration of a story. It should be noted that Nathan could have acted directly on David, by accusing him straightforwardly of having taken Uriah's wife: but, interestingly, the direct accusation follows only in verses 7-9. Nathan's story operates *indirectly*: Nathan brings David to recognize that a person Y who perpetrates a crime is guilty, and should be punished, and then he states that David is in fact the specific instance of the general case of Y represented in the story.

Taking a closer look at Nathan's story, we find that the macro-components correspond to a sequence of events, and mirror, in a certain sense, the deeds of David. But the representation involves a major transposition: whereas the story is about a nonhuman victim (viz. the poor man's little lamb) and about a man to whom damage is caused, the mischief of David involves the death of Uriah, killed by the Ammonites, and David's laying hands on Uriah's wife.

This transposition is „redressed“ in verses 9-10. Another transposition involved is that, in the case of the story, the rich man seems to owe his wealth to himself; David on the contrary, owes his strength and wealth to God, and he is therefore *a fortiori* guilty.

Turning from the „textual structure“ of the story to its semantic structure, we note the major opposition between the *rich* man and the *poor* man (verse 1: ²ehad ^cāšīr w^c ²ehad rāš). The former owns much („very many flocks and herds“), the latter almost nothing (²eyn kol kī ²im kibśāh ²aḥat „nothing except a little lamb“). But

the latter treats his property with a sense of overall-investment and attachment: his property is part and parcel of his family („it grew up with him and with his sons together [*yaḥdāw*], it ate of his own food, and it was as a daughter to him“). The rich man does not treat his property in the same way; we can readily assume that he considers it to be alienable, and has therefore no scruples about taking somebody else’s property³. Nathan’s story involves a „delayed“ referent: the „rich man“ of the story is a *type* of malefactor. David does not hesitate to condemn „the man who does such a thing“ (*hā ʾiṣ hā ʾoseh zōt*: the participle *hā ʾoseh* „who does“ also has a virtual meaning here). What we have here is an *attributive* use (in K. Donnellan’s terminology)⁴ of a definite description (as when we say „the murderer of Smith must be crazy“, without knowing the identity of the murderer, but judging from Smith’s heavily mutilated corpse). At that moment David is unaware that the definite expression also has a *referential* use (as in „the murderer of Smith must be crazy“, when we know that the police have arrested a certain Jones, who confessed the murder). It is Nathan who establishes the connection between the „delayed“ referent and the situation-referent: „You are THE man“ (*ʾattāh hā ʾiṣ*, verse 7). At that moment, David has to accept the implications of his verdict (verses 5+6) on the man in the story, and this he does, after Nathan’s explication (verses 7-12), in verse 13: „I have sinned against Yahweh“. The explication involves the fitting in of the „transposed“ referents: David’s mischief is not that of taking a lamb from a poor man, but of conceiving the plan to put Uriah in the frontline of the battle against the Ammonites, and of taking Uriah’s widow as his wife (verse 9: *w ʾet ʾištō lāqahīā lekā l ʾiṣṣāh*; see also v. 10). His punishment will be in contrastive symmetry with his camouflaged mischief: David’s wives will all be given to his neighbour, who „shall lie with them in the sight of the sun“⁵.

The passage also shows some interesting features of *intratextual* and *intertextual* structure. As to the intratextual aspect, I would mention the use of the verb *hml* in verse 4 and verse 6: in verse 4 the sequence *wayyaḥmol lāqahat miṣṣo ʾnō umibb ʿqārō* is usually translated as „he spared to take of his flock, and of his herd“, and in verse 6 *lō hāmāl* is translated as „he had no pity“. There is clearly an intratextual connection between the two verb forms, and I would prefer to translate in both cases *hml* as „to find it heavy/to find it a burden (to...)“⁶.

As to intertextuality, it seems to me that Nathan’s story should be read in connection with 1 *Sm* 25,2-42, the story of Nabal and Abigail: Nabal refuses to treat David’s servants as his guests, and his wife Abigail has to make amends for the offence of her foolish (*nābāl*) husband. Yahweh punishes Nabal for having committed this offence, and after Nabal’s death Abigail becomes David’s wife. In

³ What characterizes the rich man’s mischief is that it is both an offence against his guest (not considered worthy of being offered one of his own lambs) and a crime with respect to the poor man.

⁴ See K. Donnellan, „Reference and Definite Descriptions“, *The Philosophical Review* 75, 1966, 281-304.

⁵ David’s crime is also in contrastive symmetry with that of the rich man of the story: whereas the rich man commits an offence against his guest, David has despised his benefactor.

⁶ Cf. Akkadian *ḥamālu* „to carry away“; Arab. *ḥamala* „to bear“; compare the semantic range of *pesare*, *pesar*, *peser* in Italian, Spanish and French.

the light of these „real events“, we can understand that David pronounces a harsh verdict on the rich man of Nathan's story, and in fact we can assume that Nathan *expected* this reaction from David, so that he could lead him, by his own words, into a commitment-situation.

Nathan's story is a beautiful example of discursive relevance. The story is to the point (it concerns a mischief to be punished), it has a deeper („metaphorical“) symbolization, and it is economical: the story is confined to the „essential“ *deep fact*, viz. the crime of taking someone else's property. Putting this into the framework of speech act theory, we could say that the story, taken by itself, constitutes the *locutionary* level of the discursive event in 2 *Sm* 12,1-13. The story by itself narrates a general type of mischief. The *illocutionary* level comes into play with verse 7: „You are the man!“. Nathan makes David realize that the story is about him, David, and that he is guilty of a crime which should be punished. The illocutionary level, then, constitutes the *retransposition* of what had been transposed, through generalization and modification, in the story of the rich man and the poor man. And finally, there is the *perlocutionary* level: David realizes that he has sinned against Yahweh (verse 13). As we know, the perlocutionary effect is something beyond the control of the initiator of the speech act: we do not know how the receiver will respond (to a question, to a warning, to a command, etc.). In the case of David, the perlocutionary effect is a positive one, in that he confesses his crime, and marks his submission to Yahweh.

This brief example may have shown that interesting work can be done on the semantics of Biblical Hebrew, involving the cooperation of linguists and Biblical scholars.

Abstract:

Language is the subject matter of linguistic semantics from a particular vintage point of view: that of its status as a system of/for representation of reality. The paper opens with a survey of linguistic semantics in terms of fertilizations affecting it throughout its history. The remainder of the paper is concerned with the practical relevance of linguistic semantics for the study of the Hebrew Bible. A sample text, viz. 2 *Samuel* 12, 1-13, is used to provide an illustration of the results that can be obtained through semantic analysis, on both the intratextual and intertextual level. The analysis combines semantic and pragmatic aspects given the fact that the story told by Nathan leads David into a commitment-situation.

Address of the author:

Prof. Dr. P. Swiggers, Blijde-Inkomstraat 21, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium